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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Anyone who is older than ten can remember automobiles. 
They dwindled. At first the price of gasoline climbed. 
Finally only the well-to-do drove and that was too 
clear an indication that they were filthy rich, so any 
automobile that dared show itself on a city street was 
over-turned and burned. Rationing was introduced to 
"equalize sacrifice", but every three months the ration 
was reduced. Cars just vanished and became a part of 
the metal resource. 
Isaac Asimov 
If "crisis" is defined as a paralyzing catastrophe, then this 
country is not yet faced with an energy crisis of crippling dimensions; 
nor is such a crisis inevitable (Freeman, 1973:1). Nonetheless, at the 
rate gasoline is being used, it is only a matter of time before the 
United States begins to suffer the consequences associated with past 
energy policies which have consistently advocated "promotion, growth, 
and the lavish use of energy" (Freeman, 1973:1). Many consumers appear 
to believe they have an "inalienable, God-given right to travel when, 
where, and in whatever manner they please" (Henderson, 1978a:17). Some 
believe the threat of an energy crisis is merely an attempt by oil pro­
ducing countries and oil companies to create an artificially scarce mar­
ket which will drive up prices (Brunner and Bennett, 1978:240; Henderson, 
19788:129). Still others believe either that the problem will go away 
(Brunner and Bennett, 1978:240; Fusso, 1978:129) or that it will somehow 
be resolved within five to ten years (Murray et al., 1974:258; Brunner 
and Bennett, 1978:240). 
Consistent with the consumer beliefs stated above, comes the 
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realization that Americans are continuing to consume gasoline at an 
alarming rate. 
The average yearly increase in energy demand has been 
nearly five percent since the mid-sixties - that is a 
doubling of energy consumption in fourteen to fifteen 
years. (Freeman, 1973:15) 
Consumers do not seem to realize, either out of ignorance or perversity, 
that gasoline, unlike a renewable resource, cannot be recycled or re­
generated (Henderson, 1978 a:15). Many still maintain that American 
"know-how" will provide alternate energy sources within a decade (Murray 
et al., 1974; Moncrief et al., 1977; Brunner and Bennett, 1978; Fusso, 
1978; Richman, 1979). For example, in a nationwide study by Richman 
(1979:581), it was found that eight-six percent of the American public 
was optimistic about the ability of this country to solve the energy prob­
lem by technological discoveries and developments (called the "techno­
logical fix"). 
Faith in science and technology coupled with a general mistrust of 
oil companies have led to a great deal of "public disbelief that the 
United States faces a severe energy shortage" (Richman, 1979:581). Re­
search conducted since 1973 has yielded evidence that the majority of 
American consumers do not believe either in the reality of the present 
energy supply problems nor in future availability problems (Murray et al., 
1974; Ball, 1977; Moncrief et al., 1977; Brunner and Bennett, 1978; 
Fusso, 1978; Richman, 1979; Shippee, 1981). As Shippee (1981:35) points 
out : 
The frequency of disbelievers appears to be between 
sixty-three and seventy-seven percent. Note that such 
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polls sample a stratified, random sample of all 
Americans and not just a particular sub-population. 
Misplaced faith in conjunction with the credibility problem are, accord­
ing to Richman (1979:581) and Shippee (1981:35), the most pressing ob­
structions to a comprehensive national energy policy. 
It is not difficult to understand why American consumers are not 
taking the energy crisis seriously. On the one hand, conservation 
slogans such as "Don't be fuellsh*', "SAVAGALLONOFGASADÂY", and "Trim it 
to the limit", are made readily available for public acceptance. On the 
other hand, American businesses continue to promote "energy wasting 
goods from recreational vehicles to throwaway aluminum and plastic con­
tainers" (Henderson, 1978a;15). As Henderson (1978a:15) further points 
out : 
Those in positions of leadership, from politicians 
to academicians still cannot agree - even within 
their own ranks - on whether an energy crisis exists 
and if so what can be done about it. 
A number of researchers have also argued that much of the dilemma 
continues because the energy crisis is viewed largely in terms of supply 
and demand economics (Freeman, 1973; Brunner and Bennett, 1978, 
Henderson, 1978a; Shippee, 1981; Marbach et al., 1982). The assump­
tion is made that the solution to the energy problem can be found in 
higher prices which will invariably lead to newfound supplies of oil. 
This assumption carries with it the probability of creating a dangerous 
imbalance in the American energy budget. Henderson (1978a;16) accusingly 
states that the American petroleum system Itself, is, in large part, to 
blame for the public's disbelieving attitude toward the energy crisis 
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because it will: 
keep meeting demand as long as customers have money 
to spend - no matter what the impact on the nation's 
economic, international, or environmental well-being. 
In effect, the petroleum system will survive by para-
sitically debilitating the larger national system. 
The implication seems relatively clear. Until there is an attempt made 
by researchers and policy makers to eliminate market-oriented solutions 
to the energy crisis, the American public will refuse to see the severity 
of the situation. 
Disbelief in the energy crisis is further aggravated by worldwide 
oil gluts which have appeared from time to time since 1973 (Henderson, 
1978a; Shippee, 1981; Marbach et al., 1982), For example, in 1978 the 
world experienced an oil glut which was "particularly attributed to the 
1.2 million barrels of crude oil a day temporarily flowing from the 
Alaskan North Slope" (Henderson, 1978a :15). As a result of this glut, 
petroleum and gasoline were both plentiful and cheap. In 1982, the 
world market has again been swamped with oil. This too has had an over­
all dramatic effect on the supply and price of gasoline. For example, 
in some areas of the country there are signs in service stations adver­
tising gasoline wars and in Oklahoma gasoline is selling for as little 
as eighty-nine cents a gallon (Marbach, et al., 1982:56). 
Energy Secretary James B. Edwards has warned that this most recent 
oil glut has: 
lulled the United States into a false sense of secur­
ity. With energy prices dropping there may not be 
the driving Incentive to develop new sources of energy. 
(Marbach et al., 1982:64) 
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This false sense of security might well lead to an American economy 
hooked on an ever-increasing need for oil and consequently a rising 
dependence on foreign imports. The danger in his has been pointed out 
by Cook et al., 1982:56). They indicate that the reasons for the oil 
glut are unclear: 
Dark motive? Some analysts suggest that the "kingdom" 
may be overproducing to punish OPEC price hawks - as 
Kaddafi charges - and, as a consequence, impose a harsh 
discipline on an unruly cartel. They can certainly 
afford it. Unlike seme of their OPEC partners, such as 
Nigeria, the Saudis have been able to make their high 
prices stick. "Their losses are zero," says Theodore R. 
Eck, chief economist for Standard oil of Indiana. But 
the Saudis may also have a darker motive. With huge re­
serves , they may be allowing prices to erode to keep the 
world economy hooked on oil. If so, the strategy may 
already be working. Refiners have sharply drawn down 
crude-oil-inventories, leaving consuming nations more 
dependent on Saudi supplies. At the same time, U.S. oil 
exploration has begun to level off. Declining oil prices 
may bring some immediate relief to a depressed world 
economy, but the Saudi-enforced cheaper crude may set up 
the world for another oil shock. 
It appears that American consumers have two basic choices. As Marbach 
et al. (1982:56) ask: 
Will Americans fire up the gas guzzlers again and 
go for another oil-fueled joyride? Or can they 
reap the benefits of lower prices - and yet not get 
hooked again on cheap oil? 
The answers to the questions posed above are important. The use of 
energy touches every aspect of American life. Because of this, any con­
straint inflicted by energy shortages (e.g., conservation measures or 
rationing) is liable to bring about negative public sentiments. These 
sentiments may take a number of forms such as "public resistance, opposi­
tion, political pressure, or conflicts of interest" (Cetron and Coates, 
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1974:37). Fast evidence also Indicates a general reluctance on the part 
of the American people to alter travel behavior in response to the 
energy crisis (Murray et al., 1974; Brunner and Bennett, 1978; Fusso, 
1978; Rlchman, 1979). Past and present levels of gasoline consumption 
and consumer travel behavior consistently reflect strongly-held prefer­
ences for modes of travel which provide flexibility, mobility, and indi­
vidual freedom (Freeman, 1973; Rlchman, 1979; Martin, 1981). As Shippee 
(1981:35) has found, consumers are neither convinced of the seriousness 
of the problem nor do they appear to be willing to voluntarily alter 
their travel behavior patterns. Brunner and Bennett (1978:240) point 
out the critical nature of this situation as follows : 
Since the Mideast oil embargo in 1973, American con­
sumers have been subjected to a multi-faceted program 
to cope with the energy crisis. Early in 1977, Presi­
dent Carter presented to Congress his proposed solution 
to deal with the energy problems, asserting that the 
challenge was the moral equivalent of war. Consumers 
have been warned that the energy problem is so serious 
that it contains the seeds of depression, revolution, 
and even world war if it is not dealt with successfully. 
Unfortunately, history clearly indicates that if con­
sumers are not convinced of the seriousness of the prob­
lem, and are not willing to work effectively under a 
program designed to alleviate its hardships, any program 
is doomed to failure. 
Public sentiment appears to be one of reluctance to voluntarily 
conserve gasoline, disbelief, and skepticism. Thus, it appears essential 
that transportation researchers and policy makers discover the appropri­
ate blend of inducements needed to ingrain a conservation ethic into the 
American consumer. This need is critical because in the event of a sud­
den cutback in the supply of gasoline, the need for rationing might well 
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become a reality. The American way of life would undoubtedly change dras­
tically (Brunner and Bennett, 1978; Henderson, 1978a). Americans might 
be forced to rearrange their travel priorities. They may find themselves 
leading a relatively Inflexible style of life because of travel con­
straints. They may even find the need to redefine some degree of their 
Individuality and lower their standards of living. 
It was found by Brunner and Bennett (1978), Fusso (1978), and Rich-
man (1979) that a majority of people felt any mandatory conservation 
measure would impose too much of a personal hardship on the American pub­
lic. Consequently, "it was concluded that there was little reason to 
believe the American public would support gasoline rationing" (Murray 
et al., 1974; Brunner and Bennett, 1978; Fusso, 1978; Richman, 1979). 
Nonetheless, Henderson (1978a:17) indicates that: 
To end the energy crisis, the United States must 
abandon its near total reliance on high oil prices 
and turn to noneconomic strategies of which the 
most effective, equitable, and noninflationary is 
gasoline rationing. 
They further argue (Henderson, 1978a:17) that rationing is the only 
strategy which would give the United States Instant regulation over: 
the consumption factor of the petroleum equation 
while alerting the American people to the reality 
of the energy crisis, as the "rationing by price" 
efforts have completely failed. 
Rationing would, in addition, provide the federal government with the 
power needed to decelerate, arrest, and redirect the gluttonous and de­
structive expansion of United States energy consumption (Murray et al., 
1974; Brunner and Bennett, 1978; Henderson, 1978a; Shlppee, 1981; 
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Marbach et al., cited in Newsweek, 1982). Further, it would provide con­
sumers with the freedom to end gasoline waste by allowing them to estab­
lish their own travel priorities. For example, as Henderson (19788:17) 
suggests : 
Gasoline rationing would give the country the flex­
ibility to slash its consumption of foreign oil by 
simply eliminating the more outrageous forms of 
waste such as our ubiquitous national pastime of 
driving around looking for something to do. 
This form of energy conservation should encourage American consumers to 
save their gasoline rations for trips they feel are of the highest pri­
ority whether they are driving to work, transporting children to and from 
school activities, vacation driving, or social activities. 
Statement of the Problem 
In an attempt to address the types of energy policies which may be 
designed, evaluated, and disseminated to encourage consumer belief in 
and acceptance of gasoline rationing, the goals of this study will be: 
1. To develop a model of decision making which will permit 
an accurate understanding of consumer travel behavior 
under conditions of energy constraint. 
2. To attempt to understand ways in which individuals per­
ceive and Interpret consequences associated with con­
straints in mobility and transportation resources. 
3. To assess the impact of these consequences on consumer 
attitude toward gasoline rationing. 
The problem addressed focuses on the need for a methodology yielding new 
insights into: 
1. The impact of energy scarcity upon the individual's 
decision-making process. 
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2. The impact of energy scarcity upon consumer travel 
behavior. 
It Is believed there is a need for answers to specific questions about 
the effects of future energy shortages upon consumer attitude and travel 
behavior. Two questions believed to be the most critical are; 
1. At what point will American consumers cut back on their 
current levels of transportation mobility? 
2. At what point will American consumers reduce their mobility 
at the cost of altering their styles of living? 
Limitations of Existing Research into Consumer 
Response to the Energy Crisis 
Previous attempts to answer the questions stated above have been 
severely restricted. The reason for this is that, for the most part, 
methods of assessing the wide range of possible consumer responses to an 
energy shortage of unknown boundaries have tended to focus primarily on 
"attitude evaluations" about : 
1. The seriousness of the problem (Murray et al., 1974; 
Fusso, 1978; Richman, 1979). 
2. Consumer attribution of responsibility for the problem 
(Murray et al., 1974; Brunner and Bennett, 1978; 
Henderson, 1978a; Richman, 1979). 
3. Consumer belief in the reality of the problem (Brunner 
and Bennett, 1978; Richman, 1979). 
The inadequacies associated with these attitude evaluations used to pre-
duct future behavior are readily apparent. As it has been pointed out by 
Allen et al. (1980), 
The body of research that has sought to link attitudes 
and behavior has been notoriously unsuccessful. Either 
there exists little relationship at all between people's 
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professed attitudes and their behavior or. If there 
Is a relationship. In many Instances It Is negative. 
One of the most critical problems Is that the term "attitude" Itself has 
been defined In no less than thirty different ways. In addition, many of 
the definitions which have been developed over the years have a rela­
tively static view of human behavior. For example, in 1918 Thomas and 
Znanleckl defined attitude as: 
A process of Individual consciousness which deter­
mines real or possible activities of the Individual 
In the social world. 
In 1934, laPierre offered the following definition: 
An attitude Is a behavior pattern, anticipatory set 
or tendency, predisposition to specific adjustment 
to designated social situations, or more simply 
stated, a conditioned response to social stimuli. 
In 1975, Flshbeln and Azjen maintained that most social scientists would 
agree that: 
Attitude can be described as a learned predisposition 
to respond in a consistently favorable or unfavorable 
manner with respect to a given object. 
None of these definitions addresses the multiple perceptions used by 
different individuals in interpreting a situation. Each appears to 
assume an attitude Is a call to respond to a stimulus, a determinant of 
behavior which encourages consistent reactions by individuals. To know 
what an individual believes about a situation may, in fact, be Irrelevant 
when he actually encounters that situation. It could perhaps be argued 
that perceptions are not predispositiona1 qualities determining actual 
responses. Rather they are guides to understanding human behavior 
(Bogdan and Biklen, 1982:32). Consequently, if an attitude evaluation 
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is to be used to predict behavior, it will first be critical to under­
stand how an individual's perception will be applied in any given situa­
tion (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982:32). 
Rosenberg and Hovland's (1960) schematic representation of attitude 
at least begins to address the issues discussed above. It involves the 
following three components and is shown in model form in Figure 1: 
1. The cognitive component which pertains to the individual's 
degree of knowledge about an issue. 
2. The affective component which pertains to the emotional 
dimension attached to an attitude. 
3. The behavioral component which refers to the acts which 
an individual performs, advocates, or facilitates with 
Sympathetic nervous 
responses. Verbal 
statements of affect. 
Perceptual responses. 





Figure 1. Three-component view of attitude (From Rosenberg and 
Hovland, "Cognitive, affective, and behavioral compo 
nents of attitude." Pp. 1-14 In C. I. Hovland and 
M. J. Rosenberg (Eds.), Attitude, Organization, and 
Change. New Ifâven, Connecticut; Yale University 
Press. 




Issues, social A^ttitudes >. Cognition 




Implicit in the Rosenberg and Hovland (1960) model is the assumption 
that an adequate understanding of the relationship between attitude and 
behavior requires an assessment of all three response classes (Fishbein 
and Azjen, 1980:20). The repeated findings of a low or negative rela­
tionship between attitude and behavior have been accounted for by argu­
ing that the primary emphasis on attitude had merely been an assessment 
of its affective component (Allen et al., 1980; Fishbein and Azjen, 1980; 
Bridge, 1981). Fishbein and Azjen (1980:20) further point out that: 
It has not been made clear whether the prediction of 
behavior required assessment of all three components 
or whether it would be sufficient to obtain an index 
of the cognitive or behavioral components. 
It is argued, however, by the author that even if attempts were 
made to consider the interplay between the cognitive, affective, and be­
havioral components of attitude, it is doubtful that a more accurate pre­
diction of consumer travel behavior would result. There are a number 
of reasons for this assertion. For example, an adequate understanding 
of the decision-making process must include an emphasis on the dynamic 
social processes which produce behavior. The research process must in­
clude more than the "What if . . . ?" and "What do you think ... ?" 
survey techniques traditionally used in attitude evaluation surveys such 
as those conducted by Fusso (1978) and Richman (1979). These kinds of 
questions generally include fixed, categorical responses. For example: 
If you could get only ten gallons of gas a week and 
this meant you had to cut down on your driving, how 
serious would this be as far as you are concerned -
very serious, somewhat serious, or not too serious 
at all? 
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It could be assumed that a response to this type of question necessarily 
includes a consideration of each of the three components of attitude 
found in the Rosenberg and Hovland (1960) model (see Figure 1). For ex­
ample (see Figure 2), the stimulus involves the cutback in the supply of 
gasoline which the respondent will be able to purchase. The affective 
component of his attitude Includes the sum total of the respondent's 
feelings about the energy crisis in general, and his feelings about a 
mandatory cutback in the supply of gasoline which may constrain his 
mobility. The cognitive component refers to the knowledge the respondent 
has about the energy crisis and of his perceptions and interpretations 
of that knowledge. For example, how has the respondent reconciled the 
apparent contradiction between a serious energy crisis and an oil glut 
which have made supplies of gasoline plentiful and prices drop drasti­
cally. The behavioral component, the "predlspostion to respond" (Shaver, 
1981:155) reflects both the respondent's perceptions and interpretations 
of the energy crisis and the evaluative judgments he has made. This 
latter component brings to light other serious problems associated with 
traditional survey research techniques. 
The respondent has been asked to project himself into a future time 
period. He had been asked to create, in his thoughts, a situation which 
may not yet have been incorporated into his experiences. Assume for 
example, at the time of the survey, the respondent did not believe there 
was a possibility of an energy shortage. He might well have responded to 
the question asked (Fusso 1978:131) by indicating the ten-gallon ration 
would not seriously affect him. His choice would have been made without 
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Stimulus: (cut­
back in supply — 
of gasoline) 
-^ Attitude >- Cognition 
Affect Refers to respondent's 
feelings about the energy 
crisis (e.g. hew he feels 
about the constraint In 
mobility associated with 
the cutback in gasoline 
supply). 
Respondent's perceptions 
and interpretations of 
the energy crisis.(e.g. 
reconciliation of con­
flicting reports of an 
energy crisis and a 
world oil glut). 
Behavior Fredispostion to re­
spond. Respondent's 
evaluation of the energy 
crisis based aa his own 
experiences. May be 
based on the belief in 
the validity of knowledge 
to which he has been ex­
posed. 
Figure 2; Three-component view of attitude (From Rosenberg and 
Hovland, "Cognitive, affective, and behavioral components 
of attitude." Pp. 1-14 in C. I. Hovland and M. J. 
Rosenberg (Eds.), Attitude, Organization, and Change. 
New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. 
knowledge or consideration of the ramifications it may have upon criti­
cal factors such as time, privacy, weather conditions, and/or activity 
patterns such as leisure driving. Consequently, his response may have 
in no way reflected his actual behavior should his ten-gallon weekly 
ration become a reality. This problem has further manifested itself in 
the frustrations of transportation researchers' experiences. They have 
come face-to-face with confusing discrepancies between eager consumer 
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responses to questions such as, "If a bus came to your door would you 
ride it?" and the disinterest on the part of the consumer when these 
services have been provided. The difficulty with these kinds of ques­
tions, according to Brewer and Woodman (1978:1) exists because: 
When confronted with conventional survey questions 
intended to tap consumer attitudes, a respondent may 
state in good faith that certain changes in his 
transportation behavior are acceptable. However, that 
statement is made without sufficient foreknowledge of 
the personal consequences in terms of time, money, 
household budgets, and familial and work interaction 
patterns. 
It could be suggested that, given that foreknowledge, the respondent may 
have made different, and possibly more valid statements. 
An important conclusion which may be drawn from the awareness of 
this problem is that attitude evaluation surveys which present fixed 
choices to respondents may be limited to situations in which clear 
interpretations of choice consequences can be made. An example comes 
from the Fusso study (1978:131) in which the following questions were 
asked (see Table 1). However, researchers may be hard pressed to under­
stand the varied and numerous factors which may have influenced the re­
duction in number of miles driven. Actual concesslws to changing 
mobility opportunities are made in terms of a complicated mixture of 
situational and attltudlnal factors which the Rosenberg and Hovland 
(1960) model simply does not consider. Attitudes alone are not simplis­
tic determinants of transportation behavior (Brewer and Woodman, 1977:2). 
Transportation researchers such as Ball (1977), Brunner and Bennett 
(1978), and Shlppee (1981), on the other hand, have addressed the need 
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During the last thirty days, have you been able to cut 
down on the amount of driving you normally do? 
Respondents' answers were listed In percentages as follows: 
Yes, have cut down 37 
No, have not cut down 62 
Undecided 1 
They were then asked: If "yes", then: how much have 
you cut down - a little, some, a lot, undecided? 
Their responses were again listed in percentages as follows : 
A little 43 
Some 25 
A lot 20 
Undecided 3 
to include both attltudinal and situational factors in their development 
of attitude-behavior models of consumer travel behavior. Brunner and 
Bennett (1978), for example, in a random telephone poll of four hundred 
sixty-four households focused on: 
consumer perception of and responsibility for the 
energy crisis, its seriousness and consequences, 
and the effects that consumers perceived it would 
have on their lifestyles. (1978:241) 
They focused on the possibility of a standby gasoline tax (1978:243), the 
effect of price increases on gasoline consumption (1978:244), and their 
possible effect on the standard of living of American consumers (1978: 
245). While these may well be critical factors to consider, Brunner 
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and Bennett (1978), Fusso (1978), Rlchman (1979), and Martin (1981) all 
appear to focus much too heavily on "crystallized" attitudes toward 
transportation resource availability and constraint in their assessment 
of consumer travel behavior. As it was pointed out earlier in the 
Henderson (1978a ;17) argument: 
To end the energy crisis, the United States must 
abandon its near total reliance on high oil prices 
and turn to noneconomic strategies of which the 
most effective, equitable, and noninflationary is 
gasoline rationing. 
In order to encourage the American public to view rationing as a fair 
and equitable solution to the energy crisis, researchers must stop rely­
ing on the use of survey research techniques which tend to zero in on 
rigid and often unrealistic attitude evaluations. In illustration, the 
propensity of a respondent to believe he has "an inalienable, God-given 
right to travel when, where, and in whatever manner he pleases" (Hender­
son, 1978a:17) represents a crystallized attitude Insofar as it will, in 
all probability, guide his behavior until some outside force such as 
rationing intervenes. This crystallized attitude may distort any addi­
tional questions to which he is asked to respond. The result may be a 
severe drop in the predictive power of the model, even if that model does 
contain both attltudlnal and situational factors. 
It is a basic assertion of this study that the limitations of exist­
ing models of consumer travel behavior will not be eliminated as long as 
traditional survey research techniques are used which: 
1. Involve fixed, categorical responses to questions which 
ask the respondent to project himself into a future time 
period. 
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2. Force the respondent to create, in his thoughts, a 
situation which he has not yet incorporated into his 
experiences. 
3. Assume the respondent has sufficient and adequate 
foreknowledge of the situation which will help him 
provide valid responses to the questions asked. 
4. Do not acknowledge the dynamic social processes which 
produce behavior. 
5. Do not focus on the interplay of attitudinal and situa­
tional variables which work together to produce actual 
behavior. 
Justification of the Problem 
The objective of this research is to provide an accurate assessment 
of consumer travel behavior under conditions of energy constraint. An 
attempt will be made to explain why consumers make various kinds of de­
cisions given certain transportation resources, alternatives, and con­
straints. Rather than limiting the choices available to consumers, the 
intent will be to construct a model of decision making which discards many 
of the theoretical and methodological assumptions which have become 
accepted and reified over the years in social science research. 
This study does Involve the use of a questionnaire which has been 
designed to assess consumer attitude toward the energy crisis. However, 
in addition, it includes the development of a carefully constructed and 
realistic simulation of a "real world" gasoline rationing situation 
(hereafter referred to as SHORTAGE). It is suggested that the method­
ological flexibility of computer simulation techniques in combination 
with an attitude survey may permit a more adequate analysis of the 
multiplicity of factors which work together to produce actual behavior. 
19 
This approach should provide the researcher with an adequate understand­
ing of the nature of social structural constraints, flexibility of 
choices, and attitudlnal factors which may influence the decision making 
process. As a result, a model of decision making will be developed which 
differs fundamentally from existing models. 
Computer Simulation Research 
Simulation refers to any model a researcher builds to 
convey his preconception of how variables interrelate. 
He uses this model to make predictions. The scientist 
employing simulation posits a set of decision rules 
that he believes represent reality. (Encyclopedia of 
Sociology, 1981:254-255) 
The elements of simulations comprise a more or less 
accurate representation or model of some external 
reality with which the players Interact in much the 
same way they would interact with the actual reality. 
(Horn and Cleaves, 1980:7) 
Computer simulation research has, since the 1950s gained increasing 
importance in the social sciences both as a learning and a data-gathering 
device (Bailey, 1978:292; Nachmlas and Nachmias, 1976:86; Dodge, 1980:47; 
Finsterbusch and Motz, 1980:16; Smith, 1981:234). Unlike traditional 
social science "models" which may be static and reflect only limited di­
mensions of social reality (Encyclopedia of Sociology, 1981:185), simula­
tions are special kinds of models - models in motion. 
Simulations operate over a period of time to show not 
only the structure of the system, but also the way 
change in one variable or component affects changes 
in the values of the other variables or components. 
(Bailey, 1978:293) 
It has been suggested by Horn and Cleaves (1980:11) that: 
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Beyond providing a common experience that individuals 
can use as a basis of study, this experience-based 
method may provide an opportunity to bridge the 
troublesome gap which exists between theory and prac­
tice in fields where both are crucial. 
As a practice, the researcher may be better able to sensitize himself to 
the dynamic social processes which produce behavior. 
Simulation Research: Methodological Considerations 
KAufmann (1968:205) and Raser (1969:151) have argued that the 
record of simulation research in predicting future events has not been 
Impressive. In a summary of findings on the validity of simulations, 
the following conclusions were drawn: 
What do these assessments of simulation validity for 
research yield? 1 suggest that, as realistic labora­
tories, simulations appear to rate very well, certainly 
better than the available alternatives. Their struc­
tural isomorphism with the reference system is difficult 
to ascertain, and where ascertainable, not very impres­
sive, particularly when first designed; but this is an 
aspect that can be changed as theory and data improve. 
The process of isomorphism is perhaps better, though in 
this respect it is often difficult to compare their 
validity with that of other research techniques, for 
almost no techniques generate comparable processes. 
Finally, in post-dietive and predictive power, simula­
tions are no worse than other methods, but whether they 
are better is uncertain; the experimental results are 
too ambiguous and contradictory. (Raser, 1969:153) 
Bailey (1978:295; 1982:333), in later evaluations of simulation research, 
argued In support of Raser's findings. He indicated, for example, that 
the primary drawback of simulations is their artificiality. 
By its very definition, a simulation is merely an 
Imitation or copy of the real thing. There is always 
the possibility that the simulation is so inaccurate 
or incomplete that conclusions gained frcsn it are not 
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applicable to the phenomenon being modeled, and thus 
the findings will be invalid. 
Obviously, the validity and utility of the simulation are dependent upon 
the accuracy of the investigator's theoretical preconceptions concerning 
interrelations among components of the system he had constructed 
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976:90). 
There is always the danger that all the salient 
components have not been entered into the system. 
There is further danger that all the relationships 
between components are not designed correctly. 
(Bailey, 1982:333) 
Realistically, however, whether the researcher has developed a model 
which is viewed as a static, cross-sectional representation of a system 
or a simulation viewed as a model in motion, he must address two basic 
issues: 1) his model is an imperfect representation of reality and 
2) because of this it will not be isomorphic with that reality. This 
point of view has been reinforced by Watkins and Meador (1979:119) who 
point out that: 
Social scientists' predictions of human behavior are 
only as reliable as the stability and accuracy of 
their models. The introduction of human variables 
causes models to become imperfect representations; 
and dangers appear when they and the humans involved 
are treated as perfect replicas of reality. 
Consequently, the validity of the simulation cannot be "absolutely" in­
sured. As Button and Starbuck (1971:14) have indicated: 
A model is built in order to achieve understanding 
of an observed causal process, and the model is 
stated as a simulation in order that the assumptions 
and functional relations may be as complex and 
realistic as possible. The resulting program pro­
duces outputs resembling those observed in the real 
world, and inspires confidence that the real causal 
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process has been accurately represented. However, 
because the assumptions incorporated in the model 
are complex and their mutual interdependencies may 
be obscure, the simulation program may be no easier 
to understand than the real process. 
Raser, in opposition to his previous argument (1969), convincingly states 
that players do become deeply engrossed in simulations and taken them 
quite seriously. Persons in "real life" situations often tend to iso­
late themselves from reality and be even less involved in real events 
than are players in simulations. The conclusion drawn is that simula­
tions seem capable of or at least, have the potential of creating a 
sense of realism by bringing "real world problems" together in a setting 
in which respondents can practice making "real world decisions" 
Nachmias and Nachmias, 1976). 
Simulation Research: Theoretical Considerations 
It is "generally accepted" within the social sciences that theory 
and method are interrelated (Hage, 1972; Zeitlin, 1973; Ritzer, 1975, 
1981; Dubin, 1978; Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979; Skidmore, 1979; Johnson, 
1981; Bailey, 1982; Bogdan and Biklen, 1982; Smith, 1981). Thus, it seems 
critical to consider why it is that mainstream sociological theories 
make it difficult to adequately consider the dynamic social processes 
which produce behavior. This assertion seems justifiable in light of the 
realization that most sociological theory assumes that reality itself 
exists apart from individuals; once individuals come into interaction, 
they form social structures which constrain future interaction (Turner, 
1978:393). The primary emphasis is on constraints which appear external 
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to and coercive on the individual to the extent that it may be assumed: 
society controls, shapes, and directs individual 
behavior, leading to the conclusion that whatever 
society wishes to make of us it can. (Skidmore, 
1979:27) 
As a result, this might tend to limit researchers in terms of what they 
believe should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they 
should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the 
answers obtained (Ritzer, 1981:7). 
The statements above are critical in light of the following assertion 
by Bailey (1978; 1982) and Smith (1981). The value of the results of a 
simulation depends completely upon the quality of the components Included 
and on the realistic nature of the interrelations of those components. 
It is imperative that the simulation resemble real life as closely as 
possible (Bailey, 1982; Smith, 1981). However, as long as researchers' 
dominant theoretical emphases are on order and stability to the exclu­
sion of their antitheses or the wide range of possible behaviors on the 
continuum, this appears to be an unattainable goal. 
Because many people do the expected thing, the social scientist has 
perhaps not found it necessary to search beneath the macroscopic sense 
of order studied (Perrow, 1981:5). Nonetheless, there are innumerable 
microscopic irregularities or nonrational forms of behavior which the 
researcher often attempts to alleviate or eliminate with "rationally" 
designed models which advocate: 
1. The enactment of more laws. 
2. Stiffer penalties for those who break the law. 
3. Rewards for those who follow the law. 
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Underlying these rationally designed models is the postulate that 
"rational calculation, on the motivational or behavioral levels and the 
need for social acceptance are the prime movers of social conduct (Brown, 
1978:160). 
Rationality involves human beings choosing between 
alternative courses of action by evaluating the 
experiences with each in terms of a preference 
ranking and then selecting the "best" alternative. 
(Wallace, 1969:190) 
The social scientist may, knowingly or unknowingly, reaffirm this mode 
of thought. He may, for example, emphasize rational choices such as the 
maximization of profit (or "best" choice) in his evaluation of behavior 
to the exclusion of nonratlonal choices such as fun, politics, safety, 
and tradition. "In so doing his model may contain problems of internal 
clarity and consistency" (Brown, 1978). Still researchers con­
tinue to underplay or largely ignore the nonratlonal aspects of social 
conduct (Zeltlin, 1972; Ritzer, 1981). There is danger in this, as 
Perrow (1981:2) points out: 
Neither social scientists nor people in general are 
as smart and rational as we think they are. Social 
scientists mask this reality by desperately trying 
to make sense of many things that are really quite 
senseless when examined closely. Yet they convey 
the impression of lawful, even rational behavior be­
cause of research techniques that are largely self-
serving . 
It would appear there is a need to move beyond traditional theoretical 
assumptions about human behavior which emphasize the macroscopic social 
order and rationality while deemphaslzing the microscopic individual per­
ception of what that order is which may well contain nonratlonal aspects 
of behavior. If simulations are to be developed which assure the 
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inclusion of essential components and adequate and accurate specifica­
tions of interrelations between components (Bailey, 1978; 1982), then 
many of the traditional theoretical assumptions held by social scien­
tists must be reexamined. Most existing simulations, for example, have 
tended to focus on: 
calculating the optimal move or choice among alter­
native means for achieving a given end, and on the 
development of formulas for weighing risks, costs, 
and potential benefits in which 1) options have been 
arrayed and then 2) the "rationally best choice" has 
been determined. (Brown, 1978:160) 
This approach severely restricts the components which may be needed to 
develop a simulation which closely resembles the "real world". 
There is a need as well to move beyond the view of what individuals 
"should do" as they go about interacting in everyday life, to what they 
"actually do". As Zeitlin (1973:180) has indicated: 
The social scientist creates puppets to manipulate 
them for his purpose. These puppets have no life, 
no anxiety, no freedom, and no consciousness; they 
cannot under any circumstances act otherwise than 
was predestined by their creator. 
Perrow (1981:3) agrees with Zeitlin (1973) as he suggests that social 
scientists appear to have constructed their theoretical orientations In 
a manner which permits them to "hide the disorder of our everyday exist­
ence and the unpredictable nature of social conduct." This seems quite 
"rational" when it is recognized that, to many social scientists, "unless 
a component of the social world can be studied objectively or impar­
tially, using strict scientific techniques, it may not be considered a 
legitimate part of the field of social science" (Ritzer, 1981:211). This 
mode of thought appears to have led to a commitment to a "narrow sense 
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of science" (Ritzer, 1981:211). 
It is suggested by the author that an emphasis must be placed on 
the socially constructed and socially negotiated nature of reality. As 
Zeitlin (1973), Johnson (1981), and Ritzer (1981) argue, it cannot be 
denied that subjective meaning and individual perception play a critical 
role in the decision-making process. Perhaps such components cannot be 
studied scientifically in the strict sense of the term. However, the 
fact remains. Subjective meaning and individual perception are critical 
components of the social world. To underplay or ignore then altogether 
may create an unnecessary source of unexplained variance in social 
science research (Zeitlin, 1973; Morris, 1977; Ritzer, 1981). Assuming 
this is so, Perrow argues (1981:3) that: 
nonrational, changeable, multifaceted people be put 
back at the center of the social sciences so that 
researchers can better tolerate disorder, even 
appreciate its virtues, and learn to cope with human 
limits. 
Addressing this issue head on may well: 
guide the social scientist in the construction of 
models that will enable him to deal objectively 
with human actions and subjective meaning. (Zeitlin, 
1973:180) 
It is suggested by the author that the conceptual versatility of phenom­
enology in conjunction with the methodological flexibility of computer 
simulation techniques might offer a solution to the problems which have 
been presented. 
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Beyond Tradition: The Fhenomenological Alternative 
Facts are not something we can take for granted or 
think of as the solid rock upon which knowledge is 
built. Actually their nature is rather problematic. 
Karen Cetina-Knorr (1981:17) 
Hy lord, facts are like cows, if you look them in 
the face hard enough, they generally run away. 
Dorothy Sayers (cited in Cetina-Knorr, 1981:17) 
Phenomenology is a theoretical orientation which stresses the on­
going dialectical relationships between the individual and society. It 
is characterized by its concern for the process by which social phenomena 
are created, recreated, maintained, and/or altered in the course of every­
day interaction (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Johnson, 1981; Ritzer, 1981). 
Those who follow its tradition hold to the idea that individuals experi­
ence and share the social world with others as a phenomenon that is both 
objectively factual and subjectively meaningful (Johnson, 1981:59). 
All knowledge of objective facts in the real world 
is conditioned or colored by the social matrix in 
which it is acquired, transmitted, or learned. 
(Johnson, 1981:60) 
While the phenomenologist readily accepts the reality of an external 
factual social world, he also emphasizes the subjective meaning attached 
to phenomena as that which influences social conduct, not the phenomena 
themselves. Within the context of "conditions of energy constraint," 
consider a focus on an evaluation of individual responses to the fifty-
five mile per hour speed limit. One of the reasons the lowered speed 
limit was enacted into law was to conserve gasoline (Fusso, 1978). It 
has also been found to be correlated with a decrease in the number of 
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automobile deaths on the highway. Some consumers, of course, have 
abided by the law. Others have not. There are American consumers, for 
example, who have purchased Citizens Band radios in their attempts to 
bypass the speed limit without paying a penalty. Some have continued 
to take their chances and have exceeded the speed limit when it appeared 
the "line of traffic" was constant at sixty or sixty-five miles per hour. 
Still others who have been ticketed for speeding have expressed their 
displeasure at an unfair, reduced speed limit which they may argue wastes 
more gasoline than it purports to save (Brunner and Bennett, 1978). 
There are some conclusions which may possibly be drawn from these 
examples. Consumer travel behavior may not be identical or even similar 
among individuals. Externally imposed structural constraints such as 
the fifty-five mile per hour speed limit, by definition, mean different 
things to different people. As a result, actual behavior may be depend­
ent on the point of reference of the individuals who encounter the ram­
ifications associated with breaking or not breaking the law. It would 
seem critical, for example, to recognize that those who do not conform 
are not always exhibiting nonrational behavior, nor are they necessarily 
acting out of ignorance. In fact, their primary concern may be, for any 
number of reasons, how to get from point A to point B in the least 
amount of time. As Wrong (1982) and Perrow (1981) state, though, when 
the social scientist attempts to account for these varying and diverse 
behaviors the following is likely to count as an explanation: 
We social scientists do not explain these phenomena 
on the grounds that most human actors are less than 
brilliant, or that they have not developed adequate 
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cognitive skills, or because of failures in infor­
mation processing. Aberrations, we say, are due to 
such things as inadequate internalization of norms, 
values, culture, tradition, and unrealized conse­
quences. (Perrow, 1981:2) 
It appears to be ludicrous to maintain a theoretical need for un­
varying orderly, and rational explanations of consumer travel behavior. 
Within the "real world" consumers clearly have the conscious capacity to 
create, recreate, and/or socially negotiate situations such as the one 
involving the decision to abide by the fifty-five mile per hour speed 
limit or to break that limit. 
The author suggests that the phenomenological alternative may per­
mit more than a detached observation of social structural constraints 
believed to determine social conduct. It may enable the researcher to 
place a stronger emphasis on the subjective world of the respondent, 
which is itself a reality. 
Theory should not be about what is outside conscious­
ness, but it should be about how and in what ways the 
subjective states of the actors are created, recreated, 
and maintained. (Turner, 1978:393) 
This criterion might permit a more unified, holistic approach (Switzer, 
1981) to understanding the decision-making process. As a result, an 
adequate understanding and evaluation of the response of the American 
public to a future energy shortage may become possible. In turn, this 
may enable the researcher to develop a more adequate understanding of 
the motivational components included in the decision-making process. 
Researchers must begin to address more than individual's views on the 
energy crisis. It would be helpful to policy makers, for example, as 
was stated earlier, if researchers were able to determine at what point 
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American consumers would actually curtail their mobility, change their 
value systems, or redefine the degree of individuality they feel they 
"must" have. 
In sumnary of this section, the application of phenomenology may 
provide a more accurate description of the dynamics of social interaction 
than traditional sociological theories. It may allow the researcher 
the flexibility to consider any and all social phenomena within an in­
dividual's surroundings, of which that Individual is cognizant, in an 
analysis of the decision-making process. It permits an emphasis on the 
socially constructed nature of social reality itself. Finally, through 
the development of a phenomenologically grounded computer simulation, 
it is believed that the constructjcn and amplification of an adequate 
model of decision making may be possible. 
SHORTAGE: A Gasoline Rationing Simulation 
SHORTAGE was developed in an attempt to enhance respondent ability 
to make travel decisions under conditions of energy constraint with some 
knowledge of the kinds of "real world" consequences he might face if 
rationing became a reality. The assumption has been made that the 
"decision*tree format" (Trueman, 1977:125) used in its construction will 
have created a scenario which may well illuminate the "real world". 
Unlike the problem of making a single optimal decision, involving 
probabilistic outcomes, at a given point in time (Trueman, 1977:125), 
SHORTAGE exposes respondents to the problem of making a sequence of de­
cisions over a period of time. As it has been stated by Trueman (1977: 
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125), decision tree analysis emphasizes the fact that: 
Each decision made by the respondent may depend on 
previous decisions and thus may lead to a set of 
probabilistic outcomes. An attempt Is made to cover 
all contingencies. A graphically oriented approach 
to the solution of such multistage decision problems 
is called decision tree analysis. 
SHORTAGE should provide an opportunity for respondents to assess 
both the social and economic expenses associated with the choices they 
make (see Appendix A). An emphasis will be placed on the diversity of 
components incorporated into and Interpreted by the respondent in his 
attempts to make some intuitive sense out of the social world presented 
to him. It is believed that this may encourage him to act in a manner 
which may most profitably benefit him. 
To accomplish the goals of this study, it will be accepted that the 
respondent's travel decisions may not always follow a rational path in 
Wallace's (1969:190) sense of the term (see page 24). nationality will 
be considered then, for purposes of this study, to be a multifaceted, 
multidimensional construct defined in accordance with the subjective 
meaning and consequences it may have for the respondent as he attempts 
to cope with conditions of energy constraint. 
Purpose of the Survey Questionnaire 
A survey questionnaire was administered to each respondent prior to 
his participation in SHORTAGE (see Appendix C). This was done In an 
attempt to determine the respondent's Initial perception of the energy 
crisis. The questions asked were similar to those used in studies by 
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Murray et al. (1974), Brunner and Bennett (1978), Fusso (1978), Rlchman 
(1979), Martin (1981), and Orr (1981). The questionnaire was constructed 
in a manner which asked each respondent for the following information: 
1. Attribution of responsibility for the energy crisis. 
2. Evaluation of the severity of the energy crisis. 
3. Whether or not the respondent believed the crisis was "real". 
4. Determination of the degree of personal hardship in the event 
of another energy shortage. 
5. Consideration of the respondent's attitude toward gasoline 
rationing. 
6. Suggested resolutions to the energy crisis. 
Following completion of the questionnaire, the respondent was ex­
posed to SHOBTAGE, which presented him with: 
1. A standby gasoline rationing plan which provided him with 
120 gallons of gasoline which he could use as he chose over 
a 90-day period of time. The respondent determined the rate 
of usage by the number of miles per gallon his care received. 
2. A list of five strategies by which it was suggested he could 
move through the simulation in a way that would most profit­
ably benefit him. 
3. A series of alternatives and consequences, contained within 
each strategy, which he may or may not have decided to try. 
4. An awareness that the decisions he made may or may not be 
profitable, that some were even illegal. 
5. The realization that, as he was making his decisions, the 
clock in the simulation continued to tick away his time, 
and the fuel supply allotted to him continued to dwindle. 
SHORTAGE may well have provided the respondent with a set of realistic 
transportation resources, alternatives, and constraints that could con­
ceivably impact his attitude toward gasoline rationing as the most 
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effective, equitable, and noninflationary resolution to the energy 
crisis. 
Upon completion of the participation in SHOBIAGE, the respondent 
was given the opportunity to reassess his presimulation questionnaire 
answers. This was done because this author believes that the knowledge 
and experience gained from participation in SHORTAGE may have enhanced 
respondent awareness of the critical nature of the energy crisis and of 
the "actual" changes in transportation resources, alternatives, and con­
straints that may become a reality if gasoline rationing is implemented. 
Finally, it is believed that SHORTAGE will yield new insights into the 
point at which American consumers will: 
1. Adjust to using less fuel. 
2. Hake better use of the fuel that is available to them. 
3. Consider altering their styles of living to accommodate 
a drastic reduction in gasoline supply. 
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CHAPTER II. BEVIEW OF LITEEATUBE 
Our "energy problem" does not have a solution In the 
sense that we can win a war or put a man on the moon; 
rather ours is a brand new, long-term situation In 
which we must learn to live. And It raises a whole 
new set of issues with which we are poorly equipped to 
deal. Our first need in dealing with our new energy 
situation is to understand that it is authentic and 
long-term in nature; otherwise our decisions will be 
Inappropriate and their urgency will be underestimated. 
(Ball, 1977:48) 
One goal of this chapter will be to show that most existing studies 
of consumer responses to the energy crisis have not adequately realized 
that ; 
Nothing we can do will restore the conditions which 
prevailed in the second and third quarters of this 
century; our energy "situation" in the future will 
forever be fundamentally different from that which 
has prevailed in the past. (Ball, 1977:48) 
Researchers have traditionally focused largely on the energy "situa­
tion" as an energy "problem" (Murray et al., 1974; Bearden et al., 1977; 
Brunner and Bennett, 1978; Fusso, 1978; Richman, 1979). There is a 
dangerous risk involved with this approach. The word problem "implies 
there is a solution and a cure when applied, will permit a return to 
conditions essentially the same as they have been" (Ball, 1977:48). 
Realistically, however, the direction which may most effectively serve 
the important goals of energy policy is one that will atcack the waste 
in energy consumption, slow It down, and, ultimately, reverse its growth 
(Freeman, 1973; Ball, 1977; Henderson, 1978a; Marbach et al., 1982). 
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As a result of the perceived problems Inherent within existing 
studies, this chapter will Include a review and an evaluation of the 
literature which demonstrates that: 1) while the energy crisis has not 
yet overwhelmed the United States, it will continue to worsen because 
American consumers continue to waste energy; 2) the American public has 
only minimally accepted and/or adjusted to the energy crisis; 3) there 
has been only minimal consumer cooperation in lowering gasoline consump­
tion; 4) consumers have not been significantly receptive to either in­
creasing foreign oil imports or in permitting the government to impose a 
tax on fuel inefficient automobiles; 5) Increases in gasoline prices 
since 1974 have not significantly altered consumer travel behavior; 6) 
the perceived responsibility for the energy crisis and its resolution 
rests primarily with government and big business and secondarily with 
the American public; and 7) the development of an effective comprehen­
sive national energy policy will be an impossible task unless the follow­
ing criteria are met: 
1. The government must accept the responsibility for its 
development. 
2. The American public must comprehend and accept the 
severity of the energy crisis. 
3. The American public must be "willing" to make the sacri­
fices which will accompany an affective national energy 
policy. 
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On Energy Consumption; 1973-1982: Why Did the Crisis Worsen? 
Following the Middle East Oil Embargo in November of 1973, Presi­
dent Nixon presented a wide-ranging program to curtail United States 
energy consumption. He asked for voluntary conseirvation measures and, 
in his 1973 Energy Address to the nation, stated that: 
If shortages persist despite all of the voluntary 
actions, it may become necessary—may become neces­
sary- -to take even stronger measures. It is only pru­
dent that we be ready to cut the consumption of oil 
products, such as gasoline, by rationing, or by a 
fair system of taxation. I have directed that con­
tingency plans, if this becomes necessary, be prepared 
for that purpose. (Energy Policy, 1981:240) 
The American people were warned of the potential for the short-run per­
sonal sacrifices. However, at the same time they were assured that: 
1) efforts were being made to increase domestic supplies of gasoline; 
and 2) that a fuel allocation program would be implemented so that con­
sumers would not be forced to "suffer undue hardships" (Energy Crisis, 
Volume 2, 1974-75:76). It appeared that the President wanted to make the 
American people aware of the need for voluntary conservation. He also 
attempted to create an awareness of growing U.S. dependence on foreign 
imports in his assertion that (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1974-75:76): 
The American people must face the fact that when and 
if the oil embargo ends the United States will be 
faced with a different but no less difficult problem. 
Foreign oil prices have risen dramatically in recent 
months. Without alternative and competitive sources 
of energy here at home, petroleum prices could remain 
at crippling high levels. 
He said the United States must embark on an intensive program of re­
search and development of new technologies because: 
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This will assure that the genius of the free enter­
prise system is maintained and not destroyed by the 
energy crisis. Gas rationing with its attendant 
bureaucracy and cost to the taxpayer should be only 
a last resort. Years from now, let us look back upon 
the energy crisis of the 1970's as a time when the 
American spirit reasserted Itself for the lasting 
benefit of America. (Energy Policy, 1981:75-78) 
The oil embargo continued, and the gasoline situation worsened. 
American consumers experienced, in varying degrees: 1) long lines at 
gasoline stations (Newsweek, 1979); 2) worsening gasoline shortages that 
were especially severe in urban areas (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1974-75:3); 
3) a form of rationing that based distribution on odd and even numbered 
license plates; 4) minimum-purchase amounts to avoid panic buying or 
"topping-off" tactics; and 5) continued increases in the price of gaso­
line. Each of these factors served to heighten consumer frustration with 
and anger at the government's inability to deal adequately with the 
shortages (Murray et al., 1974). 
It was also in 1974 that Congress acted In reducing the national 
highway speed limits to no more than 55 miles per hour. The President 
indicated to the American people that he was pleased with the favorable 
public response to the lowered speed limit. He stated that if consumers 
continued to cooperate, gasoline rationing could be avoided, but added: 
The United States is still facing a severe energy 
shortage. Any slackening of conservation efforts 
by the public could result in the crisis being 
"brought home to America in a most devastating 
fashion." (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1974-75:78) 
He reminded the American public that rationing was a possibility for 
which the government must prepare. 
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Then, in March of 1974, following the lifting of the oil embargo. 
President Nixon altered his stand on an energy conservation policy. He 
barred gasoline rationing by vetoing the emergency energy bill that had 
already been passed by a 67-32 Senate vote, February 19, 1974, and a 
258-151 House vote February 27, 1974. At that time, he "flatly ruled out 
the need for compulsory gasoline rationing" (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 
1974-75:83). This veto was carried out in conjunction with his request 
that American consumers continue to voluntarily conserve gasoline by 
using car pools and reducing speed limits. 
President Nixon's policy change could have appeared justifiable in 
light of his faith in American capabilities to: 1) maximize energy sup­
plies; and 2) develop new technology. President Nixon further suggested: 
By increasing gasoline supplies, prices will go down, 
gas lines will surely disappear, and we can move 
forward as a country with the energy that we need. 
(Energy Policy, 1981:78) 
The President's policy changes, however, both confused and angered 
some consumers. Murray et al. (1974:257) found that 'Vnany consumers were 
angry and annoyed by the inconveniences created by gasoline shortages." 
Others were frightened by the ambiguity associated with the government's 
stand on energy. Freeman (1973), Murray et al. (1974), and Wirth (1975) 
concluded that: 
For many Americans, the most frustrating aspect of 
the energy crisis is that their government, for all 
its alarmist rhetoric, is carrying on business as 
usual. The energy issue has evoked a sense of national 
emergency, yet the politics surrounding it seem to lack 
any urgency. Everybody talks about the energy crisis, 
but no one does much about it. (Wirth, 1975:93) 
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The conflicting messages which the American people perceived they 
were getting led to a dangerous evaluation of the energy crisis. It was 
viewed as an energy availability problem, not an energy supply problem 
(Freeman, 1973; Wlrth, 1975). As a result, the United States continued 
to be a nation of gluttonous gasoline consumers. For example. In a Labor 
Department two-year survey. It was found that: 
Gasoline expenditures accounted for 50% of a family's 
direct energy purposes. The data were gathered from 
diaries kept by more than 10,000 families for two 
years beginning In mid-1972. (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 
1974-75:125) 
Also, In 1974, American consumers had not been convinced that It was 
necessary to examine and roll back the energy Intensive way of life which 
predominates in American society. As Murray et al. (1974:257) found: 
Since the Arab boycott and the President's appeal 
for conservation there have been pervasive but modest 
efforts at energy conservation on the part of the 
American public. However, these efforts have not yet 
gone beyond saving a bit here and there. There is 
little indication of any serious change in lifestyle 
such as changing the mode of transportation to work 
or increasing the average occupancy of cars on the 
trip to work. 
Because of the confusion created by the energy crisis, in 1974, 
chairmen of four Congressional subcommittees declared their groups would 
begin hearings to discover if the energy situation confronting the United 
States was "fact or fiction" (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1974-75:51). 
Senator Henry Jackson (Dem., Washington) stated that there was: 
total lack of public confidence in the oil industry, 
in the federal agencies charged with regulating the 
industry, and in the validity of the spIraling costs 
of gasoline. People are not going to make sacrifices 
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unless they get some straight-forward answers 
about the extent of the shortage and who is bene­
fiting from the shortage. (Energy Crisis, Volume 
2, 1974-75:51) 
Jackson's accusation appears consistent with the Murray et al. (1974) 
study in which it was found that: 1) fewer than 25% of the American 
people felt that the energy problem was critical; 2) agreement was wide­
spread that responsibility for the crisis lay most heavily on the federal 
government and the oil companies; and 3) the federal government was not 
handling the situation very well (1974:257-8). 
In retrospect, public skepticism, unconcern, and anger appear to 
have been understandable. While the extent, even the reality, of the 
energy crisis was being debated, national energy policies continued to 
favor an increasing use of energy. As Freeman (1973:2) indicated: 
For decades the government and the oil companies have 
agreed on the goals of fullest exploitation of resources 
and maximum energy consumption. Tftitil recently, no one 
has seriously questioned our growth policies. Energy, 
which does most of our hard labor and gives us leisure, 
comfort, and mobility, has been seen as an unmixed bless­
ing. The premise that more is better has gone unchal­
lenged . 
Traditionally, the trust in American expertise, to manipulate the 
environment to its own ends, had been widespread. There had been an 
image of energy resources as endless, "as if the earth could absorb, 
without limit, the damage inherent in all energy use" (Freeman, 1973:3). 
All of a sudden energy became a problem. There were symptoms that 
something had gone wrong. The depletion of petroleum resources became 
more than an issue which only concerned the environmentalists. As 
Wirth (1975:3) indicated: 
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Politicians became aware that energy is not only a 
scientific or a technical issue, but also a foreign 
policy issue. And when the OPEC cartel discovered 
that it could get away with sharp price increases, 
and the United States discovered that the era of 
cheap fuel was over, American politicians found 
that energy is an economic policy too. 
It appears evident that awareness of the complexity of the energy crisis 
did not lead to a proposed resolution. When President Ford took office 
in 1973, his first energy address to the nation paralleled Nixon's ini­
tial stand on the energy issue. He warned that the United States must 
face the prospect of energy difficulties which may last until 1985 
(Energy Policy, 1981). He also stated that the resolution of the crisis 
would require personal sacrifices on the part of the American people. 
He then proceeded, in a Washington speaking engagement on January 22, 
1975, to say he would "veto any mandatory rationing program involving 
petroleum products" (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1974-75:114). Ironically, 
according to a Gallup Poll published in Newsweek Magazine, January 20, 
1975; 
55% of those responding favored a nationwide ration­
ing program, compared with 32% who preferred to cut 
consumption through the use of higher gasoline 
taxes. 
The President, however, favored higher oil tariffs as an incentive to 
reduce the United States' consumption of foreign oil. Even though he 
was warned by many governmental leaders of the danger of skyrocketing 
inflation which his tariff could cause, he remained firm. He argued that 
"failure to act on the tariff question would have been a sign of weakness 
around the world" (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1974-75:115). However: 
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If Congress rejected this proposal, Ford said, he 
would accept arbitrary allocation of petroleum 
products as an alternative approach to cut demand 
and limit foreign oil imports, but he restated his 
opposition to fuel rationing as a measure of "last 
resort." (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1974-75:115) 
In 1976, President Ford maintained his stand on the energy issue. 
He emphasized that in pursuing the goal of energy self-sufficiency by 
1985, he intended to implement the maximum production incentives that 
could be justified. His focus was on increased domestic production. 
It appears that the President's "resolution" to the energy problem 
paralleled that of President Nixon's. He argued that: 
It is only through greater research and development 
efforts today that we will be in a position beyond 
1985 to supply a significant share of the free world's 
energy needs. And I am convinced that the United 
States has the ability to achieve this energy inde­
pendence. (Energy Policy, 1981:251) 
The emphasis remained on finding more energy. not using less. 
In light of the perceived contradictions in both government policy 
and Presidential states, it is not surprising that by 1977 researchers 
had found that (Moncrief et al., 1977:442): 
It does not appear as if gasoline conditions will 
greatly influence future travel. A majority of 
American consumers felt gasoline "availability" 
would influence their future travel decisions 
either not at all or veiry little. 
When President Carter made his first Energy Address to the nation 
in April of 1977, the American people were faced with a problem they were 




with the exception of war, this is the greatest 
challenge our country will face during our life­
time. It is a problem we will not solve in the 
next few years, and is likely to get progressively 
worse through the rest of this century. We must 
not be selfish or timid if we hope to have a decent 
world for our children and grandchildren. We simply 
must balance our demand for energy with our rapidly 
shrinking resources. By acting now we can control 
our future instead of letting the future control­
ling us. (Energy Policy, 1981:251) 
He told the American people that they would be forced to make sacrifices 
and increase their tolerance for inconvenience. He did so in conjunc­
tion with the waiming that the alternative may be a national catastrophe 
(Energy Policy, 1981:251). He attempted, then, to convince them that 
the crisis was both "real" and "long-term" in nature. 
In addressing the issue of public disbelief and/or skepticism, Pres­
ident Carter said (Energy Policy, 1981:252): 
I know many of you have suspected that some of the 
supplies of oil are being withheld. You may be right, 
but suspicions about the oil companies cannot change 
the fact that we are running out of petroleum. World 
oil production can probably keep going up for another 
six or eight years. But sometime in the 1980's it 
can't go up anymore. Demand will overtake production. 
If we do not act now, if we wait, we will live in fear 
of future embargoes. At our present rate of growth, 
within ten years we would not be able to Import enough 
oil—from any country, at any acceptable price. 
Following the President's speech, it first appeared that the American 
people 'hnay have been" open to a strong comprehensive national energy 
policy. Many Americans were beginning to accept the reality of an energy 
crisis that would eventually be long-term in nature, even though they 
continued to blame Congress for failing to resolve it. In a 1977 News­
week poll: 
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Ninety-two percent of respondents said the govern­
ment had not done all it could to solve the energy 
problem. And approximately half of the sample indi­
cated that they felt the energy companies were re­
sponsible in some way for the crisis. However, 58% 
also indicated that consumers, by failing to conserve, 
were actually responsible for the current crisis. 
(Henderson, 1978a :17) 
On the other hand, it was found that travel preferences and willingness 
to sacrifice had changed little since the advent of the crisis (Fusso, 
1978:127). The American people remained resistant to reducing mileage 
in order to conserve gasoline (Ball, 1977, Brunner and Bennett, 1978; 
Fusso, 1978). As Fusso (1978:126) indicated in a nationwide study; 
In the fall of 1977, one-third said they would 
find it very difficult to reduce the number of 
miles driven and another third would find it 
fairly difficult. 
It was apparent that American consumers saw the need for a reduction in 
travel. Still, their reluctance to be inconvenienced prevailed as: 
1. Sixty percent opposed rationing; 
2. Seventy-eight percent opposed higher taxes 
as a form of rationing; 
3. Seventy-six percent favored keeping the present 
55 mile per hour speed limit ; and 
4. Sixty-three percent indicated they would meet 
the President's request by not driving over the 
speed limit in order to save gasoline reserves. 
(Fusso, 1978:129) 
The message consumers continued to give was that they were willing to 
make the effort to conserve gasoline so long as conservation did not 
interfere with their manner of living or cost too much (Murray et al., 
1974; Brunner and Bennett, 1978). 
An understanding of this apparent lack of acceptance and adaptation 
to the energy crisis has been offered by Brunner and Bennett 
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(1978:242-3): 
President Carter, In order to dramatize the serious­
ness of the energy problem, described it as the moral 
equivalent of war. Only a third of consumers agreed 
with this assertion, and about two-fifths thought that 
this was an overstatement of its gravity. It is inter­
esting to note that approximately one-quarter were un­
decided on this matter, and many indicated they didn't 
understand the President's assertion. Substantiating 
the observation that the people did not understand the 
seriousness of the problem or the proposed program, 40% 
were uncertain whether the nation would be Injured by 
the President's energy program if it was adopted. On 
the other hand, approximately one-third thought that 
the country would suffer If It was enacted and 28% felt 
that the program would not be injurious to the nation's 
economy. Clearly an educational program is essential if 
the program is to receive widespread support. 
In light of the conclusions drawn by Brunner and Bennett (1978) and Rich 
man (1979), educating the American public appears to be critical: 
Despite the gas lines and President Carter's warning, 
most Americans remain doubtful that there is a "real" 
shortage stemming from a genuine depletion of oil re­
sources. Their predominant view is that oil shortages 
have been contrived, particularly by oil companies, to 
raise prices and profits. Americans believe that the 
oil companies and the oil producing countries could 
provide all the gasoline that's wanted for the near 
future. (Richman, 1979:576) 
This increasing skepticism came in the wake of President Carter's 1979 
Energy Address in which he reevaluated his previous warnings to the 
public : 
Our nation's energy problem is getting worse. We 
are wasting too much energy, we are buying far too 
much oil from foreign countries, and we are not pro­
ducing enough oil in the United States. We are by 
far the largest customer for OPEC oil, buying one-
fourth of that foreign cartel's total production. 
This growing dependence has left us dangerously ex­
posed to sudden sharp price rises and interruption in 
supply. In 1973 and 1974, shipment of oil was em­
bargoed and the price quadrupled overnight. These 
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shocks have sent us stem warnings about energy, 
but our nation has not yet responded to these 
warnings. (Energy Policy, 1981:256) 
The American public, however, did respond in a nationwide poll conducted 
by Richman (1979) in which they indicated the following: 
1. In June of 1979, 69% of the American people 
did not believe the energy crisis was as bad as 
President Carter had indicated; 
2. By mid-July, 1979, 53% of the American people 
believed they were merely being told there was 
a real shortage; and 
3. In mid-August of 1979, 65% of the American people 
indicated they did not believe the shortage was 
real. 
These findings were presented on the heels of the first-hand effects 
of the "new" energy crisis. From all indications, gasoline supplies 
would remain tight for the summer of 1979. As California struggled with 
its long lines at gasoline service stations and gasoline shortage, fears 
spread that other states would soon feel the crunch (Shells et al., 
1979:24). In one unprecedented episode: 
As "gasoline-starved" motorists scrambled and schemed 
for short supplies in California, bizarre behavior 
seemed almost ordinary. But when customers lined up 
at a Union 76 Service station in El Cajun, they were 
startled to see the owner presiding in Arab dress, a 
flowing silk bumoose on his head and a .44-caliber 
pistol strapped to his side. "I just got mad seeing 
these lines and wanted to attract some attention to 
our problem," he explained. "Is it the Arabs? Is it 
the government?" (Shells et al., 1979:24) 
The individual's behavior may well have been considered bizarre. However, 
his attitude at that time was shared by a majority of Americans who 
flatly refused to see the energy crisis as anything more than an oil in­
dustry conspiracy (Richman, 1979:576). 
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It was also at this time that President Carter was attempting to 
sell his Contingency Gasoline Rationing Plan to Congress (see Appendix 
B). His proposed plan was an attempt to strike a reasonable balance 
between equity and administrative feasibility. The President indicated 
that: 
Any gasoline rationing plan necessarily will be 
costly and administratively complex, will cause 
hardships to many users, and will inconvenience 
large numbers of gasoline consumers. Nonetheless, 
in a period of serious shortage, gasoline rationing 
would assure access to some gasoline by all motor­
ists at a reasonable, controlled price, reduce or 
eliminate long waiting lines, stabilize the market 
for gasoline, and would significantly mitigate the 
economic dislocations caused by a severe energy 
supply interruption. (Federal Register, Volume 43, 
No. 125—Wednesday, June 28, 1978) 
Even with the severe shortages that occurred during the summer of 1979, 
however, the Carter Administration continued in unsuccessful attempts to 
persuade Congress to pass the rationing plan until August 1, 1980. It 
appeared that the United States had become politically paralyzed over its 
energy policy (Richman, 1979; Shells et al., 1979). A reason for the 
lack of both public and Congressional support could be considered. Pres­
ident Carter, like his predecessors, emphasized conservation and sacrifice 
along with increased production and faith in American technology to give 
the United States energy security in the future (Energy Policy, 1981; 
256-7). And as Wirth (1975), Ball (1977), Henderson (1978a), Henderson 
(1978b), and Shippee (1981) have pointed out, it is this continued em­
phasis on a market-oriented solution to the energy crisis which had led 
to the consistent lack of support and ultimate failure of United States 
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energy planning. For example, Carter Henderson (1978a) argued that: 
Market-oriented supply-demand economics assumes 
that higher prices must inevitably call forth in­
creased supplies of oil, while simultaneously dis­
couraging their use. 
Hazel Henderson (see Henderson, 1978b:15) supported this argument as 
follows : 
This conventional economic approach to the nation's 
energy problems has completely dominated the energy 
debate among lawmakers in Washington, D.C., even 
though the assumptions behind it and the credibility 
of the profession which propounded it are in growing 
disrepute. 
In addition, in 1978, U.S. Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthai 
argued that "the economics profession is close to bankruptcy in under­
standing the energy crisis—before or after the fact." 
The White House and Congress continued to pursue 
the economists' largely discredited rationing-by-
price theories which cannot possibly bring America's 
gluttonous energy appetite under control. 
(Fortune, cited in Henderson, 1978a:15) 
The conclusion drawn is that a large gap exists between the magni­
tude of the energy crisis and the resolutions offered to the American 
people, which has called for only minimal sacrifices in lifestyle and 
economic growth (Orr, 1981:7). In the words of one critic (Orr, 1981:9) 
"the government's energy program resembles the captain of the Titanic 
asking the passengers to close their portholes for fear of getting wet." 
Politicians and economists alike have continued to emphasize a "painless" 
resolution to the energy crisis, as they suggest voluntary conservation 
and the use of price mechanisms to control gasoline consumption, neither 
of which has been successful (Freeman, 1973; Businessweek, 1974; Wirth, 
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1975; Sacco, 1976; Willenborg and Pitts, 1977; Burnett, 1978; Richman, 
1979; Knowles, 1980; Martin, 1981; Marbach et al., 1982). 
Rationing by Price; Why Hasn't It Worked? 
Gasoline price increases have been both an ineffective and infla­
tionary method of regulating gasoline consumption. While consumers appear 
to be opposed to price increases, they have not, to any appreciable ex­
tent, changed their driving habits (Murray et al., 1974; Sacco, 1976; 
Willenborg and Pitts, 1977; Brunner and Bennett, 1978). For example, in 
1974 (see Figure 3) it was found that: 
Despite the fact that gasoline prices jumped 43% 
since June of 1973, vehicle usage in the United 
States turned up faster than anticipated. Americans 
stepped up their driving despite the fact that they 
were paying an average of $.56 a gallon compared 
with $.39 in 1973. (Businessweek, 1974:58) 
Consumers express a preference for cheap energy. Still, a majority, 
when faced with continued increases in price, forego other expenditures 
(e.g., food and savings) rather than cut back on driving (Businessweek, 
1974:58). A reason for this has been offered by Willenborg and Pitts 
(1977:29). They suggested the gradual, though steady, rise in gasoline 
prices since 1973 permitted consumers to become accustomed to the higher 
price levels and adapt to them. For example: 
In the mid-1973 to mid-1974 period, gasoline prices 
increased by 45-50%, or by 4% a month. These in­
creases had an apparently negligible effect on the 
number of miles driven by consumers. Price mechan­
isms did not act as deterrents to drivers, even in 
a period of unusually rapid and steady price 
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Gasoline prices have risen 
sharply . . . 
. . . but vehicle usage is coming 
back fast. 
Regular gasoline 
J J A S O N D J F M A M J  
cents/gallon average in 
55 cities 
J J A S O N D J F M A M J  
percent increase over same 
month of previous year; 
total vehicle miles includ-
in trucks 
Data : Piatt's Oilgram Data : Federal Highway Admin­
istration, BW est. 
Figure 3. Consumer response to gasoline price increases from 
June 1973 through June 1974 (Businessweek, 1974:58) 
increases. An extremely inelastic demand situation 
seems to have prevailed. (Willenborg and Pitts, 
1977:30) 
While the precise effects of price on gasoline supply and demand are 
not known, it has been predicted that: 
gasoline demand will fall by about one percent for 
each four percent increase in price. Supply will 
then rise by about one percent for each five percent 
increase in price. (Henderson, 1978a :18) 
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On the other hand, economists have indicated that "actual" consumer re­
sponse to gasoline price increases may be less than that which was pre­
dicted (Businessweek, 1974:58). The most promising estimates have shown 
that a 10% increase in price would cut demand by less than 3%. This was 
reinforced by Willenborg and Pitts (1977:31) who suggested that only a 
dramatic price increase—perhaps about 100 percent—would be effective 
in lowering gasoline consumption. As a result, "even at once unheard 
of prices, most Americans would undoubtedly still find ways to keep 
their tanks full and maintain their current levels of travel" (Sacco, 
1976; Moncrief et al., 1977; Brunner and Bennett, 1978; Richman, 1979). 
As Martin (1981) suggested, perhaps it is not possible to instill into 
American consumers a conservation ethic because they are not interested 
in saving energy, especially for its own sake (1981:104). This appears 
to be consistent with Henderson's (1978a :17) assertion that: 
the American way of life is sustained by the burning 
of petroleum and more than 130 million American 
motorists are not about to let a few pennies per gal­
lon interfere with what they see as their God-given 
right to drive when, where, and in whatever manner 
they please. 
Thus, it may not be feasible to assume that gasoline consumption will 
decline in relationship to the amount of price increases. 
It would appear that there are many persons who 
consider it a necessity to continue to drive the 
distances they currently travel, who are willing 
to pay a price which increased nearly 60% in two 
years, and who will resist cutbacks even in the 
face of gradually increasing prices. Thus, the 
reduction of gasoline usage can probably best be 
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accomplished through manipulation of elements in 
the total picture other than price mechanisms. 
(Wlllenborg and Pitts, 1977:31) 
Rationing: Will It Work Again? 
Consumers seem to be either unaware or unconcerned about the pos­
sibility of future energy shortages. They apparently do not comprehend 
the ramifications of their continued demand for more and more energy 
supplies. Freeman (1973:2) suggests that the inevitable result is 
that : 
energy problems will worsen If the United States 
falls to face disagreeable facts, abandon old 
habits, and make the difficult choices involved 
in shaping new energy policies. 
Continued price increases used to curtail gasoline consumption do 
not appear to be the answer. As Burnett (1978:43) has pointed out: 
Americans have become so wedded to their auto­
mobiles that it isn't clear If any price would 
make them drive much less. Indeed, a recent sur­
vey of business executives showed that prices 
could go as high as $2 a gallon without curtail­
ing the urge to drive. 
In fact, the only thing higher prices guarantee is more inflation, which 
is the number-one concern of the American people (Burnett, 1978:43). 
Thus, it could be suggested that all the government would need to do is 
show consumers the relationship between rationing and the control of 
inflation and they will accept rationing (Burnett, 1978:48; Henderson, 
1978a;17). This parallels with a survey conducted by the Lundberg Letter 
in 1977. At that time, it was found that 60% of the American people 
would favor gasoline rationing "if they were offered a choice between 
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(it) and considerably higher prices" (see Henderson, 1978a:18). 
Those who oppose rationing do not appear to have realistically 
assessed the long-term nature of the crisis. They have not acknowledged 
President Carter's 1979 energy address to the nation in which he stated: 
The world has not prepared for the future. Dur­
ing the 1950's, people used twice as much oil as 
during the 1940's. During the I960's, we used 
twice as much as during the 1950's. And in each 
of those decades, more oil was consumed than in 
all of mankind's previous history. World consump­
tion of oil is still going up. If it were possible 
to keep it rising during the 1970's and 1980's by 
5% a year as it has in the past, we could use up 
all the proven reserves of oil in the entire world 
by the end of the next decade. (Energy Policy, 1981:252) 
As a result, the following arguments have been posited: 
1. The public will not accept gasoline rationing. 
(Burnett, 1978:43) 
2. Its administration would require a vast govern­
ment agency that would quickly become yet another 
bureaucratic disaster. (Burnett, 1978:48) 
3. Continued price increases are a natural curb on 
demand. (Freeman, 1973; Rlchman, 1979) 
These arguments appear to be a measure of the government's unwillingness 
to accept the responsibility for the development of a strong and compre­
hensive national energy policy (Wirth, 1975; Shippee, 1981). One reason 
for this lack of commitment to dealing with the energy problem might well 
be that only another crisis or the innnediate threat of a crisis would 
prompt a new look at emergency preparedness. As late as 1980, Congress 
simply did not want to give even the appearance of telling Americans to 
use less gasoline (Energy Policy, 1981:95). 
They remained hesitant to be in the position of 
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being an obstructionist force which restricts 
individual freedom. (Energy Policy, 1981:96) 
This, however, may be understandable in light of the serious con­
cerns about rationing voiced by large and politically powerful organiza­
tions such as the National Automobile Association. Its members have 
argued that consumers would not tolerate the drastic reductions in travel 
mobility which rationing would demand. Operating with this assumption, 
in 1979, they began a nationwide advertising campaign using the theme, 
"Help us protect your freedcm to drive" (Energy Policy, 1981:96). The 
campaign was financed by Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, and others who 
were instrumental in forming a new corporation called the Automobility 
Fund. The following is a statement of the focus of its members: 
"Don't take your wheels for granted," stated one 
advertisement that appeared in February 1979 issues 
of national magazines. "There are people in govern­
ment and others, whose only answer to our energy 
problem is to restrict use of the automobile. . . . 
Join with us. . . . Because if you don't speak up 
today, your freedom to drive may be restricted to­
morrow." (Energy Policy, 1981:96) 
Nonetheless, proponents of gasoline rationing continue to justify and 
legitimate its implementation. They argue the following: 
1. Gasoline rationing would give the United States 
immediate control over the consumption factor of 
the petroleum equation while alerting the Ameri­
can people to the reality of the energy crisis. 
(Henderson, 1978a:17) 
2. For most Americans, gasoline rationing would 
force some "real" energy conservation for the 
first time since 1974. (Burnett, 1978:43) 
3. Gasoline rationing would buy the time needed to 
develop the new energy sources and techniques the 
United States will need to survive in the twenty-
first century. (Burnett, 1978:48) 
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Gasoline rationing would make the United States 
immune from future oil embargoes. (Burnett, 1978; 
Henderson, 1978a) 
Rationing would empower the federal government 
to begin the critical and heretofore impossible 
job of slowing, halting, and then gradually re­
versing the unsustainable and ruinous growth of 
energy consumption. (Henderson, 1978a;18) 
Gasoline rationing would dispel the confusion sur­
rounding the sudden jumps in prices at the pumps 
which has been caused by the fact that the motor­
ist had only a vague idea of who was getting what 
out of the price he was paying for a gallon of 
gasoline or where it came from. (Kiowles, 1980:160) 
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CHAPTER III, THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Social scientists are preoccupied mainly with "techniques", 
"narrow concrete problems", and "analytical theorizing". 
Detached from empirical realities, recent sociology has 
produced neither a great synthesis nor discovered a great 
empirical unifoimity. Through empirical research, recent 
sociology has given us a fuller knowledge of a few specks 
and dimensions of the total immense, multidimensional 
social reality, but it has not substantially Increased our 
understanding of the total "superorganic" reality. 
(Sorokin, 1965:833-843) 
As Sorokin (1965:833-843) has pointed out, in the mass accumula­
tion of facts that has traditionally preoccupied social science research, 
little new sociological knowledge has been generated. He argues that 
because of an almost exclusive emphasis on microsociological problems 
to the exclusion of "different realities or the total sociocultural uni­
verse" (1965:836), sociology suffers from a lack of theoretical integra­
tion. That is, the emphasis on lower-level analytical theories provides 
a knowledge of only "specks" of social reality. These specks are "often 
viewed in isolation from the whole configuration of which they are a 
part" (1965:837). As a result, "the knowledge which is generated is ob­
viously meager and limited" (1965:837). 
In addition, social science models which are developed from lower-
level analytical theories have largely been a reflection of a rational 
posltivist (or objectivist) mode of thought. That is, the assumptions 
are made that: 
1. Reality exists external to individuals; once individuals 
come into interaction, they form social structures which 
constrain their subsequent Interactions. 
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2. Through the development of abstract theory, the social 
world can be understood. 
3. In trying to understand the social world, the contaminat­
ing influence of human senses and intellectual biases can 
be suspended by the application of the scientific method. 
(Turner, 1978:393) 
Social scientists are both encouraged and rewarded for adopting this 
mode of thought to understand the social world (Bierstedt, (1974; Bern­
stein, 1978; Skidmore, 1979; Ritzer, 1980, 1981; Perrow, 1981; Kinloch, 
1981). As Skidmore (1979:25) points out: 
Objective things, in principle, can be measured, counted, ob­
served, and correlated. This is an advantage to the social 
scientist who wishes to make the strongest possible empirical 
case for his theories, and to use observable facts to do it. 
There is also a formidable argument that there is no alter­
native to the objective approach. 
There are two potentially critical problems that have emerged as 
a result of the acceptance of rational positivism. First, as Zeitlin 
(1973), Kinloch (1981), and Perrow (1981) have commented, social scien­
tists appear to be primarily interested in constructing rational models 
of human behavior based on extant mainstream sociological theories. 
Their concern has not included the testing of whether or not the theories 
themselves are valid representations of social reality. Thus, the social 
scientist does not ask if his theory accurately reflects social reality; 
rather he asks, "Does my model accurately reflect the theory?". A second 
and related problem which emerges involves the social scientist's insist­
ence on the intrinsic rationality of social action (Kinloch, 1981:57), 
indeed on rationality as the "norm of science" (Barber, see Merton, 1973: 
225). An emphasis on rational behavior to the exclusion of an emphasis 
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on nonrational behavior (see Chapter I) has led social scientists to 
approach most, if not all, of the phenomena of human existence in the 
attempt to reduce them to evermore rationally consistent, orderly, and 
generalized forms of understanding (Zeitlin, 1973; Bierstedt, 1974; 
Bernstein, 1978; Kinloch, 1981; Perrow, 1981). Thus, the goal of social 
science research is to study "empirical regularities that are taken to 
be reflections of the external laws of an objective social reality in­
dependent of man's constitutive activity" (Ritzer, 1980:120). Emphases 
on rationality and objectivity have created a belief that it is possible 
to "observe, count, put data into the computer, have them analyzed sta­
tistically, and in this way gain valuable knowledge about human beings" 
(Morris, 1977:4), The primary requirement is that the social scientist 
must act as a disinterested and detached observer having "no vital or 
practical interest in the situation he observes, only a cognitive or 
theoretical one" (Zeitlin, 1973:179). It is accepted that this point of 
view will permit the social scientist to "observe interaction from the 
outside uninvolved in the hopes and fears of the participants, sharing 
none of their anxiety about the outcome of their actions" (Zeitlin, 1973: 
179). Such an approach assumes that human conduct is shaped primarily 
by common norms. This point of view obviously restricts the range of 
human behaviors of relevance to the social scientist (Wrong, 1982:104-
114), and may well lead to a one-sided, static interpretation of social 
reality because it does not consider the Inherently dynamic and ever 
changing nature of social Interaction (Schutz, 1967; Zeitlin, 1973); 
Bernstein, 1978; Ritzer, 1975, 1980, 1981; Kinloch, 1981; Perrow, 1981). 
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Continued emphasis on the development of rational posltlvlstlc models of 
human behavior may serve only to undermine the ultimate goal of social 
science research--the goal of understanding social reality. 
The author suggests that social scientists can no longer evade the 
anomalies that defeat the current tradition of sociological inquiry. As 
Rltzer (1981:212) comments: 
It is difficult to see how an unreal world (detached from 
empirical reality) peopled by mindless puppets helps us 
much in understanding a real world where people clearly 
have the conscious capacity to create, negotiate, and so 
forth. 
Until social scientists begin to reexamine the fundamental assumptions 
Inherent in the image of their subject matter, Sorokin (1965:837) points 
out, there will continue to be an overabundant supply of statistical 
samples and collections of objective facts. 
In addition social scientists will continue to suggest some 
refinements of the techniques of interviewing or question­
ing, statistical sampling, data processing and content 
analysis, some elaboration of soclometric, psychodramatlc, 
"scalogrammatlc", "group dynamic", "operational", "projective", 
"cybernetic", "semantic", "functional-structural", and "analyt­
ical" research; they furnish us with a number of formulae of 
uniformities, indexes, and tests, allegedly more "precise" 
than before; and once in a while they offer an improved varia­
tion of a previous sociological theory. But when these refine­
ments, improvements, and reformulations are viewed in the light 
of the preceding currents of sociological thought, they turn 
out to be, at best, improvements of details only and sometimes 
no improvements at all. (Sorokin, 1965:837) 
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Chapter Goals 
The Inadequacies associated with past attempts to understand, ex­
plain, and predict consumer response to an energy crisis of unknown 
parameters appear to be a direct result of theoretical and methodologi­
cal limitations of social science research, in particular the rational 
positivist mode of thought. As such, the ultimate objective of this 
chapter is to develop a theory of decision-making which will permit an 
adequate understanding of potential consumer travel behaviors which may 
occur under conditions of energy scarcity. Attainment of this goal will 
necessarily involve: 1) a critique of the rational positivist's approach 
to understanding consumer response to the energy crisis, 2) a reexamina­
tion of the role of rationality in the decision-making process, 3) a re-
evaluation of the value of Max Weber's contributions to an objective 
(or scientific) understanding of social action, and 4) an alternative to 
traditional images of the decision-making process: A phenomenological 
model of decision-making. 
Theoretical and methodological limitations of rational positivism; 
The energy crisis 
Because of the atheoretical nature of existing studies of consumer 
responses to the energy crisis, many researchers would be hard-pressed 
to explain the event described in the Newsweek quotation below; 
Rationing got off to a bumpy start where the shortages were 
worst. Panicky motorists bluffed and bribed to beat the 
odd-even system and station operators took most of the heat. 
One station operator reported, "one guy I didn't serve before 
his tank was full said he'd come back and drop a hand-grenade 
on me. There is a panic at the pumps and it's the worst I've 
ever seen." (Newsweek, 1979:22) 
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With the exception of two articles reviewed for this study (Willenborg 
and Pitts, 1977; Martin, 1981), theoretical justifications and expla­
nations were conspicuously absent. On the other hand, studies reviewed 
contained detailed discussions of methodology and statistical findings. 
This may be somewhat understandable, though not justifiable when it is 
recognized that "methodology is often confused with sociological theory 
and 'theory' has come to have a somewhat pejorative connotation in 
sociological discourse" (Bierstedt, 1974:134). The implication is that 
theory is subordinate to methodology and as such is "useful" only in­
sofar as it aids research by serving as a source of hypotheses or as a 
fabricator of analytical tools (Sorokin, 1965; Bierstedt, 1974). 
Several studies evaluated by the author for this investigation were 
nationwide opinion polls and surveys designed to provide insights into 
consumer attitude and response to the energy crisis (Moncrief et al., 
1977; Brunner and Bennett, 1978; Fusso, 1978; Richman, 1979). These polls 
produced a wide variety of facts. For example, it was found that: 
1. Gasoline availability and price will influence future 
travel behavior plans either not at all or very little. 
(Moncrief et al., 1977:248) 
2. About one-half of the consumers polled believed it was 
possible to conserve energy and at the same time main­
tain their present standard of living. (Brunner and 
Bennett, 1978:248) 
3. Sixty percent of the consumers polled opposed a plan of 
permanent rationing of gasoline as a means of cutting 
back on the amount of gasoline people use in their cars. 
(Fusso, 1978:132) 
4. Sixty-five percent of the consumers polled say there is 
not a "real" shortage of gasoline. The big oil companies 
are holding it back for their own advantages. (Richman, 
1979) 
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These and other similar "facts" have been used in the development of 
United States energy policy placing a focus on: 
1. Obtaining adequate supplies of gasoline for public 
consumption. (Freeman, 1973; Wirth, 1975; Bearden 
et al., 1977; Richman, 1979) 
2. The growing dependence on foreign oil which must en­
courage the Iftiited States to intensify research and 
development efforts so that energy independence can 
be reached. (Energy Policy, 1981) 
3. Control versus decontrol of gasoline prices. (Freeman, 
1973; Businessweek, 1974; Corsi and Harvey, 1977; Willen-
borg and Pitts, 1977; Ball, 1977; Moncrief et al., 
1977; Bearden et al., 1977; Burnett, 1978; Martin, 
1981) 
4. Concern for continued freedom and transportation mobil­
ity for American consumers. (Murray et al,, 1974; 
Brunner and Bennett, 1978; Richman, 1979; Energy Policy, 
1981) 
Henderson (1978a:15) points out it is assumed these issues can be in­
corporated into energy policies which will reflect the best interests 
of the United States energy budget and the values and needs of the Amer­
ican people. It is thus assumed that American consumers understand and 
accept the energy crisis as a legitimate problem, resolvable "without 
undue personal hardship" (Ball, 1977:48-51). The author suggests, how­
ever, that policies developed from fact-finding wholly objective research 
are prone to failure. 
Past U.S. energy policies, for example, that suggest the energy 
crisis can be resolved assume that: 
1. Mankind's future well-being is intimately linked to 
the prospects for an abundant supply of energy at 
reasonable prices. (Kahn et al., 1976:59) 
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2. The energy crisis is basically a supply problem and 
only secondarily one of excess demand. 
(Orr, 1981:7) 
There are two basic reasons why an emphasis on these issues will lead to 
a continued failure of energy planning in the United States. First, the 
energy problem is authentic and will be long-term in nature (Ball, 1977: 
48). Â second and related reason why an emphasis on a supply-demand 
approach to the energy crisis will fail involves an understanding and 
evaluation of the complex nature of social action. Researchers must be­
gin to realize that all of the knowledge consumers have gained about the 
energy crisis has been conditioned or colored by the meaning contexts 
within which it has been acquired, transmitted, or learned. American 
consumers have been bombarded from all sides with facts about the energy 
crisis. Their exposure has come through television, advertising, the 
news media, and their own past experiences, each of which has been criti­
cal in shaping perceptions and guiding travel decisions. Murray et al, 
(1974), Kristol and Anderson (1977), Pusso (1978), Ball (1977), Henderson 
(1978a), and Shlppee (1981) all point out that many of these facts have 
been inaccurate and misleading. It is also important to note that many 
consumers do not possess the "intellectual tools" (Sullivan et al., 1980: 
38) needed to evaluate the accuracy of the information given them. Even 
if they did, March and Simon (1958:137-171) point out: 
Individuals cannot process large amounts of information 
but only limited bits, and these slowly. Information is 
distorted as it is processed. Individuals cannot gather 
Information very well even if they could process it; they 
do not always know what is relevant information. Inasmuch 
as they do not always understand how things work. Above 
all, they cannot even be sure what their preferences are. 
64 
They also have contradictory preferences, of contradictory 
goals, and are unable to fulfill them all at once. As a 
consequence, they do not always look for optimal solutions; 
they settle for the first acceptable solution to come along. 
In other words, consumers possess only a limited capacity for cognition 
and understanding, and much of it is profoundly dependent on their sub­
jective interpretation of the energy crisis. Sullivan et al. (1980:38) 
have indicated the ability to accurately evaluate consumer perception of 
the energy crisis is important because policies developed to resolve 
problems are based on public understanding and acceptance of certain in­
formation and facts. As such it would appear necessary to reexamine the 
reasoning for continuing fact-finding studies of consumer response to 
the energy crisis. As Bierstedt (1974:145) points out: 
Sociologists are currently laboring under the impression 
that for some reason it is important to invade the Ameri­
can community with a battery of schedules and question­
naires and to compile as many facts about them as it is 
possible to stuff into a filing cabinet. 
The consequences of fact-finding approaches appea/c obvious to Bierstedt 
(1974:143-144) who comments; 
The more a sociological investigation resembles a collec­
tion of facts, no matter how comprehensive, complete, and 
accurate they might happen to be, the less is its scien­
tific significance. A survey or a census no matter what its 
intrinsic merit or utility does not contribute to a science 
except in its function as a laboratory for testing the tools 
of research, and as a source of data upon which to construct 
rational scientific theory. 
Continued dependence on opinion polling agencies such as the Gallup or 
Harris Polls (Fusso, 1978) and consumer surveys such as those conducted 
by Moncrief et al. (1977), Brunner and Bennett (1978), and Richman (1979) 
places an inappropriate emphasis upon an "aimless assembly of facts" 
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(Bierstedt, 1974:144) about the energy crisis while subordinating or 
abandoning the role of theory to explain them (Sorokin, 1965; Bierstedt, 
1974). Facts do not speak for themselves. They become meaningful only 
when they are grounded in theory; when the theoretical question, "Why did 
this occur?" is asked. As Sullivan et al. (1980:38) point out, facts 
without theories are merely unsubstantiated statements. In addition, as 
Skidmore (1979:25) comments, when the theoretical question is asked: 
"Why are these objective things the way they are and not 
otherwise?" pure objectivity does not carry us very far. 
As soon as an answer to one of these questions comes in 
terms of will, choice, belief, value, and so on, we are 
out of the realm of objectivity and face to face with 
human motives, which do not respond well to "purely" 
objective research. 
In the pursuit of objectivity, it may be that the goal of sociolog­
ical theory has been misplaced—the goal of generating adequate explana­
tions of social reality. Others too have noted (Kinloch, 1981; Perrow, 
1981; Ritzer, 1981) that in their insistence that insights can be gained 
through the study of objective reality, social scientists fail to realize 
they are attempting to explain events, many of which are, as Perrow (1981: 
3) points out : 
the result of happenstance, accidents, misunderstandings, 
and even random, unmotivated behavior. They write articles 
with simple, elegant, and inclusive hypotheses of what the 
world "should" look like. They test their models with ques­
tionnaires that create the world they want to "prove" exists. 
Each step contains self-deception. 
Also inherent in the fact-finder's methodology is the assumption 
that "rational calculation on the motivational and behavioral levels, is 
the prime mover of social conduct" (Brown, 1978:160). Such an assumption 
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seems only to aggravate the problem pointed out by Perrow (see previous 
citation). As Ritzer (1975:112) comments, this rational and artificial 
approach to understanding the social world leads to the assumption that 
social action is determined by general "laws" which regulate social 
behavior. These laws can be "revealed objectively through empirical 
techniques construed to constitute the scientific method" (Ritzer, 1975: 
112). As March and Simon (1958) point out, however, awareness of the 
alternatives, facts, and information may not be sufficient to permit 
American consumers to make rational decisions concerning their travel 
options. Mills too (see Sullivan et al., 1980:38) suggests: 
In this Age of Fact, information dominates their attention 
and overwhelms their capacities to assimilate it. It is 
not only the skills of reason that they need - although 
their struggles to acquire these often exhaust their limited 
moral energy. What they need and what they feel they need, 
is a quality of mind that will help them to use information 
and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations 
of what is going on in the world and of what may be happen­
ing within themselves. 
The recognition of limited capacity for cognition advanced by March and 
Simon (1958) and Mills (see Sullivan et al,, 1980) is consistent with 
Perrow's comments on rationality and social action. To reiterate: 
Neither social scientists nor people in general are as 
smart and rational as we think they are. Social scien­
tists mask this reality by desperately trying to make 
sense of many things that are really quite senseless when 
examined closely. Yet they convey the impression of law­
ful, even rational behavior because of research techniques 
that are largely self-serving. (Perrow, 1981:2) 
The author's intent is not to imply that rational human action does 
not occur; for it surely does (Kockelmans, 1979:86). Rather the goal is 
to acknowledge "limited rationality" (Perrow, 1981:2-9) and "nonrational 
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behavior" (Brown, 1978:160), to generally widen the scope of behaviors 
of concern to the social scientist as he attempts to understand the 
complex attitudes and consumer responses to the energy crisis. This 
will necessarily involve a réévaluation of the social scientist's tradi­
tional emphasis on finding and discussing rationally determined relation­
ships between concepts. 
The problem of rationality 
Most of the time individuals do make rational decisions; and they 
allege to have good reasons for their actions. The result of the deci­
sions made may have been contrary to what rational individuals "should 
do". Nonetheless, it has been suggested (Skidmore, 1979:119) that all 
forms of individual decisions to act are oriented toward some goal, re­
gardless of the motives or reasons given. Perhaps then the social sci­
ence debate over rational versus nonrational behavior is superfluous 
(Kockelmans, 1979:86). On the other hand, it could be argued that the 
problems inherent in the use of rationality to understand social action 
are relevant to any school of thought or methodology concerned with 
understanding social action in general and the decision-making process 
in particular. As Kockelmans (1979:86) comments: 
I am convinced that any sociologist who engages in 
a debate over the rationality of social actions is 
concerned with an issue of great importance in social 
theory. 
In a review of the theoretical literature in sociology, it was found 
that a number of social theorists have begun to address the problems with 
objectivity and rationality in social science research. Sorokin (1965), 
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Schutz (1967, 1970), Berger and Luckmann (1966), Zeitlin (1973); Ritzer 
(1975, 1980, 1981), Kinloch (1981), and Perrow (1981) have indicated that 
one of the major problems found by the sociologist in attempting to re­
main detached or objective is the inevitability of: 
the imposition of rationality upon individuals (as an 
interpretive device) rather than appreciating their own 
construction of reality as methods in their own right. 
Social scientists in particular make human beings out 
to be "judgmental dopes", attempt to "remedy" their be­
havior through empirical and theoretical devices, and 
search for the "Invariant" and "calculable" in their 
research. (Kinloch, 1981:138) 
The "judgmental" or "cultural" dope model (Kinloch, 1981; Zeitlin, 1973) 
appears to have been developed in an attempt to; 1) mask the limited 
capability possessed by individuals for cognition; 2) fulfill a need to 
make sense of things, to find an order, to acknowledge a rationality; 
3) to eliminate disorder with rational designs; and 4) to generally 
simplify explanations of all types of social action (Perrow, 1981:2-9). 
In their search for order, social scientists have created artificial 
social beings "who have no real biographical situation in the social 
world" (Ritzer, 1981:211). It is not the individuals under study but 
rather social scientists who define their situation for them (Zeitlin, 
1973; Perrow, 1981; R.itzer, 1981; Kinloch, 1981). This one-sided image 
of human action cannot account for the fact that, as Morris (1977:5) 
points out: 
The actions of human beings can be understood only if 
cultural definitions and the meanings implicit in per­
sonal and emotional feelings are taken into account, 
together with a consideration of the situations In 
which the behavior occurs. 
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A majority of social scientists fall short of providing much, if 
any, insight into this apparently subjective dimension of human action 
because of their commitment to a narrow sense of science (Ritzer, 1981: 
211). Essentially, their position is that the subjective dimension of 
human action cannot be studied scientifically, and as such, is not a 
legitimate part of the field (Ritzer, 1981:211). The problem is, as 
Ritzer (1981:211) points out; 
Whether or not subjectivity can be studied scientifically, 
it is a significant aspect of the social world. Thus to 
ignore it for scientific or other reasons is to ignore an 
important component of social reality. In ignoring it, 
sociologists simply create a source of unexplained vari­
ance in their work. 
Social scientists nonetheless have maintained the scientific attitude. 
In the process they have developed for imposition on the social world, a 
"standardization of common understandings" (Kinloch, 1981:139). Such a 
perspective leads to a conception of the character and consequences of 
social action in terms of: 
standardized expectancies, compliance with preestablished 
and legitimate alternatives of action that the common 
culture provides, a hierarchy of needs dispositions, and 
available theories of the formal properties of signs and 
symbols. Social scientists underestimate the individual's 
interpretive complexity by controlling the research envi­
ronment and interpreting the subject's behavior only in 
reference to these standardized expectancies. (Kinloch, 
1981:141) 
The conceptual model of social action described by Kinloch (1981:138, 141) 
contains limitations and deficiencies which would render the adequate 
understanding of consumer response to the energy crisis impossible. In 
illustration, during the gasoline shortages of 1979, American consumers 
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were told that "topping off"—filling their gasoline tanks when they are 
nearly full already--could create a critical problem. The Atlantic 
Ritchfield Company, during the 1979 shortages, distributed a pamphlet 
titled, Oil: America's Continuing Crisis. In it, consumers were in­
formed that; 
The average car contains about four gallons of gasoline 
at any given time. If motorists suddenly start topping 
off their tanks - as in the 1973 embargo - millions of 
barrels of gasoline will shift from service stations to 
"personal inventory". We would have the effects of a 
shortage - including lines - when no real shortage exists. 
Many consumers did top off their gasoline tanks in spite of this and 
other well-publicized warnings. Such behavior was nonrational in the 
theoretical sense of the term. As a result, it could be suggested that 
it occurred because of consumer ignorance or stupidity. However, had 
the researcher investigated the subjective dimension leading to consumer 
decisions, it may have been discovered that there was a strong relation­
ship between consumer belief in the reality of the energy crisis and 
tendency to top off gasoline tanks; or between distance driven to work 
each day and topping off. It could even have been related to the "Amer­
ican as energy glutton" label which consumers may have felt was unjusti­
fied. Consumers topping off their tanks may have merely been striking 
back at what they believed to be an unnecessary negative label. As 
Bradshaw (1979:2-7) points out, America has become an energy intensive 
society because energy has always been both cheap and plentiful. There­
fore, it is neither fair nor constructive to point a finger at the 
American people and say, "You are energy gluttons". The point is, unless 
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the social scientist can understand the meaning context in which con­
sumer travel decisions are made, an adequate evaluation of their actions 
will not be possible. 
Rationality and teleology 
The predetermined and rational perception of social action pre­
sented by the "judgmental dope" model is simplistic and ideologically 
biased. It may well lead the researcher into a teleological explanation 
of consumer travel behavior. Teleological analysis indicates that "some 
future consequence of an event causes that very event to occur" (Turner, 
1978:26). Woodman (1977:6) comments : 
Teleological arguments are those which predispose 
the reader to presume that events are heading toward 
some unalterable and somehow predictable outcome. 
As a result, if consumer travel decisions are presumed to be rational, 
the danger of teleological reasoning emerges. That is, it may be as-
summed that the effect of rational consumer travel decisions—a stabil­
ized U.S. energy budget--is the assumed cause of those decisions. In 
illustration, it has been pointed out by a number of researchers (Ball, 
1977; Henderson, 1978a; Shippee, 1981; Martin, 1981) that consumers 
must significantly slow down their consumption of gasoline if the 
United States is to expect to resolve the energy crisis. One way in 
which this could be accomplished is for consumers to change their mode 
of transportation from private automobile to the use of mass transit. 
Therefore, if mass transit is available, and consumers decide to use it 
as an alternate form of transportation to and frcm work, it may be 
assumed they have made a rational decision. This decision to ride the 
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bus will help in stabilizing the United States energy budget. However, 
in an analysis of this decision, it may be concluded that the effect of 
consumers' decisions to use mass trans it--movement toward a more stable 
U.S. energy budget—is also the assumed cause of the decision to use 
mass transit. Such an assumption may narrow the range of acceptable be­
haviors for consumers for whom the option of using mass transit exists. 
This may in turn create a large category of "nonrational" individuals 
(e.g., those whose decisions instead reflect their politics, concerns 
for safety, fun, privacy, or tradition). Teleological reasoning seems 
to deny the reality and meaningfulness of the Hobbesian question, "How 
is social order possible?" It implies that consumers will internalize 
the norms of society—in this case, that the energy crisis demands use of 
available mass transit--because they are motivated by the desire to 
attain a favorable image of themselves by winning acceptance and/or 
status in the eyes of others—in this case, by contributing to the sta­
bility of the United States energy budget. It is further assumed that: 
People are so profoundly sensitive to the expecta­
tions of others that all action is inevitably guided 
by these expectations. (Wrong, 1982:108) 
There are two identifiable problems with these premises. The first is 
that they lead to an image of society as an a11-encompassing phenomenon 
that controls, shapes, and molds the individual. As Skidmore (1979:27) 
points out: 
In its extreme form the argument leads to the conclu­
sion that whatever society wishes to make of us, it 
can. The individual has no power of resistance. 
Ritzer (1981:207-214) comments too that in its construction of an 
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artificial social reality this "determinist" point of view relies 
strongly on the need individuals have to conform to societal expecta­
tions that contribute to the social order. As Wrong (1982:108) has in­
dicated, however, the social scientist must ask himself the following 
question: 
How is it that violence, conflict, revolution, and 
the individual's sense of coercion by society manage 
to exist at all, if this view is correct? 
Ironically, it is often assumed that human action that does not fall 
within the realm of social acceptability has only limited relevance or 
is thoroughly unsound (Wrong, 1982:108). Deviant or nonconforming beha­
vior is thus accounted for by special circumstances, all of which label 
the individual in a pejorative manner. These include labels such as 
"ambiguous norms, anomie, role conflict, or greater cultural stress on 
valued goals than on the approved means for attaining them" (Wrong, 
1982:34). 
In their attempts to justify a static conception of social action, 
social scientists have left little room for the inclusion of the wide 
ranging scope of consumer perspectives on the energy crisis that actu­
ally influence travel decisions. That is, each perception held by con­
sumers about the energy crisis will inevitably lead to different actions. 
Therefore, it would seem that an evaluation of consumer responses to 
the energy crisis demands a far more complex examination of social action 
and the course it follows in the decision-making process. As such, this 
examination demands a réévaluation of one of the cornerstones of rational 
positivism, that "social action is determined by institutionalized 
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patterns, or that human conduct is totally shaped by common norms" 
(Wrong, 1982:105). 
Institutionalized patterns of social action appear in the form of 
social facts (social structures and social institutions) which are char­
acterized by their external nature and coercive power. They are pre­
sumed to exist independent of any individual manifestations. Peter Blau 
(1960:178) distinguished between two basic types of social facts: 
1. Social structures : networks of social relations in 
which processes of social interaction become organized 
and through which social positions become differentiated. 
2. Social institutions : which consist of the common values 
and norms embodied in a culture or subculture. 
The conception of social facts implies that reality exists sui generis, 
apart from the individual (Durkheim, 1964). As a result, once individ­
uals come into interaction, they form social structures and social in­
stitutions which govern future interaction and develop the potential to 
define and determine individual behavior. 
Social facts do guide human action. However, granting real or con­
crete status to socially constructed phenomena Introduces the danger of 
reification, which, according to Berger and Luckmann (1966:82), indi­
cates : 
an apprehension of social phenomena as if they were 
something other than human products - such as facts 
of nature, cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine 
will. 
Berger and Luckmann (1966:82) further comment that; 
Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting 
hlw own authorship of the human world, and further, that 
the dialectic between man the producer, and his products 
75 
is lost to consciousness. The reified world is, by 
definition, a dehumanized world. It is experienced by 
man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum over which 
he has no control rather than as the opus proprium of 
his own productive activity. 
Reification may lead to the researcher to view social facts as if they 
contained a timelessly valid quality, which implies they must be adjusted 
to, rather than altered or changed (Ritzer, 1980:46-47). When this view 
is accepted, the social scientist may neglect a consideration of the 
interpretive processes that take place in the mind of man which amounts 
to a denial that much of social action is influenced by the dynamics of 
reality construction and is not directly observable. An overemphasis on 
social facts further downplays the realization that: 
Human beings are not merely acted upon by objectively 
and clearly defined social forces; they are constantly 
shaping and creating their own social reality In Inter­
action with others. (Morris, 1977:8) 
A new direction 
The author suggests that a careful examination and evaluation of 
consumer responses to the energy crisis in general and to potentially 
restrictive conditions of energy constraint in particular are of both 
practical and theoretical concern to transportation researchers and 
policy makers. A réévaluation of the role of theory seems especially 
urgent in light of the apparent failure of United States energy plan­
ning (Wright, 1975; Freeman, 1973; Ball, 1977; Mancke, 1977; Henderson, 
1978a; Shippee, 1981; Martin, 1981). What is needed is a theory of de­
cision-making that emphasizes the social processes which influence travel 
behavior. An adequate theory should be general enough to consider the 
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continuum of diverse and often conflicting perceptions of the energy 
crisis, yet specific enough to generate adequate explanations and pre­
dictions. A réévaluation of Max Weber's contributions to the develop­
ment of a scientific understanding of social action will provide the 
foundation for such a theory—a phenomenological model of decision­
making. 
The legacy of Max Weber 
There are those who would attest to the merits of men such as Max 
Weber. Yet, generally speaking, they argue his conceptual and methodol­
ogical systems do not provide useful guidelines to the present analysis 
of sociological questions (Bierstedt, 1974:146; Ritzer, 1980:89). None­
theless, Weber's goal of developing an objective (or scientific) under­
standing of human conduct has contributed immeasurably to sociological 
theory. As such it may be helpful in the development of a theory of 
decision-making. The uniqueness of Weber's contribution is that he did 
not distinguish social structures and institutions from the diverse 
actions of the individuals who both constructed them and provided them 
with meaning (Ritzer, 1980:84), It was Weber, for example, who insisted 
that : 
To study the development of a social institution solely 
from the outside, without regard to what man makes of it, 
is to overlook one of the principal aspects of social 
life. The development of a social relationship can also 
be explained by the purposes which man assigns to it, the 
benefits he derives from it and the different meanings he 
attaches to it in the course of time. . . . 
(Freund, 1968:88-89) 
As he developed his interpretive scheme for understanding human conduct, 
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there is little argument that Weber recognized the complexities of the 
social world. He acknowledged social reality as a phenomenon unknowable 
In its totality, reasoning there will always be some other way of look­
ing at it. Because of his belief in the unknowable quality of social 
reality, Weber insisted the social sciences not copy the natural sciences 
by searching for general "laws" of social behavior (Weber, 1949:80). He 
pointed out that if this occurred; 
not much useful knowledge would be produced. His 
reasoning was that any social science oriented toward 
the development of "timelessly valid laws" would, of 
necessity, emphasize those patterns of action that are 
common from one society to another, with the result that 
idiographic (individualized) events would inevitably be 
omitted from consideration. (Turner and Beeghley, 1981; 
215) 
Weber's conceptual schema appears to be critical to the development 
of an adequate theory of decision-making wl ich emphasizes the enormity of 
scope of attitudes and perceptions of the energy crisis. As Kristol and 
Anderson (1977) point out, there is a large array of perceptions of the 
energy crisis. Each perception will lead to different actions. As a re­
sult, if the researcher artificially narrows the scope of the problem in 
a search for specific laws he will inevitably fall short of his goal— 
understanding the energy crisis. 
Weber also realized the danger inherent in going too far in the 
other direction, to an emphasis on subjective meaning. He pointed out 
that while a concern for individual meaning is critical, there is a 
danger of limiting the realm of knowable phenomena to some sort of 
"mystical and intuitive reexperiencing of others' desires and thoughts" 
(Hughes, 1958:309). This is also consistent with the conception of the 
energy crisis offered by Kristol and Anderson (1977). They point out 
there may well be as many perceptions of the energy debate as there are 
observers, and it is impossible to analyze them all. 
Weber offered a resolution to the dilemma involved in the objectiv­
ity versus subjectivity debate. He constructed a way of emphasizing the 
significance of "verstehen" that would permit an integration of individ­
ual meaning and general patterns of action. In defense of his orienta­
tion, Weber said that sociology should concern itself with the interpre­
tive understanding of "social action" in order to achieve an adequate 
causal explanation of its course and effects (Weber, 1949). Social 
action refers to "all human behavior when and insofar as the acting in­
dividual attaches a subjective meaning to it" (Abel, 1948:211-218). 
Weber added, social action takes account of the behavior of others and 
is oriented by this concern for others. Thus, it can only be understood 
when considered in an intelligible and inclusive context of meaning 
O'Jeber, 1949). In illustration, the decision to pay a high price for a 
large automobile with low gasoline mileage may seem nonrational. How­
ever, the decision may have been made because 1) a friend was killed 
while driving a small underpowered automobile; or 2) driving a small 
automobile may not have been equal to the individual's status in the 
working world. The point is, the decision, however rational or non-
rational, was derived as a result of the individual's perception of the 
negative consequences associated with driving a small underpowered auto­
mobile. While this is an individualized (or idiographic) event, as 
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Weber pointed out (Frank, 1976:18); 
Individuals, societies, and events are not unique 
entities, but rather are representative of one or 
another general category, and each can be under­
stood only by reference to their general category. 
That Is, the illustration just used was, in all probability, not wholly 
unique. Individuals, societies, and events share similar characteris­
tics. As a consequence, wherever people converge it is possible to de­
velop a schematic description of their behavior. "Such description can 
be thought of as a pattern into which ideas may be placed for conven­
ience and clarity" (Skidmore, 1979:3). 
In his development of a schematic description of social action, it 
would thus seem that the social scientist must be attuned to the recipro­
cal nature of relationships between the individual and his social envi­
ronment (Rltzer, 1981:208). As Rltzer (1981:208) further points out, 
such an emphasis will permit an acknowledgment of the dynamic and histor­
ical orientation needed for an adequate understanding of social action, 
its course and effects. This point of view may well provide the Impetus 
for an integration of nomothetic (generalizing) and idlographlc (individ­
ualizing) approaches to social life (Rltzer, 1981:75) which may lead to 
the realization that individual factors or events may be the more 
salient in understanding social action. To ignore them in favor of an 
emphasis on general patterns of action would result in the reduction of 
reality to a set of "meaningless static laws" (Weber, 1903-1917/1949:80). 
It was Weber's consideration for the inherently dynamic nature of 
social interaction that led him to Insist the key to understanding social 
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action lay in the development of ideal types; 
conceptual models or mental constructs used in the 
analysis of social phenomena. They are constructed 
from observation of the characteristics of subjects 
under study, but are not intended to correspond exactly 
to any single case. Rather they are used to describe 
and test hypotheses about empirical reality. 
(Encyclopedia of Sociology, 1981:131) 
These conceptual models, while they do not mirror the social world, per­
mit the social scientist to classify the varied and diverse dimensions 
of social action. As a result, it may become possible to uncover the 
norms which are characteristic of these dimensions. The danger does 
exist, however, for the ideal type to degenerate into a static and re­
ified conception of social action. That is, it may if the researcher im­
poses his model and its theoretical assumptions on the individuals under 
study without assessing the degree to which both are representations'of 
social reality. The ideal type must be viewed as a model in motion that 
acknowledges social action as a phenomenon contingent on an individual's 
past experiences which will Influence future actions. Use of Weber's 
ideal type might well lead the social scientist away from an emphasis on 
institutionalized patterns of wholly acceptable conduct toward a focus 
on the inherently dynamic nature of the social processes which produce 
actual behavior. The author suggests that a reintroduction of Weberian 
objectivity and the conceptual versatility of ideal types in conjunction 
with a phenomenological approach will offer the social scientist an 




In the comparatively brief duration since the concept "phenomenol­
ogy" was brought into the realm of sociological jargon, it has come to 
be regarded by a select few sociologists as a viable alternative to the 
theoretical orientations adopted by a majority of social scientists. 
Berger and luckmann (1966:19) comment: 
The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or 
rather of the subjective experience of everyday life, 
is a purely descriptive method and, as such, "empirical" 
but not "scientific" - as we understand the nature of 
the empirical sciences. 
The phenomenological method reveals a specific type of sociological 
imagination, an imagination that represents a unique way of approaching 
the constitution of social reality. It is neither "objectivist, static, 
nor abstractly empirical" (Ritzer, 1980:109). Rather its emphasis is on 
the dynamics of reality construction. Johnson (1981:60) suggests that 
phenomenology requires special methods which permit a focus on: 
the social processes whereby that which "seems" to be 
objective social reality is socially created and ex­
perienced as objectively factual in the individual's 
subjective consciousness. 
Because of its emphasis on the subjective dimension of the social 
world, Ritzer (1980:109) has pointed out that "few concepts in sociology 
have created more confusion than phenomenology." The reason for this is 
that when reality is viewed as a socially constructed phenomenon, the 
operationalization of concepts, testing of propositions and hypotheses, 
and the development of theory are made extensively more difficult 
(Ritzer, 1980:129). Even its strongest proponents at times find it dif­
ficult to explain whether phenomenology is a theory, a method, or a 
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general descriptive approach to understanding social phenomena (Morris, 
1977; Douglas, 1980; Ritzer, 1980, 1981). Some skeptics also suggest 
that because much of the phenomenological interpretation of social real­
ity is qualitative, "it has made little substantive contribution to 
either theory or method and represents little more than cultish reaction 
to mainstream sociology" (Ritzer, 1980:109). Irrespective of these crit­
icisms it is suggested that phenomenology attempts, with some degree of 
success, to narrow the gap which exists between the more or less stable 
"objective" world of empirical social forces external to human action 
and the "subjective" beliefs people hold about them (Johnson, 1981:60). 
The phenomenologist acknowledges that: 
A knowledge of social reality based on measurements 
taken of empirical indicators may or may not accurately 
reflect the underlying social reality that the re­
searcher is trying to understand. 
The implication is that an Image of social action that interprets social 
reality in terms of a set of static and coercive social facts insults 
the intelligence, ability, and judgment of individuals (Skidmore, 1979: 
27) and reduces them and their consciousness to dependent variable status 
(Ritzer, 1981:211). 
Phenomenological inquiry begins with silence (Psathas, 1972). It 
involves an attempt to understand and evaluate the meaning of events and 
interactions to ordinary people in particular situations (Bogdan and 
Biklen, 1982:31). Those who adhere to its tradition do not presume to 
"know" what things mean to the people they are studying (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966; Schutz, 1967, 1970; Zeitlin, 1973; Ritzer, 1975, 1980, 
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1981; Klnloch, 1981; Bogdan and Blklen, 1982; Johnson, 1981). Rather 
they begin with the individual and his own conscious experiences. There 
is an avoidance of the presuppositions and dogmatic assumptions about 
the ways in which individuals "should" behave. Such an approach may 1) 
permit an avoidance of the problems Inherent in a wholly rational 
approach, 2) allow the researcher to reintroduce the reality and mean­
ing fulness of the Hobbesian question, 3) recognize limited rationality 
and nonrational behavior as a relevant focus of the decisionmaking 
process, and 4) adequately address the fact that some, if not much of 
human action is "simply ill-informed, poorly thought through, and not 
sensible or rational and that all people commit a fair portion of such 
acts" (PerroH, 1981:4). 
On the idea of loose-coupling 
Reality construction involves: 
a description of the process whereby people continuously 
create, through their actions and interactions, a shared 
reality that is experienced as objectively factual and 
subjectively meaningful. (Johnson, 1981:60) 
It is believed that this point of view will permit a less rigid, more 
"loosely coupled" (Weick, 1976) image of American society. Loose coup­
ling refers to the "disconnectedness of behavior" (Meyer, 1978;15). 
Within the context of this study, the implication is that there exists 
continua of: 
1. Consumer beliefs and attitudes toward the energy 
crisis. 
2. Social scientist's assumptions about what consumers 
"should do" to alleviate the energy crisis. 
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3. Consumer beliefs about what big oil companies, business, 
and government "should do" to alleviate the energy crisis. 
4. Social scientists' conclusions about what steps can/should 
be taken to encourage consumers to adopt a "conservation 
ethic". 
Consequently, it is inevitable that there will be a "slippage between 
intention and action, as people find it difficult, impractical, or im­
possible to carry out their intentions" (Weick, 1976). Inconsistency 
between intentions and actions may also be accounted for by ambiguous 
understanding (Freeman, 1973) caused by unclear policy statements (Wlrth, 
1975), which leads consumers in unintended directions. In other words, a 
consumer's intentions to conserve gasoline may be rational. However, 
intervening factors such as conflicting Information render attainment of 
a rational goal--energy con8ervation--imposslble. 
If American society were a tightly coupled interactive system, the 
use of wholly rational assumptions about the individual decision-making 
process and ultimately, social action, would perhaps be appropriate. 
However, as Perrcw (1981:9) points out, such an image will: 
inevitably lead to policy failures more significant and 
catastrophic than the failure of loosely coupled and 
less interactive systems. 
The implication is that if the assumptions of rationality and efficiency 
are not sufficient in account for social action, then one must turn to 
the "preferences and decisions of individuals" (Meyer, 1978:15). In 
illustration, consumers are angry, frustrated, skeptical, and confused 
about the severity and reality of the energy crisis. They neither care 
about, understand, nor actively seek out information (Meyer, 1978:15) 
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from every dimension of the energy crisis (e.g., political Information, 
economic analyses, and/or social consequences). As such, while the pur­
pose of disseminating infornation is to advocate compliance through 
understanding (Sullivan et al., 1980:38), this goal will be only im­
perfectly achieved. 
Consumer's assessments of the energy crisis also depend on how the 
situation has affected them in the past and on how they perceive it may 
affect them in the future (Murray et al., 1974; Moncrief et al., 1977). 
These two factors may well be significant determinants of behavior. 
Even if consumers have an accurate understanding of the situation, they 
may be so angered by it that their behavior is nonrational—in effect a 
reflection of their anger and not their knowledge. The wide-ranging and 
conflicting information they have received may on the other hand, be 
insufficient for them to draw rational or reasonable conclusions. This 
contradiction in messages is reflected in the following statements : 
Recent articles have focused on #he International "oil 
glut" and the real progress the Iftiited States has been 
making domestically. Even venerable Harper's Magazine 
graced a recent cover with the flat assertion that 
"The Energy Crisis Is Over". 
(Luken, 1982:20) 
The White House and Congress may Just let U.S. consumers 
enjoy the pleasures of relatively low gasoline prices 
and freedom of mobility regardless of the unhappy conse­
quences that might mean in the future. (Marbach et al., 1982:64) 
Critics of the oil industry have charged repeatedly, and 
with some evidence, that shortages of gasoline have been 
produced artificially In order to increase retail prices 
for gasoline. During the gasoline shortages In the 
United States in 1979, it was reported that the big oil 
companies were keeping the supply low simply by signifi­
cantly reducing the speed of their oil tankers. (Cook, 1979:229) 
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It is little wonder the American people are confused. Upon close exam­
ination of the multitude of information they are expected to digest, it 
is also less surprising they appear to be unwilling or perhaps unable to 
rationally consider altering their travel decisions in response to what 
is objectively a critical situation. 
In conclusion of this section, to what extent and more importantly, 
under what circumstances nonrational behavior is significant in a theory 
of decision-making has not been previously explored. The author suggests 
that emphasizing ratlonal/nonratlonal behavior on a continuum will aid 
in increasing the range of relevant behaviors of concern to the social 
scientist. As a result, it may well become possible to widen the scope 
of understanding and increase the predictive power of models of decision­
making. A discussion of the need for such a development follows. 
Should conceptual models mirror the "real" world? 
To explain certain observed actions, the social scientist 
constructs ideal typical courses of action along with their 
accompanying hypothetical actors, whom he endows with 
equally hypothetical consciousness. All this he does as It 
relates to his specific scientific problem. Fictitious 
motives are thus ascribed to fictitious actors in fictitious 
situations. (Zeltlln, 1973:180) 
Ironically, it has been suggested by Zeitlin (1973), Rltzer (1975, 
1980, 1981), and Kin loch (1981) that some artificial distinctions are 
needed in order to understand the social world. As Rltzer (1981:208) 
points out : 
We should not mirror the social world In our conceptual sys­
tems. If we do, we are simply replicating the confusion of 
the world in our paradigmatic systems. Instead, what we 
should be doing is developing systems of ideas that help us 
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to better understand the confusing reality of the social 
world. In short, a confusing or confused paradigm Is of 
little utility in helping to understand a confusing social 
world. It is a paradox, but artificial distinctions are 
needed in order to deal with the real world. 
Some comment and evaluation appear to be in order on Ritzer's (1981:208) 
statements. There is an objective reality labeled "the energy crisis". 
It is a condition which has led to political and academic debate, nega­
tive public sentiment, and a variety of conflicting interests (Wirth, 
1975). On the other hand, the Interpretation of the energy crisis, 
however simple or complex it may be, is mediated through the senses. As 
such, consumers do not "directly" experience it. As Zeitlin (1973:173) 
comments : 
What we see is not at all the so-called "concrete" or 
"actual" world. For the most rudimentary ccmmonsense 
perception involves highly complex abstractions. What 
we see is never just a "thing", "out there", "as it is". 
It is rather a thought object constituted by our conscious­
ness. 
In other words, something occurs in an individual's mind between the 
time a stimulus is Introduced at point "A" and a response is exhibited 
at point "B". For example, consider the following statement excerpted 
from a CBS evening news report of July 3, 1982: 
Consumers may find cash pump savings of up to $0.06 a 
gallon of gasoline this Fourth of July weekend. Service 
stations are competing for cash customers. They are 
using "sales gimmicks" we have not seen since before the 
oil embargo of 1973. 
Even if the statement were taken at face value it contains a multitude 
of interpretations. If consumers believe in the "oil company conspiracy" 
theory, for example, it could have been construed as an attempt to 
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Increase sales and maximize oil company profits. While this may be a 
nonrational interpretation, it addresses the creative process of reality 
construction which Berger and Luckmann (1966), Schutz (1967), Rltzer 
(1981), and Klnloch (1981) argue should be of concern to the social sci­
entist. To ignore this interpretive process reduces the individual to 
a being totally constrained and coerced by external social forces. As 
a result, from a social scientific approach, consumer response to the 
energy crisis should be totally predictable. It is not. Still, in 
their attempts to be scientific, Rltzer (1981:212) comments: 
Sociologists continue to create an actor that bears 
little resemblance to actors in the real world. It is 
difficult to see how an unreal world peopled by mindless 
puppets helps us much in understanding a real world where 
people clearly have the conscious capacity to create, 
negotiate, and so forth. 
In an attempt to resolve this "problem" it is suggested that "what social 
scientists should be doing is developing systems of ideas" (Rltzer, 1981: 
208) that will illuminate and enrich their understanding of the energy 
crisis. Accomplishment of the objective will require the social scien­
tist to strive for consistency and congruence between his constructs 
and those of the experiences of the American consumer (Schutz, 1967:44). 
As Zeitlin (1973;180) comments : 
The fact that the social scientist has set the stage, 
assigned the roles, and written the scripts does not 
mean that his "puppet show" cannot illuminate the real 
social world. On the contrary, these "abstract", 
"fictitious", and "rational" models are indispensable 
in thinking about real individuals and their actions; 
if properly constructed they may in fact provide an 
understanding of social reality. 
The factors that the social scientist must keep in mind as he develops 
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these dynamic models are that: 
1. Individuals are not simply controlled by external 
social forces. 
2. They also play a role in the construction of those 
forces both historically and contemporaneously. 
3. As a result, an emphasis on the subjective and 
socially constructed nature of reality is of over­
whelming significance. (Ritzer, 1981:214) 
Of particular concern to the phenomenologist is the need which exists 
to develop: 
a dynamic, processual, creative sense of the individual 
who, while somewhat constrained by social forces Is still 
able to exhibit at least partially Innovative responses 
and to have some kind of impact on the larger social 
structure. (Ritzer, 1981:214) 
It is important to point out that the potential of an individual to act, 
in part innovatively and creatively, does not mean there will be no 
pattern to his creativity (Ritzer, 1981:215). As Weber pointed out, the 
danger lies primarily in constructing models that digress so far from 
"actual" behavior that they become incongruous with them. 
Consciousness 
The construct which repeatedly appears as a hindrance to the social 
scientist is "Individual consciousness" defined as follows: 
Consciousness is the perception of what passes in an indi­
vidual's own mind. Consciousness or reflection is a per­
son's observing or noticing the Internal operations of his 
mind. It is by means of consciousness that a person acquires 
the ideas of the various operations or mental states, such 
as the ideas of perceiving, thinking, doubting, reasoning, 
knowing, and willingness, and leams of his own mental states 
at any given time. (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volumes 1 
and 2, 1967:191) 
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Whether or not consciousness can be studied scientifically, in the 
strict sense of the term, it is still a significant component of the 
social world (Zeltlin, 1973; Rltzer, 1981; Kinloch, 1981). As it was 
pointed out earlier, in ignoring it sociologists simply create a source 
of unexplained variance in their work (Ritzer, 1981:211). In acknowl­
edging it, however, they must reexamine existing theoretical orienta­
tions and methodologies which may lock them into an inadequate approach 
to understanding the social world. In this reexamination, they may begin 
to see the need to focus on a theoretical and methodological approach 
which permits them to get at; 
the obdurate reality of consciousness. The obdurate 
character of consciousness should not intimidate us 
since most of the social world is similarly difficult 
to penetrate. (Ritzer, 1981:212) 
The conclusion drawn is that there is "no one natural objective order 
independent of man" (Ritzer, 1980:120). Realizing this, the social sci­
entist must "take great care not to distort subjective definitions 
through the lenses of his own deductive concepts" (Ritzer, 1980:120). 
In fact, he must work from the ground up, so to speak, as he focuses on: 
the form of the process by which all persons construct 
and utilize the data which constitute social reality, 
however aberrant that reality may seem to the researcher. 
(Woodman, 1977:8) 
In other words, in focusing on the ways in which individuals create 
social reality, the social scientist may rephrase the Hobbesian question, 
"How do decisions make the social order possible?" to: 
What reality construction devices are consistent enough 
across social aggregates to allow social scientists to 
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project the shape of the socially negotiated typologies? 
(Woodman, 1977:8) 
Psathas (1972:132-133) states his position of the advantages of this 
approach : 
The distinction between natural science and social science, 
as N8tanson, Schutz, and others clearly point out is based 
on the fact that men are not only objects existing in the 
natural world to be observed by the scientist, but they are 
creators of a world, a cultural world of their own. In 
creating this world, they Interpret their own activities. 
Their overt behavior is only a fragment of their total 
behavior. Any social scientist who insists that he can 
understand all of man's behavior by focusing only on that 
part which is overt and manifested In concrete directly 
observable acts, is naive, to say the least. The challenge 
to the social scientist who seeks to understand social real­
ity, then. Is to understand the meaning that the actor's act 
has for him. If the observer applies his own categories or 
theories concerning the meanings of acts, he may never dis­
cover the meanings these same acts have for the actors them­
selves. Nor can he ever discover how social reality Is 
"created" and how subsequent acts by human actors are per­
formed in the context of their meanings. 
In breaking down the obstacles that have reified the necessity for dis­
tance between himself and his subjects, the social scientist can pay more 
specific attention to the following questions; 
1. What particular motivations prompt the construction 
of social reality? 
2. Why do they do so? 
3. What are their behavioral consequences for consumers 
who are operating under conditions of energy constraint? 
Motivation 
If we are to construct a theoretical perspective emphasizing 
the creative conduct of individuals, and if we are to account 
for Institutional structures by reference to individual lines 
of action, then the theoretical explanation of these lines of 
action is paramount. (Skidmore, 1979:219) 
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An adequate understanding of what It Is that motivates social 
action must Include the meaning of the action and the degree of clarity 
with which the social scientist is able to grasp that meaning (Schutz, 
1967:19). Schutz (1967, 1970) suggests there are two basic types of 
motives which may aid the social scientist in reaching this level of 
understanding. The first is the "in-order-to" motive which refers to a 
future state that an individual wishes to bring about by his actions. 
This future state involves the completed act which the individual has 
imagined in his future perfect tense (Schutz, 1967:91). According to 
Schutz (1962:20); 
A characteristic of genuine "In-order-to" motives is 
that they have causal efficacy. Motivated the way 
of "in-order-to", therefore, is the 'voluntative flat', 
the decision: 'Let's go!' which transforms the inner 
fancying into a performance or an action gearing into 
the outer world. 
The second type of motive is the "because" motive which refers to past 
experiences the individual may have had (Schutz, 1967:91). Woodman 
(1977:8-9) comments: 
The "because" of an act resides In the environment; the 
socialization, the past experiences of the individual. 
These experiences have influenced his decision to act 
as he did. 
For both theoretical and methodological considerations, it is important 
to note that traditional methods of research into the individual decision 
making process have used interviews or questionnaires. The latter have 
employed the "what if. . . ?" and "why did you. . . ?" survey instru­
ments. Woodman (1977:9) has pointed out that this method is predestined 
to derive answers consciously constructed by the respondent using 
93 
rational, and hence socially acceptable, "in-order-to" motives. This 
criticism is consistent with Wrong's (1982:108) discussion on the "man 
as conformist" perspective accepted in sociology. He (Wrong, 1982:108) 
comments : 
Parsons' model of the "complementarity of expectations", 
the view that in social interaction men mutually seek 
approval from one another by conforming to shared norms, 
is a formalized version of what has tended to become a 
distinctly sociological perspective on motivation. 
In illustration, a respondent may inform the researcher he purchased a 
fuel efficient automobile "in-order-to" save both money and gasoline. 
Realistically, however, the cost of the automobile was thousands of dol­
lars more than fuel costs could ever save him. It may have been more 
probable to assume the individual's social environment—occupation, 
residence, socioeconomic status, or family type—was influential in 
his decision. He may have felt, for example, that a low mileage auto­
mobile presented him as an energy conscious individual and hence would 
increase his status in the eyes of his employer. The point is, it may 
well have been a nonrational "because" motive and not a rationally de­
termined "in-order-to" motive that led to his purchase. If policy re­
search emphasizes "in-order-to" motives to the exclusion of "because" 
motives, the result will tend to be ex post facto explanations of be­
havior. Finsterbusch and Motz (1980:25) have commented that a major 
defect of such an approach is that it fails to take account of the 
limits of human knowledge. That is, it must be realized that while 
individuals are conscious of their "in-order-to" motives, they are 
not conscious of their "because" motives (Schutz, 1967, 1970). This 
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assertion seems relevant in light of arguments posed by Kristol and 
Anderson (1977) and Sullivan et al. (1980) in which it is pointed out 
that people are rarely aware of the extent to which the reality they 
experience is shaped by factors in their environment such as "culture, 
education, advertising, the news media, and past experience" (Sullivan 
et al., 1980:38). They become aware of their actions only after the act 
or its initial phases have been completed (Zeitlin, 1973:177). In addi­
tion, Schutz (1967:96) comments; 
An adequate social science and theory must be concerned 
with both types of motives. Social phenomena are only 
understandable if they can be reduced to human activities; 
and human activities are only made understandable by show­
ing their "in-order-to" and "because" motives. 
Commonsense knowledge in everyday life 
Individuals share and experience the social world intersubjectively. 
The concept of intersubjectivlty acknowledges that groups of individuals 
both interpret and experience the social world in a similar manner. The 
phenomenologist assumes that this reciprocal understanding is needed 
for successful interaction to occur. Thus, the reality of everyday life 
is never wholly private, not even in the consciousness of the indivdual. 
As Schutz comments (cited in Zeitlin, 1973:171); 
I find evidence of others, evidence that my unique 
biographical situation is not wholly the product of 
my own actions. Each of us is bom into a historically 
given world that is simultaneously natural and socio-
cultural. Each of us is an element in the life situation 
of others. Just as they are in ours. I act upon them and 
they act upon me, and we all experience our common world 
in a similar fashion. Our experience of this everyday 
world is a commonsense one, for each of us takes for 
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granted that our fellow men exist, that we can coomunl-
cate with them, and that they live in the same natural, 
historical, and socioculturel world that we do. 
The phenomenologlst is concerned with the social processes used by 
individuals as they construct and share the subjective meaning structures 
which are the basis for the decision-making process and ultimately for 
social action. As a result, his conceptual model will refer not to a 
"mindless meaningless world, but to a socially constructed world of mean­
ings" (Zeltlln, 1973:176). Care must be taken in the development of 
these models. The constructs Included must permit an objective under­
standing of social action and its accompanying subjective meaning. 
Schutz (1967) has suggested three basic postulates which the social sci­
entist may follow as he attempts to understand and explain social action 
within the commonsense reality of everyday life; 
1. The postulate of logical consistency; the system of con­
structs should have the utmost clarity and distinctness. 
(Schutz, 1967:43) 
2. The postulate of subjective Interpretation; this under­
lies Weber's conception of the main task of sociology: 
the concepts and models should enable the social scientist 
to refer human action and its consequences to the subjec­
tive meanings of the actors involved. (Schutz, 1967:43) 
3. The postulate of adequacy : each term in a scientific 
model of human action must be constructed in such a way 
that a human act performed by an Individual in the way 
indicated by the construct would be understandable for 
the actor himself as well as for his fellow men in terms 
of ccmmonsense Interpretation of everyday life. (Schutz, 
1967:44) 
Postulates two and three clarify the phenomenological position on sub­
jective meaning (or verstehen). Schutz (1967), like Weber, insisted that 
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a subjective understanding of social action does not Involve the genera­
tion of "private, uncontrollable, and unverlflable Intuition" (Schutz, 
1967:56). Rather the emphasis on verstehen should be: 
subjective only In the sense that the purpose of the 
method Is to determine what meaning the action has for 
the actor as opposed to his partner or a dlstlnterested 
observer. (Schutz, 1967:56) 
The primary objective of the phenomenologleal method, then, is to use 
"verstehen" as a "commonsense method of everyday life that yields public, 
controllable, and verifiable conclusions" (Zeitlln, 1973:181). Also, in 
drawing from Weber's conceptual scheme, the phenomenologist acknowledges: 
a concern with the actor's subjective meanings must not 
be construed to imply that the actors are always conscious 
of their Intentions and purposes. Nor, certainly, should 
a concern with meaning lead one to Ignore the fact that 
the actors' actions entail consequences that they did not 
Intend and of which they are unaware. In this area the 
social scientist may make a most important contribution; 
he alone may be equipped to see what the direct partici­
pants do not see - the drama working itself out beyond 
their gaze. (Zeitlln, 1973:170) 
The social scientist may accomplish his objective of understanding social 
action by observing individuals within the context of the situation under 
study. As he does so, he will "construct typical behavior or course of 
action patterns from what is observed" (Schutz, 1967:63-64). A discus­
sion of the way in which Schutz (1967) uses the concept "typical" or 
"typiflcatlon" in his evaluation of intersubjectivlty follows. 
Tvpificatlons 
Typiflcatlon refers to the ability to establish a situ­
ation or object as being part of a socially significant 
category of situations and objects. Actors sharing common 
sets of typiflcations are able to structure their experience 
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of the world similarly by applying common meanings to 
significant regions of experience. (Schutz, 1970) 
The device individuals use to understand the reality of others in 
Interaction is the "typlflcation". Many, if not most, of the social 
situations encountered are characterized by "typical cases of interac­
tion" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:29-30). 
Most of the time, my encounters with others in every­
day life are typical in a double sense - 1 apprehend 
the other as a type and I Interact with him in a situa­
tion that is Itself typical. The typlfications of 
social interaction, however, become progressively 
anonymous the farther away they are from the face-to-
face situation. 
The importance of the concept "typlflcation" seems obvious for the social 
scientist attempting to understand the decision-making process. For 
example, the tendency exists for the social scientist to use his own 
typlfications rather than those of the individuals he is studying (Wood­
man, 1977). The shortcoming of such an approach is clear. The social 
scientist's typlfications may be used to presume how respondents "should" 
make decisions. This may in turn produce the dangers inherent in 
Kinloch's (1981) "judgmental dope model." 
The usefulness of the concept "typlflcation" is that it permits an 
emphasis on the general categories of social action (Weber, 1949) that 
emerge in the course of everyday life. The significance of this is that 
the study of the dynamics of reality construction need not be unsystem­
atic. Rather they can permit a scientific analysis of social action by 
focusing on "decisions made by Individuals acting in groups" (Woodman, 
1977:14). This may be made possible as the concept of "relevance" is 
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Introduced. Berger and Luckmann (1966:43). 
relevance structures Intersect with the relevance 
structures of others at many points, as a result of 
which we have "interesting" things to say to each 
other. An important element of my knowledge of every­
day life is the knowledge of the relevance structure 
of others. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:43) 
The key words in Berger and Luckmann's statements are "at many points". 
The implication is that while others have a perspective on the everyday 
commonsense social world, that world does not appear identically to 
everyone. For example: 
My here and now is their there. My now does not fully 
overlap with theirs. My projects differ from and may even 
conflict with theirs. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:22-23) 
This point of view produces some Insights as to how social decisions are 
made. As Woodman (1977:15) points out, "what passes for knowledge is not 
evenly distributed." Because of this, social scientists should perhaps 
widen the parameters of relevant behavior. It is not sufficient to 
assume that everyday commonsense knowledge is something to which everyone 
has access or which everyone considers relevant. The author suggests 
that Berger and Luckmann's contributions to a conceptual model of deci­
sion-making demand that the social scientist reconcile the "totality of 
the social context and the dynamics of reality construction as they work 
together to produce the outcome of Individual decisions. In sunraary of 
this section. Brewer and Woodman (1977) have developed a model from the 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) formulation depicting the dynamics of reality 
construction (see Figure 4). It is suggested that this model provides 
a guideline for social science research into the decision-making process 
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V. REIFICATION 




When meanings became focal ai^  
commonly accepted as real so that 
the reality is no longer subject 
to negotiation, reification is 
said to have occurred. 
When meanings assigned to the in­
dividuals are accepted by others, 
then the meanings are perceived 
to be objectively real. 
When assigned meanings (for any set 
of reasons) have been found not to 
serve intended functions, the mean­
ings are changed, deleted, expanded 
(and so forth) and objectification 




As human beings move through the 
ontological world, they attach 
meanings to some objects and 
classes of objects. Some meanings 
are préexistent (socially derived 
before the individual) and others 
are Intersubjectively assigned by 
the individual and others. 
The empirical world as an object 
in itself, unknowable in its 
totality. 
NOTE: Broken line arrows are associated with weak delineations. 
While Berger and Luckmann may draw distinctions between the terms 
shown in parentheses for a semantic reason, we prefer to use them 
inter changeably. 
Figure 4. Simplification of Berger and Luckmann formulation of the 
dynamics of reality construction (Taken from Brewer and 
Woodman (1977.) 
which may well alleviate the danger of stressing reified, ahistorical 
analyses of the decision-making process. 
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Woodman and Brewer (1977) comment on their model as follows: 
This figure contains a simplification of Berger and Luck-
ma nn' s (1966) depiction of the process of reality construc­
tion. There, ontology serves as the data for reality 
construction wherein meanings are socially negotiated and 
attached to some social objects and not to others (called 
"subjectivatlon" by them). If, at some point these sub­
jectively held meanings come to be consensually held to be 
real by most others, "objectlvation" has been said to occur. 
Here, the meanings are taken to be real in an objective 
sense. Two things may then happen. "Relfication" may 
occur, wherein the meanings attached are made no longer 
subject to negotiation, or some external or internal pres­
sures may cause "resubjectivatlon" where new meanings are 
attached to the cultural elements. 
General perceptions of the energy crisis ; Problem or dilemma? 
Two generalized conceptual models depicting consumer perception of 
the energy crisis may be considered to illustrate the degree to which 
"typificatlon" and "relevance structures" may be applied to understand 
consumer travel decisions under conditions of energy constraint. The 
model presented by Qrr (1981) may provide useful insights even though 
it presents the energy crisis as a dilemma (see Figure 6). The model 
offered by Kristol and Anderson (1977) on the other hand may be a wider, 
and hence more valid representation of the diverse and significant seg­
ments of opinion held by energy decisionmakers, analysts, and American 
consumers (see Figure 5). 
It is suggested that the presentation of the energy crisis as a 
dilemma (Orr, 1981) could have been instrumental in the development 
of the antigasoline rationing approach discussed by Burnett (1978:43). 
It could also have been used as a justification for the rationing 
by price theory adopted by economists (Businessweek, 1974; 
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Perception A. tends to assume that energy policies that 
worked well in the past are also best for 
the future. The energy problem, as such, 
is essentially one of developing new sup­
plies to meet expanding needs of consumers. 
Perception B. tends to see "business as usual" as a bank­
rupt strategy. It calls for a major re­
ordering of values and priorities and sees 
the future as a whole new ballgame. 
Perception C. implicitly assumes that the trends that have 
characterized industrial society thus far 
cannot continue much longer. 
Figure 5. Model of consumer perception of the energy crisis (Taken from 
Irving Kristol and Robert 0. Anderson, Energy, Society, and the 
New Class. Stanford Research Institute, 1977.) 
Perception A. Energy is unanimously regarded as the key to 
future human progress defined in material 
and technological terms. 
Perception B. The energy crisis is basically a supply 
problem and only secondarily one of excess 
demand. More energy consumption is good. 
It Is directly correlated with economic 
growth and with the quality of life. 
Perception C. The energy problem can only be solved by the 
elaboration of the existing technological 
paradigm (a "technological fix" solution). 
Figure 6. Model of consumer perception of the energy crisis (Taken from 
D. W. Orr, Problems, Dilemmas, and the Energy Crisis (1981; 
3-17) 
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Willenborg and Pitts, 1977). It would then be most useful in the study 
of crystallized attitudes resulting in static conceptions of social 
action and continued failure of energy policy. 
The model offered by Kristol and Anderson (1977), however, may per­
mit the use of Weberian objectivity and methodology as useful tools for 
describing the decision-making process which leads to different types 
of consumer actions. The scope of perceptions presented by Kristol and 
Anderson may permit a realistic response to what Weber termed the most 
important methodological question facing the social sciences: 
In what sense are there "objectively valid truths" 
in those disciplines concerned with social and 
cultural phenomena? (Turner and Beeghley, 1981: 
211) 
Conclusions 
The goals of this chapter have been to demonstrate the manner in 
which objective scientific inquiry is rationally plausible in a disci­
pline whose subject matter includes the subjectively meaningful actions 
of individuals. It is only in this way that an adequate understanding 
of the decision-making process is possible. In its use of Weberian 
objectivity as a methodological tool, phenomenology meets the require­
ments for providing insights into the decision-making process which have 
previously been impossible. 
Phenomenology presents the researcher with a solid foundation for an 
adequate theory of decisionmaking. It is general enough to include all 
relevant social phenomena, yet specific enough to generate adequate ex­
planations and predictions. The phenomenologist is concerned, then. 
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with 1) creating the social context within which individual decisions 
are made, 2) clarifying the nature of the social context, and 3) spec­
ifying the individual's place within the social context. This point of 
view allows the researcher to avoid the imposition of rationality and 
standardized expectancies which "make out the individual to be a judg­
mental dope of a cultural and psychological sort, or both" (Kinloch, 
1981:138). The phenomenologist is also aware that in stressing objec­
tivity (or scientific rationality) he is removed from the "practical 
rationality" of everyday life. As such he must take care not to confuse 
the reality construction processes used by persons in everyday life with 
scientific objectivity. Should this occur, those subjects under study 
may be "forced into preconceived molds that belie the reality of every­
day life" (Polcnna, 1979:187). This is consistent with Woodman's (1977) 
position, that a "good decision theory should not lend itself to an un­
seemly amount of ideological imputation." He points out (1977:6), for 
example, that; 
The assumption of "mini-max" theorists that individuals 
assess costs and benefits solely on the degree to which 
the latter exceeds the former presumes far too much about 
human motivation, including such things as altruism, 
greed, and individual satisfactions. 
A phenomenological model of decision-making will also provide a 
"framework for understanding decisions in such a way as to leave the sub 
ject of the research with a maximum of discretion" (Woodman, 1977:6). 
The researcher who emphasizes rationality in a model of decision-making 
to the exclusion of nonrationality may artificially narrow the range of 
relevant behaviors to be studied. As Wrong (1982:105) comments, to a 
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social scientist Inbued with the conception that social action follows 
a rational path, opposition of Individual and common Interests has only 
a very limited relevance or Is thoroughly unsound. Such an approach not 
only disposes of the Hobbeslan question, It also presents the danger of 
teleologlcal explanations of social action. 
Woodman (1977:6) points out that "teleologlcal arguments are those 
which predispose the reader to presume that events are heading toward 
some unalterable and predictable outcomes." While Individual decision 
patterns do decrease the possibilities of subsequent decisions, a theory 
of decision-making should not contain a list of predetemined outcomes, 
as such an approach may preclude "actually checking to see what occurs" 
(Woodman, 1977:7). The implication is that the most critical elements 
to be Included in an adequate model of decision-making should neither 
be derived solely from internal (or psychological) nor external (or 
social structural) sources. Bather, as Woodman (1977:8) comments, it 
should be derived from a "combination and perhaps unequal weighting of 
the two." To artificially weight variables in terms of the degree to 
which causllity is believed to exist appears to be inherent in the posi-
tivist mode of inquiry. This artificial weighting tends to allow the 
social scientist to lose sight of his ultimate goal--to develop an 
acceptable explanation of the decisionmaking process that handles indi­
vidual and social structural factors equally well (Skldmore, 1979:26). 
The posltivlst mode of inquiry renders attainment of this goal impos­
sible. The result is a one-sided and teleologlcal explanation of the 
decisionmaking process and the behavior it produces. On the other hand. 
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am emphasis on both individual and social structural variables carries 
with it the danger of the social scientist vacillating from one side to 
the other, resulting In an explanation more muddled and more confusing 
than enlightening (Skldmore, 1979:26). 
It would appear critical to find a balance between Internal and ex­
ternal variables. Phenomenology offers an alternative which will reduce 
the problems presented by the posltivist approach, which are, according 
to Stlnchcombe (1978:3-4) as follows: 
The central model of positivism is that researchers are for­
bidden to think between the time they "posit the hypotheses" 
and the time they "accept or reject the hypothesis", after 
calculating a bit and transforming something they want to 
know into something they do not want to know (the null hypoth­
esis). A really pure priest of positivism will only accept 
or reject the null hypothesis, never leaving the sacred pre­
cincts to make any bet about what the "real" world is like. 
The extreme of positivism is only to agree to talk about 
which theories have been rejected by the facts. 
Phenomenology may not encourage the construction of artificial parameters 
of social action, nor the quantification and degree of rational inquiry 
offered by the posltivist. However, as Blerstedt (1974:148) comments, 
sociology is not a mathematical discipline and as such cannot subsist on 
purely rational and empirical fare. In other words, adherence to the 
posltivist tradition may result only in "busy work and in trivial, though 
systematic exercises." Phenomenology, on the other hand, offers a potent 
new method for the generation of knowledge which may provide insights into 
the decision-making process not possible using tightly structured, un­
bending assumptions about what the social world "should" look like. 
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CHAPTER TV. METHODS AND MODELS FOR ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
The methodological goals of this chapter will emphasize an under­
standing of both theory and method and how they fit together to provide 
answers to questions asked about social reality. As Cohen (1980:95) 
points out: 
If theories are to be more than the wise sayings of great men, 
their evaluation depends upon knowing how to evaluate ; and 
knowing how to evaluate unavoidably Involves issues of method. 
Similarly, methods for gathering observations, analyzing data, 
and making Inferences, inevitably entail theoretical sophisti­
cation. 
This chapter will entail more than just a description of the "method" or 
tool used to collect the data for this investigation. In an attempt to 
maintain an awareness of the theoretical Importance of such a study, the 
author will present the following sections within this chapter: 1) the 
source of the data and the method and reasons behind the sample selected; 
2) problems associated with the data set which emerged as a result of 
the newness of the methods (e.g., because this type of study has not 
been conducted before, it was not known what kinds of problems would 
occur); 3) merging the data sets collected during 1979 and 1980; 4) rea­
sons why it became necessary to merge data sets ; 5) theoretical and 
methodological advantages and disadvantages of simulation research; 6) 
the reliability and validity of simulation SHORTAGE; 7) SHORTAGE: 
Logic behind the development of strategy categories used by participants 
in SHORTAGE, including the creation of legal and illegal categories of 
alternatives; 8) specification of statistical procedures to be used in 
the analysis of the data; 9) combining the preslmulation questionnaire 
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data with the data from SHORTAGE for purposes of statistical testing; 
10) method used in collapsing questionnaire response categories and 
strategy categories; 11) testing for significant differences between pre-
simulation and postsimulation responses in an attempt to determine 
whether or not knowledge gained from participation in SHORTAGE signifi­
cantly altered respondent attitude toward the gasoline shortage, and 
finally; 12) relationships will be suggested between the presimulation 
questionnaire data and the SHORTAGE data. 
Source of the Data 
The data used in this study were collected at two different times 
over a sixteen-month period of time. For each group, the author and two 
graduate research assistants collected the data in Room 206 Curtiss Hall 
at Iowa State University, in Ames, Iowa. Curtiss Hall housed the local 
PLATO terminals. PLATO is a large time-sharing computer based at the 
University of Illinois and is jointly operated by the University of Iowa 
and Control Data Corporation. 
The first data set was collected during June and July, 1979, from 
fifty-two Iowa State University students. The population from which the 
sample was drawn included all students enrolled during the first summer 
session in Sociology 134 (Introduction to Sociology), Sociology 420 
(Complex Organizations), and Civil Engineering 351 (Introduction to 
Transportation Engineering). The second data set was collected during 
July, August, September, and October of 1980, from ninety-two Iowa State 
University students. The population from which the sample was drawn 
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Included all students enrolled during the first summer session in Soci­
ology 420 (Complex Organizations), Civil Engineering 351 (Introduction 
to Transportation Engineering) and all students enrolled during the fall 
quarter 1980 in Sociology 134 (Introduction to Sociology). All partici­
pating students ranged in classification from freshman to senior. The 
engineering and upper division sociology classes were composed primarily 
of majors in the respective disciplines. The Introductory Sociology 
class, however, because it is an elective for many departments, enrolls 
students from across all Colleges within the university. 
Method of Sample Selection 
The author received pemlssion from instructors in each of the 
classes to solicit student participation in SHORTAGE. It was decided by 
the research group, including the author and the principal investigators, 
that students would be unlikely to volunteer for the task without in­
centive. Consequently, with permission of the Department of Sociology 
and Anthropology chairperson, each student was offered one academic 
credit in Sociology for participating. It was believed student interest, 
curiosity, and/or motivation to participate would increase with such an 
offer, and this offer was made to all students enrolled in these classes. 
Instructors from each class informed students briefly of the nature 
of the project. Those interested were asked to identify themselves via 
index cards. Each student was contacted by telephone, given adequate in­
formation about the project, told what would be expected, and how much 
of a time commitment would be required. The author contacted each 
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potential participant over a nine-day period of time for both the 1979 
and the 1980 groups of participants. The following statement of infor­
mation was given during the course of the telephone conversation: 
I understand your instructor has briefly informed you of the 
nature of the research project in which you have offered to 
participate. I must inform you that your participation is 
completely voluntary. If, after I have finished explaining 
the details to you, you wish to change your mind and not 
participate, you may feel free to do so. You will be asked 
to meet me in Room 206 Curtiss Hall. Upon your arrival there 
you will fill out a questionnaire which has been designed to 
assess consumer attitudes toward the energy crisis. The ques­
tions will refer specifically to the gasoline shortage. Upon 
completion of the questionnaire, you will be introduced to 
PLATO, an interactive gaming computer. You will then proceed 
to participate in SHORTAGE, a gasoline rationing simulation. 
I am interested in assessing consumer travel decisions under 
conditions of energy constraint. SHORTAGE is a straightforward 
simulation. You should have no difficulties understanding the 
rules of the game. If you do have problems, someone will be 
nearby to help you. When you have finished the simulation, you 
will be asked to fill out another questionnaire, one that is 
identical to the one to which you responded when you first 
arrived. This will be done because it is believed that once 
you have gained the knowledge and experience presented to you 
by SHORTAGE, you may want to alter some of your presimulation 
responses. The entire process should require no more than 
thirty to forty minutes of your time. I have been authorized 
to offer you a one credit grade of A in Sociology for your com­
mitment and participation. 
There was some initial student skepticism concerning the offer of one 
academic credit for such a brief time commitment. However, it was pointed 
out that the nature of the research topic and methodology warranted such 
an offer. Following the expanded explanation below, student skepticism 
seemed to be alleviated. 
Simulation SHORTAGE is a relatively innovative data collec­
tion instrument. It may provide social scientists with new 
insights into the understanding of the energy crisis. Thus, 
you are being asked to be a part of a research project which 
may be instrumental in widening the knowledge base of the 
methods of sociological inquiry. 
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With the exception of three persons contacted from the 1979 group and 
two persons from the 1980 group, scheduled times were assigned to and ac­
cepted by all persons who had indicated their interest by signing their 
names on the index cards. From the total list of one hundred and forty-
eight persons, six of those who were scheduled failed to fulfill their 
commitment. The total sample size was one hundred and forty-two. 
Randomness of the Sample 
Bailey (1982:91) defines a random sample as follows: 
In a random sample each person in the universe has an equal » — 
probability of being chosen for the sample, and every col­
lection of persons of the same size has an equal probability 
of becoming the actual sample. This is true regardless of 
the similarities or differences among them, as long as they 
are members of the same universe. 
By Bailey's (1982:91) definition, the sample drawn for this study was not 
random. However, because of the time commitment involved and the pos­
sible inconvenience to persons being asked to meet the researchers in the 
PLATO terminal room, it did not seem feasible to use such an approach. 
It was also believed that the heterogeneous nature of the respondents 
from the Introduction to Sociology class would somewhat compensate for 
the absence of randomness. 
The data collection began in June of 1979. At this time, respond­
ents were asked to fill out a pencil and paper questionnaire designed to 
assess their attitudes toward the gasoline shortage. The questionnaire 
emphasized only those attitudes held toward the gasoline crisis and did 
not address the energy crisis in a general manner (see Appendix C). Upon 
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completion of the questionnaire, respondents were Introduced to SHORTAGE. 
With the exception of two respondents, none had prior experience with 
Interactive computer terminals. Each respondent was given the following 
information: 
SHOBXAGE Is a gasoline rationing simulation. I will present 
you with the basic information needed for you to complete the 
simulation. If you will now note, the first page you will see 
printed on the screen in front of you asks you to type in your 
identification number (each respondent was assigned a number 
to assure anonymity). Then type in your group name, which is 
SOC. Press the key marked NEXT. This is a critical key. 
Whenever you are in doubt about what to do, this key may be 
pressed and you will go back to a familiar point in the simu­
lation. The page now being presented to you is called Index 
Page one. 
The following information appeared on the screen: 
Choose an option by pressing the corresponding letter: 
a. Introduction to SHORTAGE. 
b. SHORTAGE instructions. 
c. Gasoline rationing regulations. 
d. Begin the simulation. 
Each respondent was informed that if he wished to make comments at any 
time during the course of his participation he could do so by simultane­
ously pressing the keys marked SHIFT/lAB. Respondents were encouraged to 
make comments in reference to the following: 
1. Whether or not the gasoline rationing regulations were 
fair (e.g., the motorcycle ration allotment was only 
one-tenth that for automobiles). 
2. Whether or not they believed the strategies, alternatives, 
and/or consequences were realistic, fair, or perhaps too 
lenient in light of the seriousness of the situation. 
3. How they might feel in general about the situation they 
were experiencing. 
The researcher reminded each respondent from time to time that if he 
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forgot how comments were made, help was available. The instructions 
continued as follows : 
Please read each option on Index Page one carefully. When 
you are finished reading these options in the order in which 
they appear, simultaneously press the keys marked SHIFT/BACK 
to return to Index Page one. 
Upon completion of options "a" through "c", respondents were ready to 
begin SHORTAGE. They were asked to press the letter "d" at which time 
PLATO gave the following information: 
You have just been issued ration checks for your automobile 
totaling 120 gallons of gasoline which must last you for a 
90-day period of time. Use them wisely! Remember, we all 
have to live with and/or cope with the day-by-day decisions 
we make. 
Respondents were then asked: 
What kind of an automobile do you drive/own? 
If the respondent replied he did not own an automobile, he was aked the 
following alternate question: 
What kind of an automobile do you drive when you do have 
access to one? 
There were no respondents who could not reply to one question or the 
other. The next question asked was as follows: 
How many miles per gallon of gasoline does your automobile 
receive? 
The response to this question allowed the researcher to assign an auto­
mobile "type" to each respondent. Automobile types were determined by 
the nunber of miles per gallon an automobile received. These types 
ranged from the letters "A" to "Z" and from numbers one through four. 
Type "A" received nine miles per gallon of gasoline, while type four re­
ceived thirty-eight miles per gallon. Automobile type determined each 
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respondent's dally gasoline consumption rate for the purposes of the 
simulation. Dally gasoline consumption rate determined how quickly the 
respondent would "run out" of gasoline, or conversely, how much gasoline 
he could save (e.g., by driving a fuel-efficient automobile). 
Dally consumption rate was determined by using point seven of the 
Economic Regulatoiry Administration's guidelines which read as follows : 
passenger cars have been found to travel an average of 10,100 
miles per year with a fuel efficiency of 13.5 miles per gallon 
yielding an average annual gasoline consumption of 748 gallons. 
It is hereby noted that all passenger cars in a given state 
will receive the same 120 gallon ration allotment for each 90 
day period of time regardless of fuel efficiency. This will 
give a significant advantage to fuel efficient automobiles and 
will hopefully provide an incentive to their use. 
The dally gasoline consumption rate was calculated by dividing the 10,100 
mile-per-year estimate (rounded to 10,000 miles per year) by the number 
of miles per gallon of gasoline used. This figure in turn was divided 
by four to determine the number of gallons of gasoline consumed in a 
three-month period of time. The result was divided by ninety to arrive 
at the dally gasoline consumption rate. The figure was computed by 
PLATO (see Figure 7). Respondent car_types were collapsed into catego­
ries, labeling them as low mileage automobiles, medium mileage auto­
mobiles, and gasoline guzzlers. The breakdown of categories was not an 
arbitrary decision. The author telephoned six new and used automobile 
salespersons in the Ames, Iowa, area. The following information was 
given to each salesperson: 
My name is Kathleen Waggoner and I am from the Department 
of Sociology and Anthropology at Iowa State University. I am 
currently Involved In a research project dealing with the 
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A A = average number of miles driven per year. 
B _ . B = number of miles per gallon of gasoline per 
g - Û wnere: automobile (car_type) 
P C = Three-month period of time (120 days) 
D = Ninety-day time period. 
E = Daily gasoline consumption rate. 
Average number Number of miles Three-month Ninety-day 
of miles driven per gallon of period of time period = Daily 
per year " gasoline per time (120 gasoline 
(10,000) automobile days consump-
(car_type) tion rate 
Figure 7. Calculations for daily gasoline consumption rate as 
computed by PLATO: car_type 
energy crisis. I wonder if I might ask you some questions 
about automobile gasoline consumption? 
The questions asked were as follows: 
In your expert opinion, how many miles per gallon would 
you estimate a low mileage automile would receive? A 
medium mileage automobile? A gasoline guzzler? 
As it can be seen from the responses presented in Table 2, the mileage 
categories suggested by the salespersons were similar. The car_types 
were collapsed into categories for purposes of data analysis. As it can 
be seen from Figure 8, car_types ranged from nine miles per gallon to 
thirty-eight miles per gallon. The decision to set up car_type catego­
ries did not differ significantly from the information provided by the 
automobile salespersons surveyed. 
Following the response to the question on car__type, respondents 
were asked to provide the information on family income. The following 
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Table 2. Estimated miles per gallon for low mileage automobiles, medium 
mileage automobiles, and gasoline guzzlers based on the expert 
opinions of automobile salespersons in the Ames, Iowa, area 
Low mileage Medium mileage Gasoline guzzler 
Salesperson A 28-48 mpg 17-27 mpg 9-14 mpg 
Salesperson B 28-48 mpg 16-27 mpg 8-15 mpg 
Salesperson C 27-54 mpg 16-26 mpg 9-15 mpg 
Salesperson D 27-45 mpg 16-26 mpg 9-15 mpg 
Salesperson E 24-45 mpg 15-23 mpg 9-14 mpg 
Salesperson F 27-45 mpg 16-26 mpg 8-15 mpg 
Car__type 
Low mileage car_type 28-38 miles per gallon 
Medium mileage car__type 17-27 miles per gallon 
Gasoline guzzler 9-16 miles per gallon 
Figure 8. Categories of car__types 
question was asked: 
Approximately what is your yearly Income? If you are 
single, please estimate your parent's yearly Income. 
Response categories were as follows: 
Income increments : 
a. $0 - 4,999 
b. $5,000 - 9,999 
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c. $10,000 - 14,999 
d. $15,000 - 19,999 
e. $20,000 - 24,999 
f. $25,000 - 29,999 
g. $30,000 - 34,999 
h. $35,000 and above 
Since the respondents were students, the question included parental in­
come. 
Upon completion of the question on income, respondents were asked 
to press the key marked NEXT to begin the simulation. At this time, 
each was given the following additional information: 
You will now be presented with a number of different strategies 
which may help you as you attempt to adapt to the energy con­
straining conditions presented by gasoline rationing. You are 
reminded that some of the alternatives within certain strate­
gies may border on the line between legal and Illegal. It is 
assumed that regardless of your choice of strategy or alterna­
tive, the choices which you make are your choices and not a re­
flection of what you believe the researcher wants you to choose. 
Note that each time you make a decision, you will receive imme­
diate feedback from SHORTAGE in terms of a consequence. Each 
alternative within the five strategies contains between one and 
nine consequences which will appear with random probability. 
You will also note that some or the consequences will reward 
you, while others will penalize you either verbally or by de­
creasing your dally gasoline consumption rate. In addition, if 
at any time during the course of the simulation you feel you 
have made any or all of the decisions which are relevant to you, 
please inform me that you are ready to stop playing. At that 
time, you will be asked to press the keys appropriate to ending 
the simulation. 
If you will look in the upper left hand corner of the terminal 
screen, you will see a simulated gasoline gauge. You may want 
to keep an eye on it as you play SHORTAGE. The speed with which 
the gasoline gauge moves toward empty will be determined by your 
daily gasoline consumption rate which appears at the top of the 
screen toward the center. In the upper right hand corner of the 
screen, you will see a number which denotes the number of days 
which you have to play the game. Each day will be equivalent to 
"x" number of seconds. That is, for each "x" seconds that go 
by you will have one less day and "y" fewer gallons of gasoline 
depending on your car type. As you participate in SHORTAGE, you 
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may want to note how quickly (or how slowly) your gasoline 
gauge is moving, whether or not you have made decisions which 
have increased or decreased your daily gasoline consumption 
rate, and how many days remain in the game. These factors 
will determine if and when you will run out of gasoline before 
the game is completed. If you will note, in the few seconds 
I have been presenting you with information you have used "x" 
number of days and your gasoline gauge has moved "y" degrees 
toward empty. Good Luck! And remember, as in real life, time 
moves as you are making decisions. If you have any questions, 
please do not hesitate to ask. 
With the exception of minor questions involving how to return to the 
index page to select a new strategy, or a reminder on how to type in com­
ments, respondent participation was relatively trouble free. Upon com­
pletion of SHORTAGE, respondents were told: 
Now that you have completed the simulation I would like 
you to respond to an attitude questionnaire that is iden­
tical to the one you filled out prior to your participation 
in SHORTAGE. 
Nearly every respondent immediately asked, "why?". The researcher's 
response was similar to the information given to respondents over the 
telephone. 
This research has been designed to determine whether or not 
SHORTAGE has made you more aware of the energy crisis and 
its implications for your personal transportation decisions. 
You may want to reconsider some of your initial responses. 
Please answer the questions as you interpret them. Do not 
alter responses because you may believe it is expected of you. 
Problems with the Data Set 
After the data collection was completed, the research group met to 
discuss problems that had emerged. A discussion of these problems fol­
lows. PLATO is often adversely affected by the summer heat and humidity. 
While the room in which the terminals were housed was air conditioned. 
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there were times when the system would break down while the simulation 
was in progress. Across the screen the respondent would read the follow­
ing note from FIATO: 
We are sorry. FIATO is "down". You may resume play in 
"x" minutes. 
This message meant one of two things: 1) the respondents had to wait 
until the system was back up again, which was usually from ten minutes to 
two hours; or 2) the respondent's time had to be rescheduled. This set 
the research behind schedule so that one, two, or more respondents had 
to be rescheduled. The terminal was "down" on four separate occasions. 
The respondents who experienced the terminal breakdowns were cooperative 
and did not hesitate to reschedule. In order to avoid a loss of con­
tinuity, these respondents began the process over, including filling out 
the questionnaire. Each reported that this presented no problems in 
terms of comprehension or simulation credibility. 
A second problem involved programming errors which resulted in un­
usable data. When the data were printed out, both decision patterns and 
gasoline consumption rates were recorded for each respondent. For 
eight of the respondents, the gasoline consumption rate figures were 
incorrect. The programmer was unable to explain this except to indi­
cate it may have been due to a malfunction in the computer. As a re­
sult, nine of the cases were labeled unusable. 
A final discussion of SHORTAGE'S problems produced a consensus with­
in the research group that the penalties associated with some of the con­
sequences needed to be stronger. For example, respondents were always 
rewarded for making "rational" or wise decisions (e.g., riding the bus. 
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riding a bike to work, joining a car or van pool). These rewards were 
generally In the form of a decrease in their dally gasoline consumption 
rate. This was particularly helpful for those respondents who drove 
fuel inefficient automobiles. However, it was decided that in the 
"real" world, consumers are not always rewarded for making rational de­
cisions. Because of this, some modifications of SHORTAGE seemed to be 
in order. Over a six-month period of time from October of 1979 to March 
of 1980 the necessary changes were made. 
It was further necessary to somewhat modify the questionnaire. Some 
of the questions were eliminated because they were irrelevant to the 
sample used. For example, all of the students sampled were single. As 
a result, marital status was not a critical factor. Secondly, asking 
the number of automobiles owned was irrelevant to all respondents, who 
either owned only one automobile or had access to a single automobile 
belonging to either parents or friends. 
The research group also concluded that if the prèsImulation and the 
postsimulation questionnaires were programmed into HATO, there would be 
a sense of continuity for respondents not offered by the pencil and paper 
questionnaire. That is, instead of having the entire questionnaire in 
front of them, the terminal would be programmed to present only one ques­
tion at a time. This would perhaps encourage respondents to evaluate 
each response more thoroughly before answering each question. 
Finally, it was concluded that the 1979 data set would not be used 
in the final evaluation. Rather a second round of data collection would 
be conducted. The reason for this was that the problems associated with 
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the first data set had, for the most part, been resolved. Thus, it was 
believed the second generation of data would yield more valid and test­
able information about consumer responses to the energy crisis. 
The second group of data was collected during July, August, Septem­
ber, and October of 1980. Identical instructions were given to respond­
ents with respect to their participation in SHORTAGE. The primary dif­
ference was that each respondent was immediately introduced to PIATO upon 
his arrival. The most significant difference between the 1979 and the 
1980 groups was the length of time spent with each respondent. As was 
predicted, when the questions on the attitude questionnaire were pre­
sented one at a time, respondents spent an average of ten minutes longer 
on each questionnaire. Thus, the average length of time spent with each 
respondent from start to finish Increased from thirty to thirty-five 
minutes in the 1979 group to forty-five minutes in the 1980 group. 
In November of 1980, the most serious problem associated with the 
project emerged. The computer programmer had made two errors which led 
to a loss of two-thirds of the 1980 data set. It was understood that 
PLATO should be programmed to store data for a total of one hundred re­
spondents. The programmer was aware that each respondent would fill out 
two questionnaires, a presimulation questionnaire and a postsimulation 
questionnaire. The problem occurred because the programmer did not 
account for the use of two questionnaires for each respondent. As a re­
sult, PIATO's capacity for data storage was cut in half—from one hundred 
to fifty respondents. In addition, there were four unknown individuals 
with access to SHORTAGE who played the game for "fun", thus dropping 
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storage capacity to forty-six. 
A second error In programming Involved the programmer's discovery, 
three days and fifteen respondents Into the data collection, that the 
gasoline consumption rate was, for some unknown reason, not being stored. 
As a result, data from another fifteen respondents were labeled unusable. 
The sample size was reduced from ninety to thirty-one. 
Merging the Data Sets: 1979 and 1980 
Because of the exploratory nature of this study. It was decided by 
the research group that to Increase sample size an attempt should be made 
to combine the 1979 and 1980 data sets. It was recognized that the way 
In which the questionnaire was administered had changed. The question­
naire Itself had been modified. In addition, SHORTAGE had been modified. 
A problem also emerged In that the two sets of questionnaires were iden­
tical on only sixteen of the original thirty-four items (see Appendix C 
for complete listing of questionnaire items for 1979 and 1980). However, 
because of the lack of time and computer resources to begin a third 
round of data collection, it was decided to conduct a difference of 
means test in order to determine whether or not the two Independently 
drawn samples were similar enough to have come from the same population. 
There appeared to be reason enough to hesitate. In addition to the 
structural and content changes in the questionnaire, by the time the 1980 
data collection began, the American hostage situation in Iran had inten­
sified. In May of 1980, President Carter's attempt at rescuing the hos­
tages being held In the United States Embassy in Iran had ended in the 
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deaths of eight American military personnel. It was believed this 
incident may have resulted in a significant change in respondent atti­
tude toward the gasoline shortages. That is, the hostage situation was 
speculated to be energy related. Such a perspective introduced the 
possibilities of another Middle East oil embargo (Matthews et al., 
1980:28). Despite these potentially influencing factors, it seemed im­
portant to increase sample size in order to provide a more valid analy­
sis of the data. 
The major criterion used for merging the data sets was whether or 
not they were similar. It would have been unrealistic to assume the 
samples were identical. As such, it appeared that there were two fac­
tors to consider: "One of absolute and relative size of differences 
and one of practical or 'real' significance versus statistical signifi­
cance" (Kerlinger, 1973:199). An emphasis on relative size of differ­
ences may create problems in a small sample size. As Kerlinger (1973; 
199) points out "What appears to be a very small difference may, upon 
close examination, not be so small." Thus, it is important that the re­
searcher use care and informed Judgment in his application of substantive 
or practical significance. On the other hand, an emphasis only on sta­
tistical significance may result in a narrow and static analysis of the 
data. As 61alock (1972:163) comments: 
Statistical significance can tell us only that certain 
sample differences would not occur very frequently by chance 
if there were no differences whatsoever in the population. 
It tells us nothing directly about the magnitude or impor­
tance of these differences. 
Again because of the exploratory nature of this study, the author 
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concluded that only strong evidence that the samples might have come 
from different populations would prevent a merging of the data sets. 
The decision was made that if a < .01 the data sets could not be merged. 
Statistical testing, however, yielded evidence that the population means 
were significantly different on only one of the questionnaire items. 
This was respondent attitude toward reducing the amount of allowable 
air travel. 
The differences In the questionnaire item might have been due to 
sampling error generated by the small size of each sample (for 1979, 
sample size was forty-three; for 1980, sample size was thirty-one). On 
the other hand, the review of literature provided no insights into ways 
in which this factor might contribute to a better understanding of con­
sumer travel behavior patterns under conditions of energy constraint. 
Thus, the final decision was to omit this attitude item from the analy­
sis and merge the data sets because the statistical tests demonstrated 
that the populations were similar (see Appendix C for a discussion of 
the sample manipulation). 
Modifications of SHORTAGE 
Changes in SHORTAGE, while they did provide more significant penal­
ties for certain consequences (see Appendix A for changes) did not alter 
the fundamental structure of the simulation. The most significant change 
involved the time element. In the 1979 data set, SHORTAGE was programmed 
to run a total of eighteen minutes from beginning to end. In the 1980 
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data set, the speed with which SHORTAGE moved was determined by the 
reading speed of each individual respondent. The page describing the 
scenario, the justification for gasoline rationing (see Appendix A) was 
used to determine respondent reading speed. For respondents who spent 
three minutes or more reading the scenario, SHORTAGE ran a total of 
twelve minutes. That is, the ninety-day time period diminished by one 
day for each eight seconds of time passed. For those respondents who 
read the scenario in two to two and one-haIf minutes, SHORTAGE ran for a 
total of nine minutes. Each ninety-day period then diminished by one 
day for each six seconds of time passed. For those respondents who were 
able to read the scenario in one to one and one-half minutes, SHORTAGE 
ran for a total of six minutes. Each ninety-day time period diminished 
by one day for each four seconds of time passed. This was done primarily 
because a number of respondents in the 1979 group had asked to stop the 
simulation before they ran out of time or gasoline. They indicated they 
had made all of the decisions of relevance to them. Eighteen minutes 
was too long a time for the game to last. It did not realistically 
assess respondent attention span or reading speed. Also , the speed with 
which time diminished was related to the speed with which the gasoline 
gauge veered toward empty. As a result, it was believed respondents 
might, as in real life, be more likely to recognize the costs involved in 
making hasty decisions and/or taking too long to make decisions if they 
were more acutely aware of the passage of time. The modification of time 
did not, however, completely eliminate the attention span or reading 
speed problems. There were still seventeen respondents who asked to 
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stop before the game vas completed. 
All of the factors contributing to the success of this Investiga­
tion have not been worked out. The author confronted problems as they 
emerged, often not anticipating them. The reason for this seems obvious. 
It was not known what to expect. This was, however, no reason to under­
estimate the value of the study. On the contrary, as Anderson (1980:37) 
comments : 
Computerized simulation games have begun to offer remarkably 
new pedagogical innovations. The computer acts as a patient 
tutor which individually responds to each participant depend­
ing on his or her sequence of decisions. The two key features 
are feedback and the ability to display and process language. 
These skills combined with large data storage, rapid computa­
tion, and control of input/output devices such as graphical 
display screens, open up vast new opportunities for simulation 
and gaming techniques. 
The Advantages of Simulation Research 
As it was pointed out in an earlier discussion, simulations are 
'hnodels in motion" (Bailey, 1982:331). These models, while they do not 
mirror "real world situations", do offer the researcher a number of dis­
tinguishable and advantageous features not available using cross-sec­
tional representations of reality (Bailey, 1982:331). Beyond the advan­
tages pointed out by Anderson (1980:37), Raser (1969:15-19) comments 





A discussion of each of these features follows. 
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Economy 
The use of simulations may not only be much less expensive than 
Implementation of the "real" thing, but It also permits dry runs which 
may help to prevent costly mistakes in the real operation (Raser, 1969: 
15). For example, transportation researchers have concluded in their 
investigations into consumer response to the energy crisis that the 
American public is opposed to rationing primarily because it would in­
volve a significant change in travel behavior patterns (Freeman, 1973; 
Murray et al., 1974; Wirth, 1975; Henderson, 1978a; Brunner and Bennett, 
1978; Rlchman, 1979). These changes would inevitably result in manda­
tory trade-offs In frequency, types, and/or modes of travel. Henderson 
(1978a) says this would permit consumers to end gasoline waste by allow­
ing them to establish their own travel priorities. However, the Impact 
of energy scarcity upon the individual's decision-making processes is 
a relatively unknown factor (Shippee, 1981). 
Consumer encounters with gasoline shortages have been limited pri­
marily to those experienced during the 1973 oil embargo and the "long 
dry summer of 1979" (Newsweek, 1979). Because of the limited nature of 
actual consumer experiences with gasoline shortages, an accurate under­
standing of travel decisions under conditions of energy constraint may 
net fewer economic, political, and social costs using a simulated situ­
ation of gasoline rationing than would an experimental program in the 
real world. Simulations may, for example; 
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1. Permit the researcher to reproduce and control the study 
of respondent decision patterns and travel behavior. 
2. Provide the researcher with a predictive device which may 
be used in development of an actual policy for gasoline 
rationing. 
Both points one and two are critical. SHORTAGE, for example, was devel­
oped within the framework of a particular goal—the development of an 
effective and adequate model by which to understand and predict consumer 
travel behavior under conditions of energy constraint. , The author sug­
gests that in giving respondents the opportunity to simulate a potenti­
ally "real" situation, they may become more attuned both to the reality 
of the energy crisis and to ways in which they as consumers may be able 
to adapt to conditions of energy constraint. Consumers may in turn be 
better able to evaluate gasoline rationing as the only way that each 
consumer will be able to gain access to at least some gasoline. The 
alternative may be long lines and irregular hours at service stations, 
outbreaks of violence due to heightened tensions, and the possibility 
of general social chaos (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1973; Newsweek, 1979; 
Henderson, 1978a). 
Visibility 
Watching consumer response to conditions of energy constraint allows 
a more readily observable understanding of their attempts to cope with 
the challenge and frustration of gasoline rationing. Raser (1969:16) 
comments : 
Simulation can heighten the visibility of the phenomenon 
to be studied by making the phenomenon more accessible 
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to the researcher, and by clarifying the phenomenon by 
separating the essential components of the system from 
the irrelevant or less relevant features. 
If it can be assumed that respondents in "real life" situations do tend 
to Isolate themselves from reality and be less involved in real events 
than are players in simulations, critical insights into consumer evalua­
tion of gasoline rationing may well become possible. As Roberts (1980:7) 
points out : 
Simulations seem capable of or at least have the poten­
tial of creating a sense of realism by bringing "real 
world" problems together in a setting in which respond­
ents can practice making "real world" decisions. 
In addition. If there are other critical components that have not been 
Included in the simulation, they may be considered later In actual policy 
development. The researcher may become aware of these components through 
continued respondent observation and/or if and when respondents point 
them out as the simulation is in progress. 
Reproducibility 
"Simulations allow scholars to reproduce chains of events that they 
could not otherwise observe repeatedly" (Raser, 1969:17). There are two 
basic reasons for reproducing events. Raser (1969:17) points out, the 
first is chance. For example, suppose a researcher wants to find out 
how many American consumers are likely to make "high risk" decisions that 
involve personal danger or breaking the law—such as storing gasoline 
in a home garage, siphoning gasoline from parked cars, or rolling through 
stop signs to save the gasoline used by a full stop. The researcher 
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could perhaps link up with a computer that allows access to arrest 
records, or he could maintain close contact with the news media in his 
efforts to determine how many consumers have made such decisions. How­
ever, there are some elements of chances consumers take that would go 
undetected. Even if it were possible to gain access to such records, 
it may be virtually Impossible to determine previous consumer decisions 
which led to the "high risk" category of actions. In this case, the 
computer simulation is not only more economical, it may be less time con­
suming because it allows the researcher to "build the element of chance 
into his simulation, run it repeatedly, and learn the decision paths 
taken which may result in 'high risk' actions" (Raser, 1969:17). 
The reproducibility factor also permits respondents to reproduce as 
many times as they desire, a situation which they may well be facing in 
real life—gasoline rationing. This may encourage the respondent to 
examine and evaluate certain components of the simulation with respect 
to their possible impact if a sudden cutback in the supply or avail­
ability of gasoline should actually occur. 
The gasoline crisis has repeatedly been a major news issue in re­
cent years. American consumers hâve continuously been told of the dangers 
associated with dependence on foreign oil. And as the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) continues its debate over the level 
of oil production, the possibilities of another oil embargo have re­
appeared. It was pointed out on the CBS evening news of July 9, 1982, 
that Iran had been producing one million barrels of oil per day over its 
agreed upon quota. Its rationale was that the money received from oil 
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exports was needed to finance the war with Iraq. Iran Indicated it 
might boost its production yet another million barrels per day. The 
Iranians argued that Saudi Arabia should cut back its production to com­
pensate because Saudi Arabia is such a rich nation. OPEC had previously 
agreed to produce and export 17.5 million barrels of oil a day. As of 
July 9, 1982, the actual production rate was 18.2 million barrels per 
day. That figure was expected to rise to 19.5 million barrels per day 
by mid-August, resulting in a five-to-eight-cent drop in the price of 
a gallon of gasoline for Americans by late autumn, 1982. Some analysts 
suggested that this might have meant there was a "crack in the power of 
the oil barons or the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(Yergln, 1982). On the other hand, a study conducted by Daniel Yergin 
of Harvard University (1982) yielded evidence that the energy crisis may 
soon reach a new peak. Yergin (1982:6B) suggests that oil prices may 
double by the year 2000. He predicts: 
A third oil crisis worse than those of 1973 and 1979 is 
"highly likely" before the end of the 1980's. This 
would test the American system on a scale matched in 
this century only by the Great Depression. 
While Yergin's is a recent study, the American public has been receiving 
similar messages since the oil embargo of 1973. As such, information to 
which consumers have been exposed in some form and content may be assumed 
to be a part of the "relevance structure" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966:43) 
of respondents who participated in simulation SHORTAGE. The author sug­
gests also that the attitude questionnaire administered in conjunction 
with respondent participation in SHORTAGE may yield insights into the 
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decision process not previously addressed. 
In summary of this section, simulation SHORTAGE affords the oppor­
tunity for the researcher to reproduce situations and thus : 
1. Enable him to derive statistical probabilities 
when the outcome is uncertain and/or; 
2. Encourage him to vary numerous aspects of the sys­
tem in ways that may yield profitable insights into 
how the system works. (Raser, 1969:18) 
In other words, simulations allow controlled experiments to be made that 
would otherwise be impossible (Raser, 1969:18). 
Safety 
Bailey (1982:333) points out that in social science research: 
Simulations have potential use in situations that are 
theoretically important, but may cause harm, embarrass­
ment or some other moral and/or ethical problems if human 
subjects are used in a natural environment. 
Discovering, for example, that the consequences of storing gasoline in a 
garage are not only illegal but could have tragic consequences may be 
anxiety producing and/or humiliating. For the respondent, such an ex­
ample may be as realistic on a computer screen as it is in real life 
when he is informed that a neighbor's child playing with matches caused 
an explosion and fire that burned the child over seventy-five percent of 
his body. Raser (1969:18) comments: 
Not only do simulations allow us to avoid putting human 
beings in dangerous situations, but they also allow us 
to study dangerous situations themselves without creating 
them. So simulations are used for safety purposes, both 
to protect human beings while they are being studied, and 
to produce laboratory analogues of dangerous phenomena that 
we need to study. 
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Disadvantages of Simulation Research 
It would be unrealistic to evaluate the content of this study with­
out an examination and evaluation of some of the disadvantages and/or 
potential problems associated with simulation research. These disadvan­
tageous elements include: 
1. Artificiality 
2. Cost 
3. Training of research assistants and participants 
4. Programming and other quantitative problems. 
A discussion of each of these disadvantages and ways in which they may be 
minimized follows. 
Artificiality 
Smith (1981:220-221) states that simulations are "theoretical models 
of the elements, relationships, and social processes that may reasonably 
be included (and excluded) in symbolizing some system." They do not, 
therefore, represent an attempt at a perfect replica of that system. By 
its very definition, a simulation "constitutes a kind of caricature" 
(Coleman, 1966:3-4) of social reality. It may, therefore, not resemble 
a real life situation In one or more key elements (Simon, 1978:216). As 
a result, there is always the possibility that, as Bailey (1982:333) 
comments : 
the simulation is so Inaccurate or incomplete that con­
clusions drawn from it are not applicable to the phe­
nomena being modeled, and thus the findings will be in­
valid. 
However, as Rltzer (1982:208) points out, "we should not mirror the real 
world in our conceptual systems." Instead we need to develop systems of 
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Ideas that help us to better understand the nature of the real world 
situations we wish to understand. To reduce the probability of exclud­
ing critical components in the simulation, it would appear to be neces­
sary to ask the following questions. 
1. Does the scope of the simulation include components 
that permit it to "resemble" a real life situation? 
2. Do the respondents who play the simulation act as if 
it were a real life situation? 
3. Do the respondents experience motivations which 
parallel those experienced in real world situations? 
It seems only logical to conclude that no simulation regardless of its 
sophistication and complexity will include all salient components or 
specify all relationships between components to the "nth" degree (Bailey, 
1982:333). Nonetheless, it may still yield critical insights into the 
decision-making process not possible with cross-sectional models. 
On the other hand, if points two and three are closely examined, it 
may be concluded that the simulation is not realistic. For example, will 
a player who indiscriminately makes a decision that may cause personal 
danger or imprisonment in the course of a simulation reproduce those 
same decisions and experience the same feelings in a real life situation? 
The author suggests that it is foolish to argue that the potential for 
such a danger does not exist. However, in examining other simulation 
research which has been conducted. Baser (1969) has argued convincingly 
that players do become Immersed in the "reality" of the moment--the sim­
ulated situation with which they are attempting to cope. In addition, 
many respondents may well realize that the potential for gasoline ration­
ing is indeed real. As President Carter pointed out to the American 
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public In his 1979 energy address to the nation: 
The oil embargo of 1973 and the continued shock produced 
by OPEC price Increases have sent us stem warnings about 
energy, but our nation has not yet responded to those 
warnings. We are dangerously dependent on a thin line of 
oil tankers stretching halfway around the earth originating 
in the Middle East and around the Persian Gulf - one of the 
most unstable regions of the world. 
I know that many of you have suspected that some supplies 
of gasoline are being withheld. You may be right, but 
suspicions about the oil companies cannot change the fact 
that we are running out of oil. (Energy Policy, 1981:252) 
The message seems apparent. It does not matter whether the gasoline 
crisis is a supply problem or an availability problem. The possibility 
of a sudden cutback in gasoline does exist. In light of the most recent 
studies on the energy crisis, for example, it has been argued (Yergin, 
1982;6B) that: 
President Reagan has a strong predispostion to turn 
the energy clock back to the 1950's. The administra­
tion is not preparing to deal with a new oil crisis, is 
cutting off research into alternative energy sources, 
and is generally letting politics and ideology lead it 
into a go-it-alone approach. 
The author's primary concern has been to include, in SHORTAGE, the nature 
and kind of component that may reflect the intersubjectlvely derived 
perceptions of the American public. It is believed this goal has been 
realized by reviewing not only the professional literature, but also the 
varied and diverse often conflicting information and facts presented by 
influential persons, television, advertising, and the news media. In 
this way, it is suggested that SHORTAGE may be more likely to meet the 
necessary requirements for "resembling" the real world. 
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Cost 
Although the author has commented on the economic advantages of 
simulation research, It should by no means be assumed It Is Inexpensive 
in terms of dollars and cents. SHORTAGE, for example, has been costly 
not only in terms of computer time but also in terms of computer pro­
gramming. Three different work study student computer programmers aided 
in the construction of SHORTAGE. In addition, following the printing 
of the raw data from the PLATO system, it was necessary to hire a com­
puter analyst from the Numerical Analysis Center at Iowa State Univer­
sity. This was done so that the author would be able to complete the 
data analysis using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS). The Statisti­
cal Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was not able to handle the 
complexity of the data set. The PIATO system is time consuming, expen­
sive, and awkward for the purposes of data analysis. As a result, it 
was felt that SAS would provide a more practical way of interpreting 
the data. 
Training Research Assistants and Respondents 
While the rules and guidelines of SHORTAGE were neither difficult 
nor complex, training of research assistants was both time consuming and 
at times difficult to conduct satisfactorily. In order to ensure that 
each respondent received the information needed to successfully under­
stand and participate in the simulation, it was necessary to delegate as 
little of the responsibility for data collection as possible. On the 
other hand, respondents learned the rules and guidelines very quickly and 
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were able to ask for clarification whenever it was necessary. Had this 
not been possible, the validity of the simulation would have been placed 
in question. 
Quantitative and Programming Problems 
Bailey (1982:333) comments: 
Computer simulations may not only require costly computers, 
but may also entail programming (software) costs and com­
plex mathematical problems. If the researcher does not have 
the ability to solve complex mathematical problems or do 
sophisticated computer programming, and if he is unable to 
hire someone to solve these problems, then he may be unable 
to complete the simulation research. 
As it was pointed out in a discussion of the costs of simulation re­
search, the author relied on three different computer programmers for the 
construction of SHORTAGE. When the researcher is unable to program the 
computer himself a number of problems arise, many of which, in the uni­
versity setting, may be a function of relying on student programmers. 
The problems associated with this study were serious, though not insur­
mountable. Both the author and the primary investigators concluded that 
there were two basic problems associated with having had to hire three 
different people in order to complete the research. The first Involved 
the loss of continuity and direction. Each time a new programmer was 
introduced, there was a need to begin anew, from square one, introducing 
theoretical and analytical concerns. The problem was magnified when it 
was discovered that the TUTOR language used in programming SHORTAGE onto 
PLATO was not standardized. As a result, a great deal of time was wasted 
while each new programmer attempted to "get into" the system to make 
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necessary adjustments. The most serious problem, however, was the one 
which led to the loss of two-thirds of the 1980 data set (see discussion 
pages 120 and 121). 
Reliability 
Smith (1981:236) points out that the fundamental principle estab­
lishing the reliability of a simulation is that successive runs should 
give similar results. Consequently, there are three basic requirements 
that a simulation should meet: 
1. The rules of the simulation should be as clearly and 
simply stated as possible. 
2. The rules of the simulation should be complete and 
self-contained. 
3. The simulation should not overtax the players span 
of attention. 
Based on the discussions throughout the chapter on the advantages and dis­
advantages of simulation research, it is suggested that SHORTAGE met 
the requirements for reliability set forth by Smith (1981:236). 
validity 
Crow and Koel (1965) indicate that: 
Establishing the "validity" of simulations or any other 
behavioral science method, is difficult. We believe that 
much more rapid progress could be made by a seemingly 
simple change in viewing the problem; we should shift 
attention from the validity of the method itself to the 
validity of using the Information produced by the method. 
We suggest that validity be measured by asking: "How 
useful to the purpose for which it is to be gathered is 
the information produced by this method, as compared to 
some alternative method?" We believe this approach to 
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validity brings it more closely in accord with modern con­
cepts of the scientific method and guides research more 
directly to application. 
According to Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1969:1453), 
valid implies a sound, justified, well-founded conclusion supported by 
objective truth. To speak of "valid statements" or a "valid claim", 
or a "valid simulation", then, carries with it a degree of unavoidable 
subjectivity, especially within the realm of social science research--
objective truth according to whom? As Baser (1969:138) comments : 
It is clear that the problem of "validity will differ 
for each type of research. As such the investigator 
cannot appeal to "objective truth" or "generally 
accepted authority" as a criterion. 
Raser (1969:144) discusses three basic criteria of validity that he has 
extracted from simulation literature. 
1. A simulation is valid to the degree that its 
structure (the theory and aasumptions on which 
it is based) can be shown to be Isomorphic to 
that of the reference system. 
2. A simulation is valid to the degree that the 
social processes are isomorphic to those observed 
in the reference system. 
3. A simulation is valid to the degree that it can 
reproduce historical outcomes or predict the future. 
The author's position of the adequacy of SHORTAGE has already been dis­
cussed, so further elaboration may not seem necessary. However, in pre­
senting some additional criteria to reinforce the validity of the simu­
lation, the following questions have been asked and evaluated. First, 
"does the simulation appear reasonable or have face validity" (Smith, 
1981:236)? SHORTAGE met this requirement in that the components built 
into the simulation were similar to those operating in the "real" world. 
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The author net the requirement In an Intensive and continuous updating 
of the literature and a continued awareness of the dynamic and day-by-day 
changes associated with the energy crisis. 
The second question to be asked was "did expected events actually 
occur" (Smith, 1981:236)? SHORTAGE was constructed and then modified 
over a lengthy period of time during which the author, the primary Inves­
tigators, and the computer programmer met In weekly sessions to discuss 
possible consumer travel decisions, patterns of behavior, and potential 
consequences likely to occur under conditions of gasoline rationing. The 
group also evaluated the varied consumer responses to the gasoline short­
age of 1979. At that time It was determined that nonratlonal behavior 
In some areas of the United States, depending on the severity of the 
shortage, had seemingly become the norm. 
The third question asked was, "did unexpected processes, sequences, 
or structures emerge that violated the assumptions of the model" (Smith, 
1981:236)? Regardless of the exhaustlveness of components Included in 
SHORTAGE, the potential remained that a key element may have been 
omitted. However, most of SHORTAGE'S components did parallel or were 
consistent with events and processes that occurred or were occurring in 
American society at the time SHORTAGE was constructed. As a result. It 
is believed that SHORTAGE did not divert significantly from the thought 
objects and experiences of consumers in the real world. 
A fourth and related question was, "do the components of the simu­
lation parallel those simulated" (Smith, 1981:236)? That is, "does the 
simulation reproduce historical outcomes or predict the future" (Smith, 
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1981:236)? In the early stages of SHORTAGE'S development, the research 
group did question the validity of some of the simulation's components. 
It was wondered, for example, whether the scenario created to convince 
respondents of the reality of the energy crisis was too "far-fetched". 
Respondents were presented with the following information designed for 
this purpose: 
There has been a nuclear explosion in one of the largest 
oil fields in the Middle East. As a result of this explo­
sion, it will be from six months to one year before workers 
can safely enter the area. As you know, a large percentage 
of United States oil is imported from the Middle East. 
The Department of Energy and the Economic Regulatory Admin­
istration here by Inform you that the President of the 
United States has authorized the enactment of a stand-by 
gasoline rationing plan which will become effective in 60 
days. Rationing will be implemented for a period not to 
exceed nine months. As of today the federal goveimment has 
informed us that a cutback of 25% in gasoline consumption 
will be needed in order to assure this country will not run 
out of gasoline altogether. While it is recognized that, 
in the past, many people believed these gasoline shortages 
were created by large oil corporations in an attempt to 
drive up prices, this country has now reached the point at 
which it is critical that all Americans recognize the 
seriousness of this sudden cutback in the availability of 
gasoline. 
Approximately two months before the author was ready to begin collecting 
data, the fear of a nuclear explosion in the Middle East was voiced in 
the media. This was also the time period in which Americans from the 
United States Embassy in Iran were being held hostage. Apparently such 
fears are reappearing in a similar manner in 1982, For example, Yergin 
(1982:6B) recently reported that: 
Another serious energy crisis for the United States 
would be touched off by a "political accident", 
perhaps a war or a revolution in the Middle East. 
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The fifth, and final question asked was, "are the simulation's 
structure and processes Isomorphic to those observed In the referent 
system" (Smith, 1981:236)? This question was evaluated in an earlier 
discussion. However, the author would point out that each strategy de­
veloped for use in SHORTAGE, each alternative, and its accompanying con­
sequence (s) was observed to have occurred during the 1973 oil embargo 
and/or during the shortage of 1979. In addition, the strategies offered 
appeared to be consistent with the Krlstol and Anderson (1977) model of 
general consumer perceptions of the energy crisis discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
In summary of this section, it is recognized that the validity of 
SHORTAGE is not absolute. However, as Crow and Noel (1965) point out: 
The amount of error in the information produced by a 
method Is an important criterion for its usefulness, 
but it is not the sole factor, and may not even be the 
most important one. A less precise method may be pref­
erable because it produces information more quickly 
and/or at less cost. Moreover, the Information is more 
likely to be used if the method by which it was obtained 
is familiar and acceptable to the respondent - an im­
portant consideration to those who must produce It. If 
the purpose, is, for example, to generate new and un­
expected contingencies as an aid to planning a hypothet­
ical situation, then a "loose" method might be more use­
ful (valid) than a precise one. 
The last statement by Crow and Noel (1965) on "loose" methods is consis­
tent with the Perrow (1981), Weick (1976), and Klnloch (1981) suggestion 
that society too is a "loosely coupled interactive system". Studying 
it through the use of precise and often rigid methods may result in the 
imposition of one's own--and therefore false--rationallty, producing dis­
tortion and empirical blindness" (Klnloch, 1981:141). As Klnloch (1981: 
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141) comments : 
Professional sociologists continue to grasp the invariant 
in their studies, manage research situations, focus on 
"assumed" correspondence between observed appearances and 
Intended events, and attempt to bring each situation into 
conformity with an anticipated state, that is, the goal, 
the solved problem. These methods mean that little, if 
any, insight Into individual rationality is gained, since 
the unavailability of formal structures is assured by the 
practices of constructive analysis. 
An imposed formalized structure plainly contrasts with the commonsense 
decisions made by individuals in the course of everyday life. The point 
is, if the researcher rationalizes or reconstructs the individual's in­
tent ions --the very processes used by Individuals in the dynamics of 
reality construction--he is effectively prohibited from gaining insights 
into those processes (Klnloch, 1981:141). SHORTAGE attempts to avoid the 
methodological problems Inherent in traditional survey research. In 
doing so it provides the incentive to theory building, an inducement to 
gather further data, and a manner of grouping previously disjointed 
fragments of knowledge about the energy crisis into a coherent descrip­
tion. Because of this it Is argued that SHORTAGE, In conjunction with 
the presimulatlon and postsimulation questionnaires , is scientifically 
useful and hence valid. 
Processes Versus Structures 
Phillips (1966:52) Indicates that: 
The importance of a knowledge of process or change must 
not be underestimated. Explanations attempt to describe 
causal relationships by filling the interstices between 
events or surrounding them within a more Inclusive frame 
work. A knowledge of process makes it possible to fill 
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these interstices and provide the more Inclusive frame­
work and thus increase our understanding of what is going 
on. It Is one thing to know that if an experimenter 
Introduces a certain change, a given effect will follow; 
It is quite another thing to be able to learn about the 
various mechanisms that lie between the given change and 
the given effect and convert the change Into the effect. 
The experiment can, of course, focus on some of these 
interstices, and this technique is quite valuable for 
arriving at an explanation. Simulation techniques, how­
ever, are especially well adapted to producing data of a 
more continuous nature so that long sequences of phenomena 
can be analyzed. 
Phillips' (1966:152) statements on the advantages of simulation techniques 
appear to be compatible with tax Weber's theoretical and methodological 
objectives. That is, both are concerned with gaining knowledge of the 
dynamic social processes that produce behavior. Both also appear to 
recognize the need to emphasize both the individualized and generalized 
factors that interact in the course and effect of social action. Other 
simulation researchers (Pool, 1964; Baser, 1969) in addition have noted 
that in using simulations and their accompanying flexible methodologies 
for testing theory, hypotheses are not evaluated solely in terms of 
whether or not certain decisions are made. Rather, the emphasis is on 
whether certain decision patterns emerge. Discrete choices are considered 
as critical dimensions of social processes only when they repeatedly 
occur so they may Indicate some underlying social process (Raser, 1969: 
85-86). This emphasis parallels Weber's in its insistence that the 
social scientist focus on the Interaction between idiographic (Individ­
ualized) and nomethetlc (generalized) factors which result in certain 
categories of social action. Raser (1969:86) also points out that: 
Simulations do not possess the capability of predicting 
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single events or "outcomes" of social processes. How­
ever, simulations can give us information about how the 
relationships among various states of a given system 
might change under given conditions. 
And as Pool (1964:62-71) indicates: 
Computer simulation offers a way of handling many proposi­
tions simultaneously, no one of which, taken singly, 
accounts for much of the total variance. Add to this ad­
vantage the ability of a computer simulation to "compress" 
time and to allow multiple replications, as well as its 
controlability and safety, and it is evident why this type 
of game is now employed as a research technique and why it 
represents a methodological breakthrough, especially in 
the social sciences. 
Strategy Categories 
The criterion for simulation credibility or validity is not contin­
gent on the development of rigid definitions of and/or control of speci­
fied variables. Such an approach may too easily lead to dogmatic 
assumptions about behavior or "flat statements about discrete events" 
(Raser, 1969:85), in which case it may be assumed that the social sci­
entist : 
1. Does not believe in chance occurrences. 
2. Is ignoring the fact that there always seems to be 
more influences on events than can be taken into 
account. 
3. Is transforming tentative theories into certainties. 
4. Is going beyond the level of prediction justified by 
the current achievements of social science and entering 
the twilight realm of Winchellian soothsaying. (Raser, 
1969:85) 
5. Has imposed his own - and therefore false - understand­
ing of social reality on the subjects under study, pro­
ducing distortion and empirical blindness. (Kinloch, 
1981:144) 
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In an attempt to avoid the problems just pointed out, strategy catego­
ries were created for use in SHORTAGE. In introducing a wide range of 
choices for respondents such an approach provides a flexible method 
which corresponds more closely to social reality than do traditional 
survey research approaches (Crow and Noel, 1961; Pool, 1964; Raser, 
1969). A discussion of these strategy categories follows. 
In September of 1978, the principal investigators presented the 
author with a list of ninety-four possible choices/decisions which Ameri­
can consumers might have to consider should President Carter receive 
permission from Congress to enact his Standby Gasoline Rationing Plan 
(see Appendix C). The list was labeled the United States Department of 
Energy Ration Plan Behavior (see Appendix D for a complete listing). It 
was the task of the author to group the items into various categories or 
possible strategies which consumers might find helpful in their attempts 
to cope with gasoline rationing. These strategies encompassed the vari­
ous ways in which consumers themselves might deal with these conditions 
of energy constraint, how they might adapt to the situation, how they 
might induce outside agencies to develop policies to reduce the severity 
of rationing regulations, or how they might attempt to "beat" the imposed 
regulations by bending or even breaking the laws defining rationing 
regulations. The strategies Included the following; 
1. Attempt to obtain as much gasoline as possible for per­
sonal consumption. 
2. Make better use of gasoline rations that are made avail­
able (each automobile, regardless of fuel efficiency 
would be given a ration of 120 gallons of gasoline which 
was expected to last for a 90 day period of time). 
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3. Adjust individual travel needs in an attempt to use 
less gasoline. 
4. Attempt to induce the government (local, state, and/or 
federal level) to change its energy policy or policies 
to relax rationing limitations. 
5. Reconsider the social and moral issues involved with 
respect to individual style of living, values, and 
behavior, l&ke personal changes as needed. 
A discussion of these strategies is in order. 
In a sense, SHORTAGE is a future-oriented simulation. Its objective 
was to move its participants away from dogmatic assumptions about past 
and present perspectives on the energy crisis, to create an awareness 
of the reality of gasoline rationing and its accompanying regulations. 
SHORTAGE thus afforded its participants an opportunity to become involved 
in an as yet simulated environment which may someday become a reality. 
Out of the awareness created by their participation, respondents may 
well have become more attuned to the dynamics of their environment and 
the constraints which may be imposed on them. Through a realistic 
creation of strategies, then, respondents might have been expected to 
feel the Impact of trade-off decisions they would be forced to make in 
such a situation--trade-offs that would inevitably restrict their mobil­
ity and upset their time management schedules. On the other hand, such 
an experience might also have provided them with the freedom to set their 
own travel priorities in order of personal importance. 
The modeling of strategy categories proceeded through a process of 
design, development, and testing that included the following phases. 
Awareness of probable, preferable, or possible decisions which respond­
ents might make. Initially it was believed that respondent attitude 
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toward gasoline rationing would be a major determinant In establishing 
decision patterns. However, as the review of literature progressed it 
was demonstrated that: 1) consumer attitude toward gasoline rationing 
was primarily negative (Freeman, 1973; Murray et al., 1974; Wlrth, 1975; 
Henderson, 1978a; Shlppee, 1981); and 2) a majority of consumers do not 
believe there Is an energy crisis (Rlchman, 1979; Shlppee, 1981). In 
addition. It was also found that In many Instances there Is little or no 
relationship between these two factors (Wlrth, 1975; Henderson, 1978a; 
Shlppee, 1981). An outgrowth of this finding was a belief that it might 
be critical to consider the decisions consumers might make irrespective 
of their attitudes. It seemed necessary to emphasize numerous alterna­
tives and their potential consequences for respondents. Because of this, 
as the Ration Plan Behavior list was categorized, each alternative con­
tained from one to nine consequences each of which would appear on the 
computer terminal screen with random probability. There was also a sys­
tematic attempt to focus on a few decisions that might pose critical 
consequences for the respondent and/or those with whom he comes into 
contact as he develops his travel behavior patterns. It is suggested 
that attitudes toward certain decisions are characteristically positive 
or negative. Attitude (see Chapter One for discussion) is assumed, how­
ever, to be contingent upon the acceptability of the conditions envisioned 
(Plummer, 1980:108). For examples see Figure 9. Conservatively, these 
decisions are probably labeled correctly. However, a rationally motivated 
action is contingent on an individual's point of reference (Schutz, 1967; 
Kinloch, 1981). Also, what is termed rational may not always be the 
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Negative attitudes toward decisions; 
1. You could steal coupons from mailboxes In large 
apartment buildings. 
2. You would siphon gasoline out of cars In your 
parking lot. 
Positive attitudes toward decisions; 
1. Purchase a fuel-efficient automobile. 
2. Ride a bus to work. 
Figure 9. Attitudes negative and positive toward possible deci­
sions respondents would make under conditions of 
gasoline rationing 
wisest choice. For example, as respondents participated In SHQRl^ GE, 
many made the decision to purchase a fuel-efflclent automobile. Such a 
decision could have been labeled rational If the respondent's present 
carjtype placed him In a "gasoline guzzler" category (see Figure 8). 
However, the consequences randomly presented by SH06XÂ6E were as follows: 
a. The Blue Book value of your present automobile has 
decreased by 30% because there Is little demand for 
fuel-lnefflclent cars. Sorry! You just cannot afford 
a new automobile at this time. 
b. The bank at which you have applied for a loan has just 
Informed you that you will be able to obtain your loan 
at a reduced rate as an incentive to purchase a fuel-
efflclent automobile. However, your Insurance company 
has Informed you that the risk of serious Injury or 
death In case of an accident Is 30% higher In a small 
car than in a large car. Thus your Insurance premium 
will Increase by 100% If you purchase at this time. 
And with the price of small cars skyrocketing you really 
cannot afford one even with the reduced Interest on the 
loan. 
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When seemingly rational decisions do not provide the desired results, it 
is suggested that respondents might well consider making decisions which 
bend or break the law. On the other hand, SHORTAGE was constructed so 
that respondents were not "forced" to make any decisions. Their choices 
were always voluntary. In illustration, assume a respondent had made two 
decisions within Strategy B, to make better use of the gasoline avail­
able to him. These decisions were 1) to join or form a car or van pool, 
and 2) to ride an intercity or intracity bus if one is available. There 
were still two decisions left to make within Strategy B, 3) to purchase 
a moped or a motorcycle, or 4) to purchase a fuel-efficient automobile. 
If, however, these choices did not parallel the respondents' needs, 
wants, or fall within his general relevance structure, he was able to go 
back to the index page at which time he could select another strategy. 
Or, if he decided he had made all of the decisions which he felt were 
relevant to him, he could tell the researcher he was ready to stop the 
game. 
The second phase in the development of SHORTAGE was as follows: 
Components parts of the model were specified and organized. Phase two 
was critical in that it focused on the manner in which respondents might 
be presented with both legal and Illegal alternatives. The computer 
programmer designed SHORTAGE so that respondents must press a special 
key in order to even see the list of questionable choices. In illustra­
tion, assume a respondent pressed the letter "A" which meant he had 
selected Strategy A which would offer decisions permitting him to obtain 
as much gasoline as possible for personal consumption. Within this 
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strategy there were six possible decisions made available. As It can be 
seen In Appendix A, if the respondent made fewer than two choices within 
Strategy A he would not be offered the set of illegal alternatives. If 
he made two or more decisions with Strategy A, SHORTAGE would present 
him with the following information which he could heed or choose to 
ignore ; 
If you find that none of the choices within this strategy 
meet your needs. Bill Gobal, who operates a gas station 
downtown, says there are other alternatives. Many people 
have tried this route. However, I must warn you, they do 
not all work equally well. Some have been considered to 
be socially unacceptable while others are Illegal. There 
is a risk Involved. Do you want to see them? Or would you 
like to try another strategy now? The choice is yours. 
If you want to see these new alternatives, you must press 
the key makred DATA on the list of alternatives. Each time 
you select an alternative you immediately will be presented 
with a consequence. Each time you go back to Strategy A 
you will need to press the key marked DATA to see this list 
again. 
The consequences for each alternative appeared with random probability. 
Because these alternatives were of questionable legality, it was believed 
that many respondents might view them as possible decisions, but not 
actually choose them unless they believed they were running out of gaso­
line. For example, those respondents who would make such decisions 
might have been expected to be driving automobiles which were classified 
as "gasoline Guzzlers". See Appendix A for a more detailed description 
of Strategy B and Strategy B, illegal alternatives. It is to be noted 
that the messages leading to illegal alternatives were different for 
Strategies B and E than for Strategy A. The following information was 
presented to respondents if they chose Strategies B or E: 
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If you do not like any of the above choices or If none 
of these choices fits your needs, your neighbors have 
all gotten together and have made a list of alternative 
ways to Increase gasoline efficiency. However, they do 
admit to you and to themselves that while these alterna­
tive choices are being made, they do not work equally 
well for everyone. Some even border on the line between 
legal and Illegal, others are clearly Illegal. 
If you want to see these alternatives you must press the 
key marked DATA on the list of alternatives. Each time 
you select an alternative you will Immediately be pre­
sented with a consequence. Each time you go back to 
Strategy B you will need to press the key marked DATA to 
see this list again. 
Again the consequences for each alternative appeared with random prob­
ability. 
Neither Strategy C, adjusting travel needs to use less gasoline, nor 
Strategy D, attempting to induce the government to change its policies 
to relax rationing regulations, contained any Illegal alternatives. This 
was consciously decided in an attempt to maintain an accurate and real­
istic set of decisions. After all. In real life, illegal alternatives 
are not presented in the course of every decision made. Thus, there was 
no reason to assume that SHORTAGE should divert from reality merely by 
design. This decision did involve a value judgment. However, in an 
attempt to create a subjectively meaningful simulated environment, the 
choice appeared to be appropriate. 
It was decided that an in depth evaluation of each and every compo­
nent of SHORTAGE would become tedious and time consuming for the reader, 
and as such, unnecessary for an understanding of the methodology used. 
Thus, the remaining strategies, their alternatives and consequences 
are listed in Appendix A. A skeleton diagram of the decision paths of 
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each can also be seen. 
In the strategy development stage, it was also critical to accu­
rately depict real or possibly real decisions within the strategy cate­
gories. As it was pointed out, the decisions must be meaningful to re­
spondents, yet objectively factual in terms of realistically designed 
patterns of events. 
In the selection of illegal decisions to be included in SHORTAGE, 
it might be expected that respondents whose car types permitted them to 
finish the simulation would be the least likely to make decisions which 
would involve breaking the law. These included all respondents whose 
daily gasoline consumption rate was 1.7 gallons of gasoline per day or 
less. However, it was also noted that respondents who were sanctioned 
negatively even when making rational or wise decisions might strike out 
at the system by making illegal decisions, especially if they surmised 
they might not "get caught". In addition, it was believed that respond­
ents who were negatively sanctioned would be most likely to type in com­
ments reflecting their frustrations with the situation they were experi­
encing. 
Phase three in the development of SHORTAGE was as follows: SHORTAGE 
was designed in a manner which gave concrete form to events which had 
already occurred, were occurring, or which might occur in the event of 
gasoline rationing. Thus, the decisions to be Included were a reflec­
tion of these events. SHORTAGE'S objectives, constraints, alternatives, 
consequences, general assumptions, and other structural components were 
stipulated as boundaries within which respondents were free to act. 
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Admittedly, the simulation design was a result of a number of conces­
sions and discretionary choices made by the research group. On the 
other hand, the simulation's development process was a carefully planned 
attempt to represent conditions of rationing as accurately as possible. 
As Plinraner (1980:109) points out: 
A simulation should always be understood to inherently 
reflect the knowledge, preferences, and perspectives of 
its creater. To acknowledge bias in the design process 
is not to attribute ulterior motives to the designer, but 
is merely to recognize that it is often not possible to 
incorporate as many features or to portray them as accu­
rately as one may wish. 
While SHORTAGE was, by definition, developed within the boundaries 
of a particular methodology, it was by no means an attempt to impose on 
its participants decisions which they "should" make. On the contrary, a 
number of SHORTAGE'S participants offered invaluable insights which pro­
vided the impetus for the second generation of the simulation. For 
example, some respondents pointed out the biases inherent in the design. 
One person indicated that some of the penalties associated with certain 
alternatives were not realistic. In the 1979 data set, a respondent's 
decision to ride the bus, for example, was always rewarded with the fol­
lowing consequence: 
Your cost of traveling to and from work has been cut by 
one-third. It looks as if this was a good choice. 
Not considered was the fact that riding the bus, either intercity or 
intracity is often inconvenient and/or crowded. Individuals may have to 
stand on the entire trip, buses are often late, inclement weather creates 
problems, and there is an almost complete lack of privacy. These and 
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other bits of information provided by respondents created a need for 
phase four in the model development which is as follows: Feedback re­
ceived by participants in the simulation created an incentive to modify 
and hence improve the validity of SHORTAGE for the second round of data 
collection. In illustration, for the 1980 data collection, a consequence 
was added to the alternative of riding the bus. It read as follows: 
The bus is so overcrowded that by the time it gets to your 
stop you have stood the entire ten miles to and from work 
each day. Do you still want to ride the bus? Press the 
letter "y" for yes, "n" for no. 
It was believed that this consequence might create respondent awareness 
that decisions made may be more realistic if they take such factors as 
individual comfort, safety, or privacy into account. 
In observing respondents, it was also possible for the researchers 
to evaluate SHORTAGE while the simulation was In progress. This was a 
helpful factor in permitting an adequate evaluation of SHORTAGE'S posi­
tive and negative elements. For example, some respondents seemed to 
have a need to converse with the researchers as the simulation progressed 
Perhaps this dialogue Interfered with their responsibility to type in 
comments on the terminal. On the other hand, it did permit respondents 
to vent frustrations at times. Sometimes comments did seem nonrational. 
One respondent, for example, replied, almost rhetorically: 
This is not fair. I live in a democratic society. I should 
not be expected to undergo any personal hardships because of 
my government's Ineptitude in solving the energy crisis - if 
there is one (an energy crisis), that Is, and I'm not so sure. 
One can only speculate the perspectives of other respondents who may have 
also felt their freedom and mobility to be in jeopardy but remained 
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silent. Consequently, It would seem the researcher must be aware of two 
Important factors in simulation research: 1) that the events and deci­
sions presented in the simulation are both familiar and understandable 
to respondents; and even more importantly, that 2) these events and 
decisions may not be acceptable to respondents. Hence, the respondent 
must feel free to make comments which maintain researcher awareness of 
otherwise latent respondent perceptions of the situation, perceptions 
which might influence the decision-making process. 
Methodology 
In a sense, the objective of this investigation Is to test a method­
ology which has, to the author's knowledge, not been used previously in 
social science research. The term methodology has been used in prefer­
ence to "research method" for a reason. As Bailey (1982:32) points out, 
"by method, we simply mean the research technique or tool used to gather 
data." SHORTAGE is far more than just a "tool" for gathering data. It 
involved the development of a new and innovative methodology and included 
a theoretical evaluation of the entire research process. As Bailey (1982: 
32) comments: 
Methodology includes the assumptions and values that serve 
as a rationale for research and the standards or criteria 
the researcher uses for interpreting data and reaching 
conclusions. A researcher's methodology determines such 
factors as how he or she writes hypotheses and the criteria 
he chooses to demonstrate the existence of a relationship 
between two variables, while perhaps saying nothing about 
the nature of the relationship. Some researchers will first 
choose a research problem and then decide that one method­
ological perspective is superior to others for studying it. 
Other researchers may be Intellectually committed to a 
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particular methodological perspective and will choose a 
research problem suited to that perspective. 
For this investigation, the research problem was considered in conjunc­
tion with the methodological perspectives used in social science re­
search. The phenomenological perspective was selected in response to 
the apparent failure of extant simulation and gaming theory which follows 
the basic assumptions of rational positivism. That is, as Brown (1978: 
160) points out: 
The focus is on calculating the optimal decision or choice 
among alternative means for achieving a given end. Formulas 
are developed for weighing risks, costs, and potential bene­
fits; options are arrayed and the "rationally best choice" 
is determined. 
Phenomenology, on the other hand, offers itself as a descriptive method, 
grounded in a theoretical framework which permits a focus on the socially 
constructed and socially negotiated nature of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966; Schutz, 1967; Zeitlin, 1973; Johnson, 1981). And as Klnloch (1981: 
136) comments, such an approach deviates markedly from the assumptions 
inherent in the positivist perspective which tends to impose predefined 
rules onto empirical data. 
As the data for this investigation are analyzed, there will be an 
attempt to avoid positi&jg empirical hypotheses which might serve to 
hinder the discovery of unexpected contingencies or serendipitous events, 
i.e., "the discovery through chance by a theoretically prepared mind of 
valid findings which were not sought for" (Merton, 1957:12). Serendipi­
tous events may emerge in the form of an apparently nonrational rela­
tionship between respondent attitude toward gasoline rationing and the 
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decision to make illegal decisions. It has already been noted that 
studies have often prejudged the utility of gasoline rationing as a non-
inflationary and equitably way of dealing with the energy crisis. Re­
searchers continue to generate information that reinforces the fact 
that respondent attitude toward the energy crisis is negative, that con­
sumers do not want it considered as an alternative to present methods 
of conservation (e.g., rationing by price). As a result of the conclu­
sions drawn by the researchers (Murray et al., 1974; Moncreif et al., 
1977; Brunner and Bennett, 1978; Burnett, 1978; Richman, 1979), trans­
portation researchers and policy planners have concluded that: 
1. American consumers will be unwilling to accept the 
transportation and mobility constraints associated 
with gasoline rationing. 
2. Consumers do not want to deal with the massive bureau­
cratic problems that would be created by a gasoline 
rationing plan. 
Simulating Gasoline Rationing: Does the Method Work? 
Barber (1963:4-7) comments: 
Both scientific knowledge and ordinary knowledge of the 
ccmmonsense objects of the external world are recognized 
as analytically unjustified, highly presumptuous, and 
fallible. 
In spite of Barber's (1963:4-7) statement, SHORTAGE may provide trans­
portation researchers with a perspective on consumer travel behavior 
that differs in a fundamental way from traditional survey research. Rea­
sons for this are as follows. SHORTAGE is the result of a careful design 
in which participants were able to: 
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1. Become intellectually and emotionally involved in 
the situation presented to them. 
2. Become goal oriented. 
That is, participants, because they were able to visually experience the 
passing of time, the rate of their daily gasoline consumption, and dwin­
dling of their gasoline supply, appeared to be conscious of making 
decisions (not necessarily rational) that would profitably benefit them 
by decreasing daily consumption rate to a level which would permit them 
to finish the simulation without running out. 
3. %ve at their disposal a wide array of possible 
alternatives to aid them in attaining their goal 
(e.g., coping with, adapting to, or beating the 
system). 
4. Communicate with the researchers. 
The researchers were always on hand to answer questions or to clarify the 
ways in which respondents could most effectively complete the simulation. 
The one problem which may have interfered with respondent decision making, 
however, was the intimidation they experienced interacting with a com­
puter. In addition, it may have been uncomfortable making certain kinds 
of decisions with the researcher in such close proximity. It was, how­
ever, made clear to respondents that the researcher would leave the 
terminal room if/when asked to do so. Respondents who would experience 
this kind of discomfort might well be those who specified a positive 
attitude toward gasoline rationing but then made decisions which were 
illegal, and hence inconsistent with their professed attitude. 
5. Participate in an ambiguous, threatening, and/or con­
straining situation. 
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That is, if the participants were representative of the larger population 
of American consumers, the possibility of gasoline rationing would serve 
to act as a constant reminder that the oil reserves of both the United 
States and the world are indeed finite and running out (Ritzer, 1982: 
457). To summarize, the greater the degree to which the simulation pro­
vided an environment similar to that which might exist in actual condi­
tions of gasoline rationing, the greater the degree to which there may 
be justification for saying the results of the data analysis are valid 
and hence scientific. It is argued that SHORTAGE met the qualifications 
stated in points one through five. 
Statistical Analysis Used 
The type of statistical analysis chosen for this study was contin­
gent upon both the theory and the methodology adopted. The methodology 
called for an emphasis on the dynamic social processes which produce con­
sumer travel behavior patterns. Also demanded was the flexibility needed 
to account for serendipitous findings. As a result, it would have been 
disadvantageous to have attempted to develop a complicated process of 
analysis such as that which is used in causal and noncausal relationship 
research and in comparison research. Simon (1978:362) provides the 
rationale for this approach when he points out that : 
What type of analysis a researcher performs should depend 
upon the type of research question that he seeks to answer, 
as well as on the method by which he collects the data and 
the sharpness with which the research question has been 
formulated. 
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Univariate Analysis and Frequency Distributions 
As Smith (1981:390) comments: 
Univariate analysis refers to the examination of only 
one variable at a time. We often need to use this type 
of analysis for "descriptive" purposes. 
In a descriptive investigation, particularly one that is exploratory, 
the researcher may be more interested in describing the degree to which 
a phenomenon occurs than with studying its correlates (Smith, 1981:322). 
That is, the raw frequency distribution»-for example, the number of 
respondents who held a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat un­
favorable, or very unfavorable attitude toward gasoline rationing—may 
provide a clear picture of how this attitude Is similar or dissimilar to 
that of the general population. In addition, a statistical summary 
average may be used in presenting the data: 
The mode, most frequently reported raw grouped category, 
the median, the category with half the responses on either 
side of it, and/or the arithmetic mean, the sum of all 
responses divided by the number of responses. (Smith, 
1981:390) 
For purposes of this study, frequency distributions Including the 
mean, median, and mode will be presented where appropriate in order to 
provide as much information as possible about the nature of respondent 
attitude toward the energy crisis and ways in which respondents may or 
may not feel it will directly impact their travel behavior patterns. It 
is further suggested that the interpretation of these frequency distribu­
tions may given some indication as to whether the results of this study 
are generalizable to the wider population of American consumers. These 
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distributions will be presented on respondent attitude toward the fol­
lowing two attitude items each of which contained response categories 
of 1) very favorable, 2) somewhat favorable, 3) somewhat unfavorable, 
and 4) very unfavorable. Attitude labels follow each within parentheses: 
Attitude toward gasoline rationing (hereafter referred 
to as GASBÂT). 
Depending more on oil imports from other countries (here­
after referred to as IMPOIL). 
Respondents were also asked to respond to the following questions: 
Should a person strictly follow all laws that are set up 
to conserve gasoline, even if those laws result in per­
sonal hardships? (Hereafter referred to as CONSG.) 
Do you think that most people are willing to give up some 
of their own gasoline needs so that others will be sure to 
have enough gasoline to meet basic needs? (Hereafter re­
ferred to as GIVUP.) 
Do you think think that you would get your "fair share" if 
a gasoline rationing system were set up? (Hereafter re­
ferred to as FSHÀR.) 
The response categories for the questions just listed were based on 
Likert scaling (Likert, 1982) and are as follows; 1) definitely, 2) 
probably, 3) not sure, 4) probably not, and 5) definitely not. 
Other questions included the following : 
Overall, would you say that during the last year or so 
the effect of the gasoline shortage on your household has 
been very severe, severe, not too severe, or not severe 
at all? (Hereafter referred to as SHSEV.) 
Response categories for SHSEV were as follows: 1) very severe, 2) severe, 
3) not too severe, 4) not severe at all, and 5) don't know. 
Do you think that the shortage of gasoline will get 
worse, stay the same, or get better during the next ten 
years? (Hereafter referred to as SHWORS.) 
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Response categories for SHHORS were as follows: 1) get worse, 2) stay 
the same, 3) get better, and 4) don't know. 
In general, which of the following statements best expresses 
your feelings about the "national" gasoline shortage of the 
past year or so? (Hereafter referred to as SHREAL.) 
Response categories for SHREAL were as follows: 1) there is not and 
never was a "real" shortage; 2) there probably was a shortage, but I am 
sure it is over now; 3) there is still a shortage, but I am sure the 
problem will be solved; 4) there is a severe shortage, but it can be 
solved in the future; and 5) the shortage is so severe that nothing can 
be done about it. 
Where do you feel the most responsibility for solving the 
gasoline shortages must lie? (Hereafter referred to as 
SHRESF.) 
Response categories for SHRESF were as follows: 1) government, 2) busi­
ness and industry, 3) Individual consumers, and 4) don't know. 
For purposes of the data analysis, attitudes toward SHWORS, SHREAL, 
and SHRESF will be considered as qualitative. Each Individual response, 
therefore, will be viewed as a separate category which would not lend 
itself to quantitative analysis. 
Testing for the Existence of Simple Relationships 
Smith (1981:363) comments that: 
To say there is an association between two variables is to 
say that when one phenomenon varies, the other is likely to 
vary in a predictable manner. All the more complicated 
statements In science - cause and effect statements, for 
example - are built upon the foundation of the association. 
smith's (1981:363) statements represent the goals of social science 
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research--to explain social reality and to find an order, to acknowledge 
rationality, and ultimately to make sense of things (Perrow, 1981:2-9). 
Thus, the statistical testing of relationships is expected to yield 
information on the degree to which there is (or is not) an association 
between two variables. Sometimes the answer seems to be statistically 
obvious. Within the context of this study, however, it is suggested 
that there may be little, if any relationship, for example, between the 
attitude held by respondents about GASBAT and the other attitude ques­
tions asked. By way of illustration, the following model. Model A, might 
be expected to yield valuable insights into consumer travel behavior 
patterns under conditions of energy constraint. Based on a review of the 
literature only those attitudes believed to be critical in understand­
ing consumer response to the gasoline shortage were Included in Model A. 
Relationships Suggested 
As it has been pointed out in previous discussions, American consum­
ers have been repeatedly Informed of the danger associated with depend­
ence on foreign oil (Energy Policy, 1981). Thus, it would be expected 
that an attitude toward GASRAT would be related to respondent attitude 
toward IMPOIL. Secondarly, American consumers have been repeatedly 
warned of the ramifications associated with a continued increase in 
the demand for gasoline (Moncrlef et al., 1977; Henderson, 1978a; Rich-
man, 1979; Energy Policy, 1981). However, consumers have, since the 
1973 oil embargo, responded negatively to reports of dwindling energy 











Figure 10. General theoretical model suggesting relationships between 
respondent attitude toward gasoline rationing and 1) in­
creased foreign oil imports, 2) conservation of gasoline 
at the expense of personal hardship, 3) willingness to give 
up personal supplies of gasoline so others may have their 
basic needs satisfied, 4) the fifty-five mile an hour speed 
limit as a reasonable limit, 5) the degree to which the 
gasoline shortage has been personally severe, 6) what turn 
the gasoline shortage will take over the next ten years, 
7) getting a fair share of gasoline if gasoline rationing 
is Implemented, 8) whose responsibility it is to solve the 
gasoline shortage, and 9) whether or not the gasoline short 
age is real 
know-how will solve the problem within five to ten years (Murray et al., 
1974; Shippee, 1981). 
The gasoline shortages have been viewed primarily as a part of the 
oil company conspiracy to drive up prices (Richman, 1979). Consumers 
report that rationing would cause "undue personal hardship" (Fusso, 1978). 
As a result, it would be expected that a relationship exists between 
attitude toward gasoline rationing and respondent willingness to con­
serve gasoline, even at the expense of personal hardship. 
Researchers have also conducted studies to determine how American 
consumers feel about and would respond to cutting back of their Individual 
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consumption of gasoline to assure that everyone would be able to satisfy 
at least basic travel needs (Fusso, 1978; Richman, 1979). Both Fusso 
(1978) and Rlchman (1979) found that one-third to one-half of those in­
terviewed would find gasoline rationing a harsh imposition on their 
mobility needs. In addition, a study by Moncrief et al. (1977) yielded 
evidence that regardless of future shortages, consumers would not be 
willing to cut back significantly on their travel needs. Thus, it would 
be expected that there would be a relationship between attitude toward 
gasoline rationing and consumer willingness to give up individual gaso­
line needs so that others will be sure to have enough gasoline to meet 
at least basic travel needs. 
Murray et al. (1974) found that consumer's acceptance of the seri­
ousness of the gasoline shortages and their willingness to consider gaso­
line rationing favorably were related to consumer experience with those 
shortages. As a result, it would be expected that a relationship exists 
between attitude toward gasoline rationing and the degree to which con­
sumers have been personally affected by the shortages. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that American consumers and 
government officials believe the shortage will be solved through domes­
tic research and development and technological advances (Energy Policy, 
1981). As it was pointed out in the Review of Literature, Presidents 
Nixon, Ford, and Carter all agreed that domestic research and develop­
ment are the keys to energy Independence. This message was passed on 
to American consumers as each president presented his energy address to 
the nation (Energy Policy, 1981). Also, in a study by Rlchman (1979:581) 
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eighty-six percent of those interviewed reported they were somewhat 
optimistic to very optimistic about the ability of the United States 
to "solve the energy problem by technological discoveries and develop­
ments." Thus, it would be expected that a relationship exists between 
attitude toward gasoline rationing and belief in the ability of the 
United States to solve the problem using the "technological fix" (Orr, 
1981). 
Studies have been conducted that have shown consumers would find 
it difficult to 1) significantly reduce their automobile mileage (Fusso, 
1978, or 2) permit a gasoline shortage to interfere with their vacation 
travel plans (Moncrief et al., 1977). It might be expected then that there 
would be a relationship between attitude toward gasoline rationing and 
belief in getting a "fair share" of gasoline in the event of rationing. 
A number of attitude evaluations about consumer perception of the 
gasoline shortages have demonstrated that consumers believe the primary 
responsibility for solving the problem lies with the oil companies, the 
government, and the individual in that order (Murray et al., 1974; 
Henderson, 1978a; Fusso, 1978; Rlchman, 1979). For example, in November 
of 1973, eighty-seven percent of those included in a nationwide survey 
by the Harris Poll (Fusso, 1978:129) believed the energy shortage in the 
United States to be somewhat serious (37%) to very serious (50%). By 
October of 1975, these percentages had dropped to thirty-eight percent 
and thirty-six percent, respectively. By July of 1977, twenty-three per­
cent believed the shortage to be somewhat serious while an increase to 
fifty-four percent believed the situation to be very serious (Fusso, 
167 
1978:129). By 1981, however, this percentage had significantly dropped. 
Shippee (1981) reported that fully eighty-seven percent of Americans did 
not believe in the reality of an energy crisis. As such, it would be 
expected there is a relationship between attitude toward gasoline ration 
ing and belief in the reality of the energy crisis. 
The author suggests there may be little or no relationships between 
these various attitudes toward gasoline rationing and its potential con­
sequences. It appears citlcal then to depict the data in such a manner 
that, as Simon (1978:363) suggests, "they are clearly shown, understood, 
and their meaning is grasped by the reader." Therefore, in discussing 
the results of the data analysis, there will be individual tables for 
each idea that is being communicated. These tables will Include 1) fre­
quency distributions for each of the questions from the presimulatlon 
and postsimulation questionnaires, 2) the measures of central tendency 
for each where appropriate, and chi-square tests of significance 
for Model A depicted in Figure 10. The use of simple statistics appears 
necessary in light of the exploratory nature of this study. Also, the 
small sample size precludes a more In depth analysis of the data. 
Collapsing Categories for Questionnaire Items 
In order to construct tables from the questionnaire data, it was 
necessary to collapse the range of responses into manageable categories. 
There were two basic collapsing strategies used—one was theoretical, 
the other empirical. Theoretically, the emphasis in this study has been 
on favorable versus unfavorable attitudes toward the gasoline shortages. 
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For the sake of the reader's understanding, the tables presenting the 
frequency distributions will demonstrate the continuum of attitudes from 
those strongly in favor to those strongly opposed to gasoline rationing 
as its incumbent constraints. However, for purposes of the chi-square 
tests of significance which will be conducted on Model A and on the 
SHORTAGE data, the categories will be collapsed to depict a more general 
evaluation. Empirically, the strategy Involved "uniform or proportion­
ate collapsing" (Bailey, 1982;400). That is, each cell contained a cer­
tain portion of the possible range of responses. 
Bailey (1982:401) comments that: 
While collapsing is often necessary to make tables manage­
able, it may unfortunately, result in a loss of information. 
It can also be used unscrupulously to manipulate results. 
The problems pointed out by Bailey (1982:401) may be most likely to occur 
when the researcher "plays with different alternative groupings to see 
which one yields the most statistically significant test or the strongest 
relationship between variables" (Bailey, 1982:401). Such an approach 
was not considered for purposes of this study. Table 3 demonstrates the 
manner in which the response categories were collapsed for respondent 
attitudes toward GASRAT and IMPOIL. Responses which indicated a very 
favorable or sonewhat favorable attitude toward GASRAT and IMPOIL were 
assigned a value of 1, which indicated a favorable attitude toward GASRAT 
and IMPOIL. Responses which indicated a somewhat unfavorable or very un­
favorable attitude toward GASRAT and IMPOIL were assigned a value of 2, 
which then indicated an unfavorable attitude toward GASRAT and IMPOIL. 
Table 4 shows how the response categories for respondent attitudes 
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Table 3. Way in which response categories were collapsed for attitudes 
toward GASItAT and DfPOIL 
Response categories Value assigned to attitude 
Attitude toward ; GÂSRÂT, IMPOIL 
1. Very favorable 
2. Somewhat favorable 
3. Somewhat unfavorable 





Table 4. Way in which response categories were collapsed for attitudes 
toward CONSG, GIVUP, and FSHAR 
Response categories Value assigned to attitude 
Attitude toward : CONSG, GIVUP, FSHAR 
1. Definitely 1 
2. probably 1 
3. Not sure 2 
4. Probably not 3 
5. Definitely not 3 
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toward 1) CONSG, 2) GIVUP, and 3) FSHAR were collapsed. Responses which 
indicated that respondents held a favorable attitude toward C0NS6, GIVUP, 
and FSHAR (response categories Included were definitely or probably) 
were assigned a value of 1. Responses which indicated that respondents 
were not sure were assigned a value of 2. Responses which indicated 
that respondents held an unfavorable attitude toward CONSG, GIVUP, and 
FSHAR (response categories included were probably not or definitely not) 
were assigned a value of 3. 
Table 5 demonstrates the way in which the response categories were 
collapsed for respondent attitude toward SHSEV. Responses which indi­
cated respondent attitude toward SHSEV was very severe or severe were 
assigned a value of 1. Responses which indicated respondent attitude 
Table 5. Way in which respose categories were collapsed for attitude 
toward SHSEV 
Response categories Value assigned to attitude 
Attitude toward: SHSEV 
1. Very severe 1 
2. Severe 1 
3. Not too severe 2 
4. Not severe at all 2 
5. Don't know 3 
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SHSEV was not too severe or not severe at all were assigned a value of 
2. Responses which indicated the respondents were not sure were assigned 
a value of 3. 
Collapsing Categories for SHORTAGE Data 
In order to construct tables from the SHORTAGE data, it was also 
necessary to collapse the range of responses into manageable categories. 
This approach was necessary too in order that the chi-square cells 
would have expected frequencies greater than five. Otherwise the tables 
presented would have been so sparse that chi-square would not have been 
a valid statistical test. Tables 6 through 13 demonstrate the way in 
which the strategy categories were collapsed. These categories were 
also proportionately collapsed. It was believed there would be less 
likelihood of distorting the findings if this approach were taken. As 
it can be seen from Table 6, if a respondent made the decisions not to 
view Strategy A (N__STR1), a value of 1 was assigned. If a respondent 
made one or more decisions to view Strategy A, a value of 2 was assigned. 
If a respondent made two or fewer decisions within Strategy A (N_CH1), 
a value of 1 was assigned. If, however, a respondent made three or more 
decisions within Strategy A(N_CH1), a value of 2 was assigned. 
The number of times respondents decided to view Strategy A (N_STR1) 
ranged from zero to eleven, while the number of respondents who made 
decisions within this strategy ranged from zero to five. There was a 
total of six possible decisions within Strategy A. A total of twenty-
nine respondents did not view Strategy A during their entire 
Table 6. Breakdown of number of times respondents viewed Strategy A (N_STR1) and the number 
of respondents who made decisions within Strategy A (N_CH1) 
Number of 
Number of decisions Number of 
times respond­ Number of respondent respondents 
ent viewed respondents Value made in who made 
Strategy A who viewed assigned Strategy A decisions in Value 
(N_STR1) Strategy A to N_STR1 (N_CH1) Strategy A assigned 
0 29 1 0 38 1 
1 6 2 1 7 1 
2 6 2 2 10 1 
3 4 2 3 9 2 
4 5 2 4 5 2 
5 7 2 5 1 2 
6 5 2 6 — — — — 
7 6 2 7 — — — — 
8 3 2 8 — — — — 
9 2 2 9 — — 
10 — — — 10 — — --
11 1 2 11 - — - -
Total 74 
Strategy category: (N_STR1, N_CH1) 
Strategy A: Attempt to obtain as much gasoline as possible for personal consumption. 
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participation in SHORTAGE, while forty-five respondents viewed this 
strategy one or more times. On the other hand, thirty-eight respondents 
made two or fewer decisions within Strategy A, while thirty-two respond­
ents made three or more decisions. It might be suggested that those re­
spondents who made two or more decisions within Strategy A (N_CHI) would 
be likely to hold an unfavorable attitude toward CONSG, since Strategy A 
encouraged respondents to obtain as much gasoline as possible for per­
sonal consumption. 
Table 7 demonstrates the breakdown of responses for respondents who 
viewed Strategy A, illegal alternatives (N_STR2) and for those who actu­
ally made decisions within Strategy A, Illegal alternatives (N_CHI2). 
As It can be seen from Table 7, if a respondent made the decision not 
to view Strategy A, Illegal alternatives (N_STR2) a value of 1 was as­
signed. If a respondent made one or more decisions within Strategy A, 
Illegal alternatives (N_CHI2), a value of 2 was assigned. The number of 
times respondents decided to view Strategy A, Illegal alternatives ranged 
from zero to five, while the number of decisions actually made ranged 
from zero to three. There was a total of four possible decisions within 
Strategy A, illegal alternatives. A total of fifty-one respondents did 
not view Strategy A, illegal alternatives at all during their partic­
ipation in SHORTAGE, while twenty-three respondents viewed this strategy 
at least once. Fifty-seven respondents did not make any decisions within 
Strategy A, illegal alternatives, while sixteen respondents made one or 
more decisions. 
Table 8 demonstrates the breakdown of responses for those who 
Table 7. Breakdown of number of times respondents viewed Strategy A, Illegal alternatives 
(N_SER2) and actual number of decisions made by respondents in Strategy A, illegal 
alternatives (NJCHI2) 
Number of 
Number of Number of decisions 
times respond­ respondents respondents 
ent viewed who viewed made within Number of 
Strategy A, Strategy A, Strategy A, respondents 
Illegal Illegal Value illegal who made Value 
alternatives alternatives assigned alternatives decisions assigned 
(N_STR2) (N_STR2) to N_STR2 (N_CHI2) within N_CHI2 to N_CHI2 
0 51 1 0 57 1 
1 15 2 1 12 2 
2 5 2 2 3 2 
3 1 2 3 1 2 
4 1 2 4 — — — 
5 1 2 5 — - — — 
Total 74 
Strategy category: (N_STR2, N_CHI2) 
Strategy A, illegal alternatives: This strategy contained the Illegal alternatives for Strategy A, 
to attempt to obtain as much gasoline as possible for personal consumption. 
Table 8. Breakdown of number of times respondents viewed Strategy B (N__STR3) and actual number 
of respondents who made decisions within Strategy B (N_CHI3) "" 
Number of Number of 
Number of decisions respondents 
times respond­ Number of respondents who made 
ent viewed respondents Value made within decisions Value 
Strategy B who viewed assigned Strategy B within assigned 
(N_STR3) Strategy B to N_STR3 (N_CHI3) Strategy B to N_CHI3 
0 7 1 0 7 1 
1 1 2 1 8 1 
2 7 2 2 10 1 
3 3 2 3 22 2 
4 5 2 4 11 2 
5 6 2 5 5 2 
6 12 2 6 4 2 
7 7 2 7 3 2 
8 6 2 8 1 2 
9 10 2 9 — — — — 
10 2 2 10 — — — — 
11 2 2 11 1 2 
12 1 2 12 - - — — 
13 2 2 13 — — — — 
14 — — — — 14 — — -  —  
15 1 2 15 — — - -
16 1 2 16 - - - -
27 1 2 27 - -
33 1 2 33 — — --
Total 74 
Strategy category; (N_STR4, N_CHI4) 
Strategy B: Make better use of the gasoline rations that are made available to you. 
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viewed Strategy B (N_STR3) and for those who actually made decisions 
within Strategy B (N__CHI3). If a respondent made the decision not to 
view Strategy B (N_STR3), a value of 1 was assigned. If a respondent 
viewed Strategy B one or more times, a value of 2 was assigned. If a 
respondent made two or fewer decisions within Strategy B (N__STR3), a 
value of 1 was assigned. If a respondent made three or more decisions 
within Strategy B, a value of 2 was assigned. 
The number of times respondents decided to view Strategy B, ranged 
from zero to thirty-three, while the number of respondents who actually 
made decisions within Strategy B ranged from zero to twenty-seven. 
There was a total of four possible decisions within this strategy. One 
respondent who viewed Strategy B made these four decisions repeatedly. 
He made the decision to buy a fuel-efficient automobile more than twenty 
times. He indicated he wanted to do this more than anything else. He 
informed the researcher of the following: 
If I try long enough, I will surely be allowed to buy 
a new car. Won't I? It wouldn't be fair otherwise. 
A second respondent decided to view Strategy B sixteen different times, 
while repeatedly making the decision to ride an Intercity or Intracity 
bus. His logic was as follows : 
If I make this decision enough times my gasoline con­
sumption rate will eventually reach zero. Won't it? 
That makes sense, you know. 
This respondent could not be convinced that, as in real life, once a deci­
sion is made, it is made. That is, his decision to ride the bus had de­
creased his travel costs by one-third. His logic seemed to indicate that 
a second decision to ride the bus should decrease his travel costs by 
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another one-third and so on until his daily gasoline consumption rate 
reached zero. His logic and his decisions could have been defined as 
nonrational. Even more nonrational then was his decision to terminate 
the simulation. His reasons were as follows: 
I'm sorry. This is not fair. You have made me extremely 
upset and frustrated. I cannot handle this. Please tell 
me how I can stop the game. I'm leaving. 
With that response, the respondent angrily left the terminal room. 
Table 9 demonstrates the breakdown of responses for those who viewed 
Strategy B, illegal alternatives (N__CHI4) and for those who actually 
made decisions within Strategy B, illegal alternatives (N__CHI4). If a 
respondent made the decision not to view Strategy B, illegal alternatives 
(N_STR4), a value of 1 was assigned. If a respondent made one or more 
decisions within Strategy B, illegal alternatives, a value of 2 was as­
signed. As it can be seen from Table 9, the number of times respondents 
decidéd to view Strategy B, illegal alternatives ranged from zero to 
seven, while the number of respondents who made decisions within Strategy 
B, illegal alternatives also ranged from zero to seven. There was a 
total of seven possible decisions to be made within this strategy. A 
total of twenty-eight respondents did not view Strategy B, illegal alter­
natives at all during their participation in SHORTAGE, while forty-three 
respondents viewed this strategy one or more times. Thirty-four respond­
ents did not make any decisions within Strategy B, illegal alternatives, 
while thirty-five respondents made one or more decisions. 
Table 10 demonstrates the breakdown of responses for those who viewed 
Strategy C (N_STR5) and for those who actually made decisions within 
Table 9. Breakdown of number of times respondents viewed Strategy B, Illegal alternatives 
(N_STR4) and actual number of respondents who made decisions within Strategy B, 
illegal alternatives (N_CHI4). 
Number of Number of 
Number of Number of decisions respondents 
times respond­ respondents respondents who made 
ent viewed who viewed made within decisions 
Strategy B, Strategy B, Strategy B, within 
illegal illegal Value illegal Strategy B, Value 
alternatives alternatives assigned alternatives illegal assigned 
(N_STR4) (N_STR4) to N_STR4 (N_CHI4) alternatives to N_CHI4 
0 29 1 0 34 1 
1 7 2 1 6 2 
2 15 2 2 11 2 
3 9 2 3 8 2 
4 5 2 4 5 2 
5 5 2 5 4 2 
6 3 2 6 "• — — — 
7 1 2 7 1 2 
Total 74 
Strategy category: (N_STR4, N_CHI4) 
Strategy B, illegal alternatives: This strategy contains the Illegal alternatives for Strategy B, 
to make better use of the gasoline that is made available to you. 
Table 10. Breakdown of number of times respondents viewed Strategy C (N_STR5) and actual number 
of respondents who made decisions within Strategy C (N_CHI3) 
Number of Number of 
Number of decisions respondents 
times respond­ Number of respondents who made 
ent viewed respondents Value made within decisions Value 
Strategy C who viewed assigned Strategy C within assigned 
(N_STR5) Strategy C to N_STR5 (N_CHI5) Strategy C to N_CHI5 
0 10 1 0 13 1 
1 3 2 1 4 1 
2 3 2 2 5 1 
3 6 2 3 8 2 
4 5 2 4 9 2 
5 9 2 5 6 2 
6 9 2 6 7 2 
7 5 2 7 5 2 
8 6 2 8 6 2 
9 5 2 9 1 2 
10 5 2 10 4 2 
11 3 2 11 — — — — 
12 2 2 12 2 2 
13 1 2 13 - - -  -
18 - - -  - 18 1 2 
22 1 2 22 - - - -
47 - - — 47 1 2 
49 1 2 49 — — -  -
Total 74 
Strategy category: (N_STR5, N_CHI5) 
Strategy C: Adjust travel needs in an attempt to use less gasoline. 
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Strategy C (N_CIil5). If a respondent made the decision not to view 
Strategy C (N_STR5), a value of 1 was assigned. If a respondent viewed 
Strategy C one or more times, a value of 2 was assigned. If, however, 
two or fewer decisions were made within Strategy C (N_CHI5), a value of 
1 was assigned. If three or more decisions were made with Strategy C, 
a value of 2 was assigned. 
The number of times respondents decided to view Strategy C ranged 
from zero to forty-nine, while the number of respondents who made deci­
sions ranged from zero to forty-seven. There was a total of ten pos­
sible decisions within this strategy. Three of these decisions offered 
respondents only a marginal Increase In daily gasoline consumption rate. 
Nonetheless, one respondent repeatedly made these decisions. His logic 
was as follows : 
I'm just curious as to what might happen if I keep 
pressing the same buttons each time. Maybe, for ex­
ample, they'll change the law about driving snowmo­
biles. I own one, you know. It really isn't fair 
that I wouldn't receive any gasoline to use it. 
Table 11 demonstrates a breakdown of responses for those who viewed 
Strategy D (NSTR7) and for those who actually made decisions within 
Strategy D (N_CHI7). If a respondent made the decision not to view 
Strategy D (N_STR7), a value of 1 was assigned. If a respondent viewed 
Strategy D one or more times, a value of 2 was assigned. If two or fewer 
decisions were made within Strategy D (N_CHI7), a value of 1 was assigned. 
If three or more decisions were made, a value of 2 was assigned. As it 
can be seen from Table 11, the number of times respondents decided to 
view Strategy D ranged from zero to fourteen, while the number of 
Table 11. Breakdown of number of times respondents viewed Strategy D (N_STR7) and number of 
respondents who made decisions within Strategy D (N__CHI7) 
Number of Number of 
Number of decisions respondents 
times respond­ Number of respondents who made 
ents viewed respondents Value made within decisions Value 
Strategy D who viewed assigned Strategy D within assigned 
(N_STR7) Strategy D to N_STR7 (N_CHI7) Strategy D to C_CHI7 
0 38 1 0 40 1 
1 2 2 1 10 1 
2 10 2 2 5 1 
3 5 2 3 9 2 
4 7 2 4 3 2 
5 4 2 5 2 2 
6 3 2 6 1 2 
7 — — — — 7 2 2 
8 3 2 8 1 2 
9 1 2 9 — — — -
10 — — — — 10 — — -  —  
11 — — — — 11 — — — — 
12 — • — — 12 1 2 
13 — — — — 13 — -
14 1 2 14 -  - - -
Dotal 74 
Strategy category: (N_STR7, N_CHI7) 
Strategy D: Attempt to induce the government (local, state, and/or federal levels) to change 
its energy policy or policies to relax rationing regulations. 
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respondents who made decisions within this strategy ranged from zero to 
twelve. There was a total of ten possible decisions within this strat­
egy. None of these decisions offered respondents either a decrease or an 
increase in their daily gasoline consumption rate. The reason for this 
was that changes Involving government Intervention were believed to be 
long-run changes, while the situation of energy constraint confronting 
respondents was immediate. It was concluded that respondents might view 
the decisions within this strategy and surmise that none would be of any 
help in "getting them through the situation." Only one respondent re­
peatedly viewed and made decisions within this strategy, while the major­
ity (64 respondents) made zero to two decisions before returning to the 
index page to select a different strategy. It is noted that the respond­
ent who made repeated decisions within Strategy D informed the researcher 
of the follcwlng: 
I guess I am just curious as to what sorts of feedback I 
might get within this strategy. Actually, the government, 
at any level, should be prepared to help us (consumers). 
After all, it was the government that got us into this mess 
in the first place. 
As the data collection progressed, the type of response just described 
seemed far too rare. If one respondent, or two, or three, held this atti­
tude, perhaps others did as well. 
Table 12 demonstrates the breakdown of responses for those who 
viewed Strategy E (N_STR9) and for those who actually made decisions 
within Strategy E (N_CHI9). If a respondent made the decision not to 
view Strategy E (N_STR9), a value of 1 was assigned. If a respondent 
viewed Strategy E one or more times, a value of 2 was assigned. If two 
Table 12. Breakdown showing number of times respondents viewed Strategy E (N__STR9) and actual 
number of decisions made by respondents within Strategy E (N_CHI9) 
Number of Number of 
Number of decis ions respondents 
times respond­ Number of respondents who made 
ents viewed respondents Value made within decisions Value 
Strategy E who viewed assigned Strategy E within assigned 
(N_STR9) Strategy E to N_STR9 (N_CHI9) Strategy E to N_CHI9 
0 19 1 0 24 1 
1 4 2 1 5 1 
2 4 2 2 11 1 
3 8 2 3 9 2 
4 9 2 4 10 2 
5 5 2 5 5 2 
6 8 2 6 3 2 
7 3 2 7 4 2 
8 6 2 8 2 2 
9 6 2 9 — — — — 
10 3 2 10 1 2 
11 1 2 11 — — - -
12 1 2 12 — - - -
Total 74 
Strategy category: <N_STR9, N_CHI9) 
Strategy E: Reconsider the social and moral issues with respect to individual style of living. 
values, and behavior. Make personal changes as needed. 
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or fewer decisions were made within Strategy E (N_CHI9), a value of 1 was 
assigned. If three or more decisions were made within Strategy E, a 
value of 2 was assigned. As it can be seen from Table 12, the number of 
times respondents decided to view Strategy E (N_STR9) ranged from zero 
to twelve, while the number of respondents who actually made decisions 
within Strategy E ranged from zero to ten. With the exception of the de­
cision to report to the authorities anyone selling counterfeit ration 
coupons, none of the decisions within Strategy E decreased or increased 
respondent daily gasoline consumption rate. 
Table 13 demonstrates the breakdown of responses for those who 
viewed Strategy E, illegal alternatives (N_STR10) and for those who actu­
ally made decisions within Strategy E, illegal alternatives (NjCHIlO). 
If a respondent made the decision not to view Strategy E, illegal alter­
natives (N_STR10), a value of 1 was assigned. If a respondent viewed 
Strategy E, illegal alternatives one or more times, a value of 2 was 
assigned. If a respondent did not make any decisions within Strategy E, 
illegal alternatives, a value of 1 was assigned. If a respondent made 
one or more decisions within Strategy E, illegal alternatives, a value of 
2 was assigned. As it can be seen from Table 13, the number of times 
respondents decided to view Strategy E, illegal alternatives ranged from 
zero to three. The number of respondents who actually made decisions 
within this strategy also ranged from zero to three. There was a total 
of six possible decisions within this strategy. Each decision presented 
the respondent with some type of risk which might cost him 1) an auto­
mobile accident, 2) a possible jail sentence, 3) a possible fine. 
Table 13. Breakdown showing number of times respondents viewed Strategy E, illegal alter­
natives (N_STRlO) and actual number of decisions made by respondents within 





































0 49 1 0 54 1 
1 14 2 1 12 2 
2 6 2 2 8 2 
3 5 2 3 --
Total 74 
Strategy category: (N_STR10, N_CHI10) 
Strategy E, illegal alternatives": This strategy contains the list of illegal alternatives for 
Strategy E, to reconsider the social and moral issues involved with respect to individual 
style of living, values, and behavior. Make personal changes as needed. 
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4) cancellation of his ration coupons, and/or an explosion which may 
cost a life (see Appendix A for a description of these decisions and 
their possible consequences). 
Method of Data Analysis: SHORTAGE Data 
An analysis of the data from SHORTAGE will be conducted In a manner 
similar to that of the preslmulatlon questionnaire data. The concept 
categories from SHORTAGE to be used in the data analysis appear in Fig­
ure 11. It is noted that in the printout of the raw data for SHORTAGE, 
the following categories of decisions used in the data analysis were 
created: 1) the number of times each strategy was viewed, 2) the number 
of decisions made within each strategy, 3) the number of decisions made 
which were legal/illegal, 4) the daily gasoline consumption rate for 
each respondent (this figure was computed according to respondent car_ 
type), and 5) the number of hi_risk decisions made by each respondent. 
However, for some unknown reason, specific alternatives and the conse­
quences associated with them had not been stored. The computer pro­
grammer could not justify this error. It was also not possible to quan­
titatively chart the decision paths of each respondent. While these 
factors somewhat limit the complexity of the statistical analysis, they 
need not be Interpreted as severe limitations for purposes of this inves­
tigation. That is, it seems more Important to present the data that jj, 
available for analysis. This will be done using frequencies, percent­
ages, and ">.1-square distributions. Figure 11 depicts the labels as­
signed to each strategy category used in the data analysis. 
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Car_type (CARJEYPE) 
Number of times respondents made decisions within Strategy A (N_CHI1) 
Number of times respondents made decisions within Strategy A, illegal 
alternatives (N__CHI2) 
Number of times respondents made decisions within Strategy B (N_CHI3) 
Number of times respondents made decisions within Strategy B, illegal 
alternatives (N_CHl4) 
Number of times respondents made decisions within Strategy C (N__CHI5) 
Number of times respondents made decisions within Strategy D (N_CHI7) 
Number of times respondents made decisions within Strategy E (N_CHI9) 
Number of times respondents made decisions within Strategy E, illegal 
alternatives (N_CHI10) 
Number of times respondents viewed Strategy A (N_STR1)^  
Number of times respondents viewed Strategy A, illegal alternatives 
(N_STR2) 
Number of times respondents viewed Strategy B (N_STR3)® 
Number of times respondents viewed Strategy B, illegal alternatives 
(N_STB4) 
Number of times respondents viewed Strategy C (N_CHI5)^  
Number of times respondents viewed Strategy D (N_CHI7)^  
Number of times respondents viewed Strategy E (N_CHI9)® 
Number of times respondents viewed Strategy E, illegal alternatives 
(N_STR10 
D^enotes number of respondents who viewed each strategy. 
Figure 11. Labels assigned to each strategy category used in data 
analysis of SHORTAGE data 
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Relationships to be Tested 
Based on the review of the literature, the development of the 
theory, and the methodology adopted for this investigation, there will 
be an attempt to determine whether or not relationships exist between 
respondent attitude and actual decisions made during participation in 
SHORTAGE. Statistically, the chl-square tests of significance will be 
used. These relationships Include the following: 
1. Car__type and number of illegal decisions made. 
2. Attitude toward GÂSBÂT and number of Illegal decisions made. 
3. Car_type and attitude toward GASBAT. 
4. Attitude toward CONSG and number of illegal decisions made. 
5. Attitude toward GIVUF and number of illegal decisions made. 
6. Attitude toward CONSG and decisions made within legal strat-
egls (Strategies A, B, C, D, and E) 
The development of hypotheses or suggestion of relationships to 
test is generally contingent on the review of literature. There have 
not been to the author's knowledge, studies done which permit a theoret­
ical justification for the relationships just stated. In part, for this 
reason, no attempt will be made at this time to evaluate them. If a 
justification were made prematurely, it might well preclude a needed 
qualitative evaluation of the decision paths followed by given respond­
ents. That is, when the raw SHORTAGE data were printed, the decision 
paths of each respondent were printed along with a path which depicted 
their dally gasoline consumption rate. If it becomes necessary to do so, 
those paths will be analyzed. 
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Postsimulation Questionnaire Data 
Finally, in the data analysis paired t-tests will be conducted in 
order to determine whether or not there is a statistically significant 
difference between responses to the presimulation questionnaire and the 
postsimulation questionnaire. These tests may well yield information 
to suggest that the knowledge, awareness, and experience gained through 
participation in SHORTAGE led to a shift in respondent attitude toward 
the gasoline shortage. This finding could be invaluable to transporta­
tion researchers and policy makers if it is demonstrated that the shift 
in respondent attitude would narrow the gap which exists between attitude 
toward the gasoline rationing and actual consumer travel behavior. Such 
information may contribute to the development of energy policies based 
on consumer understanding and acceptance of the situation. Or conversely, 
policies based on consumer understanding and a lack of acceptance of 
the gasoline rationing. Either way the results of this investigation may 
provide insights into: 
1. The point at which American consumers will actually cut 
back on their current levels of transportation. 
2. The point at which American consumers will reduce their 
mobility at the cost of altering their styles of living. 
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CHAPTER V. RESULTS OF THE DATA Al^ LYSIS 
In an article titled "OPEC, Down but Not Out", Cambridge Energy Re­
search Associates (1982:6B) concluded that: 
Any forecast predicting the demise of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries is premature and the oil 
cartel could plunge the world into a third energy crisis 
as early as 1986. The current situation - where OPEC is 
struggling to maintain $34 a barrel price for its oil in 
the face of a worldwide glut - is not permanent. With only 
a modest economic recover, the world will once again become 
vulnerable to that volatile mixture of oil and politics 
that leads to disruptions and higher prices. 
It would appear that the topic under study in this investigation grows 
more Important on a day-by-day basis. As such, the data analysis which 
follows has been designed in order to suggest relationships which might 
be expected to emerge should American consumers once again experience 
the constraints In travel mobility which inevitably accompany gasoline 
shortages. The focus will be on presenting the distribution of atti­
tudes toward gasoline rationing and its attendant perspectives on con­
ditions of energy constraint rather than on a search for the causes of 
these attitudes. In addition, there will be an attempt made to dis­
cover certain types of travel behavior patterns which might be expected 
to emerge in a situation of gasoline rationing as a result of the atti­
tudes held. 
The following sections will appear in this chapter: 1) frequency 
distributions will be presented which demonstrate respondent attitude 
toward the gasoline shortages prior to participation in SHORTAGE; 2) the 
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results of the chl-square tests of significance for relationships sug­
gested in Model A will be evaluated (see page 164); 3) the results of 
the chi-square tests of significance for relationships suggested between 
presimulâtion questionnaire items and decisions made during respondent 
participation in SHORTAGE will be presented and evaluated; 4) frequency 
distributions will be presented that will demonstrate changes in re­
spondent attitude toward the gasoline shortages following participation 
in SHORTAGE; and 5) the results of the paired t-tests performed to de­
termine the degree to which respondent participation in SHORTAGE signif­
icantly altered attitudes toward the gasoline shortages will be pre­
sented. 
Frequency Distributions and Percentages: 
Preslmulation Questionnaire Items 
Respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes toward gasoline 
rationing (GASBAT). As it can be seen from Table 14, 51.8% of all re­
spondents Indicated a somewhat favorable (52.7%) to very favorable (5.4%) 
attitude toward GASRAT, while 41.9% Indicated a somewhat unfavorable 
(36.5%) to very unfavorable (5.4%) attitude. These findings demonstrate 
a marked increase from the Harris Poll conducted in 1977 (see Fusso, 
1978:132) in which it was found that 60% of those surveyed opposed gaso­
line rationing and 29% favored such a solution to the gasoline shortages. 
It was noted that the Harris Poll discovered consumers were opposed to 
1) putting higher taxes on gasoline, and 2) letting the price of gaso­
line rise all it could stand. Each of these tentative stopgaps to the 
gasoline shortages Involved a belief that "rationing by price" would 
192 
Table 14. Frequency distributions and percentages for prèsimulation 
attitude toward GÂSBÂT 
Attitude toward GASBAT N Percentages 
Very favorable 4 5.4 
Somewhat favorable 39 52.7 
Somewhat unfavorable 27 36.5 
Very unfavorable 4 5.4 
Totals 74 100.0 
= 2.419 Median = 2.346 Mode = 2,000 
®In all tables, the subsequent code goes from the positive to the 
negative part of the scale (e.g., 1 = most favorable). 
serve as a deterent to unnecesary travel. As Businessweek magazine 
(1974:58) and Willenborg and Pitts (1977) pointed out, however, such an 
approach had already been shown to be Ineffective. It might, therefore, 
be concluded that the American public would continue to be resistant 
to voluntarily reducing mileage to conserve gasoline, while at the same 
time professing to, as Fusso (1978:127) states, "prefer voluntary re­
duction In the use of gasoline, as opposed to higher taxes or rationing 
of gasoline." 
In consideration of the mixed respondent attitude toward GÂSRÂT, it 
might be expected that attitude toward importing more oil from other 
countries (IMPOIL) would also be mixed. However, as it can be seen from 
Table 15, only 10.8% of all respondents indicated a somewhat favorable 
(8.1%) to very favorable (2.7%) attitude toward IMPOIL, while 89.1% 
maintained a somewhat unfavorable (36.5%) to very unfavorable (52,7) 
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Table 15. Frequency distributions and percentages for prèsimulatIon 
attitude toward IMFOIL 













Mode = 4.000 
attitude. These responses may well be Indicative of respondent awareness 
of the potentially explosure relationship between dependence on foreign 
oil and the danger of another oil embargo. On the other hand, responses 
may have included a belief that the United States was not able to pro­
duce enough oil to meet its energy needs, thus creating an Inevitable 
though negatively interpreted dependence on foreign oil. For example, 
in a Gallup Poll conducted during April and May of 1979, It was found 
that 46% of all Americans believed the United States must import foreign 
oil in order to meet its energy needs (Rlchman, 1979:579). Since Presi­
dents Nixon, Ford, and Carter continually emphasized the need for energy 
independence as the primary requisite for uninterrupted energy supplies 
(Energy Policy, 1981:244) it would not seem surprising that respondent 
attitudes toward IMPOIL were overwhelmingly negative. 
Based on respondent attitude toward GASBAT and IMPOIL, It might be 
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expected that attitude toward strictly following all laws set up to con­
serve energy, even at the expense of personal hardship (CONSG) would be 
relatively positive. As it can be seen from Table 16, 74.3% of all re­
spondents indicated that persons probably should (59.5%) or definitely 
should (14.9%) follow such laws, while 13.5% were not sure and 12.2% 
felt persons should probably not (8.1%) or definitely not (4.1%) follow 
such laws. It would appear that the attitude toward CONSG ranges from 
one end of the continuum to the other with a majority favoring strict 
conformity to the law. This finding is consistent with Parson's theoret­
ical model of the complementarity of expectations in which It has tradi­
tionally been assumed that "In social interaction men/women mutually 
seek approval from one another by conforming to shared norms (Wrong, 
1982:108) On the other hand, Parsons' model may be neither applicable 
nor an adequate predictor of travel behavior, given actual conditions of 
energyconstralnt. In illustration, the question constructed to elicit 
respondent attitude toward CONSG was a traditionally designed "What If 
... ?" question intended to produce respondent feelings about and per­
ceptions of the gasoline shortages. It was assumed that while respond­
ents stated in good faith the changes in transportation behavior that 
"should" occur, their statements of good faith were made without an ade­
quate understanding of the consequences Involved in terms of time, 
privacy, and/or freedom of mobility. That is, gasoline rationing was 
an unknown experience to all respondents who participated in SHORTAGE. 
As such, it would seem quite rational that 25.7% of all respondents in­
dicated they were uncertain of how people should respond or that people 
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Table 16. Frequency distributions and percentages for preslmulatlon 
attitude toward C0NS6 















Mode = 2.000 
would probably not or definitely not conform to the laws set up to con­
serve gasoline, particularly If cmformlty to the law meant accepting 
personal hardship. 
It can be seen from Table 17 that 51.3% of all respondents, perhaps 
more realistically. Indicated that people would probably not (48.6%) or 
definitely not (2.7%) give up Individual gasoline needs so that others 
would have enough to meet basic needs (6IVUF). It would appear that a 
discrepancy exists between what people "should do" and what people might 
actually do under conditions of energy constraint. This discrepancy may 
have been due to a lack of understanding of what gasoline rationing 
would demand In terms of consumer travel decision trade-offs. That is, 
if gasoline rationing demanded a significant change in travel behavior, 
it might be expected that attitude toward GIVUP would be relatively nega­
tive. 
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Table 17. Frequency distributions and percentages for preslmulatlon 
attitude toward GIVEUF 
Attitude toward GIVUP N Percentages 
Definitely 2 2.7 
Probably 24 32.4 
Not sure 10 13.5 
Probably not 36 48.6 
Definitely not 2 2.7 
Totals 74 100.0 
X = 3.162 Median = 3.528 Mode = 4.000 
It might also be expected that if people believed they would get 
their "fair share" should gasoline rationing be enacted into law (FSHAR), 
there would be less resistance to potential concerns of mobility con­
straints. The responses for attitude toward FSHAR were mixed, with 50% 
of all respondents indicating they probably would (43.2%) or definitely 
would (6.8%) receive a fair share, and 50% indicating they were either 
not sure (27.8%), would probably not (17.6%) or definitely not (5.4%) 
get a fair share. It might be expected that respondent attitude toward 
FSHAR would be related to the degree that gasoline rationing was believed 
to restrict transportation mobility and force the individual to made 
trade-offs, for example, between social activities and work-related activ­
ities. That is, respondents who drove fuel efficient automomobiles 
--those getting 28-38 miles per gallon—might be more likely to believe 
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they would get a fair share than would those who drove gasoline guzzlers 
—those getting 9-16 miles per gallon (see page 210 for a discussion of 
the results of the chi-square test for presimulâtion attitude toward 
FSHAR and car_type). In assessing Table 18, it is further suggested 
that those individuals who were unaware of the fuel efficiency of their 
automobiles might logically have responded to the question by stating 
they were not sure whether or not they would receive their fair share. 
Table 18. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulation 
attitude toward FSHAR 
Attitude toward FSHAR N Percentages 
Definitely 5 6.8 
Probably 32 43.2 
Not sure 20 27.8 
Probably not 13 17.6 
Definitely not 4 5.4 
Totals 74 100.0 
X = 2.716 Median = 2.500 Mode = 2.000 
The data collected for this study were collected during and shortly 
following the "long dry summer of 1979" (Newsweek, 1979:22). At that 
time, shortages were most severe "in urban areas and in the Northeast" 
(Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1974-75:68). Respondents in the sample drawn 
for this study were primarily from the state of Iowa, and, as such, did 
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not encounter the degree of severity experienced by those living, for 
example, in New Jersey "where two to three hour waits at gasoline sta­
tions were common" (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1974-75:68). This may 
account, at least in part, for the fact that for 81.1% of all respond­
ents, the gasoline shortages were perceived as being either not too 
severe on Individual households (54.1%) or not severe at all (27.0% 
(see Table 19 for presimulatlon attitude toward SHSEV). On the other 
hand, when respondents were asked to indicate whether or not the short­
ages would worsen, stay the same, or get better over the next ten years 
(SBWORS), 71.6% indicated they believed it would get worse. These find 
ings demonstrate a significant shift in attitude toward SHWORS since 
the 1974 study conducted by Murray et al., in which it was found that a 
Table 19. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulatlon 
attitude toward SHSEV 
Attitude toward SHSEV 
Very severe 
Severe 
Not too severe 
Not severe at all 
Don't know 
Totals 








Mode = 3.000 
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majority of those surveyed believed the energy crisis would be solved 
within five years. It was also a significant attitude change from Rich-
man's 1979 findings which indicated that 86% of those surveyed were some­
what optimistic (43%) to very optimistic (43%) about the ability of the 
United States to solve the energy crisis within five to ten years 
(Richman, 1979:581). Because the response categories for respondent 
attitude toward SHHORS were considered discrete, the mean and the median 
were not included in Table 20. It was noted, however, that the mode was 
1.000 indicating a majority of respondents believed the shortages would 
worsen over the next ten years. 
Richman (1979:581) comments that during the gasoline shortages, 
"those individuals who had difficulties in getting gasoline were less 
convinced gasoline shortages were 'real' than were those who had no dif­
ficulty". Those who had experienced difficulties in obtaining gasoline 
appeared also to be more likely to blame the president for the scarcity 
than those who had no difficulty (see Table 21). An evaluation of 
Richman's findings (1979) might well be interpreted to mean that as the 
gasoline shortages intensified, as contradictory information continued 
to be disseminated to the American public, and as gasoline prices con­
tinued to rise, the public's annoyance and anger rose as well. Responses 
given within the context of this study, however, appear to contradict 
those found by Richman. They also stand opposite those presented by 
Shippee (1981:35) who pointed out that: 
Several recent polls suggest that the majority of U.S. 
citizens simply do not believe in the reality of present 
energy supply problems, nor future availability problems. 
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Table 20. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulâtion 
attitude toward SHWORS 
Attitude toward SHWORS N Percentages 
Get worse 











Totals 74 100.0 
Table 21. CBS/New York Times findings: Who is to blame for the gasoline 
shortages? Experiences in getting gasoline (July 9-11, 1979) 
Difficulty Difficulty 
Belief about oil (34% of the public) (55% of the public) 
shortages (%) (%) 
Real 24 29 
Not real 70 62 
No opinion 6 9 
Blame president for shortages 
A lot 41 30 
Not much 53 63 
No opinion 6 7 
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On the other hand, the study conducted by Shlppee (1981) was a strati­
fied random sample of all Americans, while the sample drawn for this in­
vestigation was a convenience sample, using the closest live persons as 
respondents. This question, too, contained discrete response categories 
Table 22. Frequency distributions and percentages for preslmulation 
attitude toward SHBEAL 
Attitude toward SHREAL N Percentages 
There is not and never was a 
"real" shortage 12 16.2 
There probably was a shortage 
for a while, but it is over now 14 18.9 
There Is still a shortage, but 
I am sure the problem will be 
solved 25 33.8 
There is a severe shortage, but 
it can be solved in the future 22 29.7 
The shortage is so severe that 
nothing can be done about it 1 1.4 
Totals 74 100.0 
which precluded the use of the mean and the median (SHREAL). However, 
the mode was 3.000 indicating that 33.8% of all respondents believed 
there was still a shortage but that it would be solved. By the time of 
the data collection, it was also noted that American consumers were well 
aware of President Garter's concern over the energy crisis. As it was 
pointed out in Energy Policy (1981:96) "energy policy was one of Presi­
dent Carter's earliest priorities. With rationing, however, the govern­
ment would be telling millions of people how to manage their lives." 
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Had American consumers accepted the reality of the gasoline shortages 
as a problem that would be long term in nature, it might be expected 
that they would also have needed to bear part of the burden of resolv­
ing the problem. With this in mind, it might have been expected that 
respondents would have been divided as to who would be most responsible 
for solving the gasoline shortages (SHKESP). Reasoning for this assump­
tion is as follows: 
American consumers, in 1979, were "striving to maintain their 
materialistic, energy driven life styles (Henderson, 1978a:15) which were 
still being encouraged by big business as it promoted energy intensive 
products such as recreational vehicles. The energy crisis had only 
recently begun to magnify in both intensity and complexity, and, as such, 
was difficult even for the politician, the academician, and the econo­
mist to grasp (Wirth, 1975; Henderson, 1978a; Richman, 1979; Shippee, 
1981; Orr, 1981). This, however, was also a time period in which gaso­
line prices as well as shortages were at their peak. Prices, for ex­
ample, had risen steadily from approximately fifty-eight cents per gallon 
in January of 1978 to ninety-three cents per gallon in July of 1979. 
This was, in addition, a time when many service stations were limiting, 
in some areas of the country, the total number of gallons of gasoline 
purchased, and "a number of other states had implemented a form of 
rationing that based distribution on odd and even numbered license 
plates" (Energy Crisis, Volume 2, 1974-75:68). Realizing this, it seems 
logical that 58.3% of all respondents in this study believed the primary 
responsibility for solving the gasoline shortages rested with someone 
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other than themselves (see Tables 23, 24, and 25). 
Tables 23, 24, and 25 show the frequency distributions and percent­
ages for respondent presimulation attitude toward who is most respon-
ible for solving the gasoline shortages (SHBESP). There are three 
tables for this questionnaire item for the following reason. For the 
1979 questionnaire, the response categories for SHRESP included 1) 
government, 2) business and industry, 3) individual consumers, 4) don't 
know, and 5) others (please specify). When the questionnaire was filled 
out using pencil and paper, respondents took the liberty of circling 
more than one response, indicating, for example, that government and 
individual consumers were responsible for solving the gasoline shortages. 
Because of this, an additional four response categories were added. 
However, as it was pointed out in the Methods Chapter (see pages 119, 
120), for the 1980 data collection the questionnaire was programmed 
into PIATO. The response categories for attitude toward SHRESP then 
were 1) government, 2) business and industry, 3) individual consumers, 
and 4) don't know. As it can be seen from Table 24, five respondents 
(16%) asked to combine the responses to include government, business 
and industry, and individual consumers. Because no respondents indi­
cated they "did not know" where to place primary responsibility for solv­
ing the gasoline shortages, that response category was recoded to mean 
government, business and industry, and individual consumers. As it can 
be seen from Tables 23 and 24, 58.3% of respondents from the 1979 data 
set and 45.1% from the 1980 data set indicated someone other than the 
individual consumer was primarily responsible for solving the gasoline 
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Table 23. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulation 
attitude toward SHRESP: 1979 data set (N=43) 
Attitude toward SHRESP N Percentages 
Government 14 32.6 
Business and Industry 6 14.0 
Individual consumers 10 23.2 
Don't know 0 0.0 
Government, business and industry, 
and individual consumers 2 4.6 
Government and busines and in­
dustry 5 11.7 
Government and individual 
consumers 4 9.3 
Totals 43 100.0 
Table 24. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulation 
attitude toward SHRESP: 1980 data set (N=31) 
Attitude toward SHRESP N Percentages 
Government 5 16.1 
Business and industry 9 29.0 
Individual consumers 10 32.3 
Government, business and Industry, 
and individual consumers 6 19.3 
No response 1 3.3 
Totals 31 100.0 
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Table 25. Frequency distributions and percentages for preslmulation 
attitude toward SHRESF: Combined data sets 
Attitude toward SHRESF N Percentages 
Government 19 25.7 
Business and industry 15 20.3 
Individual consumers 20 27.0 
Government, business and Industry, 
and individual consumers 6 8.1 
Government and business and 
industry 5 6.8 
Government and individual 
consumers 4 5.4 
Business and industry and individ­
ual consumers 2 2.7 
No response 1 1.4 
Don't know 2 2.7 
Totals 74 100.0 
shortages. When Tables 23 and 24 were combined, it was demonstrated 
that 52.8% of all respondents believed someone other than the individ­
ual consumer was primarily responsible for solving the gasoline short­
ages. These findings differ somewhat from those presented by Murray 
et al. (1974:184) as they found that: 
Sixty-seven percent of those surveyed expressed the 
belief that the gasoline shortages could be solved if 
individual consumers cut down on gasoline consumption. 
The findings from this study, however, do seem to parallel those in a 
CBS/New York Times study (see Richman, 1979:581) in which the following 
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question «as asked; 
We are Interested in who or what is to blame for the oil 
shortages we hear about. Would you place a lot of blame 
or not much for the problem on. . . . (For July of 1979, 
the poll question read . .we are interested in who or 
what is responsible for the energy problem we are facing. 
Would you place a lot of the blame or not much for the 
energy problem, on. . . .") 
Responses appear on Table 26. 
Table 26. Results of a CBS/New York Times poll emphasizing who is to 
blame for the gasoline shortages 
Percent "A Lot" of blame 
July 9-11 June 3-6 July 19-25 
1979 1979 1977 
American oil companies 65.0 69.0 57.0 
Middle East oil producing 
countries 56.0 47.0 44.0 
Waste by people like yourself 58.0 62.0 
The President 35.0 33.0 19.0 
Congress — — 59.0 51.0 
In summary of this section, it was noted that 1) respondent atti­
tude toward GASBAT was mixed with 58.1% favoring rationing and 41.9% 
opposing rationing; 2) respondent attitude toward IMFOIL was overwhelm­
ingly unfavorable (89.2%); 3) respondent attitude toward C0NS6 was rela­
tively positive with 74.4% indicating persons probably should or defi­
nitely should comply with laws set up to conserve gasoline, even at the 
expense of personal hardship; 4) respondent attitude toward 61VUP was 
mixed with 35.1% of all respondents indicating people probably or 
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definitely would give up some of their individual gasoline needs so 
that others would be able to meet basic needs and 51.3% indicated people 
probably would not or definitely would not do so; 5) respondent attitude 
toward FSHAR was mixed with 50% indicating they would probably to defi­
nitely get a fair share of ration coupons if rationing were set up and 
50% indicating either they did not know or that they might not receive 
a fair share; 6) respondent attitude toward SHSEV indicated that 81.1% 
of all respondents had not severely experienced the effects of gasoline 
shortages of the past year or so; 7) respondent attitude toward SHHORS 
indicated that 71.6% believed the shortages would worsen over the next 
ten years; 8) respondent attitude toward SHKEÂL indicated that 16.2% of 
all respondents believed the shortages were real but would eventually 
be solved; and finally 9) respondent attitude toward SHBESF indicated 
that 52.8% of all respondents believed someone other than the individual 
consumer was responsible for a solution to the gasoline shortages. 
Results of Model Â: Crosstabulations within 
Presimulation Questionnaires 
The general theoretical model depicting the relationship between 
presimulation attitude toward GASRAT and IMFOIL, CONSG, 6IVUP, SHSEV, 
FSHAR, SHREAL, SHWORS, and SHRESP, has been diagrammed in Figure 10, 
page 164. Chi-square tests of significance were performed in order to 
establish the existence of relationships between these various attitude 
items. Â discussion of the results follows. For the crosstabulation be­
tween presimulation attitude toward GASRÂT and CONSG, two out of the six 
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Table 27. Grosstabulation between presimulatlon attitude toward GASBÂT 
and CONSG 
Attitude toward GASBÂT 
Attitude toward CONSG (%) 
Positive Don't know Negative 
Favorable 
Unfavorable 








(33.3%) valid cells had expected cell frequencies of less than five. As 
such, it could be suggested that the chl-square distribution provided an 
2 inadequate approximation to the action distribution of X . Ott et al. 
(1978) indicated: 
The chl-square approximation should be quite good if 
no expected cell count is less than 1 and no more than 
twenty percent are less than five. 
Because of the inadequate cell frequencies for this and other crosstabu-
lations performed for this study, the focus of the evaluation will be on 
the distributions of responses given certain attitudes. This may yield 
information helpful in understanding not only the attitudes held by re­
spondents toward the gasoline shortages, but also information about the 
types of decisions and/or strategies to which respondents might be drawn 
during their participation in SHORTAGE' 
A majority of respondents (74.3%), Irrespective of attitude toward 
GÂSRAT, indicated a positive attitude toward CONSG, while only 12.2% 
indicated a negative attitude. This may have been an indication that 
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respondents held strong intentions of strictly conforming to all laws set 
up to conserve gasoline. However, it was noted that neither the presim-
ulation attitude toward GASRAT nor toward CONSG, could be expected to 
serve as adequate predictors of actual decisions made during SHORTAGE. 
The results of the crosstabulation between presimulation attitude 
toward GASBÀT and GIVUP also Indicate that a statistically significant 
relationship does not exist. However, the results of this test show 
that 64.8% of all respondents, regardless of attitude toward GÂSRÂT, in­
dicated an ambiguous or negative attitude toward GIVUP, while 35.27. in­
dicated a positive attitude. An assessment of Table 28 may permit the 
Table 28. Crosstabulation between presimulation attitude toward GÂSBAT 
and GIVUP 
Attitude toward GIVUP (%) 
Attitude toward GASBAT 
Positive Don't know Negative 
Favorable 20.3 10.8 27.0 
Unfavorable 14.9 2.7 24.3 
= 2.43 d.f. = 2 N.S. 
suggestion that an element of the unknown was operating. That is, 
ideally speaking, respondents believed people should cooperate with ra­
tioning regulations by strictly following all laws set up to conserve 
gasoline, even at the expense of personal hardship. However, for the 
attitude toward GIVUP, the responses appeared more randomly distributed, 
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suggesting that the issue of willingness to give up Individual gaso­
line needs raised the issue of restrictions in privacy, and transporta­
tion mobility. In addition, if it became necessary to give up individ­
ual gasoline needs, the inevitability of trade-offs in the decision­
making process would emerge (e.g., trade-offs between time spent in 
traveling to and from work in a car pool versus that which would be 
afforded if individual automobiles were used). Again, rationing was, 
for the respondents in this study, an unknown quantity. It could be 
suggested then that they responded quite rationally, irrespective of 
their attitude toward GASBÂT, CONSG, and/or GIVUP. 
In Table 29, the calculated chi-square Indicates that relative to 
respondent attitude toward GASRAT, there is a statistically significant 
relationship between attitude toward GASRAT and FSHAR. Of those who 
favored GASRAT, 36.5% also held a positive attitude toward FSHAR, while 
50% of those respondents regardless of attitude toward GASRAT Indicated 
an ambiguous to negative attitude toward FSHAR. It might be expected 
Table 29. Crosstabulatlon between preslmulatlon attitude toward GASRAT 
and FSHAR 
Attitude toward FHSAR (%) 
Attitude toward GASRAT 









= 7.53 d.f. = 2 Significant at .05 level 
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that respondent car_type would have been an Influencing factor. Because 
of this, a crosstabulation was performed between car_type and presinula-
tion attitude toward FSHAR. As it can be seen from Table 30, based on 
respondent car_type, the attitude toward FSHAR may seem nonrational. 
Table 30. Crosstabulation between car_type and presimulation attitude 
toward FSHAR 
Car_type 
Attitude toward FSHAR (%) 















That is, 27% of all respondents whose automobiles were gasoline guzzlers 
indicated a positive attitude toward FSHAR. While this may be an 
indication that respondent driving needs were minimal, it might further 
suggest that the full impact of gasoline rationing would not be felt 
for some Individuals until it actually happened in the "real" world, or 
perhaps in a "realistically designed" simulation. Thus, it might be ex­
pected that SHORTAGE would provide respondents with added knowledge about 
gasoline rationing which might lead them to alter their presimulation 
attitude toward FSHAR. 
It was suggested in an earlier discussion that consumer experiences 
with gasoline shortages were inversely related to attitude toward GASRAT. 
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However, as it can be seen from Table 31, relative to respondent attitude 
toward GASBAT, there was a statistically significant relationship be­
tween presimulatlon attitude toward GASBAT and SHSEV. A majority of re­
spondents (54%) appeared to be unaware or ignorant of the effects of 
the gasoline shortages on their individual households regardless of their 
attitude toward GASBAT. This may have been, in part, because of their 
student status. That is, Iowa State University is located in a rela­
tively small community. Its population Including some 25,000 students 
totals less than 50,000 people. The Campustown area, the downtown area, 
shopping malls, and restaurants are geographically spaced to demand a 
minimum of travel. Thus, it could be suggested that even at the peak of 
the gasoline shortages, the respondents drawn for this sample may not 
have been severely affected by limited sales of gasoline or by service 
stations that closed evenings and weekends. 
Table 31. Crosstabulatlon between presimulatlon attitude toward GASBAT 
and SHSEV 
Attitude toward SHSEV (%) 
Attitude toward GASBAT 
Severe Don't know Not severe 
Favorable 
Unforavorable 
= 6.51 d.f. = 2 
5.4 29.7 
10.8 24.3 
Significant at .05 level. 
23.0 
6 .8  
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Table 32 Indicates that the chi-sqtiare test did not yield evidence 
that a relationship exists between presimulâtion attitude toward GASRÂT 
and SHWORS. This test did, however, demonstrate that 71.6% of all re­
spondents, regardless of their attitude toward GASBAT believed the gaso­
line shortages would worsen over the next ten years. Some respondents 











Attitude toward SHWORS (%) 








appeared concerned over the possibility of other gasoline shortages. A 
number of them indicated to the researcher that, while they were not 
sure how "real" the shortages were, or would be, they would not be sur­
prised to see more of them. One person stated, previous to his partic­
ipation in SHORTAGE: 
The oil companies are there to make big profits. The 
shortages appear for no real reason. Then prices go up. 
Then the shortages go away. But the prices stay up. 
That's the only way to make sense of it. 1 know they've 
got plenty of oil. 
Table 33 indicates that the chi-square tests did not yield evidence 
that a relationship exists between presimulation attitude toward GASRAT 
and SHREAL. It was noted, however, that a majority of respondents who 
Table 33. Crosstabulatlon between presimulation attitudes toward GÂSBÂT and SHREÂL 




There is not 
and never 




was a shortage 
for a while, 
but it is over 
now 
There is still 
a shortage, but 




There is a se­
vere shortage, 
but it can be 
solved in the 
future 
The shortage 
is so severe 
that nothing 





X = 6.85 
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favored GASBÂT (43%) believed a shortage or a severe shortage did exist, 
but that It would be solved eventually. Ironically, of the 16.2% of 
respondents who Indicated there was not and never had been a "real" 
shortage, 6.8% Indicated a favorable attitude toward GÂSSÂT. Any evalu­
ation of these seemingly contradictory attitudes must be made with cau­
tion. Perhaps the attitude toward GÂSRAT held by these five Individuals 
was a result of President Carter's evaluation of the paradox of the 
energy crisis. That Is, the gasoline shortages may or may not have been 
a direct result of the "oil company conspiracy" theory presented by 
Rlchman (1979). Gasoline shortages, nonetheless. If and when they 
occurred, were real regardless of the reasoning given. As President 
Carter stated in an energy address to the nation in 1979 (Energy Policy, 
1981:252): 
I know that many of your have suspected that some supplies 
of oil and gas are being withheld. You may be right, but 
suspicions about the oil companies cannot change the fact 
that we are running out of petroleum. Sometime in the 
1980s demand will overtake production. 
On the other hand, 63.5% of all respondents, regardless of presimulation 
attitude toward GASBAT indicated there was still a shortage, however se­
vere it might have been. It was suggested that the responses to atti­
tude toward SHREAL may have been encouraged because of the title of the 
simulation—SHORTAGE—or because of its obvious emphasis on gasoline 
shortages. In addition, the energy crisis and its varying dimensions was 
in the news on a dally basis. Perhaps then, responses conformed to the 
standardized expectancies concept discussed in Chapter Three. Such a 
problem could, of course, not be ruled out in an absolute sense of the 
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term. However, as respondents were observed during their participation 
In the project, It appeared from their actions and their comments that 
many of their responses to the questionnaire Items were far from 
"expected". Their actions and verbal responses, as It will be seen 
throughout the data analysis ranged from passivity to open anger and 
from nonratlonal to rational on a wide continua of perspectives. 
The crosstabulation between preslmulation attitudes toward GÂSBAT 
and SHRESP Indicated that twelve out of eighteen (66.7%) of the valid 
cells had expected cell frequencies of less than five. However, as the 
distribution of percentages was examined, it was believed some Important 
insights could be gained. That is 48.6% of all respondents regardless 
of attitude toward GASBAT indicated someone other than the individual 
consumer was primarily responsible for solving the gasoline shortages, 
while 47.3% regardless of attitude toward OASEAT Indicted the Individual 
consumer was wholly or in part responsible. The responses appear to be 
consistent with much of the literature reviewed for this study. That is, 
acceptance of an Individual conservation ethic—in this case a favor­
able attitude toward GASRAT--may have been an indication that consumers 
are beginning to recognize the finite nature of nonrenewable resources. 
Also, although it cannot be determined within this study, respondents 
may have believed that the alternative to accepting individual responsi­
bility for solving the gasoline shortages would be a continued increase 
in the cost of gasoline and/or the potential for interrupted gasoline 
supplies as the result of another oil embargo. 
Finally, Table 35 Indicates that the chi-square test did not yield 
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Table 35. Crosstabulatlon between preslmulatlon attitude toward 
GASRAT and IMPOIL 
Attitude toward IMPOIL (%) 
Attitude toward GASBAT Favorable Unfavorable 
Favorable 6.7 51.3 
Unfavorable 4.1 37.8 
= 3.35 d.f. = 1 N.S. 
evidence that a significant relationship exists between preslmulatlon 
attitude toward GASBAT and IMPOIL. However, it can be seen that, irre­
spective of respondent attitude toward GASBAT, there was an unfavorable 
attitude toward IMPOIL. To reiterate, this might indicate an awareness 
of the ramifications of continued dependence on foreign oil. 
In summary of this section, preslmulatlon attitude toward GASBAT 
appears to be significantly related to FSHAB and SHSEV. That these were 
the only two relationships established as statistically significant was 
not surprising. That is, the attitude evaluation provided by the ques­
tionnaire items included an assessment of only the affective and cogni­
tive components of attitude. Following participation in SHORTAGE, it 
may be that a more adequate evaluation of all three attitude components 
can be carried out. Thus, the findings contained in the following section 
of this chapter may yield important insights into the behavioral compo­
nent of respondent attitude toward the gasoline shortages and hence 
permit a better understanding of the types of strategies and actual 
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decisions American consumers might make given conditions of energy con­
straint . 
Results of Crosstabulations Between Presimulatlon 
Attitude Items and SHORTAGE Data 
The following section contains an evaluation of the results of 
crosstabulations between the presimulatlon questionnaire items discussed 
in the previous sections of this chapter and the SHORTAGE data. Of the 
fifteen chi-square tests that were performed, no statistically signifi­
cant relationships were established. There are reasons why this may 
have occurred. For example, as was pointed out earlier, it may have been 
due to sampling error and/or small sample size. On the other hand, re­
spondents' professed attitudes toward the gasoline shortages and their 
actual behavior given conditions of energy constraint may not be closely 
related at all. It is suggested that the latter factor may be of equal 
importance with the former in understanding the types of strategies and 
actual decisions made as respondents participated in SHORTAGE. Conse­
quently, rather than attempting to give reasons why statistically sig­
nificant relationships were not established, the author will present and 
evaluate the percentage distributions which emerged given respondent 
attitude toward the gasoline shortages. These too may provide important 
insights into the decision-making process. 
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Results of Crosstabulatlons for Respondent Car__type and Decisions 
Made Within Illegal Strategy Categories 
There were three strategies within which there were illegal deci­
sions presented. These were Strategy A, to attempt to gain as much gaso­
line as possible for personal consumption (hereafter referred to as 
N_CHI2), Strategy B, to make better use of the gasoline that is avail­
able to you (hereafter referred to as N_CHI4), and Strategy E, to recon­
sider the social and moral Issues Involved with respect to style of 
living, values, and behavior (hereafter referred to as N_CHI10). The 
first crosstabulatlon to be evaluated was between cartype and number 
of illegal decisions made within N_CHI2. As it can be seen from Table 
36, 47.03% of all respondents, irrespective of car_type did not make 
Table 36. Crosstabulatlon between car type and decisions made within 
N CHI2 
Respondents who did Respondents who made 
„  ^ not make decisions one or more decisions 
'•-'•yp® within N CHI2 within N CHI2 
"% '% 
Gasoline guzzler 18.92 5.41 
Medium mileage 16.22 4.05 
Gasoline guzzler 11.89 13.51 
= 0.127 d.f. = 2 N.S. 
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any decisions within N_CHI2. On the other hand, 13.5% of the respond­
ents who drove low-mileage automobiles made one or more decisions within 
N__CHI2, while only 5.4% who drove gasoline guzzlers did so. It would 
seem that respondent car_type may or may not be an important factor to 
consider. It might be expected, however, that those individuals who 
drove fuel-efficient automobiles were more energy conscious and thus more 
aware of their dally gaollne consumption rate than were their counter­
parts who drove gasoline guzzlers. As such they may also have had a de­
sire to obtain as much gasoline as possible for personal consumption to 
assure a "deserved" freedom In transportation mobility. The reason for 
suggesting this is as follows. The author observed all respondents as 
they participated In SHORTAGE. Those respondents who drove fuel-effici­
ent automobiles seemed at times preoccupied with making decisions that 
would reduce their daily gasoline consumption rate. Conversely, those 
respondents whose car_types placed them in a gasoline guzzler category 
had a tendency to read the lists of decisions more slowly and deliber­
ately, often concentrating on strategies which offered little. If any, 
opportunity to decrease daily gasoline consumption rate (e.g., Strat­
egy D which offered no changes whatsoever in dally gasoline consump­
tion rate). 
The results of the crosstabulatlon between car_type and decisions 
made within N_CHI4 are shown in Table 37. Regardless of car_type, 45.9% 
of all respondents did not make any decisions within N__CHl4. On the 
other hand, a majority of those who made one or more decisions within 
N_CHI4 drove low-mileage automobiles. While these findings are 
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consistent with those for the relationship between car__type and N_CHI2, 
it was noted that Strategy B presented decisions (both legal and illegal) 
that would permit respondents to make better use of the gasoline rations 
available to them. Thus, such decisions may have been perceived as more 
desirable and less "greedy" than decisions made with N_CHI2. However, 
when the results of the crosstabulation between car_type and decisions 
made within N_CHI10 were examined, it was demonstrated that those re­
spondents who drove low-mileage automobiles were still somewhat more 
likely to make one or more decisions within NjCHIlO than were those who 
drove either medium-mileage or gasoline guzzler car_types. It might 
have been expected that the reverse would have occurred. That is, re­
spondents who drove gasoline guzzlers might have been more likely to 
attempt to "beat the system" by reconsidering the social and moral issues 
Involved much more readily than would their counterparts whose trans­
portation mobility might not have been so restricted should gasoline 






» 0.78 d.f. «= 2 
Respondents x^ o did 
not make decisions 





Respondents who made 
one or more decisions 





Table 38. Crosstabulatlon between car_type and decisions made within 
N CHIIO 
Respondents who did Respondents who made 
- . not make decisions one or more decisions 
i.ar_cype within N CHIIO within N CHIIO 
Gasoline guzzler 21.62 2.75 
Medium mileage 12.16 8.11 
Low mileage 39.19 16.22 
= 0.78 d.f. = 1 N.S. 
rationing occur. On the other hand, a qualitative evaluation of each 
respondent's decision paths demonstrated that the decisions made within 
N__CHI10 were, for the most part, decisions involving traffic violations 
and not decisions that would Involve serious infractions of the law 
(e.g., such as storing large quantities of gasoline in a garage). 
Results of Grosstabulations for Preslmulatlon Attitude Toward GASRAT and 
Decisions Hade Within Illegal Strategy Categories 
It can be seen from Table 39 that 77% of all respondents, regardless 
of attitude toward GASRAT did not make any decisions within N__CHI2, It 
was also noted that more respondents whose attitude toward GASRAT was 
favorable made decisions within N_CHI2, than did those whose attitude 
was unfavorable. Before evaluating Table 39, it might be valuable to 
examine Tables 40 and 41 which show the results of the crosstabulatlon 
between preslmulatlon attitudes toward GASRAT and N_CHI4 and N_CHI10. 
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Table 39. Crosstabulatlon between preslmulatlon attitude toward GASBÂT 
and decisions made within N CHI2 
Attitude toward GASBÂT 
Favorable 
Unfavorable 
= 0.252 d.f. = 1 
Respondents who did 






Respondents who made 
one or more decisions 
within N CHI2 
% 
14.9 
8 .1  
Table 40. Crosstabulatlon between preslmulatlon attitude toward GÂSBAT 
and decisions made within N CHl4 
Attitude toward GASBÂT 
Favorable 
Unfavorable 
= 0.011 d.f. = 1 
Respondents who did 
not make decisions 





Respondents who made 
one or more decisions 




Table 41. Crosstabulatlon between preslmulatlon attitude toward GASBAT 
and decisions made within N CHI10 
Attitude toward GASBAT 
Respondents who did 
not make decisions 
within N_CHI10 
% 
Respondents who made 
one or more decisions 











Table 40, for example, shows a few more respondents whose attitude 
toward GÂSBÂT was unfavorable made one or more decisions within N_CI1I4 
than within N_CHI2. However, in Table 41, a slightly different trend 
emerged. That is, more respondents whose attitude toward GÂSBÂT was un­
favorable made decisions within N_CHI10 than did those whose attitude 
toward GÂSBÂT was favorable. Because N_CHI10 involved making decisions 
which would encourage a reconsideration of the social and moral issues 
involved in the decision-making process as it related to gasoline ration­
ing, it may have been more carefully scrutinized by respondents who 
favored GÂSBÂT. Âs was shown in Table 13 (see page 185), forty-nine re­
spondents (66.2%) did not view this list of illegal decisions at all 
during their partie lotion in SHORTAGE. It was also noted that the max­
imum number of decisions made within N_CHI10 was three out of a possible 
six. While some of these decisions Involved breaking traffic laws, 
others carried severe consequences (see Appendix A). As the researcher 
observed respondents participating in SHORTAGE, a pattern of behavior 
seemed to emerge. That is, in general, respondents would look around to 
see how closely they were being watched before viewing any Illegal alter­
natives. The researcher made it clear that she would leave the room at 
any time, for any reason, if asked to do so. However, It might be spec­
ulated that respondents hesitated to ask the researcher to leave. This 
may have decreased the degree to which decisions were made or even 
viewed within N_CHI10. One conclusion drawn from this observation was 
that individuals who held an unfavorable attitude or a favorable attitude 
toward GÂSBÂT might have been willing to bend the law or attempt to béat 
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the system only If It did not involve a serious violation of the law. 
This unwillingness to break the law might not have been that fundament­
ally different with the researcher in the room than it would have been 
in a "real life" situation. On the other hand, it might also have been 
concluded that respondents used in this study appeared to work at coping 
with and adjusting to conditions of energy constraint presented to them. 
This was shown to have been the case when a qualitative examination of 
the decision paths of each respondent yielded information that demon­
strated Strategy B, to make better use of the gasoline available was the 
strategy of first choice for most respondents. It was also the strategy 
to which respondents returned if they found that they were not getting 
desired results from other strategies. Finally, it seemed to be the 
strategy (Strategy B) that led to the most frustration due to respondent 
inability to purchase a fuel-efficient automobile under any circumstances. 
Perhaps one of the keys to understanding the link between attitude 
toward GÂSBÂT and choice of decisions within illegal strategy categories 
has been pinpointed by SHORTAGE. That is, past studies which have un­
covered unfavorable consumer attitudes toward GASBÂT (Murray et al., 
1974; Wirth, 1975; Henderson, 1978a; Richman, 1979; Shippee, 1981; Ott et 
al., 1978; Martin, 1981) have not emphasized the travel trade-offs involved 
in transportation decisions. Rather, their emphasis has been on consumer 
"demand" for transportation mobility, privacy, speed, personal comfort, 
and freedom to choose one's own route of travel. Actual conditions of 
energy constraint, such as those presented by SHORTAGE may have yielded 
a more realistic picture of what "real" people might do in "real" 
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situations should their gasoline supplies be controlled through ration­
ing. 
Crosstabulations Between Presimulâtion Attitude Toward CONSG and 
Decisions Made Within Illegal Strategy Categories 
Table 42 shows that more respondents who indicated a positive atti­
tude toward CONSG made one or more decisions within N_CHI2 than did 
those whose attitude toward CONSG was negative. These findings--as well 
as those shown in Tables 16 and 17 (frequency distributions for pre-
simulation attitudes toward CONSG and GIVEUP)--demonstrate the "discon­
nectedness of behavior" (Meyer, 1978:15) associated with the loosely 
coupled nature of society (Weick, 1976). That is, respondents may well 
have recognized what "should have been done" by them to alleviate the 
gasoline shortages. However, as actual conditions of energy constraint 
were presented to them, there may have been a slippage between their 
intentions and their actions as it became difficult or Impossible to 
carry out their intentions--in this case to not make illegal decisions. 
Intervening factors such as the inability to make the apparently 
rational decision to purchase a fuel-efficient automobile (within N_CHI3) 
to reduce gasoline consumption may have rendered attainment of a rational 
goal--to make only legal decisions--impossible. 
Table 44 shows the results of the crosstabulation between presimu-
lation attitude toward CONSG and decisions made within N_CHI10. N_CHI2 
and N_CHI10 remain the least chosen strategies of respondents regardless 
of prèsimulation attitude toward CONSG. N_CHl4 was the strategy within 
which most illegal decisions were made. N_CHI4, of course, contained 
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Table 42. Crosstabulatlon between presimulation attitude toward GASRAT 
and decisions made within N CHI2 
Attitude toward CONSG 
Favorable 
Unfavorable 
= 0.161 d.f. = 1 
Respondents who did 
not make decisions 





Respondents who made 
one or more decisions 




Table 43. Crosstabulatlon between presimulation attitude toward CASSÂT 
and decisions made within N CHI4 
Attitude toward CONSG 
Favorable 
Unfavorable 
= 1.470 d.f. » 1 
Respondents who did 
not make decisions 





Respondents who made 
one or more decisions 




Table 44. Crosstabulatlon between presimulation attitude toward CONSG 
and decisions made within N CHI10 
Attitude toward CONSG 
Respondents who did 
not make decisions 
within N CHIIO 
7." 
Respondents who made 
one or more decisions 
within N CHIIO 
Positive 
Negative 







the Illegal decisions for Strategy B, to make better use of the gaso­
line that was available. It may well have been that respondents, regard­
less of attitude toward CONSG, Interpreted this as the most acceptable 
strategy within which to make decisions. 
As It can be seen fron Tables 45, 46, and 47, those respondents 
whose preslmulatlon attitude toward GIVUP was negative were more likely 
to make decisions within N_CHI2, N_CHl4, and N_CHI10 than were those who 
held a positive attitude toward GIVUP, While these relationships were 
not statistically significant, the decisions made relative to respondent 
attitudes toward GIVUP may be important, nonetheless. That is, nearly 
twice as many respondents who indicated a favorable attitude toward GIVUP 
made decisions within N_CHI4 as did those whose attitudes were negative. 
It was also noted that, irrespective of attitude toward GIVUP, more re­
spondents made decisions within N_CIIl4—to make better use of gasoline 
that is made available--than in either of the other two illegal strategy 
categories. 
Results of Crosstabulatlons Between Preslmulatlon Attitudes Toward CONSG 
and Decisions Made Within Legal Strategies 
The following section contains an evaluation of respondent's deci­
sions made within the five legal strategies relative to their attitudes 
toward CONSG. These strategies include Strategy A (hereafter referred 
to as NjCHIl), Strategy B (hereafter referred to as N_CHI3), Strategy C 
(hereafter referred to as N_CHI5), Strategy D (hereafter referred to as 
N CHI7), and Strategy E (hereafter referred to as N_CHI9). It was 
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Table 45. Crosstabulatlon between presimulatlon attitude toward GIVUP 
and decisions made within N CHI2 
Attitude toward GIVUP 
Positive 
Negative 
= 0.023 d.f. = 1 
Respondents who did 
not make decisions 




Respondents who made 





Table 46. Crosstabulatlon between presimulatlon attitude toward GIVUP 
and decisions made within N CHI4 
Attitude toward GIVUP 
positive 
Negative 
= 0.058 d.f. = 1 
Respondents who did 
not make decisions 





Respondents who made 
one or more decisions 




Table 47. Crosstabulatlon between presimulatlon attitude toward GIVUP 
and decisions made within N CHIIO 
Attitude toward GIVUP 
Respondents who did 
not make decisions 
within N CHI4 
% 
Respondents who made 
one or more decisions 











believed that respondent presimulâtIon attitude toward CONSG might be 
related to the choice of legal strategies. Chl-square tests of signif­
icance performed for these relationships, however, indicated that there 
were no statistically significant relationships between presimulation 
attitude toward CONSG and choice of strategy. An evaluation of the re­
sponse distributions does, however, demonstrate that irrespective of attl 
tude toward CONSG, respondents made more decisions within Strategy A 
and Strategy B than in Strategies C, D, or E. 
Table 48 shows the distributions of responses for presimulation 
attitude toward CONSG and number of decisions made within N_CHI1. It 
was noted that Strategy A contained decisions which might encourage re­
spondents to obtain as much gasoline as possible for personal consump­
tion. Table 5 demonstrated that 22.3% of all respondents made one or two 
decisions within N_CHI1, while 22.9% of all respondents regardless of 
Table 48. Crosstabulation between presimulation attitude toward CONSG 
and decisions made within N CHIl 
Attitude toward CONSG 
Respondents who made 
two or fewer decisions 
within N_CHI1 
% 
Respondents who made 












attitude toward CONSG made three or more decisions within N_CHI1. A 
majority of those who made two or fewer decisions within this strategy 
held a positive attitude toward CONSG. These findings may suggest that 
while people "should" follow all laws set up to conserve gasoline, even 
at the expense of personal hardship, such laws may present a real threat 
to mobility, leading people to at least attempt to "beat the system". 
It was also shown that while respondents may be likely to make legal 
decisions within N_CHI1, the illegal decisions contained within this 
strategy were somewhat less likely to be made (see Table 42). 
While a majority of respondents made two or fewer decisions within 
N_CHI1 regardless of attitude toward CONSG, Table 49 demonstrates that 
64.8% of all respondents, regardless of presimulation attitude toward 
CONSG made three or more decisions within N_CHI3. In a qualitative 
examination of each respondent's decision path, it was, to reiterate, 
found that N_CHI3 was the first strategy chosen for a majority of re­
spondents. This may be an indication that making better use of the gaso­
line that is available to you would be the most desirable, if not the 
most profitable strategy. It was noted that of the thirty-six respond­
ents who made three or more decisions within N_CHI3, fifteen made the 
same decisions more than once. One respondent, for example, made the 
decision to purchase a fuel-efficient automobile twenty-four times. As 
the researcher observed him, the respondent became visibly more and more 
angry each time he made the decision. He eventually told the researcher 
that it was not fair that he was not allowed to purchase a fuel-efficient 
car, especially since it was obvious that his "gasoline guzzler" would 
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Table 49. Crosstabulatlon between presimulâtion attitude toward CONSG 
and decisions made within N CHI3 
Attitude toward CONSG 
Positive 
Negative 
« 0.033 d.f. = 1 
Respondents who made 
two or fewer decisions 




Respondents who made 
three or more decisions 
within N CHI3 
48.65 
16.22 
not permit him the freedom in mobility he needed. He had made the assump­
tion that if he was persistent enough, SHORTAGE would eventually allow 
him to buy the new automobile. An attempt was made, unsuccessfully, to 
convince the respondent that in real life situations, if the bank turned 
him down for an automobile loan on a Monday, it would probably also turn 
him down on Tuesday, Wednesday, and so on. The respondent seemed totally 
unaware that his gasoline gauge was dropping, the days left to him in the 
simulation were passing, and his dally gasoline consumption rate re­
mained in the gasoline guzzler range (the respondent was using 2.27 gal­
lons of gasoline per day). By the time he realized that his time was 
running out, it was too late for him to complete the simulation without 
running out of gasoline. It was observed, however, that the few remain­
ing decisions he made before finishing did permit him to reduce his daily 
consumption rate to 1.94 gallons per day. As he completed the game, the 
respondent replied, "That just wasn't fair." It seemed that this respond 
ent needed to make decisions in a straight line. That is, he saw only 
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one way of getting from point "A" to point "B" and he continued to pur­
sue this course of action irrespective of the wider consequences--ln 
this case, running out of gasoline. It might be suggested that his de­
cisions were nonrational. However, it might also be suggested that he 
was an individual who was unable to understand the implications of his 
behavior in terms of how it might constrain or preclude subsequent de­
cisions. 
An evaluation of Table 50 shows that slightly over one half (56.7%) 
of all respondents, irrespective of presimulation attitude toward C0NS6 
made three or more decisions within NJCHI5. There was a total of ten 
possible decisions to make within N__CHI5 without repeating decisions. 
One respondent, however, made forty-seven decisions within this strategy. 
Three of these decisions marginally Increased his daily gasoline con­
sumption rate. Nonetheless, this individual continued to make the decl-
cision to ride a bicycle, indicating that he was correlating the number 
of times the decision was made with the number of days remaining in the 
Table 50. Crosstabulatlon between presimulation attitude toward C0NS6 
and decisions made within N CHI5 
Attitude toward CONSG 
Respondents who made 
two or fewer decisions 
within N ŒI5 
7." 
Respondents who made 
three or more decisions 
within N CHI5 
7." 
Positive 32.43 41.89 
Negative 10.81 14.86 
= 0.013 d.f. = 1 N.S. 
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simulation. His reasoning was that eventually his gasoline consumption 
rate would decrease to zero because he was not driving his automobile. 
The respondent's car_type indicated that his automobile received four­
teen miles per gallon of gasoline for a daily gasoline consumption rate 
of 2.64 gallons. While he did run out of gasoline before he finished 
the simulation, he was able to eventually make decisions that decreased 
his daily consumption rate to 1.90 gallons per day. While the respond­
ent's repeated decisions within N_CHI5 may have indicated he had a desire 
to adjust to using less gasoline, his motivation to act appeared non-
rational. It might be suggested that individuals who do not see the 
wider implications of the decisions made during the course of everyday 
interaction may be less likely to be able to cope with the frustrations 
that conditions of energy constraint would present to them. This partic­
ular respondent, as did others, indicated his feelings about his partic­
ipation in SHORTAGE by saying that "the experience was extremely frus­
trating." 
Table 51 shows the crosstabulations for prèsimulation attitude 
toward C0NS6 and decisions made within N_CHI7. While N_CHI7 contained 
a total of ten possible decisions, only 13.5% of all respondents, re­
gardless of attitude toward C0NS6, made three or more decisions within 
this strategy, none of which had been designed to increase or decrease 
respondent daily gasoline consumption rate. Each was, however, designed 
to make respondents aware that perhaps the most effective decisions they 
could make would be those which permitted them to actively participate 
in the reduction of gasoline consumption. This approach was used in 
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Table 51. Crosstabulatlon between presimulatlon attitude toward C0NS6 
and decisions made within N CHI7 
Attitude toward C0NS6 
Positive 
Negative 
= 1.243 d.f. = 1 
Respondents who made 
two or fewer decisions 





Respondents who made 
three or more decisions 




order to make respondents aware that the decisions they made which demon­
strated their active participation In adjusting to gasoline rationing 
would benefit them far more than would sitting back and expecting the 
government to resolve their problems/dilemmas. Only one respondent made 
all of the decisions within this strategy, while two respondents made 
eight decisions, and four made seven decisions. A majority viewed 
N_CHI7 only once, made the decisions of relevance to them, and did not 
return to N__CHI7 again. A number of respondents also observed that none 
of the decisions they made rewarded them. Two respondents commented that 
If anything was going to "get done", it surely won't have been because 
the government acted on it. 
Table 52 shows the crosstabulatlon between presimulatlon attitude 
toward CONSG and decisions made within N_CHI9. It would appear that, 
while this relationship was not statistically significant, those respond­
ents who Indicated a favorable presimulatlon attitude toward CONSG were 
most likely to make decisions encouraging a reconsideration of morals. 
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Table 52. Crosstabulatlon between prèsimulation attitude toward CONSG 
and decisions made within N CHI9 
Attitude toward CONSG 
Positive 
Negative 
= 0.107 d.f. •= 1 
Respondents who made 
two or fewer decisions 





Respondents who made 
three or more decisions 
within N CHI9 
24.32 
9.46 
values, and behavior. However, it was discovered that decisions made 
within NJCHI9 did not include those that would involve serious infrac­
tions of the law. 
Summary of Evaluations of Crosstabulations Between Freslmulation 
Attitudes Toward Gasoline Shortages and SHORTAGE Data 
It was demonstrated by the chi-square tests that there were no sta­
tistically significant relationships between 1) car__type and decisions 
made within illegal strategy categories, 2) presimulation attitude toward 
GASRAT and decisions made within Illegal strategy categories, or 3) pre­
simulation attitude toward CONSG and GIVUP and decisions made within 
illegal strategy categories. It was also found that no statistically 
significant relationships existed between presimulation attitude toward 
CONSG and respondent choice of legal strategy categories. However, an 
evaluation of the distribution of decisions made relative to respondent 
presimulation attitudes toward GASRAT, CONSG, and GIVUP did permit an 
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assessment of certain types of strategies and decisions which might be 
considered under conditions of energy constraint. 
For purposes of this investigation, it was assumed that respond­
ents who participated in SHORTAGE, were, for the most part, motivated to 
conform and adjust to the situation of energy constraint presented to 
them. Therefore, if respondents Indicated a favorable attitude toward 
C0NS6, for example, it might have been expected that their decisions 
would reflect that attitude. Strategy B and/or Strategy C "should have" 
contained most, if not all, of the decisions needed for acceptance of an 
individual conservation ethic. However, as was predicted, as respondents 
examined their possible options and the processes through which an ad­
justment could be made to rationing, they frequently discovered that 
1) rational or wise decisions did not always profitably benefit them; 
2) many decisions, particularly those within Strategy D, might have bene­
fited them in the long run, but the problem was Immediate—the problem 
of "getting through" the ninety-day period of time without running out of 
gasoline; 3) decisions made within illegal strategy categories had the 
potential of getting respondents into trouble with the law; 4) each de­
cision made had at least the potential of constraining or even preclud­
ing subsequent decisions; and/or 5) the possible consequences of each 
decision were unknown, encouraging respondents to be wary of or hesitate 
in making certain decisions (e.g., hi_risk decisions such as siphoning 
gasoline out of parked cars and/or storing large quantities of gasoline 
in a garage). Because of these five factors, it would seem that the re­
spondent's "practical reasoning" (Kinloch, 1981:136) and their "limited 
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rationality" (Perrow, 1981:2-9) influenced both their motivation and 
their ability to comply with rationing regulations. As was pointed out 
in an earlier discussion, there were two respondents who made the same 
decision as many as twenty-three to forty times in order to decrease 
daily gasoline consumption rates. While these respondents appeared ob­
sessed with a single decision, it was noted that others too made the 
same decisions two, three, even four times before moving on to other de­
cisions/strategy categories. As a result of this observation, it might 
be suggested that American consumers who are indeed motivated to comply 
with society's moral order may turn instead to decisions traditionally 
defined as anomic and nonrational out of sheer frustration. Or they may 
do so out of a belief that the attainment of a rational goal—strictly 
following all laws set up to conserve gasoline, even at the expense of 
personal hardship—is not possible. As such, it might be expected that 
Illegal decisions would be made. 
The theoretical assumption of rationality in social action—that 
individuals calculate risks and potential benefits and then make the 
rationally "best" decision—may be an unwarranted assumption if it refers 
to the "judgmental dope" model discussed in Chapter Three. If however, 
the rationally "best" decisions refer to decisions made as a result of 
the past experiences of individuals and of the situations they are cur­
rently encountering, the interpretation of the "rationally best decision" 
must change. It must change from what the researcher expects it to be 
based on traditionally defined "standardized expectancies" (Klnloch, 1981: 
139) to practical expectancies which take account of the thoughts and 
240 
actions of "real" people In "real" situations who must live with the 
limits of human knowledge and the realization they often must settle for 
the first acceptable solution to come along. It Is Important to note 
that, for the most part, the Illegal decisions made by respondents in 
this study did not Involve widespread and serious infractions of the law. 
Rather, Irrespective of respondent car_type, attitude toward GASBAT, 
C0NS6, or GIVUP, illegal decisions were primarily limited to breaking 
traffic laws, building a still, or decisions that would create potenti­
ally dangerous automobile accidents (e.g., turning off the automobile's 
engine to coast down hill, rolling through stop signs to reduce the 
amount of gasoline consumed by a full stop, or illegally double-parking 
to save the gasoline consumed by driving around looking for a parking 
place). 
Frequency Distributions and Percentages for Prèsimulation and Postsimula-
tlon Attitudes Toward the Gasoline Shortages 
The next section to be discussed within this chapter will Include 
an evaluation of the frequency distributions of the postsimulation ques­
tionnaire items. The postsimulation questionnaire was administered in 
order to determine whether or not respondent participation in SHORTAGE 
produced a change in attitude toward the gasoline shortages and the 
potentially restrictive regulations associated with gasoline rationing. 
The frequency tables were set up so that the reader would be able to com­
pare the postsimulation responses to the questionnaire items with the pre-
sImulatIon responses. 
Table 53 demonstrates the frequency distributions and percentages 
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Table 53. Frequency distributions and percentages for prèsimulation and 
postsimulation attitudes toward GÂSBÂT 
Attitude toward GÂSBAT Fresimulation Postsimulation % N % N 
5.4 ( 4) 13.5 (10) 
58.1 (43) 58.1 (43) 
36.5 (27) 23.0 (17) 
5.4 ( 4) 4.1 ( 3) 
0.0 ( 0) 1.4 ( 1) 







Fresimulation mean = 2.419 Median = 2.346 Mode = 2.000 
Fosts imulat ion mean= 2.149 Median = 2.105 Mode = 2.000 
for the presimulation and postsimulation attitudes toward GÀSBÂT. It was 
noted that the number of respondents who indicated a somewhat favorable 
(58.1%) to very favorable (13.5%) attitude toward GASBÂT increased to 
71.6% following participation in SHORTAGE. It might be speculated that 
the information presented to respondents during the course of their ex­
perience with gasoline rationing clarified some of the ambiguity and un­
known dimensions of gasoline rationing and the inevitable restrictions on 
transportation mobility. For example, the gasoline rationing guidelines 
presented repondents with clear and concise information about what ration­
ing would legally demand of them (see Appendix B). Many of the respond­
ents who drove fuel-efficient automobiles expressed satisfaction with 
their car__type because it seemingly assured them their sometimes expen­
sive investment would reward them (e.g., their investment in a fuel-
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efficient automobile). It was also noted that those respondents whose 
daily gasoline consumption rate was greater than or equal to 1.7 gallons 
per day were almost certain not to run out of gasoline before the simu­
lation ended. It might thus be assumed that awareness of this factor 
led to a more favorable attitude toward GÀSBÂT. 
Table 54 demonstrates the frequency distributions and percentages 
for the presimulation and postsimulation attitudes toward IMPOIl. The 
number of respondents who indicated a somewhat favorable (8.1%) to very 
favorable (5.4%) attitude toward IMPOIL increased slightly from the pre­
simulation questionnaire in which 10.8% of respondents expressed a favor­
able attitude. This might have been expected to be related to the 
degree to which respondents believed they would get their "fair share" 
Table 54. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulation 
and postsimulation attitudes toward IMPOIL 
Attitude toward IMPOIL Presimulation Poststaulatlon 
A N ra N 
Very favorable 2.7 ( 2) 5.4 ( 4) 
Somewhat favorable 8.1 ( 6) 8.1 ( 6) 
Somewhat unfavorable 36.5 (27) 37.8 (28) 
Very unfavorable 52.7 (39) 47.3 (35) 
No response 0.0 ( 0) 1.4 ( 0) 
Totals 100.0 (74) 100.0 (74) 
Presimulation mean = 3.392 Median = 3.551 Mode = 4.000 
Postsimulation mean = 3.243 Median = 3.429 Mode = 4.000 
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should gasoline rationing be set up. Table 55 does Indicate that the 
shift In attitudes became more positive following participation In 
SHORTAGE--from 50% who believed they probably would or definitely would 
receive their fair share prior to their exposure to SHORTAGE to 64.9% 
who believed so following SHORTAGE. These findings were somewhat sur­
prising since six of the respondents owned motorcyles as well as auto­
mobiles. Each of the six expressed anger at the rationing regulation 
which indicated that motorcycles would receive only one-tenth the ration 
allotment of automobiles for the same ninety-day period of time. Three 
of the respondents Informed the researcher that this was unfair because 
their motorcycles received mileage ratings comparable to fuel-efficient 
automobiles (about 45-50 miles per gallon). 
Positive attitude toward CONSG dropped slightly from 74.4% to 67.6% 
Table 55. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulatlon and 
postsimulation attitudes toward FSHAR 
Attitude toward FSHAR Presimulatlon % N 
Postsimulation 
% N 
Definitely 6.8 (5) 5.4 (4) 
Probably 43.2 (44) 59.5 (44) 
Not sure 27.8 (20) 24.3 (18) 
Probably not 17.6 (13) 8.1 (6) 
Definitely not 5.4 ( 2) 2.7 ( 2) 
Totals 100.0 (74) 100.0 (74) 
Presimulatlon mean = 2.716 Median = 2.500 Mode = 2.000 
Postsimulâtion mean = 2,432 Median = 2.250 Mode = 2.000 
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Table 56. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulation 
and postsimulation attitudes toward CONSG 
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following participation in SHORTAGE (see Table 56). This may well have 
been the result of the frustration experienced during participation in 
SHORTAGE which led respondents to make decisions to break the law or de­
cisions which seemed wise or rational but did not yield consequences in 
kind. For example, the rationing guidelines Informed respondents that: 
Unredeemed ration coupons are freely transferable. If 
you do not need or do not use all of your ration coupons 
for the ninety-day period you may give them to someone 
or sell them. It is hoped that this will promote a more 
efficient use of all available gasoline. 
However, when a respondent made the decision to buy coupons from someone 
who did not use all of his/her coupons, the two consequences that appeared 
with random probability were as follows: 
It has just been announced over the radio that Mr. Edwin 
James has been arrested for selling counterfeit ration 
coupons. The serial numbers of the coupons you have been 
buying match those of the counterfeit coupons. You are 
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now stuck with $220 worth of unusable ration coupons. 
The man who has been selling you his unused ration 
coupons at a 10% markup has just increased his markup 
by another 30% because of demand and inflation. You 
cannot afford to buy from him anymore. 
The change in respondent attitude toward GIVUP seems to have been 
negligible. While 51.3% of all respondents held an unfavorable attitude 
toward GIVUP prior to their participation in SHORTAGE, this percentage 
decreased by only 1.3% to 50% following SHORTAGE. It might be suggested 
that while the question had been phrased to read: 
Do you think most people are willing to give up some of 
their own gasoline needs so that others will be sure to 
have enough gasoline to meet basic needs? 
respondents may have read most people to mean themselves as much as or 
more than others. On the other hand, if the decisions made within 
SHORTAGE did not yield significantly negative and/or costly consequences, 
the attitude toward GIVUP might not have been expected to change signifi­
cantly. Also, to reiterate, most respondents who made illegal decisions 
stayed away from those decisions which might involve a jail sentence 
(e.g., hi_risk decisions). 
Ironically, there was a slight change in attitude toward SHSEV fol­
lowing respondent participation in SHORTAGE. As Table 58 shows, prior 
to their participation in SHORTAGE, twelve respondents (16.2%) indicated 
that the effects of the gasoline shortages of the past year or so had 
been severe, while that number dropped to 10.8% for their postsimulation 
responses. While only one respondent changed his response to indicate 
the effects of his household were very severe following exposure to 
SHORTAGE, there was a drop of 5.4% of respondents who indicated the 
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Table 57. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulation 
and postsimulation attitudes toward GIVUF 




Definitely 2.7 ( 2) 2.7 ( 2) 
Probably 32.4 (24) 33.8 (25) 
Not sure 13.5 (10) 13.5 (10) 
Probably not 48.6 (36) 43.2 (32) 
Definitely not 2.7 ( 2) 6.8 ( 5) 
Totals 100.0 (74) 100.0 (74) 
Presimulation mean = 3.162 Median = 3.528 Mode = 4.000 
Postsimulation mean = 3.500 Median = 3.500 Mode - 4.000 
Table 58. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulation 
and postsimulâtion attitudes toward SHSEV 
Attitude toward SHSEV ïxeslmulation Poststomlatioa 
/o IN /o JN 
Very severe 0.0 ( 0) 1.4 ( 1) 
Severe 16.2 (12) 10.8 ( 8) 
Not too severe 54.1 (40) 58.1 (43) 
Not severe at all 27.0 (20) 27.0 (20) 
Don't know 2.7 ( 2) 2.7 ( 2) 









Mode = 3.000 
Mode = 3.000 
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shortage was severe. These changes appear to be negligible. However, 
they may have been viewed as resulting from respondent awareness of the 
reality of gasoline rationing. That Is, rationing need not be defined as 
an Inflexible method of conservation. Rather It may be viewed as an 
encouragement to the individual to more consciously and deliberately 
make his travel decisions. Perhaps for the few respondents who shifted 
their attitudes toward SHSEV, gasoline rationing provided them with more 
freedom in transportation mobility than maximum purchases of $10 and 
Irregular service station hours had during the summer of 1979. 
The frequency distributions and percentages for presimulatlon and 
postsimulation attitudes toward SHHORS are presented in Table 59. These 
findings also indicate that respondent attitudes toward SHHORS changed 
only slightly following participation in SHORTAGE. Prior to participa­
tion in SHORTAGE only 2.7% of all respondents indicated they did not 
Table 59. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulatlon 
and postsimulation attitudes toward SHWORS 
Attitude toward SBWORS Presinulatlcm Postslinulatlon 
Get worse 




% N % N 
71.6 (53) 74.3 (55) 
20.3 (15) 10.8 ( 8) 
5.4 ( 4) 5.4 ( 4) 
2.7 ( 2) 9.5 ( 7) 
100.0 (74) 100.0 (74) 
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know whether or not the shortages would worsen, while the postsimulation 
responses Indicated 9.5% did not know. It might be suggested that for a 
few respondents, the information gained from SHORTAGE coupled with pre­
vious knowledge and experiences with gasoline shortages served only to 
cloud the energy issue. As was pointed out in an earlier discussion: 
Individuals cannot process large amounts of information, 
but only limited bits and pieces, and these slowly. In­
formation is distorted as it is processed. Individuals 
cannot gather information very well even if they could 
process it; they do not always know what is relevant 
information inasmuch as they do not always understand 
how things work. (IRirch and Simon, 1958:136-171) 
In other words, the mass of information presented to these few respond­
ents in a relatively short period of time may have been more than they 
could adequately digest and evaluate. Response categories for attitude 
toward SHWORS were considered as discrete. As such, the measures of 
central tendency were not presented. However, it was noted that the mode 
was 1.000 indicating a majority of respondents for both the presimulation 
and postsimulation questionnaire believed the shortages would get worse 
over the next ten years. 
Respondent attitude toward SHREAL also shifted slightly, although, 
as it can be seen from Table 59, 16.2% of all respondents indicated prior 
to their participation in SHORTAGE that there is not and never was a 
"real" shortage, and 16.2% also indicated this attitude following expo­
sure to SHORTAGE. On the other hand, the percentage of respondents who 
indicated prior to SHORTAGE that there probably was a shortage, but that 
it was over decreased from 18.9% to 8.1% following SHORTAGE, indicating 
an increase in those who believed the shortage was still there but would 
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Table 60. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulation 
and postsimulation attitudes toward SHREÂL 
Attitude toward SHREAL Presimulation Postsimulation 7. N 7o N 
There is not and never was 
a "real" shortage 16.2 (12) 16.2 (12) 
There probably was a short­
age, but it is over now 18.9 (14) 8.1 (6) 
There is still a shortage, 
but I am sure the problem 
will be solved 33.8 (25) 36.5 (27) 
There is a severe shortage, ' 
but it can be solved in the 
future 29.7 (22) 36.5 (27) 
The shortage is so severe 
that nothing can be done 1.4 ( 1) 1.4 ( 1) 
Totals 100.0 (74) 100.0 (74) 
be solved or that the shortage was severe but would be solved in the 
future (for a total of 73%). It might be suggested that those respond­
ents who indicated that the gasoline shortages are not and never were 
"real", would not have altered their attitudes regardless of the infor­
mation presented to them. Those whose opinions and attitudes have been 
crystallized through past experiences, contact with the media, advertis­
ing, or other Influential sources might be expected to selectively filter 
all subsequent information, retaining only that which agrees with them 
and ignoring the rest (Sullivan et al., 1980:38-39). 
The final frequency table shows the changes in respondent attitudes 
toward SHRESP. Prior to participation In SHORTAGE, 27% of all respond­
ents believed the individual consumer was most responsible for solving 
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Table 61. Frequency distributions and percentages for preslmulatlon 
and postslmulatlon attitudes toward SHRESP 
Attitude to»ard SHRESP Presimulatlm PostsiMulatlon 
/o N A N 
Government 25.7 (19) 13.5 (10) 
Business and Industry 20.3 (15) 17.6 (13) 
Individual consumers 27.0 (20) 33.8 (25) 
Government, business and 
Industry, and individual 
consumers 8.1 ( 6) 14.9 (11) 
Government and business 
and Industry 6.8 ( 2) 1.4 ( 1) 
Government and individual 
consumers 5.4 ( 5) 8.1 ( 6) 
Business and industry and 
individual consumers 2.7 ( 4) 2.7 ( 2) 
Don't know 2.7 ( 2) 4.1 ( 3) 
No response 1.4 ( 1) 4.1 ( 3) 
Totals 100.0 (74) 100.0 (74) 
the gasoline shortages, while the postslmulatlon responses indicated that 
33.8% held this attitude. On the other hand, prior to participation in 
SHORTAGE, 52.87» of all respondents indicated that the responsibility for 
solving the gasoline shortages rested with someone or some agency other 
than the individual consumer, while following exposure to SHORTAGE this 
dropped to 32.5% who believed it was someone else's responsibility. 
Again, while these changes in attitude appear negligible, they may indi­
cate a greater awareness of the ^ sollne shortages on the part of some 
respondents. Also, It may be suggested that the decisions which were most 
likely to provide incentive to conserve gasoline were those which 
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altered Individual travel behavior as opposed to those which relied on 
the government for needed change. 
Results of Paired t-tests Performed on Presimulation 
and Postsimulation Questionnaire Data 
The next step in the data analysis involved using paired t-tests 
in order to determine whether or not the differences between the pre­
simulation and postsimulation questionnaire items were statistically 
significant. As was suggested earlier, it was believed that the knowl­
edge and experience presented by SHORTAGE might lead to more realistic 
attitudes toward the gasoline shortages in general and toward gasoline 
rationing in particular. As such, a direct pair by pair comparison was 
made for presimulation attitudes toward GASSÂT (GÂSBAT1), IMPOIL 
(IMPOILl), CONSG (CONSGl), GIVUP (GIVUPl), FSHAR (FSHARl), and SHSEV 
(SHSEVl) and postsimulation attitudes toward GASSAT (GÂSBAT2), IMPOIL 
(IMP0IL2), CONSG (C0NSG2), GIVUP (GIVUP2), FSHAR (FSHAR2), and SHSEV 
(SHSEV2). Because of the discrete response categories for attitudes 
toward SHNORS, SHREAL, and SHRESP, these items were not included in the 
statistical testing. 
As it can be seen from Table 62, the paired t-tests yielded evidence 
that attitudes toward GASBAT and FSHAR were significantly different fol­
lowing respondent participation in SHORTAGE. That is, the differences 
were both statistically significant at the .01 level with 73 degrees of 
freedom. While the paired t-tests did not yield evidence that the re­
maining questionnaire Items differed significantly due to respondent 
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Table 62. Differences In means for presimulation and postsimulation 
attitudes toward GASBAT and FSHÀR: Results of paired t-tests 











exposure to SHORTAGE, this need not be considered problematic. Attitude 
toward IMPOIl, for example, was and remained primarily unfavorable with 
89.2% of respondents opposed to IMPOIL prior to SHORTAGE and 85.1% op­
posed following shortage. Bad the sample size been larger and had more 
respondents been assigned car_types in the "gasoline guzzler" category, 
this shift in attitude might have been expected to be somewhat more sig­
nificant. On the other hand, the literature generated both during and 
after the data sets had been collected emphasized a growing awareness 
of the dangers inherent in continued dependence on foreign oil. It 
might further be suggested that, while the American hostage incident in 
Iran was not shown conclusively to be energy related, an anti-Middle East 
sentiment did exist during that time period. 
In reference to attitude toward CONSG, it was not expected that 
participation in SHORTAGE would alter respondents' basic value structures. 
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It was assumed that, for the most part, respondents would attempt to 
cope with and adjust to the conditions of energy constraint presented 
to them. This was demonstrated as their responses were evaluated. That 
is, from presimulation to postsimulation questionnaire, respondent atti­
tude toward C0NS6 became only slightly less favorable as it dropped from 
74.4% to 67.6%. This too might have been more significant had more re­
spondents driven "gasoline guzzlers". On the other hand, following ex­
posure to SHORTAGE, some respondents, more than others, may have become 
more sensitive to the number and kinds of illegal decisions made. As 
such, a shift in attitude might have been necessary for them to correct 
the slippage between intentions and behavior which emerged during partic­
ipation in SHORTAGE. 
The presimulation and postsimulation attitudes toward GIVUP remained 
nearly the same. This too, however, might have been expected. It was 
assumed that respondent car__type would be closely related to transporta­
tion mobility in a situation of gasoline rationing. Given this assump­
tion, it might not have been unwarranted to assume that respondents who 
drove gasoline guzzlers believed their counterparts who drove fuel-effi­
cient automobiles would satisfy the need to give up individual needs so 
that others, like themselves, would have enough gasoline to meet basic 
needs. The reason for stating this is as follows. There were two PLATO 
terminals in the room in which the data were collected. Thus, the re­
searcher often worked with two respondents simultaneously. On numerous 
occasions, before the simulation began, but following respondent declara­
tion of car_type, those whose automobiles were the least fuel-efficient 
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expressed disdain over the efficiency of other respondent's car_types. 
One person remarked: 
It would be nice to drive a newer, more efficient car. 
I think it (rationing) will be harder on me than on 
people like him (referring to the respondent whose 
car_type had placed him in a fuel-efficient category). 
With the exception of a slight shift from severe to not too severe 
(47o), respondent attitude toward SHSEV did not change. As it was pointed 
out in an earlier discussion, however, this shift in attitude may have 
been due, in part, to an increased respondent awareness of the actual 
demands gasoline rationing would create. That is, prior to participa­
tion in SHOBTÂGE, the rationing guidelines were an unknown element. An 
Inadequate knowledge base may lead to a negative opinion on an issue— 
in this case, attitude toward SHSEV. Once the respondent had been given 
adequate information, his opinion may have shifted as did his attitude 
toward SHSEV. 
It is suggested that the significant changes in attitude toward 
GÂSBÂT and FSHAR may be the most important factors Influencing travel 
behavior under conditions of energy constraint. As was shown in the 
postsimulation frequency tables (see Tables 52 and 54) the presimulation 
attitudes toward GASBAT were mixed, with 63.5% of respondents favoring 
GÂSBAT and 41.9% opposed. The postsimulation attitudes toward GASRAT 
became more favorable (71.6%) with the unfavorable responses dropping 
from 41.9% to 27.1%. 
The presimulâtion attitudes toward FSHÂR were also mixed, with 50% 
indicating they believed they would get their "fair share" should ration­
ing be set up and 50% indicating they were either not sure (27.8%) or 
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would probably or definitely not receive a fair share. Following ex­
posure to SHORTAGE, however, it was demonstrated that 64.9% of all re­
spondents believed they would get a fair share. Because of the signif­
icant changes in attitude toward both 6ASBÂT and FSHAR, it was decided 
to perform a chi-square test in order to determine whether or not these 
two attitude items were significantly related to each other. It was 
shown that five out of nine (55.6%) of the valid cells had expected 
cell frequencies of less than five. As such, the chi-square test may not 
have provided an adequate approximation to the actual distribution of 
2 
X . However, an evaluation of the distribution of responses for atti­
tude toward FSHAR given attitude toward GASRAT, may yield important in­
sights. For the reader's clarification and comparison, the results of 
the presimulation crosstabulation for these attitude items have been 
included in Table 63. There was an increase of 17.6% in respond­
ents whose attitudes toward both GASBAT and FSHAR were positive. This 
demonstrates a positive change in attitude for 17.6% of respondents. A 
number of factors may have contributed to this attitude change. For ex­
ample, the gasoline rationing guidelines may have clarified a previously 
unknown factor for respondents, for example, "how much gasoline would I 
have at my disposal should rationing become a reality." Second, a number 
of respondents responded positively to the concept of a "white market" 
coupon exchange center. This was interpreted as acceptable, and hence, 
the antithesis of the black market exchange which operated during World 
War II. As Buimett (1978:46) pointed out, during World War II: 
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Table 63. Crosstabulatlons between preslmulation attitudes toward 
GASBAT and FSHÀR 
Attitude toward FSHAR (%) 
Attitude toward GASRAT 
Positive 
Preslmulation 
Don't know Negative 
Favorable 36.5 13.5 8.1 
Unfavorable 10.8 13.5 5.4 
No response 0.0 0.0 1.4 
« 7.53 d.f. « 4 Significant at .05 level. 
Table 64. Crosstabulatlons between postsImulatIon attitudes toward 
GASBAT and FSHAR 
Attitude toward FSHAR (%) 
Attitude toward GASBAT 
Positive 
Postsimulation 
Don't know Negative 
Favorable 54.1 13.5 4.1 
Unfavorable 10.8 10.8 5.4 
No response 0.0 0.0 1.4 
= 16.61 d.f. " 4 Significant at .01 level 
The Office of Defense Transportation, which controlled com­
mercial vehicles, was much too generous at first In issuing 
"certificates of war necessity", which could be turned In for 
ration coupons. The resulting excess of coupons led to the 
emergence of a black market. The Office of Price Administra­
tion (OPA) was extremely fierce In enforcing the law against 
counterfeiters, black marketeers, and the gas stations that 
cooperated with them. The OPA used every device available: 
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publicity, close inspection, civil actions, criminal pro­
ceedings, and the cutting of gas supplies to service sta­
tions that were involved in the black market. In general, 
unless people thought that others were complying with the 
law, the thing would have broken down. 
Providing a white market coupon exchange might be expected to reduce the 
demand for illegal ration coupons. As a result, consumers might not re­
spond as negatively to rationing today as they did in 1942, when as 
Burnett (1978:48) comments, "many Americans thought the use of their cars 
was even more vital to happiness than food." 
It would seem important to assess the primary reason given for in­
tense opposition to gasoline rationing. It has been argued that the 
American people would not accept gasoline rationing, and hence, would 
not cooperate if it were enacted into law (Brunner and Bennett, 1978; 
Henderson, 1978a). However, the results of this study seemed to indi­
cate that 1) an understanding of the reality of gasoline rationing and 
its accompanying restrictions served to reduce the element of the un­
known and 2) for the most part, led to decision patterns that demonstrated 
a willingness to adapt to conditions of energy constraint using decision 
paths which reflected an individual conservation ethic. In short, some 
minor abuses of rationing would be logically expected, but not neces­
sarily nonrational. As Paul O'Leary, the OPA's deputy administrator 
wrote just after World War II, "Americans are not a docile people. But 
they are reasonably cooperative when they see reasonable grounds for 
being asked to make sacrifices" (see Burnett, 1978:46). In addition, as 
Henderson (1978a) and Burnett (1978) have alluded, the public might well 
accept gasoline rationing because studies have repeatedly demonstrated 
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that Its number one concern Is Inflation. The emphasis then might be 
most logically placed on establishing a relationship between gasoline 
rationing and the control of inflation. In sum, as Burnett (1978:46) 
comments : 
The reason for continued increases in OPEC oil, according 
to I&iwait's oil minister, has been the declining value of 
the dollar. OPEC threatens to raise prices because of a 
loss of value of the dollar that has been caused primarily 
by their past price increase. Of course they aren't going 
to raise prices now, because there is a short-term glut of 
oil. But in a few years we are sure to be confronted again 
by OPEC's insane logic. And there is always danger of an­
other embargo. 
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION 
SHORTAGE : A Summation 
The objectives of this study have been to provide new insights into 
the travel options and actual decisions American consumers might make in 
the event of gasoline rationing. While there is no need to detail the 
information presented in the development of this dissertation, it might 
be helpful to point out that the multimethod approach used provided a 
means by which 1) respondent attitudes toward gasoline shortages of rela­
tively unknown boundaries could be assessed, 2) a serious problem could 
be approached by simulating a social environment--an environment of gaso­
line rationing, 3) a theoretical orientation—phenomenology—could be 
used that was temporally dynamic rather than static, and 4) it was pos­
sible to consider the complicated mixture of attltudlnal and situational 
factors which work together to produce actual behavior. 
The Theory 
Using the phénoménologies 1 alternative encouraged the author to 
move away from the traditional assumptions of rationality in social ac­
tion—assumptions that have become reified over the years in social sci­
ence research. As a result, it was possible to realize that she was 
studying a world that had already been preselected and prelnhabited by 
thinking and acting individuals. Inevitably, then, it was assumed that 
the respondents under study would socially construct and, if need be. 
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socially negotiate their experiences during participation in SHORTAGE. 
The task of the author became one of developing a model that "might" re­
semble actual conditions of gasoline rationing, knowing full well that 
the basic components included in SHORTAGE would be, so to speak, con­
structs of the second degree. That is, as Schutz (1967:6) comments, 
"constructs of the constructs made by the subjects under study, whose be­
havior the social scientist observes and tries to explain in accordance 
with the procedural rules of science." The use of phenomenology as a 
descriptive method which permitted an emphasis on the varying nature of 
rationality in social action made this a feasible goal. As it was dis­
cussed in an earlier chapter, there are those who would argue that phe­
nomenology is neither as impressive nor as scientific as are the rational 
positlvist orientations. However, as Baser (1969:72) comments: 
Many of these social science theories would crumble if put 
to the test (of simulation building) because assumptions 
must be clearly stated. This can be a painful consequence 
for the social scientist who has put his trust in impressive 
sounding but vague generalizations or in overwhelming piles 
of data connected by nothing more tangible than his own 
interest in them. 
The Methodology 
The simulation developed for this study was not highly sophisti­
cated, and, as such, was not capable of generating complex statistical 
interrelationships between the questionnaire data and the SHORTAGE data. 
Thus, it would be highly inappropriate to suggest that an absolute reso­
lution to the conflicts and contradictions Inherent in extant energy 
policy has been generated. Rather the objective has been to examine 
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SHORTAGE for its utility in providing transportation researchers and 
policy makers with an alternative to the attitude evaluations which have 
singularly been used in assessing consumer perception of the gasoline 
shortages. Attitudes are not simplistic determinants of transportation 
behavior. Confronting this basic fact necessarily Involved the creation 
of a social environment In which situational variables/categories could 
be presented. It is believed that SHORTAGE may have opened the door to 
future research in this area--research that may make It possible to gen­
erate a more adequate understanding of consumer travel behavior and, 
hence, a more accurate set of predictions about that behavior. In illus­
tration, Model B (see Figure 12) demonstrates the manner in which SHORT­
AGE may have provided respondents with the knowledge of gasoline ration­
ing needed to alter attitudes. The model considers the interaction be­
tween the affective and cognitive components of attitude (Rosenberg and 
Hovland, 1960) before participation in SHORTAGE. Following exposure to 
SHORTAGE, as it was demonstrated in the results chapter, the changes in 
respondent attitude toward GASBAT and FSHAR were statistically signifi­
cant at the .01 level with 73 degrees of freedom. Because of the knowl­
edge gained from SHORTAGE, then, the affective and cognitive components 
of attitude may have shifted to the degree that behavior would be more 
accurately predicted. 
While SHORTAGE, its theoretical and methodological underpinnings 
are unique and innovative, it would seem Important to consider 
its implications for further research. Perhaps one of the primary and 
most important contributions of this study was the problems encountered. 
Affect : respondent's 
feelings about the 
gasoline shortages 











pretations of the gaso­
line shortages (e.g., 
reconciliation of con­
flicting reports of an 
energy shortage and a 
world oil glut 
Affect ; respondent's 
feelings are altered 
in response to actual 









perceptions of the 
gasoline shortages are 
more accurate, realis­
tic, and well-founded 
Figure 12. Modification of the Rosenberg and Hovland (1960) three-component attitude model 
demonstrating the potential impact of participation in shortage on attitude and 
behavior 
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Future researchers may well profit from an understanding of these prob­
lems and be better able to be aware of or avoid them altogether. 
In addition, in an address to the National Academy of Sciences, 
Landsberg (1980:71) indicated that: 
Energy policy involves very large social and political 
components that are much less understood than the tech­
nical factors. . . . There will remain an irreducible 
element of conflicting values and political interests 
that cannot be resolved except in the political arena. 
It would seem that the new techniques developed for this study are badly 
needed to develop a comprehensive, yet effective energy policy. The 
implication of Landsberg's (1980:71) statement seems to be that such a 
policy is not yet within reach. Past policies have, after all, spanned 
the continuum from President Nixon's "project independence" (Landsberg 
1980:71), to President Carter's emphasis on the energy crisis as the 
"moral equivalent of war" (Energy Policy, 1981:251), and President 
Reagan's present policy of "total reliance on the magic of the market 
place" (Eisenstat, 1982;14A). Perhaps Landsberg's statement on the irre­
ducible elements of conflicting values and political interests could be 
seen as the primary stumbling blocks to an effective energy policy. When 
the literature is reviewed, for example, and presidential stands on 
energy are assessed, two very basic, yet confusing energy goals emerge. 
The first involves the attempts made by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and 
Carter to scare the American consumer into reducing his driving needs 
through warnings that a failure to do so will result in an energy catas­
trophe of unknown proportions before the end of the twentieth century. 
The second involves giving those same consumers the assurance that 
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American genius and know-how will most certainly provide a solution to 
the gasoline shortages--a solution that will assure continued growth and 
mobility. Such contradictions appear ludicrous to say the least. To 
reiterate, in the words of one critic, "the government's energy program 
resembles the captain of the Titanic asking the passengers to close 
their portholes for fear of getting wet" (Orr, 1981:7). Past solutions 
to gasoline shortages have called only for minimal sacrifices in both life­
style and economic growth (e.g.. Trim It To The Limit and SÀVÀGALLONOF-
GÂSÂSAY). While such policies may encourage some measure of conserva­
tion, they have largely failed. One reason for this failure may be that 
it has been traditionally assumed that the role of policy makers is to 
pass on knowledge of an issue--in this case the seriousness of the gaso­
line shortages--to "rational" people who will respond by altering their 
behavior as needed. Consumer travel behavior, however, when it has been 
voluntarily and "self" controlled, has tended to sway with the price of 
gasoline. As Yergin (1982;14A) comments, "in the four weeks ending May 
7, 1982, the demand for gasoline was six percent above the level of a 
year earlier." Particularly since the shortages of 1979, consumer de­
mand for gasoline has not necessarily done what it was "supposed to do" 
(Yergin, 1982:14A). 
Based on the discussion above, it would seem that the question may 
one day be not whether American consumers "want" gasoline rationing, 
rather it may be that rationing will become the necessary and inevitable 
resolution to runaway inflation, dwindling oil reserves, and future oil 
embargoes (Ball, 1977; Henderson, 1978a; Burnett, 1978; Orr, 1981. 
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Consumers may well be initially resistant to a program of gasoline 
rationing, but it has been pointed out and argued quite convincingly by 
Ball (1977), Henderson (1978a, b), Martin (1981), Orr (1981), Shippee 
(1981), Yergin (1982), and Eisenstat (1982) that unless government, 
business and industry, and individual consumers work together "we will 
mortgage our future to the temporary pleasures of another oil glut, and 
again confront national tragedy" (Eisenstat, 1982;14A). While statements 
by researchers such as Orr (1981) and Eisenstat (1982) may seem tinged 
with subjectivity, the objective reality is that the world lives in the 
twilight of the crude oil era. American and OPEC energy production is 
unlikely to rise dramatically. We must prepare now for a future with 
scarce crude oil (Eisenstat, 1982:14A). 
The development and execution of this study has provided three 
fundamental, yet significant contributions to social science research. 
First, in using Weber's approach to the objective and scientific study 
of social action in conjunction with the theoretical versatility of 
phenomenology, it became feasible to widen the parameters of social 
action of relevance to the social scientist. That is, the emphasis was 
on understanding a "real world" situation where the subjects under study 
clearly possessed the conscious capacity to create and negotiate the 
dynamics of the gasoline rationing setting imposed upon them. Second, 
because the phenomenological method is neither objectivist, static, 
nor abstractly empirical, it became possible to develop a methodology— 
in the form of simulation SHORTAGE— which would permit the researcher 
to narrow the gap which exists between the more or less stable objective 
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world of empirical social forces and the subjective beliefs people hold 
about them (Johnson, 1981:60). Such a focus led the researcher away 
from the traditional approaches to simulation research which assume 
rationality in social action and permitted an emphasis on limited and 
practical rationality. This was done in order to more adequately under­
stand and evaluate the complex and often confusing responses to the 
gasoline shortages exhibited by American consumers. Third, this study 
yielded important new insights into the point at which American con­
sumers might alter and/or cut back on their current levels of transpor­
tation mobility. In conclusion, a reexamination of the methods of 
sociological inquiry may well permit the development of models of social 
action which 1) differ fundamentally from those which have traditionally 
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APPENDIX A: TEST OF SHORTAGE: LIST OF STRATEGIES, DECISIONS, 
AND CONSEQUENCES, SKELETON DIAGRAM OF DECISION 
PATHS, STRATEGY B IN DIAGRAM FORM, FLOW CHART, 
AND CONSEQUENCES FOR DECISIONS MADE 
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SIMULATION SHORTAGE 
The following appendix contains the text of SHORTAGE including 
the following: 1) the beginning page of SHORTAGE which presents respond­
ents with options; 2) reasons why gasoline rationing must be implemented; 
3) a list of the strategies which will be made available; 4) the Economic 
Regulatory Administration's guidelines for gasoline ration allotments 
(the entire text of President Carter's Contingency Gasoline Rationing 
Plan may be found in Appendix B; 5) the scenario developed to convince 
respondents of the severity of the gasoline shortages; 6) issuance of 
gasoline ration coupons; 7) respondent car_type; 8) parental or self-
income; 9) index page one for strategies; 10) strategies A through E, 
their decisions and consequences including illegal strategy categories; 
11) a skeleton diagram of SHORTAGE which demonstrates the decision paths 
for each of the five strategies; 12) a flow chart which demonstrates the 
process used by respondents as they participated in SHORTAGE; and 13) a 
complete diagram of Strategy B and Strategy B, illegal decisions which 
shows the manner in which decisions both legal and illegal were made. 
Choose an Option by pressing the corresponding letter; 
a. Introduction to SHORTAGE 
b. SHORTAGE instructions 
c. Gasoline rationing regulations 
d. Begin the simulation 
Note: You are encouraged to make comments at any time and may do so by 
pressing the key marked SHIFT/LAB. 
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The known reserves of oil are limited. New supplies may be found, 
but even so, this country is experiencing shortages, which range from 
5% to 20%. Lesson "SHORTAGE" is a simulation of a gas rationing plan 
which could very soon be implemented in the United States if the supply 
of gasoline fails to meet public demand. In some areas of the U.S. 
such as Pennsylvania, California, and New York, this is already happen­
ing. The result has been long lines at service stations, outbreaks of 
violence due to heightened tensions, irregular hours at service stations, 
and mass confusion on the part of the American people. 
Any gasoline rationing plan will cause hardships to many people and 
will inconvenience large numbers of gasoline consumers. Nonetheless, 
in a period of serious shortage, the rationing of gasoline will assure 
access to some gasoline by all motorists at a reasonably controlled 
price, reduce or eliminate long waiting lines, reduce incidences of vio­
lence, and stabilize the market for gasoline. There will be costs to 
adapting to gasoline rationing. Given a level of spendable income and 
certain selfrdefined needs, you will be given the options of 1) paying 
additional costs in mobility (e.g., through buying extra ration coupons 
from someone who does not need or use them or from an exchange market 
such as a bank) or 2) altering your lifestyle so that you will be able to 
reduce your gasoline consumption (e.g., moving closer to your job, cut­
ting down on social activities which require driving, etc.). Either 
option will represent a substantial change in your present travel pat­
terns. 
A number of strategies will be presented to you. Several alterna­
tives within each strategy will be given and you will be asked to make 
decisions based on these alternatives. These strategies are as follows: 
1. Strategy A : Attempt to gain as much gasoline as possible 
for personal consumption. 
2. Strategy B; Make better use of the gasoline rations that are 
made available to you. 
3. Strategy C; Adjust individual travel needs in an attempt to 
use less gasoline. 
4. Strategy D; Attempt to induce the government (local, state, 
and/or federal) to change its energy policy or policies to re­
lax rationing limitations. 
5. Strategy E; Reconsider the social and moral issues involved 
with respect to individual style of living, values, and behavior. 
Make personal changes as necessary. 
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The following is a list of the proposed rationing rules. 
The Economic Regulatory Administration has determined eligibility 
for ration allotments using the following guidelines: 
1. Your basic eligibility for ration allotments will be determined 
by the number of gasoline-powered vehicles which you own. In 
order to insure that some individuals are not abusing this rule, 
it has been determined that each household will be allowed a 
maximum of three vehicle registrations for purposes of obtain­
ing ration coupons. 
2. Ration checks will be issued to you upon your presentation of 
satisfactory identification. 
3. These ration checks will be mailed to you on a quarterly (90-
day) basis, with the appropriate allotment amount printed on 
each check. 
4. Ration coupons will be issued in 5-gallon amounts and in 1-gal-
lon amounts. 
5. Ration coupons will have identification numbers and expiration 
dates. 
6. A registration cut-off date prior to the effective date of 
rationing has been implemented to prevent the registration of 
fictitious, junked, or inoperable vehicles for the sole purpose 
of obtaining rationing rights. 
7. Passenger cars have been found to travel an average of 10,100 
miles per year with a fuel efficiency of 13.5 miles per gallon 
yielding an average annual gasoline consumption of 758 gallons. 
It is hereby noted that all passenger cars in a given state 
will receive the same 120 gallons for each 90-day period of 
time, regardless of fuel efficiency. This will give a signif­
icant advantage to fuel efficient vehicles and will hopefully 
provide an incentive to their use. 
8. Motorcycles and other gasoline-powered motorbikes will receive 
.1 of the ration allotment to automobiles (12 gallons of gaso­
line for each 90-day period of time). 
9. Recreational vehicles (e.g., snowmobiles, campers) will receive 
NO allotment whatsoever. 
10. Unredeemed ration rights are freely transferable. If you do not 
need or do not use all of your ration coupons for the 90-day 
period, you may given them to someone or sell them. It is hoped 
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that this will promote a more efficient use of all available 
gasoline. 
11. Any person who violates any provision of these regulations 
or any order issued shall be subject to the penalties as set 
forth in section 5 of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act 
of 1973, which has established several categories of civil 
penalties with fines ranging as high as $40,000 depending on 
the category of the violation. The maximum criminal penalty 
for such willful violation is one year imprisonment. 
Attention: 
There has been a nuclear explosion in one of the largest oil fields 
in the Middle East. As a result of the explosion, it will be from six 
months to one year before workers can safely enter the area. As you 
know, a large percentage of U.S. oil is imported from the Middle East. 
The Department of Energy and the Economic Regulatory Administration 
hereby informs you that the President of the United States sent a gaso­
line rationing contingency plan to the Congress. Each House of Congress 
has since passed a resolution approving a gasoline rationing plan which 
will become effective in 60 days. Rationing will be implemented for a 
period not to exceed 9 months. As of today the federal government has 
informed us that a cutback of 25% in fuel consumption will be needed in 
order to assure this country that it will not run out of fuel altogether. 
While it is recognized that in the past many people believed that 
fuel shortages were created by large oil corporations in an attempt to 
drive up the price of gasoline, this country has not reached the point 
at which it is critical that all Americans recognize the seriousness of 
this sudden cutback in the availability of gasoline. 
You have just been issued ration checks for your car totaling 120 
gallons of gasoline. Use them wisely. Remember, we all have to live 
with and/or cope with the decisions we make. 
Before you begin we need some basic information about you. 
What type of car do you drive? (How many miles per gallon of gaso­
line do you receive?) 
Note; (See the sheet with the list of cars provided by the researcher. 
Tell the researcher what your gasoline mileage is and you will be 
assigned a car_type) 
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Approximately, what is your yearly income? If you are single, please 
estimate your parents income. 
Income Increments 
a. 0 - $ 4,999 
b. 5,000 - $ 9,999 
c. 10,000 - $14,999 
d. 15,000 - $19,999 
e. 20,000 - $24,999 
f. 25,000 - $29,999 
g. 30,000 - $34,999 
h. above $35,000 
Presentation of strategies; 
There are a number of decisions you may make within each strategy. 
It is, however, understood that because the amount of gasoline 
available is limited, some of the decisions necessarily border on 
the line between legal and illegal. Press the letter key to select 
the strategy you wish to choose. After each decision is made, you 
will be presented with a consequence that will reward or cost you 
either verbally or in terms of a change in your daily gasoline con­
sumption rate. When you finish reading each consequence, press the 
key marked NEXT to return for more decisions or to try another 
strategy. 
Strategy A; Attempt to obtain as much gasoline as possible for 
personal consumption. (N__CHI1) 
List of Decisions and Consequences 
15. You can purchase old low value cars from the junkyard and use their 
registrations to receive more ration coupons. 
a. A routine check on the registrations of the cars you own re­
vealed that they are not operable. In fact, one has no motor 
in it. You may be subject to a $500 fine and 30 days in the 
county jail. 
b. Remember you are only allowed three registered vehicles for 
the purpose of obtaining ration coupons. If you attempt to 
to register more than three cars you will be subject to 
arrest. 
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16. You may buy coupons from someone who does not use all his/her 
coupons. 
a. It has just been announced over the radio that Mr. Edwin James 
has been arrested for selling counterfeit ration coupons. The 
serial numbers of the coupons you have been buying match those 
of the counterfeit coupons. You are now stuck with $220 worth 
of unusable ration coupons. 
b. The man who has been selling you his unused ration coupons at 
a 10% mark-up has just increased his mark-up margin by another 
30% because of demand and inflation. 
17. You may consider buying a car which uses diesel fuel, which is not 
rationed; such as a Mercedes Benz, a Volkswagen Rabbit, or a new 
diesel burning Oldsmobile. 
a. Have you priced cars recently? Particularly those which run 
on diesel fuel? A VW Rabbit diesel using vehicle now sells for 
$13,500. Volkswagen does it again!!! 
b. It doesn't really matter whether or not diesel fuel is rationed 
when there is none available. You now have a $13,500 automobile 
for which you have no gasoline. 
18. You might think about asking your elderly parents to move in with 
you. You would then be eligible to receive a "hardship" fuel allo­
cation in their names. 
a. Is it really worth all the extra work it will create? 
b. It was a nice gesture to invite your parents to live with you. 
However, the increased cost of having them live with you is 
going to place quite a strain on your household budget. 
19. You could buy a large truck and use its fuel allocation in your 
other vehicles. 
a. The neighbors have signed a petition forcing you to move that 
"ugly trudc" out of their neighborhood. Where are you going to 
park it? 
b. Good choice. Because trucks net fewer miles per gallon of gaso­
line than cars, your ration allotment for your truck will be 
three times that given for passenger vehicles. Your problem is 
solved. 
20. You could form or join a volunteer fire department and apply for the 
unlimited ration to "emergency services" groups. 
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a. You drove to a local fire to participate in a volunteer fire 
department call and sparks from the fire ruined the paint on 
your new automobile. Repair estimates range from $400 to $600. 
b. In order to retain your status as a volunteer fire department 
member you are required to use your vacation this summer to 
participate in the Iowa State University Fire Training Exten­
sion Program. 
c. If choice was (a) there is :t7o probability that this will occur! 
Because you were convicted of illegally registering automobiles 
you now have a criminal record and cannot form a volunteer fire 
department. 
Strategy A, illegal decisions. (N_CHI2) 
21. You could steal coupons from mailboxes in large apartment buildings. 
a. The owner of the filling station where you buy your gasoline 
became suspicious of you when his attendant mentioned you seemed 
to be buying more gasoline than usual. A check of the serial 
numbers of the stolen coupons you just cashed in were on a hot 
sheet in all service stations. You have just been arrested and 
if convicted you could go to jail for up to 2 years. 
b. All mailboxes in the apartment buildings have locks on them 
and there is a closed circuit TV set-up. Don't be a fool! 
Tampering with the U.S. mail is a federal offense. 
c. You now have enough gasoline to last for a while, but the poor 
widow you stole the coupons from was selling most of her coupons 
for extra money to live on and using the rest for important 
trips to the doctor and the grocery store. As a result of your 
actions, she had to stop seeing her doctor and became ill since 
she wasn't receiving her medication, last week she died alone 
and her body wasn't found until yesterday. Feel proud of your­
self now? 
d. Well, you got by with it; this time! But who knows about next 
time? 
22. You could form a fake construction company and apply for an "off-
highway" fuel allocation. 
a. This just isn't your lucky day; you have been caught. You could 
receive a fine of $10,000 and serve up to 1 year in jail. 
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b. So far you have been lucky. Sooner or later you will probably 
be caught. 
23. You could set up a still in your basement to make alcohol to bum 
in your car. 
a. You have been caught. If conviced you will be subject to a 
$10,000 fine and up to 1 year in jail. 
b. The price of sugar has just gone up to $2.00 a pound. It seems 
that a lot of people are buying large amounts of sugar all of 
a sudden. The Economic Regulatory Administration has gotten 
wind of the fact that people are operating stills in their 
homes. If this price Increase does not lower the demand for 
sugar they will instigate random house checks looking for these 
stills. 
c. It is a well-known fact that sugar is a prime ingredient in 
hone brewed moonshine. Due to the increase in the demand for 
sugar in large quantities, the price has risen to $2.00 per 
pound. If this does not lead to a decrease in the consumption 
of sugar those persons who purchase it will be asked to sign 
their names on a government form when buying more than 10 pounds 
at a time. These persons will then be viewed as suspicious 
persons who may be breaking the law. 
d. Good idea! But if you are caught, remember moonshining is a 
federal crime. 
24^ . You could siphon gasoline out of cars in parking lots. 
a. You were just caught siphoning gasoline out of your neighbor's 
car and he has threatened to report you to the authorities 
unless you turn over half of your ration coupons to him for the 
next 6 months. 
b. This time you were lucky. But don't you feel guilty? 
c. Amateurs can get hurt. You swallowed quite a bit of gasoline 
while you were sucking it up the siphon hose. The doctors say 
you might have permanently damaged your lungs. 
H^I risk. 
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Strategy B: Make better use of the gasoline rations that are made 
available to you. (N_CHI3) 
List of Decisions and Consequences 
25. Purchase a very fuel efficient car. 
a. The Blue Book value of your present car has decreased by 30% 
because there is little demand for fuel inefficient automobiles. 
You just can't afford a new car at this time. 
b. The bank at which you have applied for a loan has just informed 
you that you will be able to obtain your loan at a reduced per­
cent as an incentive to purchase a fuel efficient automobile. 
However, your insurance company has informed you that because 
of the risk of serious Injury or death in case of an accident 
is 30% higher in a small car your premium will be twice what you 
were paying before. And with the price of small cars sky­
rocketing, you just can't afford one now. 
26. Purchase a mo-ped or a motorcyle. 
a. Your ration allotment for your mo-ped or motorcyle is one-tenth 
that of a passenger vehicle, which means instead of a ration 
allotment of 120 gallons for the 90-day period you will receive 
only 12 gallons. 
b. Your motorcycle collided with a car at the intersection of 
Lincoln Way and Duff. You have a broken leg and a possible con­
cussion. This means you may miss work for as long as a month. 
c. Due to the increase in the number of motorcycle and mo-ped 
accidents the State of Iowa has just passed a law requiring you 
to carry both liability and collision insurance. These rates 
will be inordinately higji because of the high risk involved in 
operating these vehicles. 
d. This is fine in good weather, but sub-zero weather and rain make 
travel uncomfortable and dangerous. 
e. You have made a wise decision in that you will be getting from 
90 to 125 miles to a single gallon of gasoline. 
f. Four thousand people in this country have been killed in motor­
cycle accidents within the past 5 months. 
27. Ride an Intraclty or intercity bus (if available). 
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a. The bus is so crowded that by the time it reaches your stop you 
find you must stand the entire 10 miles to and from work each 
day. Do you still want to ride the bus? Press the letter "y" 
for yes, "n" for no. 
If respondent pressed "y" for yes, the consequence was: 
b. Your cost of traveling to and from work has been cut by one-
third. It looks as if this was a good choice. 
If respondent pressed "n" for no, the consequence was: 
c. I don't blame you, but if you run out of gasoline before 120 
days are up, don't blame us. 
Join or form a car or van pool. 
a. One of the members of your car pool has a tendency to exceed the 
speed limit. This is the third time in two weeks he has been 
stopped by the State Patrol. It looks as if you will be late to 
work again today. 
b. One of the members of your car pool seems to be shoving her 
driving days off on you. Every time it is her turn to drive, 
it seems she claims her car is "in the garage" for repairs. 
c. One of the members of your car pool smokes cigars. The days he 
drives he feels it is his car and if he wants to smoke he does. 
Your asthma is bothering you because of this (more doctor bills) 
d. The car pool group set down a set of rules or guidelines to 
which each member of the car pool must adhere if he wants to 
remain a member. It should work. 
e. This was a good idea. You are not only relieved of the respon­
sibilities of driving every day, but it also saves wear and tear 
on your car. 
f. You have been given a discount rate for monthly parking because 
you have joined a car pool. 
g. The Internal Revenue Service has been authorized by the Economic 
Regulatory Administration to give an added tax break to those 
persons who are participating members of car and van pools. 
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Strategy B, illegal alternatives. (N_CHI4) 
29. Purchase an electric powered automobile. 
a. O.K. They cost about $3,000 and have a maximum range of 50 
miles. They have a top speed of 25 miles per hour, and carry 
from two to four people. 
Note; Manufacturers are working on the concept of the elec­
tric automobile. Some are on the market and selling 
for about $8,000. Maybe this wasn't such a bad idea 
after all. 
30. Purchase an electric powered bike. 
a. This is a good idea if you can find someone to build it for you. 
However, its top speed would not be much over 15 miles per hour. 
31. Ride a horse for some travel needs. 
a. Where will you park it when you go shopping or when you work 
an 8-hour day? 
b. You have just been fined $25 for creating a public health 
hazzard. Your horse was caught "relieving" himself in the 
middle of the business section of town. 
32. Turn all emission control equipment off on your automobile to in­
crease gasoline mileage. 
a. You have been stopped in a routine safety check and the Iowa 
State patrolman who just checked your car has routinely checked 
to see if your emission control device is working. You have 
just been issued a warrant to appear in court to answer to the 
charge. If convicted you may lose your driver's license and/or 
receive a $100 fine and/or 30 days in jail. 
b. It is against the law to turn off emission control equipment. 
You may be subject to a fine if you are caught. Garage mechan­
ics have been alerted to the fact that this is being done and 
are required by law to report anyone guilty of this crime. 
33. Roll through stop signs to reduce the fuel consumption required for 
a full stop. 
a. Because so many people are doing this the police department has 
issued a notice that persons taking down license numbers of 
those individuals who break this law will be rewarded by re­
ceiving ration coupons worth 3 gallons of gasoline. 
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b. No one was around so you decided to take the chance, didn't 
you? However, you didn't see the County Patrol car sitting 
behind the billboard, did you? Sorry. If you are convicted 
you will lose your driver's license, receive a $500 fine, and 
a 30-day stay In the county jail. 
c. Because you already have three other convictions for traffic 
offenses your driver's license has been taken away for 6 months. 
d. Do you realize this Is against the law? Shame on you! 
34. Purchase oil or gasoline treatment additives to Increase your gaso­
line mileage (e.g. STP). 
a. Good Idea. However, Consumer Report just Issued a notice that 
STP and other oil additives do not Increase gas mileage. But 
you may Increase the life of your car by taking better care 
of it. 
35. Drive without air conditioning in the summer to increase your gas 
mileage. 
a. Driving without an air conditioner may save gasoline, but it is 
also very hot. Although, considering that you seem to be using 
your 90-day allocation quite rapidly, you might try it for a 
time. 
Strategy C; Adjust Individual travel needs in an attempt to use 
less gasoline. (N_CHI5) 
List of Decisions and Consequences 
36. Ride a bike or walk to work. 
a. The traffic on the highway Is heavy both ways and cars are often 
inconsiderate of bicycles and pedestrians. 
b. You just had a flat tire and you now have to walk the bike to 
work. It is still about two miles. You are going to be late 
again. 
c. This is good exercise, but you will work up quite a sweat by 
the time you get to work. Your job requires you to wear a 
suit/dress and you will be all hot and sticky when you arrive. 
d. The sun was shining when you left for work this morning with 
no chance of rain. However, the weather forecase was revised 
at 10 A.M. It is raining and the wind is blowing at speeds up 
to 30 miles per hour. It looks like you are going to get wet 
today. 
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e. You forgot to lock your bike this morning. Someone just stole 
it. 
37. Make the children walk or ride bikes to school and other activities. 
a. It will be good for them. If only they felt that way about it. 
b. If their activities are important to them, they will manage. 
If not, then let them stay home. You really cannot afford the 
expenditure of the extra gasoline. 
38. Shop from a catalog and have the goods delivered to your home. 
a. Those stores which put out catalogs generally do not sell high-
quality products. 
b. You ordered a suit/dress to wear and when it came it looked 
horrible on you. Nothing ever seems to fit when you buy from 
a catalog. 
c. By the time you pay postage, it costs more to buy through the 
catalog than from a store in town. Besides, clothing always 
looks better in the book than it does when you get it home. 
d. Looks like it is working out fine so far. You have gotten every 
item you have ordered with no hassles and have saved time and 
gasoline too. 
39. Shop from a door-to-door peddler. 
a. This usually costs more and the quality of the products you can 
buy from door-to-door peddlers is often low, 
b. There has been an increase in door-to-door peddlers who con­
vince potential customers they can save large sûmes of money on 
clothing, cosmetics, and kitchen utensils. However, it has come 
to the attention of the local police that many of these peddlers 
do not deliver the goods. You just paid out $150 for two new 
suits/dresses and have been notified that the persons who sold 
them to you are confidence artists and have been arrested. 
40. Order groceries by telephone based on an advertisement(s) in the 
newspaper. 
a. The grocery store delivered, but it cost you 15% more than if 
you had done your own shopping. And at the price of groceries 
today no one can afford this. 
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b. It would save you money if you would shop just once a month 
at a Warehouse Food Market. The savings amounts to about 15%. 
41. Pay bills and do your banking by telephone. 
a. This will save you both time and money. Good choice! 
42. Watch cable television and cassette home movies instead of going 
out for entertainment. 
a. A Beta-Max sells for about $1,000, That is a lot of money, 
b. For about $10-15 per month, you can have cable television in­
stalled where it is available. Most of the movies that are 
shown are uncut versions of movies which have only recently 
been shown in movie theaters. The price of a movie is between 
$3.00 and $4.00. In a year's time that really does add up. 
43. Stop going snowmobiling. 
a. This is not really a choice. Remember! Government regulations 
state that NO allotment will be given to recreational vehicles. 
44. Write letters or phone instead of traveling to visit people, even 
those who live close by. 
a. Your mother just does not understand. She only lives twenty 
miles away and is heartbroken that you cannot make the trip to 
see her. 
b. You could phone your mom every day and talk for a few minutes. 
She might enjoy that as much as your once a week or once a 
month "duty" visits. 
45. Have someone in the family or a neighbor cut your hair instead of 
going to a barber shop or beauty salon. 
a. Your spouse just cut your hair and it looks like someone put a 
bowl on your head and cut around it. 
Strategy D. Attempt to induce the government (local, state and/or 
federal levels) to change its policy or policies to 
relax rationing regulations. (NjCHI?) 
List of Decisions and Consequences 
46. Stop mowing grass and weeds along the higheway. 
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a. À school bus loaded with kindergarten children collided with a 
statlonwagon on a county road. Weeds had grown out of control. 
The driver of the car did not see the bus coming. Two children 
were killed and 17 were seriously injured. 
b. This will force large numbers of lay-offs within the Department 
of Transportation increasing the already high unemployment rate 
which might well force the country into a recession. 
c. This could save an estimated 50 million barrels of gasoline per 
year. 
47. Stop picking up trash along the highway. 
a. A bill has been Introduced in the Legislature to Increase the 
fine for littering from $100 to $1,000 and 30 days in jail. 
NEWS HASH 
A statlonwagon carrying seven children and two adults was just involved 
in a one-car crash on Highway 1-35 near Des Moines, Iowa. Investigators 
at the scene of the accident indicated that the driver of the car, C. R. 
Budney, apparently swerved to avoid hitting a large object in the road 
and crashed into a telephone pole. The object turned out to be a case 
of empty beer bottles which were dumped or fell from a moving vehicle. 
Budney and four of his children are reported dead. His wife and three 
more children are in critical condition in a Des Moines hospital. This 
type of accident rarely happened when the highway crews kept the road­
sides clear. 
b. Workers from the Department of Transportation estimate that they 
pick up 700,000 tons of trash from primary highways each year. 
Looks like the highways are going to get cluttered, but it will 
conserve gasoline. 
48. Stop patching potholes in the roads. 
a. You just hit a pothole in the road which threw your car out of 
control. You hit a fire hydrant and flooded the area with water. 
You were driving home from work and your car pool has five mem­
bers, four of whom were still in the car. Three of them suf­
fered only minor injuries but your next door neighbor was thrown 
through the windshield. He is in the Intensive care unit in 
Mary Greeley Hospital. 
b. Because minor road repairs are no longer being made, the De­
partment of Transportation has been forced to layoff 20,150 men 
and women across the country. One-third of them have applied 
for state aid because they have been unable to find other work. 
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This has placed a strain on our nation's economy. Therefore, 
the federal withholding tax will be increased by 5% across the 
board beginning September 1, 1979. 
c. Due to heavy spring rains, many rural roads have been closed. 
Underground springs have caused deep rutting and deterioration 
of a large number of these roads many of which lead into and 
out of heavily populated subdivisions. 
49. Cancel trucking regulations which force trucks to run empty in one 
direction. 
a. This will save an estimated 250,000 gallons of gasoline per 
month nationwide. This will increase the state reserves and 
decrease the chances of another cut in ration allotments for 
passenger cars. 
50. Enact stricter laws to enforce the speed limit. 
a. Those persons who are stopped for violating the 55-mile per hour 
speed limit will automatically lose their driving privileges for 
90 days. 
51. Break consolidated schools up into one-room schools so children 
can walk to school. 
a. Most secondary education teachers (e.g. grades 7-12) receive 
their college educations in specialty areas. In order for such 
a split in schools to occur these teachers would have to attend 
classes at a college or university for a minimum of 30 hours or 
1 year. À large number of teachers are planning a march on 
Washington, D.C. in protest of this which could close all high 
schools in the country for the remainder of this school year. 
b. This could conceivably lower the quality of education your 
children would receive. 
c. This would leave schools around the country empty and virtually 
useless. The tax dollars invested and the bonds sold to build 
these modem teaching facilities would have to be stored away 
and thousands of people from maintenance men to principals 
would lose their jobs. 
52. Delete all school activities requiring travel. 
a. Students are refusing to attend school and are picketing in 
protest. 
b. The rate of juvenile delinquency has risen 35% in the 2 months 
since school activities requiring travel have been cancelled. 
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c. Great! The grown-ups waste the fuel until the crisis hits. 
Now the kids have to pay for it. This is not fair. 
d. This would save hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel each 
year. However, it will also put thousands of school bus 
drivers out of work which will also add to an already strained 
economy. 
53. Eliminate most postal delivery and use telephone and television-
type communication to replace letters. 
a. The cost to the economy involved here would be monumental and 
the individual costs would be high as well. This would hurt a 
lot of people, particularly the elderly and the poor who repre­
sent nearly 50% of the total population. 
b. This is a good idea for long-run projections but it would take 
at least two years and millions of dollars to implement it. 
NEWS FLASH 
Thousands of unemployed postal workers who staged a protest against the 
elimination of all postal delivery converged on Washington, B.C. today. 
One violent confrontation between police and protesters has left two men 
dead and 18 more critically injured. One of the dead men was your next 
door neighbor who went along as a concerned citizen. 
NEWS FLASH 
Postal workers are picketing television stations all over the country 
that have agreed to become involved in this "sabotage" of the U.S. econ­
omy. Employees of television stations across the country have agreed to 
honor the picket lines. The top administrators of ABC, NBC, CBS, and the 
PBS have expressed their fears that all four networks may shut down 
permanently unless this terrible threat to the nation's economy is re­
moved . 
54. Construct housing and factories around existing shopping centers 
to create urban villages. 
a. Building construction costs have risen 30% in the past month. 
It does not seem feasible at this point to consider this as a 
working alternative. 
b. Central city areas in Boston, Chicago, New York City, Pitts­
burgh: the list is endless; have reached the point of bank­
ruptcy. Unless people can be motivated to once again shop in 
these areas these cities may die. 
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c. Good idea! The problem lies In the fact that the areas around 
these large shopping centers are already inhabited by single 
and multiple residence dwellings. 
d. This is ideal for long-range forecasting but in the short-run 
it is not a feasible alternative. These things take time. 
55. Lay off government employees to reduce driving of government-owned 
vehicles. 
a. This will increase the unemployment rate across the country by 
another 1.5% which will bring the total unemployment rate in the 
U.S. to 14.7%, an all time high. 
Strategy E; Reconsider the social and moral issues involved with 
respect to individual style of living, values, and 
behavior. Make personal changes as necessary. (W_CHI9) 
List of Decisions and Consequences 
56. You may buy surplus coupons from a local bank or exchange market. 
a. The First National Bank buys coupons from persons who do not 
need the full 90-day allotment. The bank then sells these 
coupons for 10% over the price of gasoline. However, you may 
only buy twenty gallons worth of coupons during each 90-day 
period from this source. 
57. You could buy ration coupons from someone who does not need all of 
his coupons. 
a. ATTENTION! James Gabel was just arrested for selling what could 
turn out to be as much as $50,000 worth of counterfeit ration 
coupons. The serial numbers of the coupons you bought yesterday 
match those of the counterfeit coupons. You are now stuck with 
$400 worth of unusable coupons. 
b. You do realize, don't you, that there are a large number of 
counterfeit ration coupons in circulation? If you are caught 
spending them you will be arrested. Ignorance of the law is no 
excuse for breaking it. If you are going to buy extra ration 
coupons "on the street", be careful. 
c. Most of the persons who sell unneeded ration coupons are charg­
ing exhorbitant prices. 
58. Stop using your personal vehicle on business errands. 
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a. You could save as much as ten gallons of gasoline in a 90-day 
period of time if you stop using your car to run business 
errands. 
b. Good idea! The company you work for may as well pick up the 
tab. 
59. Buy a ten-acre farm and apply for an off-highway allocation. 
a. Have you priced farm land recently? It is selling for as much 
as $5,000 per acre. 
b. In most states tractors used for farming are not registered 
with the Department of Motor Vehicles. The provision for off-
highway vehicles will provide you with fuel to run your tractor. 
You do have a tractor don't you? Because if you don't you are 
not eligible for extra coupons and are breaking the law. 
c. You could buy a lot of ration coupons with the $30,000 you just 
paid for those 10 acres of land out in the country. 
60. Buy a large truck and use its ration coupons in your car. 
a. Good idea! Your truck is allowed three times the ration allot­
ment (360 gallons) of a passenger vehicle for the 90-day period 
of time. 
b. The neighbors have just gotten up a petition to force you to 
move that "ugly truck" out of the neighborhood and it is going 
to cost you a bundle to park it somewhere else. 
61. Drive no faster than 50 miles per hour on the highway to conserve 
gasoline. 
a. You will save an average of 3 miles per gallon of gasoline if 
you lower your speed to 50 mph. 
62. Sell your unexpired ration coupons. 
a. To whom will you sell them? The bank offered you 5% over the 
cost of gasoline. On the other hand, some people are selling 
them on the street for as much as 20% over cost. And it is all 
legal. 
63. Report to the authorities anyone selling counterfeit ration coupons. 
a. The federal government has offered a reward of $1,000 for in­
formation leading to the arrest and conviction of anyone who 
prints or sells counterfeit coupons because the country is 
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being flooded with counterfeits. If this continues, the U.S. 
reserve supply of fuel may be gone within six months. You 
have just found out that your next door neighbor has been in­
volved in selling these counterfeit coupons. Are you going to 
turn him in? 
IF YES: The evidence against your neighbor was circumstantial and 
the charges levied against him have been dropped. He had since 
threatened to "get you" for turning him in. 
IF NO: The flood of counterfeit ration coupons has reached serious 
proportions in this area of the country. Thirty percent of the 
fuel reserves in the Midwest have been used up. You are hereby 
informed that gasoline ration allotments have been cut from 120 
gallons every 90 days to 100 gallons for that same time period. 
If this crisis situation is not relieved, the free world as we 
have known it since 1945 may one day soon no longer exist. 
Strategy E. illegal alternatives. (N_CHI10) 
List of Decisions and Consequences 
64. Falsely report that your ration coupons were not delivered in order 
to obtain a second set of coupons. 
a. À computer check of cashed coupons turned up your "alleged" 
missing coupons. Your automobile ration booklet has been can­
celled and it will be at least sixty days before a new one will 
arrive. It is hoped that this will provide an Incentive for you 
to keep track of your ration coupons in the future. 
65. Turn off all emission control equipment on your vehicle(s) if in­
structions are available in order to increase gas mileage. 
a. You have just broken the law. You will be subject to a fine 
if you are caught. 
b. You have been stopped in a routine safety check and the Iowa 
State patrolman who just checked your car has routinely checked 
to see if your emission control device is working. You have 
just been Issued a warrant to appear in court to answer to the 
charge. If convicted you may lose your driver's license and/or 
receive a $100 fine and 30 days in jail. 
c. It is against the law to turn off emission control equipment. 
You may be subject to a fine if you are caught. Garage mechanics 
have been alerted to the fact that this is being done and are 
required by law to report anyone guilty of this crime. 
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66. Roll through stop signs to reduce fuel consumed by a full stop. 
a. The Police Department has just Issued a public notice that be­
cause of an increase in traffic accidents there will be severe 
penalties imposed upon those who violate traffic laws. 
67. Illegally double park rather than driving around the block several 
times to find a parking place. 
a. Your car has just been towed away. To reclaim it will cost you 
$50.00 in towing fees plus a $25.00 ticket for illegal parking. 
68. Turn off your engine and coast down long hills to save gasoline. 
a. Because so many people are doing this the Police Department has 
issued a notice that persons taking down license numbers of 
those individuals who break this law will be rewarded by re­
ceiving ration coupons worth three gallons of gasoline. 
b. No one was around so you decided to take the chance. However, 
there was a County Patrol car sitting behind the billboard to 
your left. Sorry, you just got caught. If convicted, you will 
lose your driver's license and receive a $500 fine. 
c. Do you realize this is against the law? Shame on you. 
d. Because you already have three other convictions for traffic 
offenses, you just lost your license for six months. 
69. If I had ration coupons which were to expire tomorrow and the fuel 
tanks on my vehicles were full, I would use the coupons to fill cans 
to be stored in my garage. 
a. It is against the law to store large quantities of gasoline 
within 40 feet of a building. Your next door neighbor just 
turned you in to the authorities. He said he was afraid for 
the safety of his family. 
b. Your son was playing with matches in the garage. He dropped 
a lighted match on the floor too close to your gasoline cans. 
There was an explosion and he was severely burned over 70% of 
his body. 
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Costs/Rewards Associated with Decisions within 
Strategy Categories; SHORTAGE Data 
This section of the appendix will focus on the consequences asso­
ciated with certain decisions within SHORTAGE. As it was pointed out 
in the Methods Chapter, SHORTAGE was modified somewhat before the 1980 
data collection began. The modifications seemed necessary In order 
that more realistic costs could be attached to some of the decisions, 
particularly the hi_rlsk. Illegal decisions. Table A.1 shows a list of 
each consequence that contained a reward/penalty in terms of gasoline 
consumption rate. For the reader's clarification, the rewards/penalties 
attached to consequences are presented both before (listed as 1979) and 
after (listed as 1980) SHORTAGE had been modified. 
As it can be seen from Table A.l, most of the consequences led to a 
decrease in respondent's daily gasoline consumption rate. For example, 
the decision to join or form a car or van pool added a total of six gal-
longs of gasoline to a respondent's ration allotment, at the time a 
decision was made, while the decision to falsely report that ration cou­
pons were not delivered resulted in a loss of thirty gallons of whatever 
gasoline was left at the time of the decision. 
As the data were analyzed, it became apparent that the research 
group had perhaps focused too strongly on the hl_risk. Illegal decisions 
while ignoring other decisions which might have been altered. That is, 
the respondents might have been more acutely aware of the passing of 
time and of their daily gasoline consumption rate had more decisions 
been designed to significantly penalize or reward them. It might also 
302 
have been feasible to build into the simulation delayed reactions by 
SHORTAGE, so that respondents would not have immediately felt the impact 
of their decisions, but rather, as in "real" life that impact would be 
felt days or even weeks later. 
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Table Â.l. List of decisions and costs of consequences for 1979 and 
1980 SHORTAGE data 
Decision made 1979 
Reward/penalty in gallons 
1980 
Ride an intercity/intracity bus 45 
Siphon gasoline out of parked cars 
Join or form a car or van pool +6 
Ride a horse for some travel needs +5 
Purchase oil or gasoline treatment 
additives to increase your gasoline 
mileage +2 
Drive without air conditioning in 
the summer to increase your gasoline 
mileage +2 
Ride a bike or walk to work +5 
Shop from a door-to-door peddler +1 
Order groceries by telephone based 
on advertisement(s) in the news­
paper +1 
Stop using your personal vehicle 
on business errands +2 
Drive no faster than 50 mph on 
the highway to save gasoline +1 
Report to the authorities anyone 
selling counterfeit ration coupons 
Falsely report that your ration 
coupons were not delivered in order 
to obtain a second set of coupons 
if respondent ressed "y" 
for yes, then 45, other­
wise no change 
Respondent loses one-
half of whatever gasoline 










respondent loses 22% of 
total number of remaining 
gallons of gasoline for 
failing to turn in anyone 
guilty of counterfeiting 
respondent loses 30 gal­
lons of whatever gaso­
line he has left at the 
time of this decision 
Respondent enters simulation 
Enter personal data (income, cartype) 
I  
Respondent chooses information levels desired prior 
to activating the simulation which provide information 
needed to participate in SHORTAGE 
4 
Respondent receives ration allotment (120 gallons of 
gasoline for the ninety-day time period) 
ll' 
-^ Respondent is presented with operational strategies. 
-y.He is asked to select^ a strategy to operate SHORTAGE. 
>• SHORTAGE presents respondent with a list of decisions 
subsumed within each strategy. 
"I" w 
no—Respondent makes a decision if he chooses to. g 
I yes SHORTAGE presents a consequence associated with decision—^ (SHORTAGE assesses 
which is made (consequences appear with random probability cost increment of 
1 consequence. Re-
Respondent reads consequence, presses key marked NEXT spondent's daily 
to return to list of decisions gasoline consump-
4 tlon rate may 
yes want to make more decisions within present strategy? stay the same, 
(Legal decisions/Illegal decisions? Increase, or de-
i no 






















3 Strategy A 
Illegal 
Alternatives 
I I I I.' 
a b e d  
21 22 23 24 
4 Strategy B 
rrrr 
a b e d  
25 26 27 28 
DATA 









( i l l  
a b c a è f g 
29 30 31 32 33 34 35 
... . D^enotes high risk decision. 






6 Strategy C 
a b c d e 
36 37 38 39 40 
f g h 1 j 
41 42 43 44 45 
m 
J 34 35 
8 Strategy D 
TT 
a b o d e  
46 47 48 49 50 
I I  I I 
g h i j 
51 52 53 54 55 
10 Strategy E 
a b e d  
56 57 58 59 
rrr j  
e f g h 
60 61 62 63 
DATA 
11 Strategy E 
Illegal 
Alternatives 
1-1 I I I I 
a b o d e  f "  









Attempt to gain as much gasoline as possible for 
personal consumption. 
Make better use of the gasoline rations that are 
made available to you. 
Adjust individual travel needs in an attempt to use 
less gasoline. 
Attempt to induce the government (local, state, 
and/or federal) to change its energy, policy or 
policies to relax rationing limitations. 
Reconsider the social and moral Issues involved 
with respect to individual style of living, 
values, and behavior. MUke personal changes 
as necessary. 
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Strategy B: Make bette# 
available 
a- (25) 
Purchase a very fuel-
efficient automobile. 
Consequences appear with 
random probability. 
1. You went to the VW sales outlet and 
were told that the Blue Book value 
of your present car has decreased 
by 30% because there is little demand 
for gas guzzling cars. Besides that 
you cannot afford to buy a new car 
at this time. 
2. The bank at which you have applied 
for a loan has just informed you that 
you will be able to obtain your loan 
at a reduced cost as an incentive to 
purchase a fuel-efficient car. How­
ever, yctur insurance agent informed 
you that because of the risk of seri-
out injury or death in case of an acci-
dent is 30% higher in a small car. 
Thus your insurance premium will be . 
twice what you were paying for your 
gas guzzler. You discovered that you 
Just cannot afford both the.cost of 
a new car and increased insurance 
I rates. Sometimes you Just cannot win. 
b (26) 
Purchase a mo-ped or a 
motorcycle. 
Consequences appear with random 
probability 
1. Your ration allotment for your 
mo-ped or motorcycle is one-tenth 
that of a passenger vehicle. This 
means instead of a ration allotment 
of 120 gallons for the 90-day^ period, 
you will receive only 12 gallons. 
2. Your motorcycle collided with a car 
at the intersection of Lincoln Way ' 
and Duff. You have a broken leg and 
a possible concussion. This means 
you may miss work for as long as a 
month. 
3. Due to the increase in the nujnber of 
motorcycle and mo-ped accidents, 
the State of Iowa has Just passed a 
law requiring you to carry both lia­
bility and collision insurance. These 
rates will be inordinately high be-
- cause of the high risk involved in 
operating these vehicles. 















,If respondent makes fewer than two decisions, he will not be offered 
the set of Illegal Decisions. If he makes two or more choices within 
Strategy B, then the simulation will present him with the decision of 
whether or not to look at Illegal Decisions and also of whether he 
may want to make decisions which are illegal. To see this list, the 
respondent must press the key on the computer marked DATA. 
a (29) 
Purchase an electric 
automobile. 
powered 
Consequences appear with random 
probability 
1. O.K. They cost about $3,000 
and have a maximum range of 50 
miles. They have a top speed 
of 25 mph, and carry from two 
1  
b (30) 
Ride a'horse for some travel 
needs. 
Consequences appear with random 
probability 
1. Where will you park it when 
you go shopping or when you 
work an Q-hour day? 
2. You have Just been fined $25 
Strategy B: Illegal De^  
r 
C (31) 
Turn all emission control! 
ment off on your autcmobil 
increase gasoline mileage] 
Consequences appear with i 
probability. 
1. You have been stopped j 
routine safety check ai 
Iowa State Patrolman wl 
Make better use of the gasoline ration that is made 
available to you. 
4. This is fine in good 
weather, but subzero 
weather and rain make 
travel uncomfortable and 
dangerous. 
5. You have made a wise de­
cision in that you will 
be getting from 90 to 125 
miles to a single gallon 
of gasoline. 
• 6. Four thousand people in 
the United States have 
been killed in motor­
cycle accidents within 
the past five months. 
se 
c (27) 
Ride an intercity or 
intracity bus (if 
available). 
Consequences appear with 
random probability 
1. The bus is so crowded 
that by the time it 
reaches your stop you 
have been standing for 
the entire 10-mile ride. 
2. Your cost of traveling 
to and from work has 
been cut by one-third. 
It looks as if this was 
a good choice. 
d (28) 
Join or form a car or van pool. 
Consequences appear with random 
probability 
1. One of the members of your car . 
pool has a tendency to exceed the 
speed limit. This is the third 
time in two weeks he has been 
stopped by the State Patrol. It 
looks as if you will be late to 
work again today. 
2. One of the members of your car 
pool seems to be shoving her driv­
ing days off on you. Every tine 
it is her turn to drive it seems 
she claims her car is in the 
garage for repairs. 
3. One of the members of your car 
pool smokes cigars. The days he 
drives, he feels it is his car 
and if he wants to smoke he does. 
Your asthma is bothering you be­
cause of this (more doctor bills). 
4. The car pool group set down a set 
of guidelines to which each member 
of the car pool must adhere if he 
wants to remain a member. It 
should work. 
3: Illegal Decisions 
ission control equip-
your autcmobile to 
isoline mileage. 
iS appear with random 
been stopped in a 
safety check and the 
I te patrolman who just 
d (32) 
Roll through stop signs to reduce 
fuel consumption required for a 
full stop. 
Consequences appear with random 
probabllty 
1. Because so many people are doing 
this, policy departments have 
issued a notice that persons tak-
—: [ 
e (33) 
Purchase oil or gasoline treatment 
additives to increase your gasoline 
mileage! (e.g., STP). 
Consequences appear with random 
probability 
1. Good idea ! However, Consumer 
Report just issued a notice that 
STP and other oil additives do 
d (28) 
Join or form a car or van pool. 
Consequences appear with tfandom 
probability 
1. One of the members of your car • 
pool has a tendency to exceed the 
speed limit. This is the third 
time in two weeks he has been 
stopped by the State Patrol. It 
looks as if you will be late to 
work again today. 
2. One of the members of your car 
pool seems to be shoving her driv­
ing days off on you. Every time 
it is her turn to drive it seems 
she claims her car is in the 
garage for repairs. 
3. One of the members of your car 
pool smokes cigars. The days he 
drives, he feels it is his car 
and if he wants to smoke he does. 
Your asthma is bothering you be­
cause of this (more doctor bills). 
4. The car pool group set down a set 
of guidelines to which each member 
of the car pool must adhere if he 
wants to remain a member. It 
should work. 
.5. This was a good idea. You 
are not only relieved of 
the responsibilities of 
driving every day, but it 
also saves wear and tear 
on your car. 
6. You have been given a dis­
count rate for monthly 
parking because you have 
joined a car pool. 
7. The Internal Revenue Ser­
vice has been authorized 
by the Economic Regulatory 
Administration to give an 
added tax break to those 
persons who are partici­




Purchase oil or gasoline treatment 
additives to increase your gasoline 
mileagef (e.g., STP). 
Consequences appear with random 
probability 
1. Good idea! However, Consumer 
Report Just issued a notice that 
STP and other oil additives do 
not increase gasoline mileage. 
ever, yq[iir Insuxanéé agent Informed 
you that because of the risk of aeri-
out injury or death in case of an acci­
dent is 30% higher in a small car. 
Thus your insurance premium will be . 
twice what you were paying for your 
gas guzzler. You discovered that you 
just cannot afford both the cost of 
a new car and increased insurance 
rates. Sometimes you Just cannot win. 
3. Due to the increase in the nuinber of 
motorcycle and mo-ped accidents, 
the State of Iowa has Just passed a 
law requiring you to carry both lia­
bility and collision insurance. These 
rates will be inordinately high be-





,If respondent makes fewer than two decisions, he will not be offered 
the set of Illegal Decisions. If he makes two or more choices within 
Strategy B, then the simulation will present him with the decision of 
whether or not to look at Illegal Decisions and also of whether he 
may want to make decisions which are illegal. To see this list, the 
respondent must press the key on the computer marked DATA. 
Strategy B: Illegal ] 
a (29) 
Purchase an electric powered 
automobile. 
Consequences appear with random 
probability 
1. O.K. They cost about $3,000 
and have a maximum range of 50 
miles. They have a top speed 
of 25 mph, and carry from two 
to four people. 
Note ; Manufacturers are working 
on the concept of the elec­
tric automobile. Some are 
on the market and selling 
for about $8,000. Maybe 
This wasn't such a bad 
idea after all. 
1 
b (30) 
Aide a'horse for some travel 
needs. 
Consequences appear with random 
probability 
1. Where will you park it when 
you go shopping or when you 
work an Q-hour day? 
2. You have Just been fined $25 
for creating a public health 
hazzard. Your horse was 
caught "relieving" himself in 
the middle of the business 
section of town. 
T 
C (31) 
Turn all emission contr 
ment off on your automo 
increase gasoline milea 
Consequences appear wit 
probability. 
1. You have been stoppe 
routine safety check 
Iowa State Patrolman 
checked your car haj 
checked to see if yi 
control device is W( 
have been issued a i 
appear in court to t 
the charge. If corn 
may lose your drive] 
and/or receive a $1( 
and/or 30 days in t1 
jail. 
2. It is against the If 
off emission contro' 
You may be. subject I 
if you are caught, 
mechanics have been 
the fact that this 
done and are requir 
to report anyone gu 
this crime. 
Figure A.3. Breakdown of decisions and consequences for Strategy B, 
to make better use of gasoline that is made available 
to you 
ive made a wise de-
1 in that you will 
tting from 90 to 125 
to a single gallon 
Boline. 
thousand people in 
nited States have 
killed in motor-
accidents within 
aSt five months « 
the entire 10-mile ride, 
2. Your cost of traveling 
to and from work has 
been cut by one-third. 
It looks as if this was 
a good choice. 
Work agHin xouay... 
2. One of the members of your car 
pool seems to be shoving her driv­
ing days off on you. Every time 
it is her turn to drive it seems 
she claims her car is in the 
garage for repairs. 
3. One of the members of your car 
pool smokes cigars. The days he 
drives, he feels it is his car 
and if he wants to smoke he does. 
Tour asthma is bothering you be­
cause of this (more doctor bills). 
4. The car pool group set down a set 
of guidelines to which each member 
of the car pool must adhere if he 
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d (32) 
Roll through stop signs to reduce 
fuel consumption required for a 
full stop. 
Consequences appear with random 
probabilty 
1. Because so many people are doing 
this, policy departments have 
issued a notice that persons tak­
ing down license numbers of those 
individuals who break the law 
will be rewarded by receiving 
ration coupons worth three gallons 
of gasoline, 
2. Bo one was around so y°&u decided 
to take the chance, didn't you? 
However, you didn't see the County 
patrol car sitting behind the bill­
board, did you? Sorry. If you are 
convicted, you will lose your driver's 
license, receive a $500 fine, and a 
30-day stay in the county jail. 
3. Because you already have three 
other convictions for traffic 
offenses, your driver's license 
has been taken away for six months'. 
4. Do you realize this is against the 
law? Shame on you! 
e (33) 
Purchase oil or gasoline treatment 
additives to increase your gasoline 
mileag^  (e.g., SIP). 
Consequences appear with random 
probability 
1. Good idea! However, Consumer 
Report just issued a notice that 
STP and other oil additives do 
not increase gasoline mileage. 
But you may increase the life of 
your car by taking better care 
of it. 
f (34) 
Drive without air conditioning 
in the summer to increase your 
gas mileage. 
Consequences appear with 
random probability 
1. Driving without an air con­
ditioner may save gasoline, 
but it is also very hot. 
Although, considering that 
you seem to be using your 
90-day allocation quite 
rapidly, you might try it 
for a while. 
speed limit. This Is tHé third 
time in two weeks he has been 
stopped by the State patrol. It 
looks as if you will be late to 
work again today. 
2. One of the members of your car 
pool seems to be shoving her driv­
ing days off on you. Every time 
it is her turn to drive it seems 
she claims her car is in the 
garage for repairs. 
3. One of the members of your car 
pool smokes cigars. The days he 
drives, he feels it is his car 
and if he wants to smoke he does. 
Your asthma is bothering you be­
cause of this (more doctor bills). 
4. The càr pool group set down a set 
of guidelines to which each member 
of the car pool must adhere if he 
wants to remain a member. It 
should work. 
the responsibilities of 
driving every day, but it 
also saves wear and tear 
on your car. 
6. You have been given a dis­
count rate for monthly 
parking because you have 
joined a car pool. 
7. The Internal Revenue Ser­
vice has been authorized 
by the Economic Regulatory 
Administration to give an 
added tax break to those 
persons who are partici­




Purchase oil or gasoline treatment 
additives to increase your gasoline 
mileagef (e.g., STP). 
Consequences appear with random 
probability 
1. Good idea! However, Consumer 
Report Just issued a notice that 
STP and other oil additives do 
not increase gasoline mileage. 
But you may increase the life of 




Drive without air conditioning 
in the summer to increase your 
gas mileage. 
Consequences appear with 
random probability 
1. Driving without an air con­
ditioner may save gasoline, 
but it is also very hot. 
Although, considering that 
you seem to be using your 
90-day allocation quite 
rapidly, you might try it 
for a while. 
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APPENDIX B: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ECONOMIC REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION 
CONTINGENCY GASOLINE RATIONING PLAN 
28134 
13128-01] 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
Ecaneinic Itflulalsry Admlnlilrotlen 
(10 CFR Port SOO] 
CONTINGENCY GASOUNE RATIONING PLAN 
Prapetad SuUmakttig and Public Htating 
AGENCY: Department of Energy. 
Economic Regulatory Administration. 
ACTION: Notice of proposed ruiemalc- ' 
ing and public hearing. , 
SUMMARY: The economic Regula­
tory Administration (ERA) of the De­
partment of Energy (DOE) hereby 
gives notice of a proposed rulemaking 
and public hearing to receive com­
ments as to. its proposed adoption of 
contingency gasoline rationing regula­
tions. Following promulgation as a 
final rule, this plan would be submit­
ted to Congress for approval. Upon ap­
proval by Congress, these regulations 
would remain in standby status, and 
would become effective only upon (1) 
a finding by the President that the ra­
tioning of motor gasoline to end-users 
is required by "a severe energy supply 
interruption or In order to fulfill obli­
gations of the United States under the 
International Energy Program:" and 
(2) the President transmits a request 
lo Congress to put the rationing plan 
into effect; and (3) neither house of 
Congress disapproves such a request in 
accordance with the procedures speci­
fied In the Energy Policy and Conser­
vation Act (Pub. L. 94-163) (EPCA). 
Accordingly, this plan would become 
effective and is designed for use only 
In the event of a serious gasoline 
shortage. Any gasoline rationing plan 
must make difficult tradeoffs between 
L'ciuila\)ly meeting the diverse needs of 
millions of gasoline users and limiting 
(he administrative complexity of the 
plan, its cost and the bureaucracy 
needed to direct it. This proposed ra­
tioning plan attempts to strike a rea­
sonable balance between equity and 
administrative feasibility. However, 
any gasoline rationing plan necessarily 
will be costly and administratively 
complex, will cause hardships to many, 
"xcrs, and will inconvenience large 
numbers of gasoline consumers. None­
theless. in a period of serious shortage, 
gasoline rationing would assure access 
to some gasoline by all motorists at a 
reasonable, controlled price, reduce or 
rliminale long waiting lines, stabilize 
I lie market for gasoline, and would sii;-
nificantly mitigate the economic dislo­
cations caused by a severe energy 
•supply interruption. 
DATES: Comments by August 31, 
1978, 4:30 p.m.: requests to speak by 
July 21, 1978, 4:30 p.m. 
Hearing Dales: Washington hearing: 
August 22 and 23. 1978, 9:30 a.m.: 
Hartford hearing: August 1 and 2, 
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1978, 9:30 a.jn.; Detroit hearing: 
August 8 and 9, 1978, 9:30 a.m.; Atlan­
ta hearing: August IS and 16, 1978, 
9:30 a.m.; Dallas hearing: August 17 
and 18, 1978. 9:30 a.m.; Kansas City, 
hearing: August 3 and 4, 1978, 9:30 
a.m.; Denver hearing: August 10 and 
11. 1978. 9:30 a.m.; Los Angeles hear­
ing; July 25 and '26. 1978. 9:30 a.m.; 
Spokane hearing: July 27 and 28, 1978, 
9:30 a.m. 
ADDRESSES: All comments to: Public 
Hearing Management, Room 2313, 
Box TE. 2000 M Street NW., Washing­
ton, D.C. 20461. 
REQUESTS TO SPEAK 
Washington hearing: Attention: 
Public Hearing Management. Room 
2313, Department of Energy, Box TE. 
2000 M Street NW.. Washington. D.C. 
20461; Hartford hearing: Department 
of Energy, Attention: Kathy Healy, 
150 Causeway Street, Room 700, 
Boston, Mass. 02114; Detroit hearing: 
Department of Energy. Attention; 
Charles Swank, 175 We.st Jackson 
Boulevard, Chicago, 111. 60604; Atlanta 
hearing: Department of Energy. At­
tention: Sylvia Orr, 1655 Peachtree 
Street, Atlanta, Ga. 30309; Dallas 
Hearing: Department of Energy, At­
tention: Arlene Millard, 2626 West 
Mockingbird l,ane, P.O. Box 352228, 
Dallas, Tex. 75235; Kansas City hear­
ing: Department of Energy, Attention; 
Larry Rice, 324 East 11th Street, 
Kansas City, Mo. 64106; Denver hear­
ing: Department of Energy. Attention: 
Robert Drawe, 1075 South Yukon 
Street. P.O. Box 26247. Belmar 
Branch. Lakewood, Colo. 80226; Los 
Angeles hearing: Department of 
Energy, Attention: Robert Laffel, 111 
Pine Street. 3d Floor. San Francisco, 
Calif. 94111; Spokane hearing: Depart­
ment of Energy, Attention: Janet 
Marcan. Federal Building. 915 Second 
Avenue, Room 1992, Seattle Wash. 
98174. 
HEARING LOCATIONS 
Washington hearing: Room 3000A. 
12th and Pennsylvania Avenue. NW., 
Washington. D.C. 20461; Hartford 
hearing: Hartford College for Women, 
Science Auditorium, 1265 Asylum 
Avenue, Hartford. Conn. 06105: De­
troit hearing: Federal Building. Court­
room 13. 231 West Lafayette. Detroit. 
Mich. 48226: Atlanta hearing: Atlantic 
Civic Center, 395 Pii'Hmont Avenue 
NE., Room 201, Atlanta, Ga. 30308; 
Dallas hearing: Department of 
Energy, Training Room 250. 2626 West 
Mockingbird Lane, Dallas. Tex. 75235; 
Kansas City hearing: Federal Office 
Building. 601 Eant 12th Street. Room 
140, Kansas City. Mo. 64106; Denver 
hearing: Main Post Office Building. 
Room 269, 18lh and Stout Streets, 
Denver, Colo. 80268; Los Angeles hear­
ing: Department of Water and Power 
Auditorium, 111 North Hope Street, 
Los Angeles. Calif. 90051; Spokane 
hearing: Post Office Building. 3d Floor 
Courtroom 306, West 004 Rlversi'le. 
Spokane, Wash. 99210. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT: 
Deana Williams (DOE Reading 
Room). Department of Energy. 12th 
and Pennsylvania Avenue NW., 
Room 2017. Washington, D.C. 20461, 
202-566-9161. 
Ed Vilade (Media Relations). De­
partment of Energy, 12th and 
sylvan la Avenue NW.. Room 3104. 
Washington, D.C. 20461. 202-565-
9833. 
Benton P. Massell (Division of Major 
Emergency Programs). Economic 
Regulatory Administration. 2000 M 
Street NW., Room 8212, Washing­
ton, D:C. 20461, 202-632-6500. 
Fred A. Wolgel (Office of General 
Counsel), Department of Energy, 
12th and Pennsylvania Avenue NW., 
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lit. The Proposed Gasoline Rationing 
Regulations 
A. General Provisions 
B. General Definitions 
C. General Provisions Relating to the Dr-
termination. Issuance, and Disposition of 
Allotments 
D. Calculation of Ration Allotments 
E. Designated Firms 
1. "Off highway Vehicles" 
2. Other Designated firms 
P. Priority Clasx Firms 
G. Purchase of Gasoline; "While Market" 
Sales 
II. Initial Redemption Account Advanco 
I. Relationship of Allocation to Rationing 
J. Ration Banking 
1. Participating Banks and Coupon Issu­
ance Points 
2. Ration Rights Accounts 
. 3. Redemption Accounts 
K. The National Ration Reserve 
L. State Ration Reserves 
IV. Specific Comments Requested 
A. Stale Adjustment Factor 
B. Allotments Based on Drivers' Licenwi 
or on Registered Vehicles 
V. Diesel Fuel Rationing 
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Analysis 
VII. Environmental Assessment 
VIII. Comment Procedures 
A. Written Comments 
D. Public Ilparings 
1. Procedure for Request to Make Oral 
Presentation 
2. Conduct of the Hearings 
I. BACKGROUND . 
Section 203(a)(1) of the Enercy 
Policy and Conservation Act (Pub. L 
94-163) (EPCA) requires the President 
to prescribe by rule a contingency pUn 
for the end-use rationing of gasoline, 
and diesel fuel used in motor vehicles. 
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Sccllons 201 (a) and (b) of the EPCA 
require the President to transmit the 
rationing contlnccncy plan to the Con­
gress for approval. Section 552(a1 of 
the EPCA provides that, before the 
plan becomes effective as a contingen­
cy plan, each House of Congress must 
pass a resolution approving the ration­
ing contingency plan within sixty (GO) 
calendar days of continuous session of 
Congress following transmittal of the 
plan. The plan would then remain in 
standby status until the President 
finds that putting the plan Into effect 
is required by a severe energy supply 
interruption or In order to fuflll obli­
gations of the United States under the 
international energy program and 
transmits such finding to the Con­
gress, together with a statement of the 
proposed effective date and manner 
for exercise of such ^lan. Pursuant to 
section 203(b) of the EPCA. the Presi­
dent would also be required. In order 
to implement the standby rationing 
plan, to find that such plan is neces­
sary to attain, to the maximum extent 
practicable, the objectives specified in 
section 4(b)(1) of the Emergency Pc-, 
troieum Allocation Act of 1973 (Pub. 
L. 93-159). as amended (EPAA). For 
the rationing contingency plan to 
become effective and be converted 
from standby status, the President's 
request to the Congress to put the 
plan Into effect must not be disap­
proved by either House of Congress 
under the procedures prescribed In 
section 551 of the EPCA. Section 551 
provides that gasoline rationing would 
take effect unless between the date of 
transmittal and the end of 15 calendar 
days of continuous session of Congress 
following such transmittal, either 
House passes a resolution slating In 
siibstaijce that such House docs not 
favor such action. • After these steps 
are completed, the rationing contin­
gency plan would be implemented for 
the period specified in the plan but for 
not more than 9 months. 
On January 18, 1977, a rationing 
contingency plan was adopted after 
public comment, but its transmittal by 
President Ford to the Congress was 
not perfected. The current administra­
tion subsequently decided to restudy 
the numerous rationing systems that 
appeared feasible within the con­
straints of the EPCA, and to propose a 
new rationing plan which would be 
subject to public comment throught 
the rulemaking process and promul­
gated as a final rule for submission to 
the Congress. 
The Department of Energy Organi-
. zatlon Act (Pub. L. 95-91) transferred 
all functions previously performed by 
•Section SSI also provides that rationing 
may take effect prior to the expiration of 
the 15-day period If each House approves a 
resolution stating that sucli House does not 
objcct to such action. 
the PEA to the DOE. Delegation 
Order No. 0204-4 (42 FR 60725. No­
vember 29, 1977) transferred the pre­
scription of energy conservation and 
rationing contingency plans to the Ad­
ministrator of the ERA. By this 
notice, we hereby set forth our pro­
posed gasoline rationing contingency 
plan and give notice that we will hold 
public hearings throughout the United 
Stales and receive written comments 
with respect to the plan. 
Because the regulation proposed 
here requires affirmative Congression­
al approval before it becomes effective 
and may be in a standby status for a 
substantial period before it would 
have to be implemented, the regula­
tion is general in Its terms In order to 
provide some flexibility to meet 
changing circumstances. It is contem­
plated that further rules, orders and 
guidelines would have to be issued at 
the time rationing is implemeiiled In 
order to "fine-tune" the rationing 
system to the level of gasoline supply 
shortfall actually Incurred and other 
circumstances as may exist at liie 
time. The instances in which details of 
the program would have to provided 
at the time of implementation are 
clearly Indicated and authorlTied in Ihe 
proposed regulation. In order to pro­
vide guidance as to our present con­
templation of how these proposed reg­
ulations would be implemented, we are 
publishing as a appendix to this notice 
a "Proposed Standby Gasoline Ration­
ing Plan Narrative". We invite com­
ment on both the proposed regulation 
and the further details of the plan de­
scribed In the Narrative. 
II. STATUTORY REQUIKEMENTS OF THE 
EPCA AND NNIEF DESCRIPTION or THE 
PltOrOSED PLAN I 
Section 203(a)(1) of the EIPCA estab-
lishes the general framework that 
must be Included In any rationing con­
tingency plan: 
The President shall prescribe, by rule In 
accordancc with section S23(a) of this Act. a 
ratlonlnR contingency plan which shall, for 
purposes of enforecmcnt under section 5 o( 
the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 
1973. be deemed a part of the reciilation 
under section 4<a) of the Emergency Petro­
leum Allocation Act of 1973 and which shall 
provide, consistent with the attainment, to 
the maximum extent practicable, of the ob­
jectives specified in section KbKl) of such 
Act— ' 
(A) For the establishment of a program 
for the rationing and ordering of priorities 
among clas.ies of end-users of gasoline and 
dlcscl fuel used In motor vchirlrs. and 
(D) For the assignment of rights, and evi­
dence of such rights, to end-users of gaso­
line and such diesel fuel, entitling such end-
users to obtain gasoline or such diesel fuel 
In precedence to other classes of end-users 
not similarly entitled. 
The contingency rationing regula­
tions proposed today are Intended to 
satisfy these provisions of the EPCA 
with respect to gasoline rationing. 
Section 203(c) of the EPCA prohib­
its any rationing contingency plan de­
veloped under the EPCA from: 
(1) Imposing any tax: 
(2) Providing for a credit or deduc­
tion in computing any tax; or 
(3) Imposing any user fee. except to 
the extent necessary to defray the cost 
of administering the rationing contin­
gency plan or to provide for initial dis­
tribution of end-user rights. 
The ERA has developed a gasoline 
rationing contingency plan in compli­
ance with these requirements. The 
basic eligibility for ration allotments 
would be determined by vehicle regis­
tration records maintained In the 
States' departments of motor vehicles 
(DMV's). The ERA or its delegate 
would distribute "ration rights" in the 
form of "Government ration checks" 
to owners of registered vehicles. The 
amount of ration rights so distributed 
would be based on the projected 
supply of gasoline for a given period. A 
percentage of the total ration rights to 
be Issued would be reserved for distri­
bution to the States as a Slate Ration 
Reserve. Another percentage of the 
total ration rights issued would be re­
served for the establishment of a Na­
tional Ration Rcserye. Recipients of 
Government ration checks could ex­
change these Government ration 
checks for ration coupons at designat­
ed Issuance points. The ERA would 
control the sale of gasoline by requir­
ing that each purchaser of gasoline 
present ration rights (coupons or 
chckcs) to the seller equal on a gallon 
basis to- the amount of gasoline to be 
purchased. Retail outlets and other 
suppliers would be required to 
"redeem" or cancel the ration rights 
received In exchange for gasoline sold. 
Suppliers may open "redemption ac­
counts" for the deposit of redeemed 
ration rights. In order to be resupplied 
with gasoline, a supplier would either 
give its supplier redeemed ration 
rights or a "redemption check" drawn 
on its redemption account, made pay­
able to Ita supplier, equal on a gallon 
basis to the amount of gasoline re­
ceived. Principal suppliers. Le., refin­
ers and Importers, would be required 
periodically to write a redemption 
check or give redeemed ration rights 
to the ERA equal on a gallon basis to 
the volume of gasoline sold.during a 
given reporting period. 
The petroleum allocation program 
that has been promulgated under sec­
tion 4(a) of the EPAA would be signifi­
cantly modified so that It would be 
compatible with rationing. Supplier/ 
purchaser relationships would be 
maintained. Suppliers would compute 
allocation fractions and purchasers 
would compute allocation entitlements 
in a manner similar to the current 
system, but wholesale purchaser-re­
sellers, including retail sales outlets, 
would receive their entire allocation 
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enlillemcnt only if they possessed suf­
ficient redeemed ration rights. A ba.se 
period purchaser would be assured of 
receiving gasoline from Its base period 
suppliers In an amount equal to its re­
deemed ration rights, but no greater 
than Its allocation entitlement. If a 
base period customer has more re­
deemed ration rights than its alloca­
tion entitlement, It would be eligible 
to bid for surplus gasoline from (I) its 
supplier, and (2) from other suppliers 
which have excess gasoline because 
their customers had Insufficient re­
deemed ration rights to purchase their 
full allocation entitlement. 
Under the proposed plan, ration cou­
pons that have not been redeemed 
would be freely transferrable on a 
"white market." The ERA would not 
regulate the purchases and sales of 
ration coupons, including the prices at 
which they are transferred. 
The ERA would Issue supplemental 
allotments of ration rights to certain 
"priority classes," such aa law enforce­
ment, fire fighting, emergency medical 
services, mass public transportation, 
and sanitation services. 
The ERA would also Issue supple­
mental allotments to "designated 
firms" on the basis of a percentage of 
historical usage. The percentage 
would be determined at the time of ra­
tioning and would depend upon the 
total supply of gasoline available. 
Users of vehicles which are deter­
mined by the ERA to qualify as "off-
highway" vehicles would receive sup­
plemental allotments as "designated 
firms" if such vehicles account for a 
substantial portion of that user's total 
nasoiine consumption. The ERA be-
Ii(>vos such a provision would enable 
farmers and construction equipment 
operators (wiiich consume significant 
pirrcentigos of their gasoline in vehi­
cles whic'h are frequently not regis-
ti'rod with state motor vehicle depart­
ments) to receive supplemental allot­
ments. 
Allotments to businesses that own 
registered vehicles would be on the 
same ba.sis as allotments for inciivid-
unls, but the ERA would have authori­
ty to designate classes of owners of 
commercial vehicles or any individual 
commercial vehicle owner as a "desig­
nated firm" to receive supplemental 
, allotments. While it is not contemplat­
ed that this provision would be used at 
(lie Initiation of rationing, this provi­
sion would permit the ERA to convert 
businesses to a percentage of base 
period use if it appeared to be required 
after a time to reduce economic dislo­
cations. 
in. THE PnoposED GASOLINE 
RATIONING REGULATIONS 
, A. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
The proposed, rationing regulations 
provide that gasoline rationing woUid 
be effective on a date to be specified 
and published by the FjUA. subject to 
the provisions of section 201 (b) and 
(c) of the EPCA (see discussion In l'art 
I above). It Is our intention that gaso­
line rationing. If imposed, would be ef­
fective in ail fifty States and the Dis­
trict of Columbia. We have made no 
determination at this time whether it 
would also be necessary to Impose gas­
oline rationing in Puerto Rico and the 
territories and possessions of the 
United States. Accordingly, the pro­
posed regulations provide that gaso­
line rationing would be effective In all 
or such parts of the United States as 
specified by the ERA. Under this pro­
vision, the Administrator could 
exempt some or all of the territories 
and possessions of the United States 
from gasoline rationing. 
The -proposed regulations provide 
that 10 CFR Part 205 (Administrative 
Procedures and Sanctions) and the 
EPAA-based petroleum price regula­
tions found in 10 CFR Part 212 would 
be applicable to gasoline rationing. 
Thus, all requests for interpretations, 
rulings, applications for exception 
relief (other than those applications' 
for hardship relief filed with the 
States), or modification of a classifica­
tion shall be governed by the adminis­
trative procedures contained in Part 
205. 
Any person who violates any provi­
sion of these proposed regulations or 
any further regulations or orders 
issued under them would be subject to 
the penalties set forth in section S of 
the EPAA and Subpart P of 10 CFR 
Part 205.' The proposed regiilalions 
would also Impose a duty upon ail 
firms having custody, care or control 
of ration coupons or Government 
ration checks to take all nccc.s::.iry pre­
cautions against the use of counterfeit 
and altered ration coupon;; or Govern­
ment ration checks, as well as a duty 
to safeguard ration coupons anil Gov­
ernment "ration checks from embczale-
ment, loss, theft, damage or unauthor­
ized destruction. 
Section 500.4 of the proposed regula­
tions would permit the ERA to require 
such reports as it deems necessary to 
administer the Contingency Gasoline 
Rationing Program. 
Section 500.5 would permit the ERA 
to impose a uniform fee on each gallon 
sold during the period for which ra­
tioning is in effect. As noted above, 
under EPCA such a fee could be im­
posed only to the extent necessary to 
'Section S of the EPAA eslablLshcs .several 
categories of civil penalties, with fine.s rang-
ing as lilRh as *40.000. defending on the cat-
CKory of violation. The maximum criminal 
penalty for carl» willful violation Is one year 
imprisonment, or a fine raniilng a.s hiRh as 
*40,000. depenrilnc on the category of viola­
tion. The civil and criminal penalty provi­
sions In Subpart P of Part 205 are pat-
tcnrned after the EPAA provisions. 
defray administrative and initial dis­
tribution costs. 
B. GENERAL DEFINITIONS 
In the period immediately preceding 
the effective date of rationing, it is an­
ticipated that the ERA would Imple­
ment standby regulations or continue 
(if then In force) both allocation and 
price controls on crude oil and petro­
leum products. The base year for gaso­
line rationing would be consistent with 
the base period definition contained In 
the standby product allocation regula­
tions currently being developed so 
that suppliers and their customers 
would not have to change to a differ­
ent base year once rationing became 
effective. However, if the standby allo­
cation regulations were not imposed 
prior to rationing, the base year would 
be the 12 calendar months ending with 
the third month (or some other month 
designated by the ERA) prior to the 
month in which the President trans­
mits to the Congress a request to 
Impose gasoline rationing. The "base 
period" is defined as the period in the 
base year corresponding to the current 
calendar month, or current ration 
period, as appropriate. Thus, the base 
period would be updated from the cur­
rent allocation regulations, which 
define the, base period as the month In 
1972 corresponding to the current 
month. 
"Ration coupon" Is defined as a 
coupon Issued by the ERA entitling 
the bearer to purchase a specified 
volume of gasoline. "Ration check" is 
defined as a negotiable document 
other than a ration coupon evidencing 
the right to purchase specified vol­
umes of gasoline. "Ration righus" 
means either ration coupons or ration 
checks. In most instances, ration 
rights would be distributed to a "regis­
trant," which is defined as the party 
named in the most recent vehicle reg­
istration record maintained at a Si aie 
Department of Motor Vehicle office 
(or, in the case of Federal vehicles, 
maintained with the appropriate Fed­
eral agency), which vehicle has been 
determined by the ERA as eligible for 
an allotment. A category of "eligible 
individual" has been established, so 
that the ERA may in special circum­
stances issue ration rights to persons 
who are not registrants. An example 
of such a group would be those Indi­
ans living on Federal reservations 
where the operation of vehicles is per­
mitted without state vehicle registra­
tions. Other recipients of ration rights 
are designated firms and priority 
classes, which are described above. 
Thus, "ration recipients" are defined 
as reglstranLs, eligible individuals, des­
ignated firms, and priority class firms. 
The ERA or its delegate will distribute 
ration rights in the form of "Govern­
ment ration checks" to ration recipi­
ents. 
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The definition of "retail sales 
outlet" has been narrowed from the 
definition contained in {211.51 of the 
allocation regulations so as to make it 
clear that the entity to which that 
term applies is Clearly understood to 
be the typical service station where 
sales of gasoline are made to owners of 
passenger cars and trucks. The term 
does not refer to a Jobber or refiner 
making rack sales to commercial ac­
counts. To qualify as a retail sales 
outlet, the major activity of a supplier 
would be to supply 130 gallons or less 
of gasoline into a vehicle's fuel tanks. 
The volume of 130 gallons was chosen 
because it is the ERA'S understanding 
that in most instances 130 gallons is 
the maximum fuel tank size of any ve­
hicle for which gasoline would be pur­
chased at a service station. 
The definition of "sanitation ser­
vices" would by Indetlcal to Its current 
form In §211.51, with the exception 
that the reference to "during emer­
gency conditions" would be deleted 
with respect to the maintenance, oper­
ation and repair of liquid purification 
and waste facilities. ' 
Several other definitions will be dls-
cusscd below in the separate sections 
where these terms are applied, and the 
remaining definitions are similar or 
lUciillcal to those definitions as cur­
rently set forth In { 211.51 or 9 211.102 
of the allocation regulations.. 
C. CENEnAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE 
DETERMINATION, ISSUANCE, AND DISPO­
SITION OR ALLOTMENTS 
The KRA would Issue ration rights 
equal to the estimated total available 
•supply for a given period. Ration 
rights would bo Issued as follows: 
( D A  p r r c e n i a g e  w o u l d  b e  r e s e r v e d  
for the Nfitlonal Ration Reserve. 
(2) A pkrccntage would be reserved 
for I he Stale Ration Reserves. 
(3) The ERA would Issue ration 
rit'lils lo designated firms and priority 
classes. 
(<t) The ERA would Issue ration 
rltilUs lo all registrants and eligible in­
dividuals. 
It is our current Intention that 
ration rights would be issued in the 
form of Government ration checks 
mailed to ration recipients on a quar-
icTly basis, with the appropriate allot­
ment amount printed on each check. 
AdUilionatly, the ERA would have dis­
cretion to deposit ration rights direct­
ly inlo ration rights accounts. 
In addition, we are currently evalu-
aliiiK a variation of the allotment dis­
tribution mechanism which ,• would 
avoid the need for the mailing of Gov­
ernment ration checks by providing 
coupon Issuance points with computer-
prepared lists of eligible registrants. 
Coupons would be issued lo registrants 
upon their presentation of satisfactory 
Ulcnlificalion at designated issuance 
points. Although this alternative 
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mechanism Is not upecifically referred 
to In other parts of this plan, the defi­
nition of Government ration check in 
the proposed regulations would permit 
the adoption of a computerized direct 
transfer system for the issuance of 
ration rights in lieu of tangible ciiecks. 
Disposition of Government Ration 
Cheeks. In addition to exchanging 
Government ration checks for ration 
coupons at designated Issuance points, 
a Government ration check could be 
transferred by endorsement to any In­
dividual or firm, or deposited in a 
ration rights account, or endorsed to a 
supplier in exchange for gasoline. 
Under proposed § 500.14, ration cou­
pons would be redeemable for the face 
value of gasoline shown. It Is antici­
pated that ration coupons will be 
Issued In 5-gallon amounts, with the 
possibility that 1-gallon ration cou­
pons or other denominations may be 
issued. Ration coupons which were 
printed In early 1974 with the designa­
tion "one unit" may also be utilized. If 
we determine to utilize these coupons, 
wo would announce, by advance notice 
published In the FEDERAL REGISTER, 
the gallon amount for which each 
such coupon would be redeemable. 
Ration coupons would have a series 
designation and the ERA would pub­
lish an advance notice of the effective 
date for each coupon series designa­
tion. A coupon would not be valid until 
such date, but once a coupon had 
become valid. It would in effect remain 
valid for the duration of gasoline ra­
tioning. However It may become neces­
sary periodically to require old cou­
pons to be redeemed for newer ones to 
avoid having too many series valid at 
one time. 
D. CALCULATION or RATTON ALLOTMENTS 
Based on reports submitted by refin­
ers and Importers, and upon other In­
formation available to the ERA. the 
ERA would estimate the total availa­
ble supply of gasoline (TAS) for a pre­
determined computation period. It is 
presently anticipated that the ERA 
would issue ration rights and estimate 
the total available supply on the basis 
of a 90 day computation period. 
A net available supply (NAS) would 
be determined by subtracting the 
amount of ration rights to bo allotted 
to the State Ration reserves (SRR) 
and the National Ration Reserve 
(NRR): 
TAS - NRB - SRR-N.\S 
Prom this flijure, the tola! supple­
mental allotments (SA) to designated 
firms and priority classes would be 
subtracted to yield a basic allotment 
supply (BAS); 
NA.S-SA-BA3 
ALLOTMENTS TO VEUICI.ES 
Under the proposed rationing plan, 
the basic eligibility for ration ailot-
28137 
ments would be determined by vehicle 
registration records maintained in the 
individual States' departments of 
motor vehicles (DMVs). Any Individu­
al or firm named on a registration 
record (the registrant) would be eligi­
ble for an allotment of ration rights if 
the corresponding registered vehicle is 
gasoline-powered, and was either al­
ready registered on a specified date 
prior to the effective date of the ra­
tioning program or Is a new car pur­
chased during the rationing program. 
The purpose of a registration cut-off 
date prior to the effective date of ra­
tioning would be to prevent the regis­
tration of fictitious. Junked or inopera­
ble vehicles for the sole purpose of ob­
taining ration rights. The actual cut­
off date for vehicle registrations would 
be determined by the ERA when ra­
tioning is Implemented. Vehicles for 
which there are multiple registrations 
would receive only a single allotment, 
based on the most recent registration 
date. In addition, we would intend to 
cross-check Individual State registra­
tion files to eliminate duplicate regis­
trations among the States. 
The proposed regulations would give 
El^ authority to establish different 
allotments for different, types of vehi­
cles. The Narrative describes our pres­
ent Intention as to how that would be 
done. Based on an analysis of fuel con­
sumption and average annual miles 
traveled by vehicles in various catego­
ries, we would establish allotment indi­
ces to compute the size of the allot­
ment for each type of vehicle. These 
indices would be based on the average 
annual fuel consumption of each vehi­
cle category. The indices are keyed to 
the single passenger automobile allot­
ment, which is assigned an index value 
of 1.0. 
The following example Illustrates 
how the proposed allotment indices 
were computed. To begin with, passen­
ger cars were found to travel an aver­
age of 10,100 miles per year with an 
average fuel efficiency of 13.5 miles 
per gallon, yielding an average annual 
gasoline consumption of 748 gallons. 
The amount was assigned a reference 
Index of 1.0. All other vehicles classes 
are compared to this passenger auto­
mobile reference index. For example, 
trucks between 26.000 pounds and 
33,000 pounds (gross vehicle weight) 
were found to travel an average of 
16.600 miles per year with an average 
fuel efficiency of 5.3 miles per gallon, 
yielding an average annual gasoline 
consumption of 3,132 gallons. Dividing 
this figure by the passenger car gal­
lons per year figure of 748, the allot­
ment index for these trucks Is found 
to be 4.2. Allotment indices for other 
vehicles were similarly determined, all 
keyed to the reference index of 1.0 for 
passenger cars. 
It should be noted that all vehicles 
within a given category (e.g., all pas-
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s(*nger cars) In a felvcn State will have 
the same Index number and therefore 
will receive the same ration allotment, 
regardless of fuel efficiency. This will 
give a significant advantage to fuel ef­
ficient vehicles and would provide an 
Incentive to their use during a period 
of rationing. 
It should also be noted that esti­
mates of vehicles miles traveled and 
fuel efficiency vary considerably 
among different sources. As new data 
become available, we will periodically 
recompute all vehicle allotment indi­
ces to reflect the latest and most accu­
rate statistics. The figures shown 
below are therefore only representa-
llfc of the approximate magnitudes of 
the allotment Indices for the vehicle 




The sum of the CVP's for all vehicle 
classifications equals the total vehicle 
points (TVP). 
CVP. + CV1',>.... -TVP 
A basic allotment (BA) would be 
computed, by dividlnR the basic allot­
ment supply (BAS. as discussed at the 
beginning of this section) by the total 
vehicle points (TVP). 
• BM 
fvr • BA 
For example, assume the total vehi­
cle points in the United States equals 
150 million; and the basic allotment 
supply for a 90 day computation 
period totals 18 billion gallons, then 
the basic allotment Is determined as 
follows: 
OnA X CF • IV 
In this example, the length of the 
ration period would be as follows: 
110 gallon: IDBA) x 90 • 82.50 days 120 gallon! (BAJ 
In this example, the ration period 
would be rounded up to 83 days, and a 
rounding adjustment would be made 
In the computation of the following 
ration period. In other words, In this 
excaniple the ERA had distributed 110 
gallons of ration rights to registrants 
of private automobiles on the basis of 
estimated supplies for a 90 day period. 
Subsequently, the ERA determined on 
the basis of updated data that the 
actual supply for the 90 day period 
would yield a basic-allotment of 120 
gallons. Accordingly, the ERA would 
announce that the length of the 
ration period would be shortened to 83 
days. 
The registrant of any given vehicle 
could determine Its actual distributed 
allotment (ADA) by multiplying the 
distributed basic allotment (DBA) 
times the allotment Index (AI) for 
that vehicle and rounding to the near­
est five gallons: 
DBA x AI-ADA (rounded) 
For example, a truck with an allot­
ment index of 2.4, .nd assuming the 
DBA was 110 gallons as in the above 
examples, would receive an allotment 
for a given ratio period as follows: 
no gallons (DBA) x 2.4 (AI)»2C< gallons; 
rounded to tlie ncarrsl five gallo:is=2GS 
gallons 
In this example, a truck with an al-
lotmrnt index of 2.4 would receive 2G5 
gallons of ration rights for an 83 day 
ration period. 
VEHICLE RENTAL COMPANIES 
Because the ration allotments will 
be issued to the registrants of regis­
tered vehicles, vehicic rental or leasing 
companies would receive ration allot­
ments for their registered vehicles. In 
order to avoid conferring a windfall on 
vehicle leasing companies, proposed 
§500.15 would permit the ERA to re­
quire that the lessor of a registered ve­
hicle receiving ration allotments trans­
fer such ration allotments to the 
lessee of such vehicle. 
E. DESIGNATES FIRMS 
1. "0/f-hiçhieay Vrhiclcs." We pro­
pose to treat that class of firms that 
consumes a significant percentage of 
their total gasoline consumption in 
off-highway vehicles (vehicles that are 
not registered with a State DMV, or 
registered with a State DMV for off-
highway usage) as a category of "des­
ignated firm" in § 500.31(a). The ERA 
ALLOTMENT INDICES roa HIGHWAY VEHICLES 
AUotmtnt 
Vrhiclt estcffory Index 
MoioreyclM. motorsceours, and mopeds...... 0.1 
PaM«>nitcr automobiles, busei »titf aU trucks 
tirifJrf 10.000 lbs *. 1.0 
Trucks * bclwecn 10.000 and 20.000 lbs......... 2.3 
Trucks * between 20.000 and 20.000 lbs 2.4 
Trucks * between 20.000 and 33.000 lbs.......... 4.2 
Triirks'ovcr 33.000 Ib97.0 
All Fi'dcral, State and local government ve« 
hides » 1.0 
' All welfhts are gross vehicle weight (GVW). 
'Excluding Federal. State, and local government 
vehicU*s. 
No allotment Index would be pro­
vided for "dealer plate" registrations 
since these registrations are not issued 
to specific vehicles. 
Trailers and other non-pov;ered ve-
hides registered with State DMV's 
would reçoive no allotment index. 
Mopeds and motorscooters would be 
tsivfii the moiorcyclc allotment index 
of 0.1 if they are registered In a State's 
registration files. . 
Hecrcalional vehicles would receive 
no allolniont index. 
Our vehicle use study has shown 
that Federal, Slate, and local govern­
ment trucks and buses consume sig­
nificantly less gasoline per year on the 
average than comparable private vehi­
cles. Accordingly, to avoid granting a 
disproportionately large allotment to 
these governmental vehicles, they 
would be granted an allotment Index 
of 1.0. Units of Federal, State and 
local government agencies could apply 
for supplemental allotments as prior­
ity class firms or as designated firms, 
if they meet the eligibility require­
ments for such classifications. 
Once the allotment indices have 
been established for all eligible vehi­
cles. the sum of all vehicles In a given 
vehicle classification (VC) would be 
multiplied by the allotment Index (AI) 
for that classification to yield a classi­
fication vehicle point (CVP). 
VCX AI-CVP 
n.ooo.oeo.ooo (basi 
ISO,000,000 {riTT - 120 gallon. (BA) 
Because ration rights will be distrib­
uted to, registrants prior to the begin­
ning of a ration period, and because 
the actual supply will not be known In 
advance, the total amount of ration 
rights to be distributed will be based 
on a projection of gasoline supplies for 
the ration period. Based on this com­
putation, the ERA will also compute 
the value of ration rights to be distrib­
uted per vehicle point (DBA). 
It is possible that the actual gasoline 
supply will either exceed or fall short 
of the projected supply by a wide 
margin. In such a case, to reconcile 
the actual supply of gasoline with the 
number of ration rights already dis­
tributed, It will be necessary to vary 
the length of the ration period. If the 
number of ration rights that had al­
ready been distributed significantly 
exceeds the actual supply of gasoline 
for the period, it will be necessary to 
lengthen the ration period so that the 
given number of distributed coupons 
are "strctched" over a longer period 
and thereby over a greater supply. 
Conversely, If the actual supply of gas­
oline substantially exceeds the 
amount of distributed ration rights, 
the ration period would be shortened. 
A change in the length of the ration 
period could be accomplished by de­
laying or moving up the validity date 
of the ration coupons issued for the 
following ration period. 
To illustrate, assume that on the 
basis of the projected available supply, 
the ERA had distributed 110 gallons 
to registrants of private automobiles 
(DBAs 110). Assume that the basic al­
lotment (HA) is 120 gallons, as in the 
above example. The length of the 
ration period would be computed by 
dividing the distributed basic allot­
ment (DBA) by the basic allotment 
(BA). This quotient would be multi­
plied by the length of the computation 
period (CP), which in this example is 
90 days. 
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would determine and publish In subse­
quent regulations the classes and 
types of vehicles and equipment which 
qualify as "off-highway." In most 
States tractors and other vehicles used 
for agricultural production are not 
registered with State DMV's. In States 
where such vehicles are registered, we 
would cither exclude such vehicles 
from the standard per vehicle allot­
ments (discussed in section O.l. above) 
or would subtract the per vehicle allot­
ments for such vehicles from the sup­
plemental allotments that firms would 
rcceive for off-highway vehicles. It is 
our intention that this provision for 
off-highway vehicles would provide for 
the maintenance of agricultural oper­
ations, as required by section 
4(b)(I)(C> of the EPAA. This would be 
accomplished by giving each designat­
ed firm a certain percentage of its base 
period use, which percentage would 
depend on the severity of the gasoline 
supply shortfall and the category of 
the designated firm Involved. With re­
spect to agricultural production, we 
would consult 'Alth the Secretary of 
Agriculture In establishing an appro­
priate level of supplemental allot­
ments to meet the gasoline require­
ments of fanners engaged In food pro­
duction. 
The procedures by which designated 
firms would identify themselves and 
their base period volumes would be 
specified by regulations Issued prior to 
, or at the time rationing is Implement­
ed. It Is our expectation that the two 
largest categories of designated firms 
would be farming operations and con­
struction firms. Others might Include 
such firms as those engaged in logging 
operations or the operation of gaso­
line powered fishing boats. In the 
public comments on the proposed reg­
ulation. .commenters are specifically 
requester to Identify other operators 
of "off-highway vehicles" that should 
be considered as "designated firms." 
2. Other DesipnaCetl firms. We have 
designed this rationing program on a 
pur vehicle basis because such a 
system can be implemented relatively 
quickly in a severe gasoline supply 
emergency. We recognize that any 
system which relics on average vehicle 
fuel consumption will provide allot­
ments which for many firms would 
differ from historical usage and from 
actual requirements. It is our inten­
tion that In most such instances, a 
firm with insufficient ration rights 
would be required to purchase the nec­
essary additional ration rights on the 
ration rights exchange market ("white 
market"). However, In ordbr to offset 
severe adverse economic imlpacts If any 
should develop, the ERA would retain 
the authority under proposed 
f 500.31(b) lo designate any other class 
of firms or any individual firm as a 
designated firm. 
We would also determine and pub­
lish by order or subsequent regulation 
PROPOSED RULES 
the size of the supplemental allotment 
for each designated firm or ealrgory 
of designated firm. It Is presently an­
ticipated that supplemental allot­
ments would be based on a specified 
percentage of a designated firm's base 
period gasoline consumption (minus 
the per vehicle allotments already re­
ceived by the firm), as would be the 
case for operators of off highway vehi­
cles. We initially considered a formula 
for shifting most firms from per vehi­
cle allotments to a percentage of base 
period usage by the third quarter of 
rationing. We rejected this alternative 
In favor of the current proposal, which 
is less complex but still permits the 
flexibility to Issue ration allotments to 
firms on the basis of historical con­
sumption If such a course proves nec­
essary to prevent severe economic dis­
location to a particular firm or class of. 
firms. 
We are Interested in receiving specif­
ic comments as to the proposed treat­
ment of businesses under this plan. 
We are particularly Interested in re­
ceiving comments as to (1) whether 
firms should receive allotments on the 
basis of historical (base period) usage 
rather than on the. basis of vehicle 
ownership; (2) whether specific crite­
ria for eligibility as a designated firm 
should be set forth In the regulations, 
rather than establishing these criteria 
at the time rationing Is Implemented, 
and (3) whether specific formulae 
should be established In this regula­
tion, rather than when rationing is im­
plemented, for the determination of 
supplemental allotments. 
r. PRIORITY CLASS FIRMS 
Section 500,32 provides that emer­
gency services, sanitation services and 
public passenger transportation ser­
vices would receive supplemental allot­
ments as priority class firms. Emer­
gency services are defined a.i law en­
forcement, fire fighting, snow removal, 
and emergency medical services. 
Public passenger transportation has 
been broadly defined as facilities and 
services for surface public transporta­
tion whether publicly or privately 
owned, including water, rail, bus and 
van transportation, but excluding taxi-
cabs; and bus and van traasportation 
of pupils to and from school. The ERA 
believes that it would be inappropriate 
to treat taxicab companies as priority 
class firms, in that taxieabs can 
achieve gasoline savings through 
shared riding, reduced cruising, in­
creased use of taxi stands, and greater 
use of radio call equipment. In addi­
tion, the ERA believes that the desig­
nation of firms as priority class firms 
should be strictly limited to essential 
public services.' 
* It should be noted, however, that nt the 
time rationing Is Implemented wc could ex­
ercise the authority under proposed 
28139 
The proposed regulation provides 
that the ERA may also, by publishing 
advance notice, designate other per­
sons or firms as priority classes. This 
provision would permit us to include 
other essential public services as prior­
ity class firms if such additions prove 
necessary. 
Priority class firms would receive a 
percentage of their base period gaso­
line consumption, such percentage to 
be determined by the ERA at the time 
rationing is Implemented. It Is our in­
tention that priority class firms would 
receive a percentage of base period 
usage generally greater than that re­
ceived by designated firms, but in most 
cases would likely receive less than 100 
percent of their base period usage. 
Proposed section 500.33 would estab­
lish the right of precedence of delivery 
for priority class firms, in accordance 
with section 203(a)(1) of the EPCA, 
which requires "the assignment of 
rights, and evidence of such rights, to 
end-users of gasoline * * * entitling 
such end-users to obtain gasoline * * * 
In preccdencc to other classes of end-
users not similarly entitled." 
c. PURCHASE or GASOLINE; "WHITE 
MARKET" SALES 
The proposal provides that each con­
sumer must present valid ration rights 
to its supplier according to the quanti­
ty of gasoline purchased. Thus, no 
purchaser may obtain gasoline with­
out first giving' Its supplier (including 
a retail sales outlet) the appropriate 
number of ration rights. Suppliers 
(I.e., wholesale purchaser-resellers) 
would be required at the time of deliv­
ery to give their suppliers a redemp­
tion check or redeemed ration rights 
equal to the amount of gasoline trans­
ferred. 
Proposed § 500.41(c) specifies that 
ration coupons of a given series desig­
nation cannot be used for the pur­
chase of gasoline prior to their effec­
tive date. 
Proposed § 500.41(d) provides that 
unredeemed ration rights are freely 
transferrable. This provision for a 
ration rights exchange market ("white 
market") should promote a more effi­
cient use of all available gasoline. 
Section §500.41 (e) and (f) are In­
tended to protect the rights of pur­
chasers and sellers of gasoline. Section 
500.41(e) would prohibit any supplier 
from requiring any purchaser to pur­
chase ration rights from any firm in­
cluding itself as a condition of trans­
ferring gasoline. Section 500.41(f) 
would prohibit any seller of gasoline 
from refusing to accept valid ration 
coupons at the time of sale. A supplier 
; 500.31(b) (dlscusscd in section E.2. above) 
to designate taxicabs as a class of "designat­
ed firms." and thus give them a specified 
percentage of their base period gasoline 
usage. 
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may accept a Government ration . 
chcck for the purchase of gaxollne. but 
would not be obligated to do so. A sup­
plier may also accept a ration check 
drawn on a ration rights account (see 
section J below on Ration Banking), 
but, as In ordinary commercial trans­
actions. the supplier/payee would 
Incur the risk that such a check was 
Invalid, and his only recourse would be 
against the purchaser/payor. 
The proposed regulation provides 
that suppliers (including retail sales 
outlets) which receive ration coupons 
In exchange for the sale of gasoline 
would be required to "redeem" (i.e., 
cancel) such coupons by indelibly 
marking them with the supplier's 
name. Its redemption account number, 
if any, and the legend "redeemed." 
Similarly, a supplier would be required 
to redeem all ration checks It had re­
ceived. In order to be resupplled, a 
supplier would be required at the time 
of delivery to give Its supplier a re­
demption check or redeemed ration 
rights equal to the amount of gasoline 
received. In this manner redeemed 
ration rights would "move up" the gas­
oline supply distribution chain In an 
amount equal to the volume of gaso­
line "moved down" the chain. Under 
§500.44, refiners and importers, de­
fined as principal suppliers, would be 
required to periodically submit a 
report to the ERA certifying, the 
volume of gasoline sold during the re­
porting period and would be required 
to submit a redemption check or re­
deemed ration rights equal on a gallon 
basis to the volume of gasoline sold 
during the reporting period. In this 
manner, the distribution system would 
bo "clearud," and the ERA would be 
able to ensure that gasoline was not 
sold without the transfer of ration 
rights. !, 
H. INITIAL REDEMPTION ACCOUNT 
ADVANCE 
At the beginning of rationinK, sup­
pliers that have largely depleted their 
inventories will not have the opportu­
nity to accumulate sufficient re­
deemed ration rights from the sale of 
«asollne to obtain an adequate resup-
ply of gasoline. Accordingly, It will be 
necessary, at the commencement of 
rationing, to provide an initial redemp­
tion account advance to suppliers 
which would permit them to obtain 
deliveries until they have accumulated 
sufficient redeemed ration rights. Pro­
posed i 500.45 provides that each sup­
plier other than a principal supplier 
will receive an Initial redemption ac­
count advance under a formula that 
will be established by the ERA and 
published prior to the implementation 
of rationing. Although the proposed 
regulations do not contain a specific 
formula for the computation of the 
initial redemption account advance, we 
are Interested in receiving comments 
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on the following formula that we are 
considering. Tho formula would pro­
vide that each supplier would receive 
an initial redemption account advance 
equal to the greater of (1) the amount 
of an average single delivery during 
the base year, or (2) ten (10) days' 
average gasoline receipts during the 
base year. 
An alternative formula that we are 
considering would be to provide an ini­
tial redemption account advance that 
would be uniform for all suppliers of a 
given level In the distribution system 
(i.e., there would be a different ad­
vance for Jobbers than for retail out­
lets). This alternative would be admin­
istratively simpler, in that the number 
of individual applications would be re­
duced to only those suppliers for 
whom the uniform initial advance Is 
inadequate. Such suppliers would file 
an application to receive an additional 
Initial redemption account advance. 
Alternatively, for each level of the dis­
tribution system the advance could be 
equal to the largest inventory capacity 
of any supplier In that class. This ap­
proach would ensure that the initial 
redemption account advance would be 
adequate for each supplier, eliminat­
ing the need for individual applica­
tions. We are interested in receiving 
comments on these proposals, as well 
as receiving additional proposals for 
formulating an initial redemption ac­
count advance. 
The ERA would also require suppli­
ers to repay their initial redemption 
account advance. Proposed 5 500.4C 
provides that each supplier (Including 
retail sales outlets) account for inven­
tory drawndown at the end of the ra­
tioning program by submitting to the 
ERA a redemption check or redeemed 
ration rights equal on a gallon basis to 
the amount of inventory drawndown, 
less a specified amount for losses due 
to spillage and evaporation. 
I. RELATIONSHIP OF AT.LOCATION TO 
RATIONING 
In developing the rationing plan and 
these proposed regulations, we have 
assumed that any supply Interruption 
severe enough to occasion implemen­
tation of the rationing plan would 
cause us to continue or to réimposé al­
location and/or price controls at the 
time of or during the period prior to 
the effective date of rationing. Once 
rationing Is implemented the alloca­
tion program would be modified as set 
forth in these regulations so that the 
distribution of gasoline to wholesale 
purchaser resellers (including retail 
sales outlets) would conform to the 
distribution of ration rights to con­
sumers. The retention of supplier/pur­
chaser relationships would a.ssure 
wholesale purchasers of their histori­
cal share (on a pro-rata basis) of the 
available supplies If they possess suffi­
cient redeemed ration rights. 
The proposed gasoline rationing reg­
ulations provide that supplier/pur­
chaser relationships would be reim-
posed or continued, as the case may 
be, so that each supplier of gasoline 
would be required to supply all whole­
sale purchaser-resellers,' wholesale 
purchaser consumers, and bulk pur­
chasers which purchased or obtained 
gasoline from that supplier during the 
base period. Because the standby prod­
uct allocation regulations currently 
being developed would probably be im­
plemented during the period immedi­
ately preceding rationing and bccause 
the standby product allocation regula­
tions may in some instances provide 
for different supplier/purchaser rela­
tionships than provided in these pro­
posed regulations, proposed § 500.52 
establishes supplier/purchaser rela­
tionships on the basis of base period 
sales, unless otherwise directed by the 
ERA. This would permit us to retain 
the supplier/purchaser relationships 
that had been Imposed under the 
standby product allocation regula­
tions. Similarly, the proposed base 
year for gasoline rationing Incorpo­
rates the term base period year as de­
fined in the standby product regula­
tions. Thus, if standby allocation con­
trols immediately preceded rationing, 
suppliers would not have to recompute 
their allocation fraction on the basis 
of a different base period, nor would 
supplier/purchaser relationships be al­
tered as a result of the shift from the 
standby product regulations to the ra­
tioning regulations. If separate stand­
by allocation controls were not Im­
posed, the base year would be defined 
as the 12 calendar months ending with 
the third full month (or some other 
month designated by the BRA) prior 
to the month in which the President 
transmits to the Congress a request to 
Impose gasoline rationing. 
Suppliers would calculate an alloca­
tion fraction in the same manner that 
they would under the standby product 
allocation regulations; that Is, each 
month suppliers would provide each of 
their customers with Its pro-rata share 
of the supplier's gasoline supplies. 
Suppliers would have an obligation to 
make supplies available only to those 
wholesale purchasers and bulk pur­
chasers which they supplied in the 
base period. However, as a condition to 
receiving all or any portion of Its allo­
cation, a wholesale purchaser-reseller 
would be required to account for sup­
plies it receives by giving Its supplier 
redeemed ration rights equal to the 
amount of gasoline received, or by is­
suing a redemption check at the time 
of delivery drawn on its redemption 
account. The redemption check would 
be drawn to the order of the wholesale 
purchaser-reseller's supplier for re­
deemed ration rights equal to the 
amount of gasoline received from the 
supplier. Wholesale purchaser-con-
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sutners and bulk purchoficrs would be 
required to transfer at the time of de­
livery ration rights equal on a galllon 
basis to the volume of gasoline pur­
chased or obtained. In this regard it Is 
Important to note that ration rights 
(ration coupons or ration checks) are 
not Identical to redemption checks; re­
demption checks are checks drawn 
against deposits of redeemed ration 
rights. Wholesale purchaser-consum­
ers and bulk purchasers would not 
have redemption accounts because 
they consume rather than resell gaso­
line. ; f 
DISTRIBUTION or "SCRPLUS" GASOLINE 
Under the allocation system de­
scribed above, many retail sales outlets 
will be unable to purchase their full 
allocation entitlement due in part to 
sharply changed driving patterns that 
would inevitably occur as a result of a 
gasoline shortage (whether or not gas­
oline rationing was imposed). Similar­
ly. the ration allotments received by 
many wholesale purchaser-consumers 
. and bulk purchasers may not be suffi­
cient to permit them to purchase their 
full allocation entitlement. If they 
have not purchased additional ration 
rights on the "white market," they 
would have to suffer a cut-back In 
their deliveries. 
On the other hand, by drawing down 
inventories, many retail sales outlets 
would possess redeemed ration rights 
In excess of their allocation entitle­
ment. 
With respect to those base period 
customers with ration rights or re­
deemed ration rights greater than 
their allocation entitlement, the pro-
posed allocation regulalions would 
permit them to receive supplies Initial­
ly only to the extent of their alloca­
tion entitlement. However, the alloca­
tion regulations would also require 
that a supplier treat the volumes of 
gasoline which are "under-lifted" by 
its base period customers as a surplus. 
In other words, if a supplier has base 
period customers who have not pur­
chased their full allocation entitle­
ment or who have notified their sup­
plier of their intent not to purcha.sc 
their full allocation entitlement, such 
"under-lifted" volumes must be sold 
accordng to § 500.53(e), which provides 
for the distribution of surplus gaso­
line. Suppliers with allocation frac­
tions greater than 1 must allocate on a 
basis of an allocation fraction of 1, and 
treat any additional volumes as sur-
piiLS gasoline. 
Under proposed § 500.53(c), a suppli­
er must first offer any surplus gasoline 
on a pro-rata basis to its base period 
customers who have not yet received 
tiicir full allocation entitlement from 
that supplier. The amount offered to 
each b.-we period customer (on a pro­
rata basis) would be the difference be­
tween the allocation entitlement of 
that base period customer and the 
amount actually mold to that purchas­
er for that month. However, as is the 
case for all purchases of gasoline, base 
period customers must pay their sup­
plier at the time of delivery the appro­
priate amount of ration rights (If the 
base period purchaser Is a bulk pur­
chaser or a wholesale purchaser-con­
sumer) or a redemption check or re­
deemed ration rights (if the base 
period purchaser Is a wholesale pur­
chaser-reseller) equal to the volume of 
gasoline so transferred. If a supplier 
still has surplus gasoline. It must next 
offer it to each of its base period cus­
tomers on a pro-rata basis, provided 
they pay the supplier in ration rights 
or redeemed ration rights, as appropri­
ate, If a supplier still has surplus gaso­
line after offering it to all its base 
period customers, it could sell surplus 
supplies to any holder of ration rights 
or redeemed ration rights, as appropri­
ate. 
Principal suppliers and prime suppli­
ers (as defined in ; 211.51 of the cur­
rent allocation regulations) will be re­
quired to submit reports on their dis­
position of surplus gasoline. The ERA 
will retain the authority contained In 
Part 211 to redirect surplus products. 
SPECIFIC COMMENTS RCQT7ESTE0 ON 
PROPOSED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
RATIONING AND ALLOCATION PRO-
CRAMS 
- It Is our tentative conclusion that 
these provisions for the disposition of 
surplus gasoline would provide suffi­
cient flexibility so that Jobbers or 
other distributors could redirect gaso­
line to follow the flow of ration cou­
pons, while at the same time inde­
pendent marketers would be protected 
from discrimination that might other­
wise occur in a period of shortage. In 
particular, it is our preliminary view 
that during a period of gasoline ration­
ing it is necessary to maintain the allo-
- cation program to prevent certain 
large marketers from increasing their • 
market shares through discriminatory 
practices. However, we are Interested 
In specific comments as to whether 
the ERA should maintain the alloca­
tion regulations as modified herein, or 
whether we should eliminate the allo­
cation program and allow wholesale 
purchasers and bulk purchasers to 
find any source of resupply, with vol­
umes determined solely by tlie number 
of ration riislits or redeemed ration 
rights held by each purchaser. It 
should be noted In this regard that 
proposed §500.1 provides that the ra­
tioning rcKiilations would become ef­
fective severally or In to to, so that the 
Aclmlnistralior would retain the dis­
cretion not to Impose an allocation 
scheme. If we retain the allocation 
program as outlined above, we are in­
terested in specific comments as to 
whether the ERA should establish 
time periods by which base period cus­
tomers must declare the volumes of 
gasoline they wish to "lift" for a given 
month, as well as time periods within 
which suppliers must offer and base 
period purchasers must respond to 
offers to purchase surplus gasoline, so 
that the distribution of surplus gaso­
line can be accomplished as quickly 
and as efficiently as possible. 
PROVISION FOR UNLEADED GASOLINE 
In order to ensure that retailers 
have access to available supplies of 
both leaded and unleaded gasoline, 
proposed { 500.54 requires each suppli­
er to make available to each of its base 
period purchasers a volume of unlead­
ed gasoline that bears the same ratio 
to that purchaser's allocation entitle- . 
ment as the ratio of that supplier's 
supply of unleaded gasoline to its total 
supply of gasoline (leaded and unlead­
ed). ' Proposed g 500.54 is a simplifed 
version of the current provision for 
the allocation of unleaded gasoline, 
contained In § 211.108 of the allocation 
regulations. Proposed S 500.54 should 
promote the equitable distribution of 
the available unleaded gasoline supply 
for each purchaser and will automati­
cally adjust itself to* the expected in­
crease in the supply of unleaded gaso­
line compared to leaded gasoline. 
STATE Strr-ASIDE 
Because the purposes of the State 
"set-aside" and the State Ration Re­
serve In the regulation proposed here 
would essentially be redundant, we 
hare tentatively concluded that it 
would be unnecessary to maintain 
both systems within each State for the 
relief of hardship. Accordingly, pro­
posed 9 500.56 provided that the State 
set-aside system would not be in effect 
for the duration of the rationing pro-. 
gram. 
J. RATION BANKING 
1. Participating Banks and Coupon 
Issuance Points. It is our intention 
that the ERA would contract with a 
variety of financial Institutions and 
firms to act as coupon Issuance points 
(CIP's) or participaing banks. CIP's 
would serve to exchange ration cou­
pons for Government ration checks. 
Participating banks (which may or 
may not also be CIP's) would accept 
applications for and establish ration 
rights accounts and redemption ac­
counts. Holders of Government ration 
checks could exchange such checks for 
ration coupons at CIP's. Presently, we 
anticipate that ration recipients would 
receive quarterly Government ration 
checks through the mall. The ration 
coupons received for each Government 
rations check would bear a separate 
scries designator that would not 
become effective until the first day of 
the ration period or periods applicable 
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to that Government ration check. Sub­
ject to terms and conditions to be es­
tablished by the ERA. CIP's would be 
required to acccpt Government ration 
' checks presented by the payee In ex­
change for ration coupons. 
Since it would be our intention to es­
tablish CIP's and participating banks 
at locations throughout the country 
convenient to all ration rights recipi­
ents and suppliers, we arc interested in 
receiving specific comments on how 
ERA might go about ensuring that 
sufficient numbers of banks and other 
tiistltutions participate In the ration­
ing program. In particular, we request 
comments on whether the proposed 
regulation should provide ERA with 
express authority to require appropri­
ate firms to act as CIP's or participat­
ing banks, subject to certain specified 
terms and conditions to protect them 
from incurring an undue burden. 
2. Ration Rights Accounts. The pro­
posed rationing regulations provide 
that any firm or individual may open a 
ration rights account at a participat­
ing bank. However, the ERA may es­
tablish a minimum initial deposit re­
quirement, as well as other terms and 
. conditions (including fees to defray 
the costs of administering the ac­
counts) governing the operation and 
maintenance of ration rights accounts 
as arc deemed to be necessary. It is 
our current Intention that the mini­
mum initial deposit required for the 
opening of • ration rights accounts 
would be set sufficiently high to limit 
their use to those entities wliich would 
otherwise be required to handle large 
numbers of ration coupons. The ERA 
would also issue forms and instruc­
tions for the opening of such accounts. 
Ration rights accounts are Intended 
to operate in much the same manner 
as monet&ry checking accounts. Hold­
ers of ration rights accounts may de­
posit ration coupons and ration checks 
in tlicir account and write ration 
ciiccks drawn against their accounts. 
Proposed { 500.62(b) provides - that no 
Individual or firm shall issue a ration 
chock drawn upon a ration rights ac­
count In which there are insufficient 
ration rights to cover that ration 
check and other outstanding ration 
checks drawn on that account. It Is in­
tended that normal commercial prac­
tices would govern In determining 
which party bears the burden of loss 
with respect to overdrawn ration 
chocks. However, we are particularly 
interested in receiving comments as to 
alternative methods of perventlng 
overdrafts of ration rights accounts. 
3. Redemption Accounts. Any suppli­
er, Including a retail sales outlet, may 
open a redemption account at any par­
ticipating bank. Redemption accounts 
would be used by suppliers for the de­
posit of ration rights they have re­
ceived and redeemed for gasoline sales 
to ond users, and for the deposit of re­
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demption checks they have received 
for gasoline sales, If any. to other sup­
pliers. Suppliers would also deposit Ini­
tial redemption account advances (as 
discussed in section II. above) In their 
redemption accounts. 
Participating banks would service re­
demption accounts in the same 
manner as ration rights accounts. The 
ERA would establish forms and 
Instructions for the opening of such 
accounts. Redemption account holders 
would be prohibited under # 500.63(c) 
from writing a redemption check upon 
which there are insufficient deposits 
to cover that redemption check and 
other outstanding redemption checks 
drawn on that account. Because re­
demption checks represent deposits of 
redeemed ration rights, proposed 
§ 500.63(d) provides that redemption 
checks shall not be valid for deposit In 
a ration rights account. Since redemp­
tion accounts and redemption checks 
are intended for use solely by suppli­
ers, as a further safeguard against 
misuse, ; 500.63(d) provides that re­
demption checks shall not be valid for 
the purchase of gasoline by wholesale 
purchaser-consumers, bulk purchasers 
and other ultimate consumers. 
K. THE NATIONAL RATION RESERVE 
The National Ration Reserve would 
be established as a special allotment 
which may be used by the ERA to 
meet national disaster relief needs, or 
for any other purpose which the ERA 
may deem necessary. It Is currently 
anticipated that the National Ration 
Reserve would also bo used to provide 
the Department of Defense with what­
ever allotments are required for activi­
ties directly related to the mainte­
nance of national security. For those 
activities deemed nonessential to the 
maintenance of national security, the 
Department of Defense would receive 
ration allotments on the same basis as 
provided to registrants of other vehi­
cles. 
The National Ration Reserve would 
be computed as a precentage of the 
total available supply, such percentage 
to be determined by the ERA for each 
ration period. 
L. STATE RATION RESERVES 
For each ration period, we would de­
termine a percentage of the total 
available supply to be distributed to 
the States as a State Ration Reserve, 
in proportion to each State's gasoline 
sales daring the base period and ac­
cording to other relevant criteria. 
Upon approval of an application by a 
Slate to establish a State Ration Re­
serve, the Reserve would be adminis­
tered by a Slate Rationing Office. 
This office could, at the Slate's option, 
be the same as the State Energy 
Office. The State Rationing Offices 
may redelegale the authority given to 
them. 
We currently anticipate that the size 
of the State Ration Reserves would be 
approximately 3 percent of the total 
gasoline supply. However, we are Inter­
ested In receiving specific comments as. 
to the appropriate size of the Slate 
Ration Reserves, and whether the reg­
ulations should specify the percentage 
of the total available supply allotted 
to the State Ration Reserves. We arc 
also Interested in receiving comments 
as to whether the State Ration Re­
serves should be set at a substantially 
higher level than 3 percent, so that 
the States would thus acquire a sub­
stantial additional administrative re­
sponsibility in the rationing program. 
The States would be required to use 
the State Ration Reserves for meeting 
the hardship needs of approved appli­
cants (cither individuals or firms) and 
would be required to report to the 
ERA each month as to the disposition 
of the State Ration Reserves to hard­
ship applicants. Pursuant to the re­
quirements of section 203(a) of EPCA, 
the States would be required. In the 
disposition of hardship applications, to 
give consideration to the mobility 
needs of the handicapped. The States 
would also be allowed to consider the 
hardship needs of other individuals 
and firms, such as low-income long-dis­
tance commuters, migrant workers, 
persons engaged in household moves, 
and other recurring or one-time hard­
ship needs. It is our tentative view 
that, with the exception of hardship 
applications by the handicapped 
(which must be given consideration, 
the States should be given broad dis­
cretion and flexibility in the disposi­
tion of the State Ration Reserves, in 
récognition of the varying needs and 
interests of the different States. We 
are also considering requiring the 
States to provide Interim allotments to 
registrants claiming nonreccipt of 
ration rights, subject to later reim­
bursement by the ERA. We arc inter­
ested In specific comments whether 
mandatory hardship guidelines ex­
tending beyond provision for the 
handicapped and registrants claiming 
nonrcceipt of ration rights should be 
established for the administration of 
the State Ration Reserves and. if so, 
what such guidelines should provide. 
EPCA requires that within 30 days 
of the date the rationing contingency 
plan is approved by Congress, the 
ERA must propose a rule establishing 
the criteria for delegation of the 
ERA'S functions under EPCA, in 
whole or In part, with respect to the 
rationing plan to offices or local 
boards (of balanced composition re­
flecting the community as a whole) of 
States or political subdivisions of 
States. The proposed rule must also 
prescribe procedures for petitioning 
for the receipt of such delegated au­
thority. While the public will have an 
opportunity to comment on such pro-
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posed rule after It Is issued, we never­
theless request at this time specific 
suggestions as to the criteria the ERA 
should establish for deleeating to the 
States the administration of the State 
Ration Reserves. These comments will 
guide us in formulating a future pro­
posal for public comment following 
any Congressional approval of the ra­
tioning contingency plan. 
IV. SPECIFIC COMMENTS REQUESTED 
We encourage comments from Inter­
ested parties on all aspects of the ra­
tioning plan as proposed today. To the 
extent comments are critical of any 
aspect of the plan, they should include 
alternative measures. In addition to. 
comments on the specific issues identi­
fied in the foregoing discussion, we are 
interested in receiving comments on 
the following specific Issues. 
A. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE 
FOR A STATE ADJUSTMENT FACTOR 
Wc have considered and have done 
substantial analysis on the possibility 
of adjusting ration allotments to regis­
trants to reflect differences among the 
States In gasoline consumption per ve­
hicle. We take no position at this time 
as to whether this feature should be 
adopted. However, this Is an Important 
Issue on which we encourage a maxi­
mum of public discussion and debate. 
Under the proposed calculations for 
determining and issuing ration allot­
ments (discussed In Part III above), 
registrants would receive ration allot­
ments subject to a State Adjustment 
Factor which would vary for each 
State according to its historical gaso­
line consumption per vehicle point. Al­
though we have not finalized how wc 
would calculate a State Adjustment 
Pactpr (if such proposal Is adopted), it 
would probably be based (among other 
factors) on the total gasoline sales 
within a State In the base year divided 
by the total vehicle points for vehicles 
registered in that State. This resulting -
quotient for each State (subject to 
other adjustments. deemed appropri­
ate *) would probably be divided by a 
national average gasoline consumption 
figure, equal to the quotient of the 
total gasoline sales in the United 
Slates in the base year divided by the 
total vehicle points In the United 
Stales. The resulting quotient for each 
State would equal that State's State 
Adjustment Paclor. The State Adjust­
ment Factor would thus have the 
effect of varying ration allotments per 
vchicle point by Stale according to 
historical fuel use per registerd vehi­
cle. 
Providing for varying allotments 
among the States, depending on their 
'Fur example, tlic base period use of dps-
Ignaled firms given supplemental allot-
menls could be subtracted from the base 
period gasoline use for each Slate, 
! respective fuel use per vehicle would 
presumable give the averace motorist 
In each Slate a closer match to his rel­
ative historical usage than would a 
uniform national allotment. This can 
be demonsrated by the following ex­
ample: Suppose that the gasoline 
shortfall were 20 percent. If a uniform 
national allotment of 80 percent of the 
average motorist's usage were Im­
posed, the average motorist in a State 
that uses 20 percent less than the na­
tional average would receive 100 per­
cent of his or her base period use, 
whereas in a State that consumes 20 
percent'above the national average, 
the average motorist would receive 
only 67 percent of his or her base 
period use. If a State by State adjust­
ment were made, however, the average 
motorist In each Stale would receive 
80 percent of his or her base period 
use. 
In addition, the total volume of 
"white market" sales of ration rights 
should presumably be lower under an 
allotment system that varied from 
State-to-State than under a uniform 
national allotment system. This would 
reduce Interstate income transfers re­
sulting from "white market" transac­
tions between motorists In States with 
higher fuel needs purchasing ration 
rights from motorists in States with 
lower fuel needs. Thus, a State Adjust­
ment Factor would tend to reduce the 
adverse regional economic Impacts of 
the rationing plan. 
Another factor in favor of adopting 
a State Adjustment Factor Is that dis­
tribution of ration rights on a uniform 
national basis rather than on base 
period gasoline consumption patterns 
would require adjustment in the gaso­
line distribution system. If the distri­
bution of ration rights caused a sharp 
divergence in historical demand pat­
terns, the gasoline distribution system 
could be strained. 
State by-Slate variations would not 
—be without substantial disadvantages, 
however. One disadvantage is that it. 
would create a new set of Inequities, 
. by widening the differential between a 
light user of gasoline in a State that is 
above the average and the heavy user 
in a State having below average usage. 
To Illustrate, a-ssume two motorists in 
different Slates had identical base 
period usages. If one lived In a State 
that, on the average consumed 20 per­
cent more gasoline per vehicle than 
the national average and the other 
lived in a Slate that consumed 20 per­
cent less, the first motorist would re­
ceive a ration allotment that was 50 
percent greater than the second mo­
torist's. In addilion, a Stale adjust­
ment factor could not take into ac­
count differences within a Stale. 
Thus, for example. Ihe motorist In 
New York City who seldom drives his 
or her car would reçoive the same al­
lotment as the rural resident of up-
State New York who drives an auto­
mobile every day. 
- The Ideal solution would be. of 
course, to vary allotments on the basis 
of geographical areas that reflect aver­
age gasoline usage more accurately . 
than State boundaries—e.g., on the 
basis of counties or standard metro­
politan statistical areas. At the present 
time, however. It Is our understanding 
that the data base which would be re­
quired in order to make such adjust­
ments has not been developed, and the 
development of such a data base for 
rationing purposes would likely be ex­
tremely burdensome and expensive. 
Even the data base that would be 
used for State by-State adjustments Is 
not without distortions that could 
cause severe inequities. That Is be­
cause gasoline consumption per regis­
tered vehicle Is necessarily computed 
by dividing the amount of gasoline 
sold within a State by the number of 
registered vehicles In that State. In 
some Jurisdictions, however, substan­
tial volumes of gasoline are sold to 
persons whose vehicles are registered 
in another State. This is typically true 
In large cities having a substantial 
amount of commuter traffic from an 
adjoining State and in Stales having a 
substantial tourist trade. It may ex­
plain, for example, why the District of 
Columbia shows per vehicle gasoline 
usage 13 percent above the national 
average. Persons having vehicles regis­
tered In such Jurisdictions would, 
under a Stale-by-State adjustment, 
enjoy a substantial advantage over 
registrants In other States during ra­
tioning, even though their actual gaso­
line usage is the same or less. 
To illustrate the range in gasoline 
consumption among the States. Table 
I below shows the gasoline consump­
tion for 1976 by State In relationship 
to registered motor vehicles and com­
pares the ration allotments of a 25 
percent cutback with and without the 
application of a State Adjustment 
Factor. It Is important to note, howev­
er, that these figures are solely for 
purposes of illustration. If adopted, 
the actual State Adjustment Factor 
would be based on data selected by the 
ERA for the appropriate base year at 
the time rationing is implemented. 
In developing its rationing plan, the 
ERA hxs provided an opportunity to 
Slate energy officials to express their 
views on several rationing issues, in­
cluding vvhpther the ERA should vary 
allotments to the States according to 
differences in gasoline consumption. 
Of the 22 responses received, 15 Stales 
favored varying basic allotments ac­
cording to per capita gaisoline con­
sumption. These responses were re­
ceived prior to the time the data In 
Table I were available, and, based 
upon such data, several Sl.ilcs re­
sponding in favor of State-by-Stale 
variations turned out to bo below the 
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national average In gasoline usage per 
vehicle. We invite these States, as well 
as any other Interested party, to again 
provide comments and any available 
supporting information on this impor­
tant issue. 
1976 Monthly 
Gasoline Per Vehicle 
Table I 
Ration Allotment With 
25% cutback and No State 
Gallons Per Ratio to 
Vcliiclo Natiœal Gallons Per Porccnt of 
• • fl) Average (2) Vehicle (3)* 1976 Use (4) 
Arkansas 75.8 ••'1.19 47.8 
- .63 
Missouri 75.2 1.10 47.8 .64 
South Carolina 73.9 1.16 47.8 .65 
Wkist Virginia 72.6 1.14 47.8 .66 
Delaware 72.6 1.14 47.8 .66 
D.C. 72.0 1.13 47.8 .66 
Texas 72.0 1.13 47.8 .66 
Georgia 72.0 1.13 47.8 .66 
Wyoming 70.7 1.11 47.8 .68 
Tennessee 70.0 1.10 47.8 .68 
Mississippi 69.4 1.09 47.8 .69 
New Hudco 68.8 1.00 47.8 .69 
Louisiana 68.8 •• 1.08 47.8 .69 
Vermont 68.2 1.07 47.8, .70 
Wisconsin 68.2 1.07 47.8 .70 
Michigan 68.2 1.07 47.8 .70 
Indiana 67.5 1.06 47.8 .71 
Nevada 67.5 1.06 47.8 .71 
Arizona 67.5 1.06 47.8 .71 
Mïine 66.2 1.04 47.8 .72 
New Hdnpshire 66.2 1.04 47.8 .72 
Virginia 66.2 1.04 47.8 . .72 
New Jersey 65.0 1.02 47.8 .74 
New York 65.0 1.02 47.8 
.74 ÛkJLdlviia 64.3 1.01 47.8 .74 
Alabama 64.3 1.01 47.8 
.74 
Kentucky 63.7 1.00 47.8 .75 
Maryland 63.7 • 1.00 47.8 
.75 
Illinois 62.4 .98 47.8 .77 
Nurtl) Carolina 62.4 .98 47.8 .77 
Florida 61.8 .97 47.8 
Utah 61.8 .97 47.8 • 
South Dakota 61.8 .97 47.8 
.77 
Massachusetts 61.8 . . .97 47.8 
.77 
CaliCoxnia 61.8 .97 47.8 .77 
Iowa 59.9 .94 47.8 .80 
Alaska 59.2 .93 • . • 47.8 .81 
aiio 59.2 .93 47.8 .81 
Ida)» 59.2 .93 47.8 .81 , 
Orctjcn 57.3 .93 47.8 .83 
Kansas 57.3 .93 47.8 
.83 
Minnesota , 58.6 .92 47.8 .82 
Minitana 58.6 , .92 47.8 
.82 
Colorado 56.1 .08 47.8 .85 
Wuutûngtçn 55.4 .87 47.8 
.86 
Nebraska 54.1 • .85 47.8 
.88 
Connecticut 54.1 .85 47.8 • .88 
Rtiode Island 52.2 .82 • 47.8 
.92 
Niirth Dakota - 51.6 • .81 47.8 
.93 
I'uuisylvania 50.3 .79 47.8 
.95 
lluwaii 49.1 .77 47.8 
.97 
US 63.7 1.00 47.8 .75 
Ration Allotment With 
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With no State adjustment, allotments would be rounded to 45 gallcns and the rat^  period reduced to 28 days. 
FEDERAI REGISTER. VOL 43. NO, 125—WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, J97» 
PROPOSED RULES 28145 
B. ALLOTMENTS BASED ON DRIVERS' 
LICENSES OR ON REGISTEIICD VEHICLES 
The two practical alternatives for 
(lislribitllnK ration rights lo individ­
uals are on the basis of llccnsccl driv­
ers or registered vehicles, lists of 
which arc maintained in both cases by 
Stales" Departments of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV's). Within the driving age popu­
lation of approximately 160 million in 
the United States, about 80 percent, or 
134 million, now hold drivers' licenses. 
OMV vehicle registration files contain 
approximately 130 million motor vehi­
cle records, of which 106 million are 
estimated to be automobiles. To our 
knowledge, the use of other lists, or 
combination of lists, (such as social se­
curity files), or the use of individual 
applications made solely for the pur­
pose^ of rationing would be too expen­
sive, too subject to fradulent misuse, 
or too slow lo implement for the pur­
poses of . an emergency rationing plan. 
After careful consideration of the ad­
vantages and disadvantages of the two 
practical alternatives, we have pro­
posed a rationing plan based on vehi­
cle registrations. Each of the two al­
ternatives is accompanied by signifi­
cant and complex administrative prob­
lems, but we have tentatively conclud­
ed that the problems associated with a 
vehlclo-bascd allotment system are 
less formidable, and that a per vehicle 
allotment system could be implement­
ed in a significantly shorter time 
period than a rationing system based 
on individual drivers' licenses. Addi­
tionally, in the absence of a national 
Identification data bank, It is unlikely 
that the EUA would be able to prevent 
individuals who have multiple drivers' 
licenses in different States from re­
ceiving multiple allotments. Finally 
the use of Vehicle registrations would 
give ration allotments to firms with re­
spect to their registered vehicles. This 
would give at least some ration rights 
lo tiiose firms who were not eligible 
for supplemental allotments as desig­
nated firms; if ration rights were only 
distributed to licensed drivers, all 
firms would have to apply (at the be­
ginning or prior lo the start of ration­
ing) for some form of allotment based 
on historical usage. This would signifi­
cantly Increase the Implementation 
time for rationing (measured from the 
. dale rationing is announced to Ihe ef­
fective date of rationing), and the ad­
ministrative complexity and costs of 
the program. ' 
We are Interested in receiving com­
ments on these issues, especially as to 
whether the problems associated with 
a drivers' license system are soluble, 
and whether a drivers' license system 
would be more equitable or preferable 
to a per vehicle allotment system. 
V. DIESEL FUEL RATIONING 
Sections 201 and 203 of the EPCA 
require the .submission to Congress of 
n rationing plan not Just for gasoline 
but also for "diesel fuel used in motor 
vehicles." The ERA has tentatively 
concluded that there are major differ­
ences between the supply characteris­
tics of gasoline and diesel fuel wlilch 
require that the two fuels bo rationed 
by separate and Independent mecha­
nisms. We are currently developing a 
separate plan for diesel fuel rationing 
and are Interested In receiving public 
comments as to some of the serious 
problems associated with developing 
such a plan. — 
Our analysis to date suggests that 
the principal problem associated with 
developing a diesel fuel rationing plan 
is the interchangcability of highway 
diesel fuel with other fuels, particular­
ly off-highway diesel fuel and home 
heating oil. It also appears that diesel 
fuel rationing may not be as desirable 
as gasoline rationing, since during a 
crude oil supply shortfall situation 
adequate supplies of diesel (above the 
level at which rationing would become 
necessary) could be maintained by re­
finery yield orders issued by the ERA. 
We solicit comments on these very 
tentative conclusions, and also on how 
a diesel fuel rationing plan could pre­
vent highway diesel fuel consumers 
subject to rationing from diverting 
non-rationed middle distillate to high­
way diesel use. 
VI. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND 
REGUMTORY ANALYSIS 
Section 201(f) of EPCA requires that 
any rationing contingency plan sub-
mitled to Congress be based upon a 
consideration of lite potential econom­
ic Impacts of such plan. Including an 
analysis of— 
(1) Any effects of such plan on—(A) 
vital Industrial sectors of the econony; 
(B) employment (on a national and re­
gional basis); (C) the economic vitality 
of States and regional areas; (D) the 
availability and price of consumer 
goods and services; and (E) the gross 
national product; and 
(2) Any potential antlcompetivlve ef­
fects. 
In addition. Executive Order 12044 
(42 PR 120S1, March 24, 1918) requires 
that a "regulatory analysis" be pre­
pared on all significant regulations ex­
pected to have "major economic conse­
quences for the general economy, for 
individual Industries, geographical re­
gions or levels of government." The 
Administrator of ERA has determined 
that such a regulatory analysis is re­
quired for the contingency gasoline ra­
tioning regulations. 
Given the similarity of EPCA and of 
Executive Order 12044 regarding the 
requirement of an analysis of econom­
ic Impact, we have decided to combine 
them into one document. Accordingly, 
ERA has had prepared a preliminary 
"Economic and Regulatory Analysis of 
the Proposed Standby Gasoline Ra­
tioning Plan" which when finalized is 
Intended to meet the requirements of 
both section 203(f) of EPCA and Ex­
ecutive Order 12044. 
Copies of this preliminary document 
are available for public review In the 
DOE Freedom of Information Reading 
Room, Room 2107, 12th and Pennsyl­
vania Avenue NW., Washington, D C. 
20461. Copies of this preliminary docu­
ment will also be obtainable from the 
Government Printing Office. Please 
address your inquiries to; United 
States Government Printing Office, 
Superintendent of Documents—Book­
store. North Capitol and H Street 
NW., Washington, D.C. 20401. Inquir­
ies should be Identified with the desig­
nation "Draft Economic and Regula­
tory Analysis of the Proposed Standby 
Gasoline Rationing Plan." Interested 
parties are invited to submit written 
comments on the draft Economic and 
Regulatory Analysis to the address In­
dicated In the "Addresses" section of 
this preamble. 
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
Pursuant to the national environ­
mental Policy Act' of 1969 (NEPA), 42 
U.S.C. 4321, ei 3c<r., DOE has prepared 
an environmental assessment on the 
proposed Contingency Gasoline Ra­
tioning Plan. Following a review of 
this assessment, DOE has determined 
that the proposed action does not con­
stitute as "major Federal action sig­
nificantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment" within the 
meaning of section 102(c)(C) of NEPA. 
Accordingly, preparation of an envi­
ronmental Impact statement is not re­
quired, and a negative determination 
to that effcct is hereby issued. 
Copies of the environmental assess­
ment are available for public review In 
the DOE Freedom of Information 
Reading Room, Room 2107, 12th and 
Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washing­
ton, D.C. 20461. Copies of the environ­
mental assessment will also be obtain­
able from the Goverrmient Printing 
Office. Please address your Inquiries 
to: United States Government Print­
ing Office, Superintendent od Docu­
ments—Bookstore, North Capitol and 
H Street NW., Washington, D.C. 
20401. Inquiries should be identified 
with the designation "Environmental 
Assessment of the Proposed Standby 
Gasoline Rationing Plan." Interested 
parties are invited to submit written 
comments on the environmental as­
sessment to the address Indicated in 
the "Addresses" secton of this pream­
ble. 
VII. COMMENT PROCEDURES 
A. WRITTEN COMMENTS 
YOU are Invited to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting data, views 
or arguments with respect to the pro­
posals set forth in this notice. Written 
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comrtients should be submitted by 4:30 
p.m.. e.d.t.. August 31. 1978 to the ad-
dress indicated In the "Addresses" sec­
tion of this preamble and should be 
.idenliricd on the outside envelope and 
on tlic document with the designation: 
'•Contingency Gasoline Rationing 
Plan." Fifteen copies should be sub­
mitted. 
Any Information submitted which 
you consider to be confidential must 
be so identified and submitted in writ­
ing, one copy only. We reserve the 
right to determine the confidential 
status of the Information and to treat 
It according to our determination. 
B. PUBUC nCAllINCS 
1. Procedure for Request to Make 
Oral Presentation. The time and place 
for the hearing are Indicated in the 
"Dales" and "Addresses" sections of 
this preamble. 
If you have an Interest in the pro­
posed amendments Issued today, or 
represent a group or class •>f persons 
that has an Interest, you may make a 
written request for an opportunity to 
make oral presentation by 4:30 p.m., 
July 21, 1978. You should be prepared 
to describe the Interest concemcd and, 
if appropriate, to state why you are a 
proper representative of a group or 
claas of persons that has such an Inter-
. est, and to give a concise summary of 
the proposed oral presentation. You 
should also provide a phone number 
where you may be contacted through 
the (lay before the hearing. 
If you are selected to be heard, you 
will be so notified before 4:30 p.m., 
July 24. 1978. One hundred copies of 
your statement are due five working 
days prior to the dale of the hearing 
and NliouW be delivered to the "Re-
quoiiU lo Speak" address for all loca­
tions except Hartford, Detroit. Spo­
kane and Los Angeles. For these ex­
cepted locations, oral statements 
should be brought lo the hearing 
room on the date of the hearing. 
2. Cojiduct ol the Hearings. We re­
serve Uie right to select the persons to 
be heard at this hearing, to schedule 
their respective presentations, and to 
csl.ibli.sh the procedures governing the 
coniiui;t of Ihe hearing, llie lenglli of 
each presentation may be limited, 
based on Ihe number of persons re-
I questing to be heard. 
An KRA official will be designated lo 
preside at the hearing. This will not be 
a judicial or evidentiary-type hearing. 
Questions may be asked only by those 
conducting the hearing, and there will 
be no cross-examination of persons 
presenting statements. At the conclu­
sion of all inillal oral statements, each 
person who has made an oral slale-
niont will be given the opportunity to 
make a rebuttal statement. The rebut­
tal statements will be given In the 
order in which the initial stalemcnla 
were made and will be subject lo lime 
limitations. 
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You may submit questions to be 
asked of any person making a state­
ment at the hearing to the address In­
dicated above for requests to speak 
before 4:30 p.m.. July 24, 1978. If you 
wish lo ask a question at the hearing, 
you may submit the question, in writ­
ing. to the presiding officer. The EUA 
or, if the question is submitted at the 
hearing, the presiding officer will de­
termine whether the question is rele­
vant, and whether the time limitations 
permit it to be presented for answer. 
Any further procedural rules needed 
for the proper conduct of the hearing 
will be announced by the presiding of­
ficer. 
A transcript of the hearing will be 
made and the entire record of the 
hearing, including the transcript, will 
be retained by the ERA and made 
available for inspection at the DOE 
Freedom of Information Office, Room 
2107, Federal Building. 12lli and Penn­
sylvania Avenue N.W., Washington, 
D.C.. between the hours of 6 a.m. and 
4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday. 
You may purchase a copy of the tran­
script from the reporter. 
As required by section 7(a)(1) of the 
Federal Energy Administration Act of 
1974. Pub. L. 93-275. a copy of this 
notice has been submitted to the Ad­
ministrator of the Environmental Pro­
tection Agency for his comments con­
cerning the impact of this proposal on 
Ihe quality of the envirniunenl. Uy 
letter dated April 28, 197R. the Admin-
istralor provided the following com­
ments; 
In response to your letter of April 27, 1978. 
Ihe Environment al Promet ion Agency has 
reviewed llic Heiwrtmi-nl of Kncrisy's «Irsift 
notice of propd.sed rulemaklnn r.st.-it)ll.sliinK 
10 (Till Piirl .WO "ContliiRency Caroline Il.v 
lionlnK Plan." At present, we <lo not foresee 
this action having unacceptable imparl on 
the quality of the environment su related lo 
the duties and rcsponslbllllles of KPA. We 
are currently reviewlni; the environmental 
assessment on the ralionlnR plan as pre­
pared by DOE. Should we Identify sli;nifl-
canl environmental conrems. we will notify 
DOE during the public review period pro­
vided for this action. 
Pursuant to the requirements of sec-
lion 404(a) of the Deparlineiil of 
Energy Organization Act (Pub. L. 95-
91). this proposed rule ha.s been re­
ferred. concurrently with the Issuance 
hereof, lo ll>e Federal Energy Regula-
tary Commission for a delcnninalion 
whether the proposed rule would sig­
nificantly affect any matter within the 
Commission's Jurisdiction. 
(Emergency Petroleum Alloeatlon Act of 
1973. Pub. L. 93 159. as amended. Pub. I,. 
93-511. Pub. L. 94-99. Pub. L. 94-133. Pub. L. 
94-163. and Pub. L. 94-385: Federal Kncrgy 
Administration Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-275. 
as amended. Pub. L. 94 332. Pub. I.. 94-385. 
Pub. Ij. 95-70. and r\ib. L 95-91; Knercy 
Policy and Con.<ierv;ilmn Art, Pub. I.. 94-163, 
as amended. Pub. L. 94-3n5. and Pub. U 95-
70; Department of EnetRy OrKanb^ition Act. 
Pub. L. 95-91: E.O. X1790. 39 PR 23185: E.O. 
12009, 42 FR 46267) 
In consideration of the foregoing. 
Chapter II. Title 10 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, is proposed lo be 
amended as set forth below. 
Issued in Washington, D.C.. June 22, 
1978. 
. DAVID J. BARDIN, 
Administrator, Economic 
RegtUatory Administration. 
10 CFR Chapter II is amended by 
adding Part 500, to read as follows: 
PART 500—CONTINGENCY CASOUNE 
RATIONING REGULATIONS 
Sirflpafff A—G«ii«v«t fr«vltJ«4» 
Sec. 
@00.1 Scope. ' I 
500.2 General definitions. 
500.3 Penalties. 
500.4 Reporting requirements. 
500.5 User fees. 
500.6 Authority to contract or delegate. 
SiApsft S—Gat«lln« 
500.11 Determination of allotments. 
500.12 Distribution of ration rights. 
500.13 Disposition of Government ration 
checks. 
500.14 Ration coupons. 
500.15 Mandatory transfers of ration allot­
ments. 
Subpvrt C—CompwtoHon el md 
500.21 Definitions. 
500.22 Calculations. 
Subpart D—'SwppUmvnlot Allo4m«nlt lo Dttignatld Finn* and ffioHly CJa»»» 
500.31 Designated firms. 
500.32 Supplemental allotments to priority 
cla&ses. 
500.33 Prcccdcnce of delivery. 
Vfbparl E—Pwftha## of Cataiin* 
500.41 General. 
500.42 Supplier disposition of ration cou­
pons and ration chocks. 
500.43 Supplier's oblieation to Its supplier. 
500.44 Principal supplier's obUgations to 
the ERA. 
500.45 Redemption account advances. 
500.46 Inventory changes. 
Subpart ^-*AI(aco4iaa «f Gataffna 
500.51 Relationship to Parts 210 and 211. 
500.52 Supplier/purchaser relationships. 
500.53 Allocation by suppliers to wholesale 
purchasers and bulk purchasers. 
500.54 Allocation of unleaded gasoline. 
500.55 Normal business practices. 
500.56 State set aside. 
Subpart 6—talion Banking 
500.61 Coupon Issuance points and partici­
pating banks. 
500.112 Ration rights accounts. 
500.63 Redemption accounts. 
500.64 Restrictions on endorsements. 
Subport H—Nattonol Kollon Katorvo 
500.71 National Ration Rc.'serve. 
Subport I—Slolo Ralleo Sotorvo 
500.81 Establishment of State Ration Re­
serve. 
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See. 
500.82 Hnrdshtp gppKcttlons and guide­
lines. 
AUTHOHIT*: See. J03(»)(L) of the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Aet (Pub. L. 94-
163) 89 Stat. 892, 42 U.S.C. 6263. 
Subpart A—C*n«ral ProvUten» 
i SIIO.I Scop*. 
(a) This part applies in all or such 
parts of the United States as specified 
By the Economic Regulatory Adminis­
tration ("ERA") of the Department of 
Energy ("DOE"), to the end-use ra­
tioning of gasoline produced In or im­
ported into the United States. 
(b) Ef/ecHve dale. These regulations 
shall become effective severally or in 
toto on a date or dates to be specified 
and published by the ERA. subjcct to 
the provisions' of section 201 (b) and 
(c) of the Energy Policy and Conserva­
tion Act (Pub. L. 94-163) (EPCA). 
(c) Relationship lo Other parts. 
Unless oliierwisc specified, the provi­
sions of Parts 205, 210, 211. and 212 of 
this chapter shall apply to this part. 
§ 500.2 General definitions. 
For purposes of this part— 
"Allocation entitlement" means the 
product of a supplier's allocation frac­
tion multiplied by an amount equal to 
that part of the purchaser's base 
period use obtained from that suppli­
er. 
"Allotment" means the value in gal-
ions of gasoline of the ration rlKhts 
issued lo a ration rcciplcnt. 
"Hsi.se period" means a period in the 
base year corresponding lo the current 
calendar month or quarter, or current 
ration period, as appropriate. 
"Dased period use " means base 
period volume or adjusted base period 
volume, as appropriate. 
"11:1X1» year" means base period year 
as defin'ed in Special Rule No. 1 of 10 
CPR. Part 211, or in tiie event Special 
Rule No. 1 is not implemented, base 
year means the 12 calendar months 
ending with the third month (or some 
olher month designated by the ERA) 
prior to the month in which the Presi­
dent transmits to the Congress, pursu­
ant to § 201(c) of the Energy Policy 
and Conservation Act (Pub. L. 94-163) 
(KPCA). a request to impose gasoline 
rationing. 
"Uuik purchaser" means any firm 
which is an ultimate consumer which, 
as part of its normal business prac­
tices. purchases or obtains motor gaso-
line from a supplier and either (a) re­
ceives delivery of that product into a 
storage tank substantially under tlie 
control of that firm at a fixed loca­
tion. (b) with respect to use in apricul-
lural production, receives delivery into 
a storage tank with a capacity not less 
lli.in 50 gallons substantially under 
tlir control of that linn, or (c) receives 
delivery of that product for use in 
cargo, freight and mail hauling by 
truck. 
"Designated firm" means (Da firm 
that In the base year con.sumer gaso­
line in vehicles or equipment deter­
mined by the ERA to qualify as off-
highway vehicles and equipment, and 
that meets such additional eligibility 
requirements to be established by the 
ERA pursuant to an application ap-
provc(i by the ERA pursuant to Sub­
part D of this part, or (2) a firm desig­
nated by the ERA as a designated firm 
pursuant to § 500.31(b). 
"Eligible Individual" means a natu­
ral persbn designated by the ERA as 
eligible to receive ration rights on the 
same basis as a registrant of a speci­
fied vehicle classification. 
"Emergency services" means law en­
forcement. fire fighting, snow removal, 
and emergency medical services. 
"ERA" means the Economic Regula­
tory Administration or its delegate. 
"Firm" means any association, com­
pany. corporation, estate, individual, 
joint-venture, partnership, or sole pro­
prietorship, or any other entity how­
ever organized including charitable, 
educational, or other eleemosynary in­
stitutions, and the Federal Govern­
ment including corporations, depart­
ments, Federal agencies, and other in­
strumentalities, and State and local 
governments. The ERA may, in regu­
lations and forms issued In this part, 
treat as a firm: 
(a) A parent and the consolidated 
and unconsolidated entitles (if any) 
which it directly or indirectly controls, 
(b) a parent and ils consolidaied enti­
ties. (c). an unconsolidated entity, or 
(d) any part of a firm. 
"Gasoline" means motor gasoline as 
defined in } 211.51 of Part 211 of this 
chapter excluding, however, aviation 
fuels as defined in §211.142 of Part 
211 of this chapter. 
"Government ration check" means a 
ration check issued by the ERA or Its 
delegate to a ration recipient, or the 
intangible representation of ration 
rights (evidenced by lists or other 
means) to bo distributed by the ERA 
to coupon issuance points. 
"National Ration Reserve" means 
the ration rights reserved by the ERA 
each month pursuant to Subpart C of 
this part. 
"Principal supplier " means a suppli­
er which manufactures gasoline in or 
Imports gasoline into the United 
Slates. 
"Public passenger transportation" 
means (a) facilities and services for 
surface publie transportai ion whether 
publicly or privately owned, including 
water, rail, bus and van transporta­
tion. but excluding taxicabs: and (b) 
bus and van transportation of pupils 
lo and from school. 
"Ration check" means a negotiable 
document other than a ration coupon 
evidencing the right to purchase speci­
fied volumes of gasoline. 
"Ration coupon" means a coupon 
issued by the ERA entitling the bearer 
to purchase a specified volume of gaso­
line. 
"Ration recepient" mean's a . regis­
trant. an eligible individual, a desig­
nated firm, or a priority class firm. 
"Ration rights" means ration cou­
pons and ration checks which shall be 
evidence of a ration recipient's right to 
purchase specified volumes of gaso­
line. 
"Ration rights account" means an 
account opened pursuant to the provi­
sions of §500.62 for the deposit and 
withdrawal of ration rights. 
"Redeemed ration rights" means 
ration coupons or ration checks ac-, 
cepted by a supplier in exchange for 
the sale of gasoline, and cancelled , or 
endorsed by that supplier pursuant to 
§500.42. • 
"Redemption account" means an ac­
count opened by a supplier pursuant 
to the provisions of § 500.63 for the de­
posit of ration rights received and re­
deemed In exchange for the sale of 
gasoline, and for the deposit of re­
demption checks received from olher 
suppliers in exchange for the sale of 
gasoline. 
"Redemption check" means a check 
drawn on a redemption account by a 
supplier who is the holder of that ac­
count. 
"Registrant" means the parly 
named In the most recent vehicle reg­
istration record maintained at a State 
Department or Motor Vehicle office 
(or in the case of Federal vehicles, 
maintained with the appropriate Fed­
eral agency), which vehicle has been 
determined by the ERA as eligible for 
an allotment. 
"Retail sales outlet" means a site on 
which a supplier maintains an on­
going business of selling ga-soline to 
any ultimate consumer: Provided, 
That the major activity of that suppli­
er is to supply during the course of 
any single transaction one hundred 
thirty (130) gallons or less or gasoline 
into supply tanks on a vehicle for use 
as fuel for that vehicle. 
"Sanitation services" means the col­
lection and disposal for the general 
public of solid wastes, whether by 
public or private entities, and the 
maintenance, operation and repair of 
liquid purification and waste facilities. 
Sanitation services also includes the 
provision of water supply services by 
public unities, whether privately or 
publicly owned or operated. 
"Stale" means any one of the fifty 
Stales, the Dislrict of Columbia. 
Puerto Rico or any territory or posses­
sion of the United Slates. 
"Stale Rationing Office" means the 
office established or designated by the 
Chief Executive of each Slate to carry 
out the authorities delegated lo that 
office by the ERA pursuant to Sub­
part I of this part. 
"State Ration Reserves" means the 
ration rights provided to the Stale Ra-
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Honing Otflccs by the ERA for distri­
bution within the States to meet the 
needs of approved hardship appli­
cants. 
"Supplemental allotment" means 
the allotment distributed to a desie-
natod firm or priority class firm pursu­
ant to Subpart D of this part. 
"Supplier" means any firm or any 
part or subsidiary of any firm other 
than the Department of Defense 
which currently, during the base 
period, or during any period between 
the base period and the present sup­
plies, sells, transfers or otherwise fur­
nishes (as by consignment) gasoline to 
wholesale purchasers or end-users. In­
cluding, but not limited to refiners. Im­
porters, resellers, Jobbers, and retail­
ers. 
"Total available supply" means the 
•total available supply of gasoline de­
termined pursuant to Subpart C of 
this part to be rationed during a ration 
period. 
"Wholesale purchaser" means a 
wholesale purchaser-reseller or whole­
sale purchaser-consumer, or both. 
"Wholesale purchaser-consumer" 
means any firm that is an ultimate 
consumer which, as part of Its normal 
business practices, purchases or ob­
tains gasoline from a supplier and re­
ceives delivery of that product into a 
storage tank substantially under the 
control of that firm at a fixed location 
and which either (a) purchased or ob­
tained more than 20,000 gallons of gas­
oline for its own use in agricuitural 
production In the base year, or (b) pur­
chased or obtained more than 84,000 
gallons of ga-soline In the base year. 
"Wholesaler purcli.ascr-rcseller" 
means any firm which purchases, re­
çoives through transfer, or otherwise 
obtains (w by consignment) gasoline 
and resells or otherwise transfers It to 
other purchasers without substantial­
ly chaniilng Its form. 
! 5110.3 I'cnaUicn. 
(a) Any person who violates any pro­
vision of those regulations or any 
order issued pursuant thereto shall be 
sul>ject to the penalties a-s set forth In 
scclion 5 of the Emergency Petroleum 
Allocation Act of 1973, and shall be 
subject to the penalties as set forth In 
Subpart P of Part 205 of this chapter. 
(b) Any firm having custody, care or 
control of ration coupons or Govern­
ment ration checks shall at all times, 
In receiving, storing, transmitting, or 
otherwise handling ration coupons, 
take all precautions necessary to avoid 
acceptance, transfer, negotiation, or 
use of spurious, altered, or counterfeit 
ration coupons and Government 
ration checks, and to avoid any unau­
thorized transfer, negotiation, or use 
of ration coupons and Government 
ration checks. Such firms shall also 
safeguard ration coupons and Govern­
ment ration checks from theft, embez-
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element, loss, damage, or unauthorized 
destruction. 
§ 50(1.4 Rcportlnic rrqiiircmcnLi. 
The ERA shall require such reports 
as it deems necessary to administer 
the Contingency GmaoHne Rationing 
Program. 
5 ROD.S Umer foes. 
The ERA may impose a uniform fee 
on each gallon of gasoline sold during 
the period for which these regulations 
are In effect: Provided, That the total 
fees collected shall not exceed the cost 
of administering the Contingency Gas­
oline Rationing Program and the cost 
of initial distribution of end-user 
rights. 
S 500.6 Authority to contract or dclcimte. 
The ERA may delegate or contract 
for the carrying out of all or any part 
of Its functions under this part. 
Subpart RaHenlng of Oomelln* 
9 500.11 Determination of allotments. 
The ERA shall Issue ration rights 
for each ration period equal to the es­
timated total available supply of gaso­
line as follows: 
(a) A percentage shall be reserved 
for distribution pursuant to Subpart H 
of this part for a National Ration Re­
serve. 
(b) A percentage shall be reserved 
for distribution to the States as a 
State Ration Reserve pursuant to Sub­
part I of this part. 
(c) The ERA shall Issue ration rights 
to designated firms and priority 
classes pursuant to Subpart D of this 
part. 
(d) The ERA shall issue ration 
rights to all registrants'and eligible In­
dividuals pursuant to Subpart C of 
this part. 
§ 500.12 Distribution of riition riKtilK. 
Ration rights will be issued In the 
form of Government ration ciiccks dis­
tributed to ration recipients. In addi­
tion, ration rights may at the discre­
tion of the ERA be directly deposited 
into ration rights accounts. 
§ 500.13 Disposition of Government rulion 
checks. 
Government ration checks may be 
disposed of as follows; 
(a) Government ration checks may 
be exchanged for ration coupons at 
coupon Issuance points pursuant to 
Subpart G of this part, 
(b) Government ration cheeks may 
be deposited in a ration nKhl.s ac­
count, and may be subsequently with­
drawn as ration rights pursuant to 
§ 500.02. 
(c) Government ration checks may 
be surrendered to a supplier for gaso­
line. 
(d) Government ration checks may 
be transferred or sold to any Individu­
al or firm. 
§ 500.14 Ration coupons 
(a) Value of ration coupons. A ration 
coupon shall be redeemable for the 
number of gallons Indicated on the 
face of the coupon, or for such other 
amount as shall be determined and an­
nounced by the ERA. 
(b) Validity of ration coupons. 
Unless declared Invalid by the ERA or 
redeemed pursuant to §500.42. ration 
coupon?, of a given series designation 
shall be* valid from a date specified in 
an Order published by the ERA 
through the end of the Contingency 
Gasoline Rationing Program. 
S 500.15 Mandatory transfer* of ration al­
lotment*. 
The ERA may require the lessor of a 
registered vehicle receiving ration al­
lotments to transfer such ration allot­
ments to the lessee of such vehicle 
whenever the terms of the lease 
extend beyond a minimum period to 
be established by the ERA, or accord­
ing to other terms and conditions to be 
established by the ERA. 
Subpart C—Compulallon of Rttarvat and 
Allalmants 
S 500.21 Dcflnltion*. 
For purposes of this Subpart C, the 
following symbols have the following 
meanings: 
Symbol tJnIU Meiuilnic 
CP..... The computiitlon pciind. the 
lenmh of which will be 
dclermlnrd by the ËIIA and 
will be uMd to compute the 
Irnsth of the rstlon period. 
REF.. Oslloni....... Projected refinery output of 
SiLiollne during the 
computation period. 
I M P .  - . . . . d o P r o i c r t p d  I m p o r t !  o f  R M O l l n e  
durinK the computation 
period. 
EXP do.......... rrojrrli'd exporta ol cuollne 
during the computation 
period. 
LOS..' ......do......... Projected lo.wj of «.isollnc 
from splllnce, evaporation, 
and casualty lou» during 
the computation period. 
INV.. .....do... Amount of dp.slrcd K.vuillnc 
Inventory drawdown or 
buildup during the 
compulaUon period from 
Induiitry. 
AOJ do_..._ An adjusting term n presenting 
errors, rounding:, and 
unclaimed allotment* In 
previous ration periods, 
TAS. ......do..._.» The lotAl available supply of 
gxiollne to be rationed during 
a ration period. 
NRR do Ration rights to be reserved (or 
use In the National Itatlon 
Iteserve for the ration period. 
SRR do Ration rights distributed to the 
States for the State Ration 
Reserves tor the ration 
period. 
MAS do The net available supply of 
gasoline during a 
computation period, equal to 
the TAS minus amounts 
necessary lor the National 
Ration Reserve and the Stale 
Ration Reserves. 
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Symbol UnlU Meaning 
GA._ Omilon*— The lupplcmcnUI allotmenU 
to deslfnatcd (Irms uid 
priority cluici for the 
computation period. 
DAS M'.—•doThe bule allotment (upply 
available for distribution to 
mUtranli. 
V C . — . . — V e h i c l e  c l a u l l l c a t l o n l s )  t o  b e  
eitabllshcd by the ERA (or 
all vehlclea designated by the 
' ERA aa eligible to receive 
allotment*. 
A I  . M . — T h e  a l l o t m e n t  I n d e x ,  w h i c h  
. . . . expreuea the value oX the 
allotment for any vehicle In I 
v' : •' given vehicle claialllcatlon In 
relation to the allotment (or 
private automobile* (the 
allotment Index (or private ' 
automobile* will be 1.0). 
CVP;, Oallo!i*_._ The clauKlcatlon vehicle point, 
which I* the *um of all 
vehicle* In a given vehicle 
classification, multiplied by 
the allotment Index for that 
vehicle classification. 
TVP. .>..do........ The total vehicle points, which 
Is the sum of the 
clo-uKlcatlcn vehicle poInU 
(CVP'at for all vehicle 
classification*. 
0A_. _do The basic allotment for private 
automobile*. 
DBA, .„.do....... The distributed basic 
allotment, which I* equal to 
the value of ration rights In 
gallons nlloKcd for private 
automobiles. 
RP.„ Days.......... The length of a ration period In 
dny*. 
ADA. Gallon*...- The actual dlatrlbutcd 
allotment, which for any 
given vehicle 1* equal to the 
dlatrlbutcd basic allotment 
• (DBA) multiplied by the 
allotment Index (All for that 
vehicle. 
S 500.22 Calculaliuns. 
(a) Total available supply iTAS). 
The total available supply (TAS) of 
gasoline for a computation perloci Is 
determined from data available on the 
refining and Importing of gasoline, ad­
justed for exports, losses, inventory 
changes, and other adjustments. 
TAS-REP+IMP-EXP-LOS±INV+ADJ 
(b> ffel available supply (NAS). The 
net available supply is computed by 
subtracting from the TAS the Nation­
al Ration Reserve and the State 
Ration Reserves. 
NAS-TAS-NRR-SRR 
(c) Basic allotment supply (23/lS). 
The basic allotment supply (BAS) Is 
computed by deducting the sum of the 
supplemental allotments (SA) to desig­
nated firms, and the priority class al­
lotments, from the NAS. 
NAS-SA-DAS 
(d) Basic allotment IBA). The b.-usic 
allotment (BA) is computed as follows; 
(I) The sum of all vehicles in a given 
vehicle classification Is multiplied by 
the allotment index (AI) for that clas­
sification to yield a classification vehi­
cle point (CVP). ' 
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VCxAI»CVP 
(2) The sum of the CVP's" for all ve­
hicle classifications equals the total 
vehicle points (TVP). 
CVP.+CVP,+. . .-TVP 
(3) The basic allotment (OA) equals 
the basic allotment supply (BAS) di­
vided by the total vehicle points 
(TVP), 
B»S - BA 
TVP 
(e) Length of the Ration Period. The 
length of the ration period Is deter­
mined as follows: 
(1) the ERA will determine a distrib­
uted basic allotment (DBA) which is 
the value of ration rights in gallons al­
lotted for private automobiles. 
(2) the length of the ration period 
equals the distributed basic allotment 
(DBA) divided by the basic allotment 
(BA), the quotient multiplied by the 
computation period (CP), and rounded 
to a full day. 
(f) Actual distributed allotment 
lADA). The value of ration rights in 
gallons distributed to the registrant of 
a given vehicle for a ration period 
equals the distributed basic allotment 
(DBA) multiplied by the allotment 
Index (AI) for that vehicle, such prod­
uct to be rounded by the ERA. 
ADA-DDAxAI 
Subpart D—Supplomanlol Allolmtnt* le 
Ooilgmalod firm* and Priority Clou** 
§ 500.31 Denignotcd (irm*. 
(a) A firm may apply to the ERA for 
a supplemental allotment ns a desig­
nated firm, if in the base year such 
firm consumed gasoline in vehicles or 
equipment determined by the ERA to 
qualify as off-highway vehicles and 
equipment and such firms meets such 
additional eligibility requirements to 
be established by the ERA. 
(b) The ERA may desiitnate other 
classes of firms or any individual firm 
as a designated firm(s) to rcccive sup­
plemental allotments on a basis to be 
established by the ERA. 
(c) A designated firm applying for a 
supplemental allotment shall submit 
an application to the ERA according 
to forms and procedures to bo estab­
lished by the ERA. 
$.'>00.32 Supplcmrntnl oliiilmrnti to prior­
ity rinsiw;*. 
(a) A firm in any of the following 
classifications may apply to the ERA 
for a supplemental allotment equal to 
a percentaue of such firm's consump­
tion of gasoiinc during the base 
period, such percentage to be deter­
28149 
mined by the ERA for each firm or 
classification of firms; less all other al­
lotments, if any, provided to such 
firm: 
(1) Emergency services; 
(2) Sanitation services; and , 
(3) Public passenger transportation. 
(b) The ERA may designate other 
classifications or firms as priority 
classes eligible to apply for a supple­
mental allotment pursuant to para­
graph (a) of this section. 
(c) Any firm applying toi a supple­
mental allotment as a priority class 
shall submit an application to the 
ERA according to forms and proce­
dures to be established by the ERA. 
S 500.33 ' Precedence of delivery. ' 
Prior to arranging delivery schedules'^ 
for any other purchasers, suppliers 
shall first establish mutually satisfac­
tory delivery schedules with all their 
base period purchasers which qualify 
as priority class firms pursuant to 
S 500.32. 
Subpart E—Purcha** of Caiolina 
S 500.41 General. 
(a) Except as Otherwise provided in 
paragraph (b) of this section, no sup­
plier may sell or otherwise transfer 
gasoline without securing from the 
purchaser at the time of sale or trans­
fer ration rights equal on a gallon, 
basis to the volume of gasoline trans­
ferred. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions 
of paragraph (a) of this section, no 
supplier may sell or otherwise transfer 
gasoline to a wholesale purchaser-re­
seller without securing from the whole 
purchaser-reseller at the time of sale 
or transfer a redemption checic or re­
deemed ration rights equal on a gallon 
basis to the amount of gasoline trans­
ferred. 
(c) .No purchaser may tender, and no 
supplier may accept ration coupons of 
a given series designation in exchange 
for gasoline prior to the date for 
which such series designation has been 
declared valid by the ERA pursuant to 
§ 500.14. 
(d) Subjcct to the provisions of 
§ 500.64 of Subpart G of this part, un­
redeemed ration rights may be freely 
transferred for or without considera­
tion. 
(e) No supplier (including a retail 
sales outlet) shall require any purchas­
er to purchase ration rights from any 
firm (including Itself) as a condition of 
transferring gasoline. 
(f) No supplier (including a retail 
sales outlet) may refuse to accept valid 
ration coupons offered as evidence of 
entitlement to purchase gasoline if 
such coupons are tendered by a cus­
tomer at the time of sale. A supplier 
may accept ration checks other than 
Government ration checks from a cus­
tomer as evidence of entitlement to 
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purchase gasoline, but If there are In-
, sufficient ration rights In the ration 
rights account on which the ration 
chcck Is drawn, the payee shall be 
liable for the deficiency. 
; 500.13 Supplier dixpomUiom of rulion 
riglits and ration chcclw. 
(a) A supplier (including a retail 
sales outlet) which accepts ration cou­
pons in exchange for gasoline shall 
redeem all such coupons by indelibly 
mariiing them with the supplier's 
name, Its redemption account number, 
if any. and the legend "redeemed." No 
supplier shall sell or otherwise trans­
fer gasoline for consumption to a pur­
chaser In exchange for ration coupons 
that have previously been redeemed. 
(b> A supplier (including a retail 
sales outlet) which accepts ration 
checics In exchange for gasoline shall 
< redeem all such checks by indelibly 
marking them with the supplier's 
name, Its redemption account number, 
if any, and the legend "redeemed." 
{500.43 Supplier's obligation to Its (uppli-
er. 
(a) A supplier shall Issue to its sup­
plier at the time of delivery a redemp­
tion chcck or redeemed ration rights 
equal on a gallon basis to the volume 
of gasoline received. 
' (b) A supplier that has a redemption 
account shall promptly deposit all re­
demption chccks and redeemed ration 
rights received in Its redemption ac­
count. 
t 
{500.44 Principal supplier'* obligation: to 
the KI(A. 
Karh principal supplier shall file 
with the ERA In such form and for 
such period as shall be designated by 
the ERA, a report certifying the 
volume of gasoline sold during the re­
porting period, and shall submit with 
such report a redemption check or re­
deemed ration rights equal on a gallon 
basis to the volume of gasoline sold 
during the reporting period. 
* {500,45 Redemption account advances. 
(a) Every supplier other than a prin­
cipal supplier shall be entitled to re­
ceive an initial redemption account ad­
vance for deposit in Its redemption ac­
count according to a formula to be es­
tablished and published by the ERA. 
Such formula shall take into account 
the needs, if any, of suppliers located 
in remote areas subject to infrequent 
or irregular supply schedules and sup­
pliers in areas subject to highly sea­
sonal demand. 
(b) The ERA may provide for such 
additional redemption account - ad­
vances as It deems necessary. 
(c) The ERA shall require suppliers 
receiving redemption account ad­
vances to repay such advances to the 
ERA according to terms and condi­





{500.46 Inventory cliancei. 
(a) Each supplier (Including a retail 
sales outlet), shall report according to 
forms and instructions to be issued by 
the ERA, its Inventory of gasoline, 
measured on the first day of rationing 
before any sales of gasoline are made, 
measured at the end of the rationing 
program, and measured at intervals to 
be specified by the ERA. 
(b) Any supplier (including a retail 
sales outlet), whoise inventory at the 
close of the rationing program Is less 
than its inventory measured on the 
first day of rationing shall be required 
to submit a redemption check or re­
deemed ration rights to the ERA or its 
designate equal on a gallon basis to 
the amount of inventory drawdown, 
less an amount to be specified by the 
ERA for losses due to spillage and 
evaporation. 
Subpart F—Allocation of Goiollma 
.{500.51 Relationship to Parts 210 and 211. 
(a) Except where inconsistent with 
the provisions of this part, the provi­
sions of Parts 210 and 211 of this 
chapter shall apply to this part. 
(b) The allocation levels as provided 
In Part 211 shall not apply to this 
part. 
{500.52 Supplier/purchaser relationship. 
Unless otherwise directed by the 
ERA, each supplier of gasoline shall 
supply all wholesale purchaser-re­
sellers, wholesale purchaser-consum­
ers, and bulk purchasers which pur­
chased or obtained gasoline from that 
supplier during the base period. 
{500.53 Allocation by suppliers to whole­
sale purchasers and built purchasers. 
(a) Supply obligation, A supplier's 
supply obligation of gasoline for a 
month which corresponds to the base 
period is the sum of (1) the amounts 
of its wholesale purchaser-resellers' 
base period volumes which were sup­
plied by the supplier during the base 
period: Provided, That the wholesale 
purchaser-reseller Is still In business: 
(2) the amounts of its wholesale pur­
chaser-consumers' base period volumes 
which were supplied by the supplier 
during the base period: Provided, 
That the wholesale purchaser-consum­
er Is still in business;. (3) the amounts 
of its bulk purchasers' base period vol­
umes which were supplied by the sup­
plier during the base period, provided 
that the bulk purchaser Is still in busi­
ness; and (4) the amounts of base 
period uses of new wholesale purchas­
ers and bulk purchasers assigned by 
the ERA. 
(b) Allocation bv suppliera to whole­
sale purchasers and bulk purchasers. 
Each supplier shall allocate to each 
wholesale purchaser and bulk pur­
chaser a volume of gasoline equal to 
the product of that supplier's alloca-
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tlon fraction (as defined In Part 211 of 
this chapter) multiplied by the 
amount equal to that wholesale pur­
chaser's or bulk purchaser's base 
period use; Provided, That. (1) a 
wholesale purchaser-reseller transfers 
to its supplier at the tln.u 'rf delivery a 
redemption check or redeemed ration 
rights equal on a gallon basis to the 
volume of gasoline purchased or ob­
tained: and (2) a wholesale purchaser-
consumer or bulk purchaser transfers 
to Its supplier at the time of delivery 
ration rights equal on a gallon basis to 
the volume of gasoline purchased or 
obtained. 
(c) Allocation fractions equal to or 
less than one. (1) When a supplier's al­
location fraction is less than one (1). a 
supplier shall reduce, on a pro-rata 
basis, the amounts of gasoline to be 
supplied its wholesale purchasers and 
bulk purchasers. 
(2) Any supplier whose allocation 
fraction Is equal to or less than one (1) 
and whose wholesale purchasers or 
bulk purchasers entitled to receive an 
allocation from that supplier either 
have not purchased or have notified 
the supplier of their intent not to pur­
chase their allocation entitlement by 
the end of the allocation period must 
dispose of such additional volumes as 
surplus gasoline in accordance with 
the provisions of paragraph (e)(1) of 
this section. 
(d) Allocation fractions greater than 
one. Any supplier whose allocation 
fraction Is greater than one (1) shall 
make allocations based on an alloca­
tion fraction of one (1) unless other­
wise directed by the ERA. 
(e) Distribution of surplus gasoline. 
(1) A supplier which has additional 
volumes of gasoline as a result of the 
application of paragraphs (c)(2) or (d) 
of this section, shall dispose of such 
additional volumes as follows: (i) The 
supplier shall offer to sell on a pro­
rata basis to wholesale purchasers and 
bulk purchasers which are entitled to 
receive an allocation from that suppli­
er and which have not received 100 
percent of their allocation entitlement 
from that supplier an amount equal to 
the difference between the allocation 
entitlement of that wholesale purchas­
er or bulk purchaser minus the 
amount actually sold to that purchas­
er for the month: Provided, That a 
wholesale purchaser-consumer or bulk 
purchaser transfers to Its supplier at 
the time of delivery ration rights 
equal on a gallon basis to the volume 
of gasoline purchased or obtained, and 
that a wholesale purchaser-reseller 
transfers to Its supplier at the time of 
delivery a redemption check or re­
deemed ration rights equal on a gallon 
basis to the volume of gasoline pur­
chased or obtained; (II) the supplied 
shall next offer to sell such additional 
volumes remaining to Its wholesale 




ERA may nulhorlzc certain firms and 
Inslitutions to act as coupon Issuance 
points to Issue ration coupons In ex­
change for Government ration checks. 
The ERA may authorize additional 
firms and Institutions to act n.s partici­
pating banks. PartlclpalInK banks 
shall establish ration rights accounts 
and redemption accounts and may also 
act as coupon issuance points. 
(c> Participating banks and coupon 
Issuance points shall maintain such 
records and Issue such reports as may 
be required from time to time by the 
ERA. 
i 500.62 Ration rights accounLi. 
(a) Any firm or Individual may es­
tablish a ration rights account in ac­
cordance with forms and procedures to 
be established by the ERA. The ERA 
may by Order and Notice establish a 
minimum Initial deposit and other 
terms and conditions governing the 
operation and maintenance of ration 
rights accounts. 
(b) No individual or firm shall Issue 
a ration check drawn upon a ration 
rights account in which there are In­
sufficient ration rights to cover that 
ration check and other outstanding 
ration checks drawn on that account. 
§ 500.63 Redemption accounts. 
(a) Any supplier Including a retail 
sales outlet may open a redemption ac­
count at any participating bank for 
the deposit of an Initial redemption 
account advance, If any, redeemed 
ration rights, and redemption rliocks. 
(b) The opening of a redemption ac­
count and the receipt of deposits 
therefor shall be made at participating 
banks according to forms and proce­
dures to be established by the ERA. 
(c) No Individual or firm shall Issue a 
redemption check drawn upon a re­
demption account in which there are 
insufficient deposits to cover that re­
demption check and other outstanding 
redemption checks drawn on that ac­
count. 
(d) Redemption checks shall not be 
valid for deposit In a ration rights ac­
count, nor shall redemption checks be 
valid for the purchase of gasoline by a 
wholesale purchaser-consumer, bulk 
purchaser or other ultimate consumer. 
§ 500.64 Rextrlrtinns on rndomenicntn. 
The ERA may establish limitations 
on the endorsements of ration checks 
and redemption checks. 
Subpart H—National Ration Raiervo 
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total available supply for which ration 
rights shall be reserved by the ERA 
for the National Ration Reserve. 
Subpart I—Slat# Ration Ro>«rv*i 
§ 500.MI Eslnbiiiihment of Stale K.i(ion Re­
serves. 
(a) For each ration period, the ERA 
shall determine a percentage of the 
total available supply for which ration 
rights shall be reserved by the ERA 
for distribution to the States to meet 
the needs of approved hardship appli­
cants. 
(b) Any State may apply to the ERA 
to create a State Rationing Office to 
administer the State Ration Reserve 
according to criteria for the delegation 
of such authority to be prescribed by 
the ERA by rule. Such application 
may provide for the distribution of 
ration rights from the State Ration 
Reserve' through local boards,. pro­
vided such boards are of balanced 
composition reflecting the community 
as a whole. After ERA review of a 
State's application and upon certifica­
tion by the ERA, such State Rationing 
office will be delegated appropriate 
authority to administer the State 
Ration Reserve allotted by the ERA to 
that State. 
(c) The State Ration Reserves will 
be distributed by the ERA to the State 
Rationing Offices by transmitting a 
Government ration check to each 
State. The size of the State Ration Re­
serve for each State shall be deter­
mined according to that State's gaso­
line sales during the base period and 
according to other relevant criteria de­
termined and published by the ERA. 
<d) Each month the State Rationing 
Office shall report to the ERA with 
respect to the preceding month (1) the 
number of hardship petitions received 
by category of hardship alleged, (2) 
the disposition made of hardship ap­
plication, (3) the amount of ration 
rights Issued from the State's Ration 
Reserve, and (4) such other informa­
tion as the ERA .shall require. 
(e) The State Rationing Office may 
redelegate the authority given to It by 
the ERA to local rationing boards, 
provided they meet the balanced com­
position criteria set forth in paragraph 
(b) of this .section. 
(f) No State shall issue a ration 
check drawn upon a ration rights ac­
count If there are insufficient ration 
rights to cover that ration check and 
other outstanding ration checks drawn 
on that ration rights account. 
pro-rata basis: Provided, That a whole­
sale purchaser-consumer or bulk pur­
chaser transfers to its supplier at the 
time of delivery ration rights equal on 
a gallon basis to the volume of gaso­
line purchase or obtained, and that a 
wholesale purchaser-reseller transfers 
to Its supplier at the time of delivery a 
redemption check or redeemed ration 
rights equal on a gallon basis to the 
volume of gasoline purchased or ob­
tained; (III) a supplier may dispose of 
any additional volumes of gasoline not 
sold or otherwise transferred pursuant 
to paragraphs (e)(l> (1) and (II) of this 
section to any holder of ration rights 
or redeemed ration rights: Provided, 
That a purchaser transfers to the sup­
plier at the time of sale or delivery 
ration rights or a redemption check or 
redeemed ration rights equal on a 
gallon basis to the amount of gasoline 
sold or otherwise transferred. 
(2) Surplus product reports. A princi­
pal supplier or prime supplier that has 
additional volumes of gasoline as a 
result of the application of paragraph 
(c)(2) or (d) of this section shall file a 
surplus product report specified In 
i 211.10 of this chapter. 
(3) Redirection of surplus product 
, Notwithstanding the provisions of 
paragraph (e)(1) of this section, the 
ERA may direct that surplus gasoline 
be held in Inventory or distributed In a 
manner designated by the ERA. 
§ 500.51 Alioculion of unleaded gaiinlinc. 
For a month which corresponds to 
the base period, each supplier shall 
make available to each of its purchas­
ers which Is entitled to rcceive motor 
gasoline from that supplier a volume 
of unleaded gasoline which bears the 
same ratio to the purchaser's alloca­
tion entitlement (as described In 
§ 500.53) OS) the ratio of the supplier's 
supply of unleaded gasoline to Its total 
supply of gasoline (leaded and unlead­
ed) to be allocated pursuant to 
} 500.53. 
S 50U.55 Normal business pmcllres. 
Suppliers will deal with purchasers 
of gasoline according to normal busi­
ness practices in effect during the base 
period. The provisions of §210.62 (b) 
and (c) of this chapter shall apply to 
this part. 
§ 500.56 Stale net-aside. 
The provisions of §211.17 of this 
chapter establishing a State set-aside 
system shall not apply to this part. 
Subpart G—Ration Banking 
§ SUD.fil Coupon Issuance points and par-
tiripiitinK banks. 
(a) Holders of Government ration 
checks may exchange such checks for 
ration coupons of equal value at 
coupon Issuance points. 
(b) Subject to terms and procedures 
to be established by the ERA, the 
§ 300.71 National Italion Reserve. 
(a) The National Ration Reserve 
shall be used by the ERA to meet na­
tional disaster relief needs or for any 
other purpose at the discretion of the 
Administrator of the ERA. 
(b) For each ration period, the ERA 
shall detemine a percentage of the 
§ 500.82 Hardship application and guide­
lines. 
(a) Hardship applications will be re­
ceived by the State Rationing Office 
or its delegate for review and determi­
nation. In Its administration of the 
State Ration Reserve, a State Ration­
ing Office or its delegate shall consid-
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PROPOSED RULES 
er the mobility needs to handicapped 
persons. In addition, the Stale Ration­
ing Office or Its dcieeate may consider 
the hardship needs of other individ­
uals and firms, such as low Income, 
long-distance commuters, miKrant 
workers, persons engaged in household 
moves, and other recurring or one­
time hardship needs. 
(b) For purposes of this section, the 
term "handicapped person" means any 
Individual who. by reason of dlsn.-usn. 
Injury, age, congenital malfunction, or 
other Incapacity or disability, is 
unable without special facilities, plan­
ning or design to utilize mass transpor-
ation vehicles, facilities, and services 
and who has a substantial impediment 
to mobility. 
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FINDING ANSWERS TO IOWA'S TBANSPORTATION FUEL PROBLEMS: 1979 
The following questions focus on the gasoline crisis which is facing the 
United States today. Please indicate your attitude on a continuum from 
very favorable to very unfavorable toward the following: 
1. Gasoline rationing 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
2. Adding a thirty cents per gallon gasoline tax 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
3. Voluntary restrictions on personal driving 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
4. Banning weekend driving 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
5. Closing recreational areas on Sundays 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
6. Reducing the amount of allowable air travel 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
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7. Mandatory alternate gasoline buying days 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
8. Taxing cars getting less than twenty miles per gallon 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
9. Special privileges for car pools 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
10. Government subsidies to encourage bus riding 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
11. A $3.00 per gallon gasoline price 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
12. Higher taxes to finance the development of new energy sources 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
13. More government controls on oil companies 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
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14. Importing more oil from other countries 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
15. Should a person strictly follow all laws that are set up to con­
serve gasoline even If those laws result In personal hardship? 
(Circle the letter.) 
a. Definitely 
b. Probably 
c. Not sure 
d. Probably not 
e. Definitely not 
16. Do you think that most people are willing to give up some of their 
own gasoline needs so that others will be sure to have enough gas 
to meet basic needs? (Circle the letter.) 
a. Definitely 
b. Probably 
c. Not sure 
d. Probably not 
e. Definitely not 
17. Overall, would you say that during the last year or so the effect 
of the gasoline shortage on your household has been very severe, 
severe, not too severe, or not severe at all? (Circle the letter.) 
a. Very severe 
b. Severe 
c. Not too severe 
d. Not severe at all 
e. Don't know 
18. Do you think that the shortage of gasoline will get worse, stay 
the same, or get better during the next ten years? (Circle the 
letter.) 
a. Get worse 
b. Stay the same 
c. Get better 
d. Don't know 
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19. Do you think that you would get your "fair share" if a gas ration­
ing system were set up? (Circle the letter.) 
a. Definitely 
b. Probably 
c. Not sure 
d. Probably not 
e. Definitely not 
20. In general, which of the following statements best expresses your 
feelings about the "national gas shortage" of the past year or so? 
(Circle the letter.) 
a. There is not and never was a real shortage. 
b. There probably was a shortage for a while but it is over now. 
c. There is still a shortage, but I am sure the problem will be 
solved. 
d. There is a severe shortage but it can be solved in the future. 
21. Where do you feel the most responsibility for solving any gasoline 
shortage must lie? (Circle the letter.) 
a. Government 
b. Business and industry 
c. Individual consumers 
d. Government, business and industry, and individual consumers 
e. Goveimment and business and Industry 
f. Government and individual consumers 
g. Business and industry and individual consumers 
h. No response 
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FINDING ANSWERS TO IOWA'S TRANSPORTATION FUEL PROBLEMS (1980) 
The following questions focus on the gasoline crisis which is facing 
the United States today. Please indicate your attitude on a continuum 
from very favorable to very unfavorable toward the following: 
1. Civic awards for carpooling 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
2. Voluntary restrictions on personal driving 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
3. Driving smaller cars to save gasoline 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
4. Combining shopping trips to save gasoline 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
5. Taking shorter and fewer vacations 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
6. Setting up a "still" in your home to make your own gasoline 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
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7. Riding a bicycle or walking to work 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
8. Reducing the amount of allowable air travel 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
9. Research and development projects to build more fuel efficient 
automobiles 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
10. Making bus and train terminals cleaner and more attractive to 
attract customers 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
11. Voluntary nationalization of oil companies 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
12. Gasoline rationing 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
13. Adding a fifty cents a gallon gasoline tax 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
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14. Taxing cars getting less than twenty miles per gallon 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
15. Government subsidies to encourage bus riding 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
16. Importing more oil from other countries 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
17. Should a person strictly follow all laws that are set up to con­
serve gasoline even if those laws result in personal hardship? 
a. Definitely 
b. Probably 
c. Not sure 
d. Probably not 
e. Definitely not 
18. Do you think that most people are willing to give up some of their 
own gasoline needs so that others will be sure to have enough gas 
to meet basic needs? 
a. Definitely 
b. Probably 
c. Not sure 
d. Probably not 
e. Definitely not 
19. Do you think that a 55 mile per hour speed limit is a reasonable 
limit for the purpose of saving gas? 
a. Definitely 
b. Probably 
c. Not sure 
d. Probably not 
e. Definitely not 
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20. Overall, would you say that during the last year or so the effect 
of the gasoline shortage on your household has been very severe, 
severe, not too severe, or not severe at all? 
a. Very severe 
b. Severe 
c. Not too severe 
d. Not severe at all 
e. Don't know 
21. Do you think that the shortage of gasoline will get worse, stay the 
same, or get better during the next ten years? 
a. Get worse 
b. Stay the same 
c. Get better 
d. Don't know 
22. Do you think that you would get your "fair share" if a gas rationing 
system were set up? 
a. Definitely 
b. Probably 
c. Not sure 
d. Probably not 
e. Definitely not 
23. In general, which of the following statements best expresses your 
feelings about the "national gasoline shortages" of the past year 
or so? 
a. There is not and never was a "real" shortage 
b. There probably was a shortage for a while, but it is over now 
c. There is still a shortage, but I am sure the problem will be 
solved 
d. There is a severe shortage, but it can be solved in the future 
e. The shortage is so severe that nothing can be done about it 
24. Where do you feel the most responsibility for solving any gasoline 
shortages must lie? 
a. Government 
b. Business and industry 
c. Individual consumers 
d. Government, business and industry, and individual consumers 
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FINDING ANSWERS TO IOWA'S TRANSPORTATION FDEL PROBLEMS; 
COMBINED DATA SETS 
The following questions focus on the gasoline crisis which is facing the 
United States today. Please indicate your attitude on a continuum from 
very favorable to very unfavorable toward the following: 
1. Gasoline rationing 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
2. Voluntary restrictions on personal driving 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
3. Reducing the amount of allowable air travel 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
4. Government subsidies to encourage bus riding 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
5. Mandatory alternate gasoline buying days 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
6. Importing more oil from other countries 
a. Very favorable 
b. Somewhat favorable 
c. Somewhat unfavorable 
d. Very unfavorable 
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7. Should a person strictly follow all laws that are set up to con­
serve gasoline even If those laws result In personal hardship? 
a. Definitely 
b. Probably 
c. Not sure 
d. Probably not 
e. Definitely not 
8. Do you think that most people are willing to give up some of their 
own gasoline needs so that others will be sure to have enough gaso­
line to meet basic needs? 
a. Definitely 
b. Probably 
c. Not sure 
d. Probably not 
e. Definitely not 
9. Overall, would you say that during the last year or so the effect 
of the gasoline shortages on your household has been very severe, 
not too severe, or not severe at all? 
a. Very severe 
b. Severe 
c. Not too severe 
d. Not severe at all 
e. Don't know 
10. Do you think that the shortages of gasoline will get worse, stay 
the same, or get better during the next ten years? 
a. Get worse 
b. Stay the same 
c. Get better 
d. Don't know 
11. Do you think that you would get your "fair share" if a gasoline 
rationing system were set up? 
a. Definitely 
b. Probably 
c. Not sure 
d. Probably not 
e. Definitely not 
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12. In general, which of the following statements best expresses your 
feelings about the "national gasoline shortages" of the past year 
or so? 
a. There is not and never was a "real" shortage. 
b. There probably was a shortage for a while, but it is over now. 
c. There is still a shortage, but I am sure the problem will be 
solved. 
d. There is a severe shortage, but it can be solved in the future. 
e. The shortage is so severe that nothing can be done about it. 
13. Where do you feel the most responsibility for solving any gasoline 
shortage must lie? 
a. Government 
b. Business and industry 
c. Individual consumers 
d. Government, business and industry, and individual consumers 
e. Government and business and industry 
f. Government and individual consumers 
g. Business and industry and individual consumers 
h. No response 
i. Don't know 
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Method Used in Merging the 1979 and 1980 Questionnaire Data 
The questionnaire used in the 1979 data collection included four­
teen attitude items which contained the response categories very favor­
able, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, and very unfavorable. 
These items were as follows: 
1. Attitude toward gasoline rationing (GÂSBÀT) 
2. Attitude toward adding a thirty cents per gallon gasoline tax 
(FTAX) 
3. Attitude toward voluntary restrictions on personal driving 
(VOLND) 
4. Attitude toward banning weekend driving (HDRIVE) 
5. Attitude toward closing recreational areas on Sundays (CLOSREC) 
6. Attitude toward reducing the amount of allowable air travel 
(AIRBED) 
7. Attitude toward mandatory alternate gasoline buying days (6ÂLTD) 
8. Attitude toward taxing cars getting less than twenty miles per 
gallon of gasoline (TAXCAR) 
9. Attitude toward special privileges for car pools (GARPOOLO 
10. Attitude toward government subsidies to encourage bus riding 
(GOVSUB) 
11. Attitude toward a $3.00 per gallon gasoline price (HPRICE) 
12. Attitude toward higher taxes to finance the development of new 
energy sources (FINSCORC) 
13. Attitude toward more government controls on oil companies 
(GOVCONT) 
14. Attitude toward importing more oil from other countries (IMPOIL) 
The remaining questionnaire items on the 1979 questionnaire were identical 
to those used in the 1980 data collection (see pages 161 and 162 for a 
discussion of these items). 
There were two basic reasons why the questionnaire was modified for 
the second round of data collection. First, as it was pointed out in the 
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Methods Chapter, some of the questionnaire items were shown to be irrel­
evant to the sample drawn for this investigation. Second, when the four­
teen items listed above were assessed, it became apparent that a majority 
of them emphasized actions the government might take to resolve the gaso­
line shortages, while only four emphasized actions which might be taken 
by Individual consumers or business and industry (see Table C.l for the 
way in which the items were categorized). 
Table C.l. Categorization of questionnaire items for the 1979 data set 
Categories 
Individually controlled actions to resolve the gasoline shortages 
1. Voluntary restrictions on personal driving (VOLND) 
2. Special privileges for car pools (CARFOOL) 
Business and industry actions which might be taken to resolve the gaso­
line shortages 
1. Closing recreational areas on Sundays (CLOSREC) 
2. Reducing the amount of allowable air travel (ÂIRRED) 
Government actions which might be taken to resolve the gasoline shortages 
1. Adding a thirty cents per gallon gasoline tax (FTAX) 
2. Banning weekend driving (NDRIVE) 
3. Mandatory alternative gasoline buying days (GÂLTD) 
4. Taxing cars getting less than twenty miles per gallon (TAXCÂR) 
5. Government subsidies to encourage bus riding (GOVSUB) 
6. A $3.00 per gallon gasoline price (HPRICE) 
7. Higher taxes to finance the development of new energy sources 
(FINSCORC) 
8. More government controls on oil companies (GOVCONT) 
9. Importing more oil from other countries (IMPOIL) 
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The research group concluded that the questionnaire Items should, some­
what more equally, reflect each of the three areas in which responsibil­
ity for resolving the gasoline shortages might rest. This was believed 
to have been an important stage in modifying the questionnaire because 
it permitted a more realistic focus on ways in which individual consumers 
could begin to accept at least part of the responsibility. It is sug­
gested that bringing these attitudes toward individual action to the sur­
face, so to speak, would provide respondents with added knowledge of the 
multidimensional nature of the gasoline shortages. That is, that no one 
group, by itself, would be able to resolve the shortages. Many American 
consumers believed that the gasoline shortages had emerged overnight in 
response to the 1973 oil embargo and the quadrupling of OPEC's prices. 
However, as Wirth (1975:101) concluded, the energy crisis bad been emerg­
ing for a long time. The problem came about, in part because: 
It has taken Americans years to wake up to the energy crisis, 
and it will take even more years for them to consent to the 
consequences of solving the crisis. Ultimately there are only 
two forms that a solution can take. Either the United States 
will develop or otherwise acquire a nondepletable energy 
source, or it will have to reduce drastically its consumption 
of depletable nonrenewable resources. (Wirth, 1975:101) 
Since Wirth published his conclusions in 1975, others have noted as well 
(Ball, 1977; Henderson, 1978a; Orr, 1981) that the United States has not 
and probably will not, in the near future, find an alternative nondeplet­
able energy source to replace oil, and neither is the "technological 
fix" close at hand. Consequently, it may became necessary to redefine 
the "material" standard of living to which Americans have been accustomed. 
In the interim, consumers will need to become aware of the degree to 
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which their individual and collective actions may contribute, in part, 
to a relatively stable United States energy budget. Indeed, such actions 
may not only be a more desirable resolution to the gasoline shortages, 
they may also be more effective, because the political arena appears 
fraught with conflicting values and political Interests which will be 
neither easily nor quickly resolved (Wirth, 1975; Landsberg, 1980). 
Table C.2 shows the categorization of questionnaire items for the 
1980 data set. While the items Included in this table appear to be small 
contributions to a very large problem, each required an individual 
sacrifice in terms of time, privacy, and/or personal comfort. It is 
also suggested that respondent attitude toward individually controlled 
actions might not be related to the actual decisions made during partic­
ipation in shortage. That is, indication of an attitude toward any of 
these items may have been stated in good faith, but gasoline rationing 
was an unknown element for each of the respondents drawn for this sample. 
As such, some, if not all, of the questionnaire items might not be ex­
pected to be related to actual behavior given conditions of gasoline 
rationing. 
Table C.3 shows the attitude items which were Identical on both the 
1979 and the 1980 questionnaires. As is shown, a number of the items 
were lost as a result of the questionnaire modification. However, it was 
concluded that those items which remained could still provide a valid 
means by which the data could be analyzed. 
The major difficulty encountered in attempting to merge the data 
sets came about because of the discrete response categories for attitudes 
343 
Table C.2. Categorization of questionnaire items for the 1980 data set 
Categories 
Individually controlled actions to resolve the gasoline shortages: 
1. Civic awards for carpooling (CIVAWD) 
2. Voluntary restrictions on personal driving (VOLND) 
3. Driving smaller cars to save gasoline (SMCÂR) 
4. Combining shopping trips to save gasoline (SHOP) 
5. Taking shorter and fewer vacations (SFVAC) 
6. Setting up a "still" in your home to make your own gasoline (STILL) 
7. Riding a bicycle or walking to work (BIWK) 
Business and Industry actions to resolve the gasoline shortages : 
1. Voluntarily reducing the amount of allowable air travel (AIRBED) 
2. Research and development projects to build more fuel-efficient 
automobiles (RESCAR) 
3. Making bus and train terminals cleaner and more attractive to 
attract customers (ÂFFSER) 
4. Voluntary nationalization of oil companies (NATOIL) 
Government actions to resolve the gasoline shortages 
1. Gasoline rationing (GÂSRAT) 
2. Adding a fifty cents a gallon gasoline tax (FTAX) 
3. Taxing cars getting less than twenty miles per gallon (TAXCAR) 
4. Government subsidies to encourage bus riding (GOVSUB) 
5. Importing more on oil frcm other countries (IMPOIL) 
toward SHWORS, SHREAL, and SHRESP. Because these response categories 
were discrete, it was not possible to perform a difference of means test 
for them. Instead it was decided to examine the frequency distributions 
and percentages for these pre sImula t ion and postsimulation items for each 
year, 1979 and 1980, respectively. It was believed such an approach 
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Table C.3. Attitude Items used In merging the data sets 
Attitude toward 
Gasoline rationing (GASBÂT) 
Taxing cars getting less than twenty miles per gallon (TAXCAR) 
Government subsidies to encourage bus riding (G07SUB) 
Voluntary restrictions on personal driving (VOLND) 
Reducing the amount of allowable air travel (AIRRED) 
Mandatory alternate gasoline buying days (GALTD) 
Importing more oil from other countries (IMPOIL) 
Strictly following all laws set up to conserve gasoline (CQNSG) 
Giving up individual gasoline needs so that others will be able to 
meet basic needs (GIVUP) 
Degree of severity of the gasoline shortages on individual's household 
during the past year (SHSEV) 
Degree to which the shortages will worsen, stay the same, or get better 
over the next decade (SHWORS) 
Getting a fair share of gasoline if rationing should be set up (FSHAR) 
Belief in the "reality" of the gasoline shortages (SHREAL) 
Who is most responsible for solving the gasoline shortages (SHRESP) 
might provide some insights into the degree of differences between the two 
samples. 
A qualitative examination of Table C.4 seems to indicate that the 
differences in responses were most noticeable in the response category 
indicating the gasoline shortages would worsen over the next ten years. 
In 1979, 65.1% of all respondents Indicated the shortages would worsen, 
while in 1980, 74.2% maintained this attitude. This finding was puzzling 
in that those respondents who were a part of the 1979 sample had been 
more likely to have experienced difficulty purchasing gasoline than were 
those used in the 1980 sample. However, these findings were consistent 
with Richman's (1979:581) in which it was found that people who had ex­
perienced difficulty in purchasing gasoline were the least likely to 
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Table C.4. Frequency distributions and percentages for prèsimulation 
attitude toward SHWORS: 1979 and 1980 questionnaires 





Get worse 65.1 (28) 74.2 (23) 
Stay the same 21.0 ( 9) 19.4 ( 6) 
Get better 9.3 ( 4) --
Don't know 4.6 ( 2) 6.5 ( 2) 
Totals 100.0 (43) 100.0 (31) 
believe the shortages would worsen. The consensus in 1979 was that with­
in five-to-ten years the gasoline shortages would no longer be a problem. 
An examination of Table C.5, however, suggests the postsimulation 
differences between the two samples were negligible. It was decided, 
based on the evaluation of the frequency distributions and percentages, 
to include the attitude item SHWORS in the data analysis. 
Table C.5. Frequency distributions and percentages for postsimulation 
attitude toward SHWORS: 1979 and 1980 questionnaires 
1979 1980 
Attitude toward SHWORS „ / o n  / o  N  
Get worse 74.4 (32) 74.2 (23) 
Stay the same 7.0 ( 3) 16.1 ( 5) 
Get worse 9.3 ( 4) -- --
Don't know 9.3 ( 4) 9.7 ( 3) 
Totals 100.0 (43) 100.0 (31) 
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Table C.6 demonstrates the frequency distributions and percentages 
for presimulatlon attitude toward SHREAL for the 1979 and 1980 samples. 
The differences between these responses were small for both presimula­
tlon and postsimulation responses, with a majority of respondents in­
dicating there was a gasoline shortage, but that it would eventually be 
solved. As such, the decision was made to include the attitude toward 
SHREAL in the data analysis. 
Table C.6. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulatlon 
attitude toward SHREAL: 1979 and 1980 
1979 1980 
Attitude toward SHREAL 
N % N 
There is not and never was a 
"real" shortage 16.3 (7) 16.1 (5) 
There probably was a shortage, 
but it is over now 23.2 (10) 12.9 ( 4) 
There is still a shortage, but 
I am sure the problem will be 
solved 27.9 (12) 32.2 (10) 
There is a severe shortage, 
but it can be solved in the 
future. 32.6 (14) 35.5 (11) 
The shortage is so severe that 
nothing can be done about it 0.0 (0) 3.2 (1) 
Totals 100.0 (43) 100.0 _ (31) 
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Table C.7. Frequency distributions and percentages for postsimulation 
attitude toward SHREAL: 1979 and 1980 
1979 1980 
Attitude toward SHBEAL % N % 
There is not and never was a 
"real" shortage 14.0 ( 6) 19.4 ( 6) 
There probably was a shortage, 
but it is over now 7.0 ( 3) 9.7 ( 3) 
There is still a shortage, but 
I am sure the problem will be 
solved 39.5 (17) 32.3 (10) 
There is a severe shortage, 
but it can be solved in the 
future 37.2 (16) 35.5 (11) 
The shortage is so severe 
that nothing can be done about 
it 2.3 ( 1) 3.2 ( 1) 
Totals 100.0 (74) 100.0 (74) 
Table C.8 shows the frequency distributions and percentages for the 
presimulâtion attitude toward SHBESP for the 1979 and 1980 question­
naires. There was some hesitancy as to whether or not attitude toward 
SHRESP should be included in the data analysis (for a discussion of the 
modification of this question, see pages 203-206). As it can be seen 
from Table C.8, prior to participation in SHORTAGE, 32.6% of all respond­
ents in the 1979 sample indicated that government was primarily respon­
sible for solving the gasoline shortages, while only l6.1% indicated 
this attitude in the 1980 sample. Further examination of this table, 
however, showed that, prior to participation in SHORTAGE, 41.7% of all 
respondents within the 1979 sample indicated that individual consumers 
were wholly or in part responsible for solving the gasoline shortages. 
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Table C.B. Frequency distributions and percentages for presimulation 
attitude toward SHRESP 
1979 1980 
Attitude toward SHRESP % N % N 
Government 32.6 (14) 16.1 ( 5) 
Business and industry 14.0 ( 6) 29.0 ( 9) 
Individual consumers 23.2 (10) 32.3 (10) 
Government, business and in­
dustry, and individual con­
sumers 4.6 ( 2) 19.3 ( 6) 
Government and business and 
industry ( 5) » M — — 
Government and Individual 
consumers 9.3 ( 4) #, » «• a 
Business and industry and 
individual consumers ' 4.6 ( 2) » wm 
No response 3.3 ( 1) 
Don't know — — — — — — — — 
Totals. 100.0 (43) 100.0 (31) 
while for the 1980 group, 51.6% indicated this attitude. 
Table C.9 shows the frequency distributions and percentages for the 
postsimulation attitude toward SHRESP. Within the 1979 sample, 60.5% of 
all respondents indicated the individual consumer was wholly or in part 
responsible for solving the gasoline shortages, while for the 1980 
sample, 51.7% held this attitude. While these differences may be impor­
tant, because of the exploratory nature of this study it was decided to 
include attitude toward SHRESP in the data analysis. 
Table C.IO shows the results of the differences of means test 
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Table C.9. Frequency distributions and percentages for postsimulation 
attitude toward SHRESP 
1979 1980 
Attitude toward SHBESP 7. N % N 
Government 11.6 ( 5) 19.4 ( 5) 
Business and industry 11.6 ( 5) 29.0 ( 8) 
Individual consumers 27.9 (12) 32.3 (13) 
Government, business and in­
dustry, and individual con­
sumers 14.0 ( 6) 19.4 ( 5) 
Government and business and 
industry 2.3 ( 1) — — " tm 
Government and individual 
consumers 4.6 ( 2) M — •m — 
No response 7.0 ( 3) - -
Don't know 7.0 ( 3) — — — M 
Totals 100.0 (43) 100.0 (31) 
performed for the 1979 sample and the 1980 sample. Included are atti­
tudes toward G&SBÂT (GASBAT79, GASBAT80), TAXCAR (TAXCAR79, TAXCAR80), 
60VSUB (GOVSUB79, GOVSUB80), AIRBED (AIRRED79, AIRRED80), IMPOIL 
(IMPOIL79, IMPOIL80), CONSG (CONSG79, CONSG80), GWUP (GIVUP79, GIVUP80), 
SHSEV (SHSEV79, SHSEV80), FSHAR (FSHAR79, FSHAR80), and GALTD (GALTD79, 
GÂLTD80). Respondent attitude toward AIRBED, reducing the amount of 
allowable air travel was the only item which demonstrated a statistically 
significant difference in means between the 1979 and 1980 samples. As 
it was pointed out in the Methods Chapter, however, the review of liter­
ature did not yield evidence to Indicate that this attitude item was 
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Table C.IO. Results of difference means test for attitude Items: 
1979 and 1980 
Mean Difference t 
GASRAT79 2.3548 0.1290 N.S. 
GÂSRÂT80 2.2258 
TAXCAR79 2.2900 0.0968 N.S. 
TAXCÀR80 2.0323 
G0VSUB79 1.6774 0.2903 N.S. 
G0VSUB80 1.3871 
AIRRED79 2.2903 ** 
0.3226 .01 
AIRRED80 1.9677 
IMP0IL79 3.2581 0.2258 N.S. 
IMPOIL80 3.0323 








FSHAR79 2.7162 0.2842 N.S. 
FSHAR80 2.4322 




significant in determining consumer travel behavior patterns. Respond­
ent attitudes toward alternate gasoline buying days and taxing cars get­
ting less than twenty miles per gallon were also dropped from the data 
analysis in favor of including only those attitude items believed to be 
critical to understanding consumer travel behavior under conditions of 
energy constraint. That is, SHORTAGE was a gasoline rationing simula­
tion. There was no indication in the literature that attitude toward 
TÂXCÂR or GÂLTD would have any bearing on respondent behavior given con­
ditions of rationing. 
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APPENDIX D: IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH—UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY RATION PLAN BEHkVIOR 
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IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TBANSPOKIATION RESEARCH--
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY BATION PLAN BEHAVIOR 
1. purchase old low value cars 
2. purchase fuel miser car 
3. purchase moped or motorcycle 
4. buy someone's coupons 
5. loan-exchange-trade coupons 
6. steal coupons 
7. fly in a dirigible Instead of airplane 
8. ride an intercity bus 
9. join or form a carpool or vanpool 
10. relocate residence to minimize travel 
11. stop attending church services 
12. do all shopping once a week or less 
13. stop children's extracurricular activities 
14. stop attending service club meetings and related functions 
15. limit visiting friends and relatives more than 50 miles away 
16. drop participation in bowling, golf, tennis, bridge parties, etc., 
by adult family members 
17. buy gasoline from someone who doesn't require coupons 
18. buy a diesel vehicle if no rationing of diesel fuel 
19. ride a bike to work 
20. ride a bike to shop 
21. make the children ride a bike to their activities 
22. walk to work 
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23. walk to shopping areas 
24. make the children walk to their activities 
25. stop using personal vehicle on business errands 
26. buy a 10-acre farm and apply for an agricultural fuel allocation 
27. form a fake construction company and apply for an "off-highway" 
fuel allocation 
28. move an elderly relative into your home and apply for a "hardship" 
fuel allocation in his or her name 
29. stop mowing grass and weeds along the roadside 
30. stop picking up trash along the highway 
31. stop patching potholes in the roads 
32. cancel trucking regulations which force trucks to run empty in one 
direction 
33. stop plowing snow on gravel roads 
34. stop grading the bumps and ruts on rural gravel roads 
35. break consolidated schools up into one-room schools distributed 
around so children can walk to school 
36. operate school system classes 4 days a week for 8 periods in place 
of 5 days for 6 periods per day 
37. operate school system classes 3 days a week for 10 periods in place 
of 5 days for 6 periods per day 
38. delete all junior and senior high activities requiring school travel 
39. shop from a catalog with goods delivered to home 
40. shop from a door-to-door peddler 
41. order groceries by telephone based on newspaper ad shopping list 
prices with store delivering groceries 
42. pay bills and do banking by telephone if such service is available 
43. eliminate all postal delivery except packages and require telephone, 
TV type communication to replace letters 
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44. purchase an electric powered automobile 
45. purchase an electric powered bike 
46. ride a horse for some travel needs 
47. set up a still in the basement to make alcohol to bum in your 
gasoline engine 
48). construct housing and small factories around large existing shopping 
centers to create urban villages 
49. buy a large truck and use the truck gasoline allocation in other 
vehicles 
50. watch cable TV and cassette home movies (if available) instead of 
going out of the home for entertainment 
51. use mobile library services to get books to read 
52. stop going snowmobiling 
53. stop going water skiing 
54. stop recreationally flying 
55. outlaw motorcyle racing events 
56. outlaw auto racing events 
57. outlaw motorboat racing events 
58. stop downhill skiing 
59. I might run out of ration coupons before I got home if I made a trip 
miles 
60. I would drive no faster than miles per hour on the open highway 
to conserve my fuel on a trip 
61. falsely report that ration coupons were not delivered in order to 
get a second set of coupons 
62. fom a private security service (like a night watchman service) and 
apply for the unlimited ration to "emergency services" groups 
63. form or join a volunteer fire department and apply for the unlimited 
ration to "emergency services" groups 
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64. form a trash hauling service and apply for the unlimited ration to 
sanitation services 
65. turn off all emission control equipment on my vehicle if instruc­
tions were available and it would Increase my gas mileage 
66. apply pressure on political friends to obtain some of the state 
controlled allocation ration 
67. exaggerate the economic hardship of reduced fuel available on busi­
nesses in my area to obtain a larger fuel allocation in the area 
68. layoff administrative city, county and state employees to reduce the 
driving of publicly owned vehicles 
69. roll through stop signs to reduce fuel consumed by a full stop 
70. drive through a red stop light if no one is coming on the cross 
street to avoid wasting fuel 
71. illegally double park rather than drive around the block several 
times to find a parking space 
72. coast down long hills to save fuel 
73. take all my vacations at home 
74. write letters Instead of traveling to visit people, even those who 
live close by 
75. ride a bus to travel around in town 
76. violate weight limit laws in hauling goods and produce if a truck 
is more fuel efficient with a heavier load 
77. have someone in the family or a neighbor cut my hair or style it 
rather than going to a barber shop or beauty parlow. 
78. purchase oil or gasoline treatment additives to Increase my mileage 
(such as STP and others) 
79. purchase carborator fuel flow restriction inserts to increase gas 
mileage 
80. if I had ration coupons which were to expire tomorrow and the fuel 
tanks on my vehicles were full I would use the coupons to fill cans 
to be stored in my garage 
81. I would sell my unexpired ration coupons to anyone needing them if 















extra ration coupons that I did not expect to need to use would be 
given away to someone who could use them. 
I would drive without air conditioning in the summer to conserve 
fuel 
I would disconnect the air conditioning in my home to conserve fuel. 
we would cook all hot meals on our kitchen range only once per day 
to conserve fuel 
each person in our family would take a bath or shower no more than 
once every three days to conserve fuel (two, four, five days?) 
our lawn mowing, shrub trimming, garden tilling, snow removal, etc., 
will all be done with hand tools to conserve fuel 
all hair dryers, hair blowers, hot combs, etc., will be abandoned 
to conserve fuel 
all food preparation for meals will (except actual cooking) be done 
with hand powered appliances to conserve fuel 
no more than one meal per month will be eaten out of the home to 
conserve fuel 
I would report to the authorities any service station selling fuel 
without requiring ration coupons 
1 would report to the authorities anyone selling counterfeit ration 
coupons 
if I owned an oil company and knew rationing were going to start in 
90 days, I would raise my prices today 
steal fuel 
